By Giorgia Facchini

Over the past couple of months, the fighting in Yemen has intensified dramatically between the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement – better known as the Houthis – and the forces of the internationally recognized Yemeni government and their Saudi patrons.

The latest escalation began on July 13, when a Mahan Air flight returning a Houthi delegation from the funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attempted to land at Sanaa Airport. Seen as an Iranian attempt to establish a direct air link with Houthi-controlled territory, the Saudi-led coalition struck the airport runway. In response, the Houthis declared an end to the four-year Yemeni ceasefire, announcing a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and striking Saudi oil tankers.

The ensuing Saudi airstrikes and Houthi retaliation rapidly broadened the conflict. The Houthis struck Saudi ports, air bases, airports, Aramco facilities, and pipelines, further straining global energy markets already weakened by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. At the same time, fighting intensified within Yemen. In mid-September, in a military blitz, the Houthis seized the key port city of Mokha and the strategic islands of Greater and Lesser Hanish in the southern Red Sea, strengthening their capacity to monitor and interdict maritime traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The contested city of Taiz has also come under siege from the Houthis, while fighting still rages around the Yemeni side of the Bab al-Mandeb and missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure continue unabated, exacting a mounting civilian toll.

The conflict has attracted considerable attention from commentators across the globe, who largely view it as a spillover of the war in Iran – and there is little mystery as to why. A Houthi official told the AP that Iranian advisers were “present at all levels,” from planning tactical maneuvers to working alongside front-line commanders.1 As to why Tehran is getting involved, Steven Cook, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, explained that “the Houthis’ ability to control or threaten the Bab al-Mandeb chokepoint is good for Iran.” By threatening this critical shipping route, the Houthis can put pressure on the global economy, giving Tehran more leverage in negotiations with Washington.2

If Iran is perceived by many international commentators as having strengthened its position through the fighting in Yemen, there is a clear loser: Saudi Arabia. Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, described Riyadh as facing a “humiliating dilemma” in which it has “no good options,” arguing that any settlement would likely require concessions to the Houthis. The situation is compounded by Washington’s reluctance to intervene directly. U.S. officials have indicated that American support may be limited to intelligence and target-identification assistance, while President Donald Trump dismissed the escalation as a conflict affecting only one country. Secretary of State Marco Rubio pledged that the United States would “live up to our commitments,” but offered little clarity on what that meant in practice. According to former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Michael Ratney, the ambiguity has deeply unsettled the Saudi leadership.3

Beyond the devastating humanitarian consequences for Yemen’s civilian population,4 the fighting has also led international analysts to question what role China may be playing. Reports have suggested that Chinese commercial vessels continue to transit through the Bab al-Mandeb even when sailing from Saudi ports.5 Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have reportedly used Chinese-made weapons,6 while Beijing has supposedly sought to pressure Tehran to rein in the Houthis.7

Amid this discussion, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines the Chinese government’s line on the developments in Yemen after the recent Saudi-Houthi escalation, as well as the surrounding Chinese media and expert debate. Our analysis shows that although Chinese officials refrained from making strong public statements, Chinese experts and scholars have offered a much more detailed and incisive assessment of Saudi Arabia’s security dilemma and possible future arrangements involving Riyadh, the Houthis and other regional actors. Their analysis is pessimistic about Saudi Arabia’s room for maneuver, particularly following the alleged U.S.-Houthi deal and the lack of support from Pakistan and Türkiye, Saudi allies under the newly signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.

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China’s Official Stance on the Yemeni Escalation

Chinese officials have largely kept a low profile during the latest escalation in Yemen. During talks in Beijing with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned against allowing regional tensions to spill further into Yemen and the Red Sea, calling on all parties to stop complicating the situation and return to dialogue and negotiation.8 He further argued that the crisis once again exposed the inadequacy of the existing Middle Eastern security architecture, pointing instead to President Xi Jinping’s four-point proposal for a new Middle East security architecture based on “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.”9

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun likewise stressed that:

“attacks on civilian facilities related to people’s livelihoods are unacceptable. The sovereignty and security of all countries should be respected, and resolving disputes through political and diplomatic means is the only way forward.”10

China reiterated these principles most recently at the United Nations Security Council on October 9, when Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, called for de-escalation, respect for international law, and a political settlement as the only viable long-term solution. Notably, Fu stated that “The international community universally recognizes the legitimate government of Yemen, and the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Yemen and Saudi Arabia must be respected.”11

These initial statements are largely consistent with China’s diplomatic posture during the Iran and Gaza wars: calls for de-escalation, appeals for “all sides” to return to dialogue, and the promotion of Chinese frameworks. In particular, while condemning “indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets; attacks on airports, energy facilities, and other infrastructure vital to people’s livelihoods” as “unacceptable,”12 Beijing often refrains from explicitly identifying those responsible for such attacks. Even Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, when condemning the deadly strike on Riyadh’s international airport on Sunday, October 11, did not explicitly name or blame the Houthi movement.13

This reluctance to directly assign responsibility for an attack (unless they are the U.S. or Israel) echoes Beijing’s immediate responses to Iranian strikes on the Arab Gulf states during the initial stages of the Iran War.14 Although often criticized as “selective” or “biased” neutrality, this stance likely reflects Beijing’s effort to maintain workable relations with all relevant parties. For China, Saudi Arabia remains an important economic and energy partner, while the Houthis are closely aligned with Iran, itself a strategic partner.

At the same time, a Reuters report by journalist Parisa Hafezi claimed that China had privately asked Tehran to rein in the Houthis following an appeal from Saudi Arabia.15 Such an intervention would likely reflect Beijing’s fear of further disruption in global energy supplies. Indeed, according to analyses published in Bloomberg, The Economist and Middle East Eye, China has drawn on its substantial strategic and commercial oil reserves (among the world’s largest according to estimates cited by The New York Times, drawing on Kpler data) to buffer domestic and global markets. Although this power over global oil prices has granted China significant international influence, more recent reporting suggests that this buffer is being depleted. Regardless of Beijing’s interest in energy-market stability, even if the reported diplomatic intervention took place, it remains unclear how much influence Beijing can exert over Tehran, and how much leverage Tehran, in turn, can exercise over the Houthis.

Any Chinese diplomatic intervention could therefore be understood as a token effort to reassure Saudi Arabia. The expectation is likely that Riyadh’s actual military allies, the U.S., Pakistan and Türkiye, are responsible for providing the hard-security support that Beijing is neither willing nor prepared to offer. However, Chinese analysts, like commentators elsewhere, have been pessimistic about the level of support Saudi Arabia has received or can realistically expect. Their assessment may in turn help explain Beijing’s cautious approach: China has an interest in preventing further escalation, but little incentive to become directly involved in an apparent military debacle with little global backing.

Chinese Experts See No Help on the Horizon for Saudi Arabia

As mentioned, Chinese experts have been far more outspoken than their government, and markedly more pessimistic about where the Yemeni crisis is heading. Much of this scholarly analysis has focused on the United States’ reluctance to provide Saudi Arabia with direct military support.

Even before the latest escalation, Liu Zhongmin, Professor at the Middle East Institute of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), and doctoral candidate Nie Gancheng argued that the Trump administration was seeking to maintain U.S. hegemony at minimal cost. Yet the failure to achieve rapid regime change in Iran, they contended, had left Washington entangled in an asymmetric regional conflict of its own making.16 A similar assessment underpins the analysis of Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang from Xi’an’s Northwest University. They justify American reticence in Yemen by noting how airstrikes have already proven themselves completely insufficient in stopping the Houthi advance. With airstrikes ineffective and American capacity limited by the war in Iran, they argue that Washington will likely only provide Riyadh with intelligence, early-warning and logistical support, while avoiding direct involvement.17 As Sun Yuan, a PhD researcher at SISU’s Middle East Institute, puts it:

“as long as the Houthis do not directly touch U.S. core interests, the Trump administration will not easily engage in direct military conflict with them.”18

While acknowledging that restraint in Yemen is a logical move for Washington, Chinese analysts note that this has led to a growing security dilemma for Riyadh. Wang Ruoxian, a reporter for Xinmin Evening News, underlined the depletion of Saudi air-defense interceptors and the Kingdom’s need to seek assistance from France, the UK, Pakistan and Türkiye.19 Even more worrying is the vulnerability of Saudi energy infrastructure. According to Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang, the September 11 Houthi attack on the critical East–West Crude Oil Pipeline demonstrated just how difficult such infrastructure is to defend and replace.

“Once Saudi Arabia’s oil export capacity is continuously suppressed, the global energy market will no longer face short-term transportation disruptions, but rather a structural supply contraction.”20

The reported reluctance of President Trump to answer Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s repeated calls for help, alongside reports of a secret U.S.-Houthi deal has likely made Riyadh’s position even more uncomfortable. By securing freedom of movement for American vessels in the Red Sea, the agreement would give Washington a further reason to avoid direct involvement in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. Chinese commentators have taken the reported deal seriously, with Wang Ruoxian arguing that Saudi Arabia now has no choice but to seek support from other countries.21

However, for Sun Degang, the Director of Fudan University’s Center for Middle East Studies, the U.S.-Houthi deal is temporary and rests on divergent interests rather than any long-term alignment. He argues that the Houthis’ goal is to prevent the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia from forming a united front, allowing the Yemeni group to confront each one of their adversaries sequentially, with Riyadh being the current priority. Sun also points to domestic political pressure on the Trump administration ahead of the midterm elections as a factor encouraging Washington to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the Houthis. He nevertheless warns that the deal remains fragile, arguing that both sides’ “current engagement is more akin to a delaying tactic.”22

Li Zixin, a Middle East expert at the China Institute of International Studies, offers a far blunter explanation: defending Saudi Arabia is simply not a priority for the U.S. In his view, the Trump administration’s cost-benefit calculus sees stabilizing oil prices and safeguarding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz as more profitable than protecting the Kingdom from Houthi attacks. Faced with Washington’s reluctance and unreliability, Riyadh has “reluctantly” been forced to turn to other regional actors, notably Pakistan and Türkiye, culminating in the signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement in August.23 Many experts, including Chinese ones, view the agreement as a part of a wider Saudi effort to diversify its security partnerships and reduce its dependence on the United States. However, the most recent escalation in Yemen has exposed the limits of this strategy.

As Chao Xinwen reporter Sun Yuan explains, “following the Houthi attacks on Saudi territory, neither Türkiye nor Pakistan expressed an intention to launch a direct military response against the Houthis.”24 Only recently have both countries pledged to “rapidly deploy” their forces to Saudi Arabia, though it is unclear whether they will actively participate in the fighting.

The question for several Chinese analysts is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia can find alternative security partners, but whether those partnerships can translate into concrete military commitments when the Kingdom actually comes under attack. In any case, Chinese scholars believe that a second Saudi full-scale intervention in Yemen (an “Operation Decisive Storm” 2.0) might be even less effective than the one in 2015. Given how well-rooted the Houthi movement is in the Yemeni highlands and how it excels in protracted warfare, Sun Degang instead advocates that Riyadh and the Houthis maintain open dialogue channels and seek a political compromise.25

Chinese Perspectives on the Future of Yemen

Despite the escalation, many Chinese scholars still see a political solution in Yemen as possible in the medium-to-long term. According to Cao Fengyu and Yang Boliang, both sides rely heavily on a tacit understanding that the conflict must not spiral out of control. The Houthis, they argue, are open to talks as they have never expected to defeat Saudi Arabia outright on the battlefield.26 Their attacks are instead perceived by Chinese analysts as aimed at pressuring Riyadh into making concessions, while avoiding a level of escalation that could provoke a strong retaliation.27

The Houthis may likely be hoping to reach a deal with the Saudis soon as, according to Niu Song, a professor at SISU’s Middle East Institute, the Houthis’ capacity to defend themselves and interdict maritime traffic is dwindling due to Iran’s heavy losses.28 However, Riyadh also faces an equally difficult calculation. It can either refrain from further military interventions, thus risk turning Houthi threats to Red Sea shipping and Saudi energy infrastructure into long-term leverage, or deploy more forces and risk becoming trapped in a war with no clear way out.29

Against this backdrop, Chinese experts see a stalemate as the most likely scenario, a state of “neither fighting nor stopping.” Such a situation would give the Houthis the time to consolidate their recent gains while allowing Saudi Arabia to reorganize its anti-Houthi strategy. However, if the anti-Houthi opposition remains fragmented, the Houthis could expand their offensive toward the cities of Taiz and Marib, the latter being home to Yemen’s main oil- and gas-producing infrastructure. This could force Riyadh to increase its reliance and investments in proxies and even deploy ground troops.30

In the long-term, Cao and Yang warn of a possible “Sudan-style fragmentation and division in Yemen”, in which:

“there is neither a decisive military victory, nor a sustainable political solution, but rather a recurring cycle of conflict and ceasefires.”

This, the analysts conclude, would be the worst possible outcome for Yemeni civilians.31

Conclusion

While Chinese analysts have been far more explicit than their government in describing the dramatic situation in Yemen, they largely share the official line’s notably non-partisan view of the conflict. Chinese scholars generally avoided taking sides, reflecting not only a preference for neutrality but, more importantly, an awareness that a prolonged war in the Red Sea poses immediate risks to global energy markets and, by extension, to both domestic and international stability (it should be noted though that the commentaries examined in this article predate the Houthi attack on Riyadh’s international airport, which the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemned without, however, explicitly naming the Houthi movement).

At the same time, the recent escalation in Yemen has exposed a tension in Chinese thinking about the regional security order. Chinese experts, like Beijing itself, have long called for an end to U.S. military hegemony in the Middle East and the development of a more autonomous regional security framework led by local actors. However, this crisis has underscored the gap between that ambition and the ability of the region’s states to guarantee and provide credible security guarantees in practice – a capacity China has an interest in strengthening to safeguard the stability of global energy markets. The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement has so far done little to demonstrate that such an alternative can effectively replace the deterrent role once provided by Washington, now limited by its own wars and beholden to domestic political concerns.

Given this context and the widespread recognition of the Houthis’ tenacity and military capabilities, the Chinese debate focuses less on whether Ansar Allah can be defeated but on the increasingly stark choices facing Saudi Arabia. Chinese scholars generally view a large-scale Saudi intervention as an inevitable, costly and protracted debacle, while a settlement with the Yemeni militants would reward the Houthis with a sword of Damocles to hang over Saudi Arabia: the precedent and unfettered ability to threaten the Kingdom’s energy infrastructure and maritime access

This, in turn, raises a set of questions about how Saudi Arabia ended up in its current predicament. Why has its security apparatus remained so fragmented, and how much has that constrained its military effectiveness? Why have its diplomatic efforts failed to secure more reliable commitments from its partners? And how did Riyadh misjudge the weakness of the pro-government forces it has backed in Yemen? These questions are likely to be expanded upon in the Chinese expert debate as the conflict in Yemen seemingly continues to escalate, despite Chinese predictions (and hopes) for a stalemate and political settlement.

Giorgia FACCHINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is currently a scholar at Peking University’s Yenching Academy. She also holds a master’s degree in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. Her research interests include Sino–Middle Eastern relations, with a focus on China’s role in key maritime chokepoints and strategic corridors, and its economic interests and foreign policy behavior in the region.

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While data collection is still ongoing, we are happy to present an early snapshot of our findings through a case study authored by Theo Nencini, one of the minds behind this framework. In this article, he analyses how the impact that the U.S.-Israeli war on Iranian has had on the main actors involved in Iran’s oil trade with China and how they have adapted to the conflict.

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By Theo Nencini

When the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, 2026, they framed it as a struggle over the country’s political system. In a video address that morning, President Donald Trump told Iranians, “when we are finished, take over your government,” as if regime change were the explicit objective. Within days, Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz. Seven months on, the war has not toppled the regime, but the stakes have changed. The question is no longer whether Iran’s political order will survive, but who will control the conditions under which Persian Gulf’s oil can reach the global market.

Negotiations over the Strait now dominate the conflict. The fourteen-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), signed on June 17, covers a far broader agenda: a cessation of hostilities, sanctions relief for Iranian crude exports and the banking, insurance and transport services attached to them, the release of frozen assets, a $300 billion reconstruction plan and, eventually, the nuclear file. Yet as the military campaign stalled, these issues receded behind the immediate problem of freedom of navigation. Iranian and Omani negotiators, alongside Pakistani mediation, Qatari proposals and indirect U.S. participation, have spent weeks on a transit arrangement, which Tehran makes conditional on further concessions, including compensation for wartime damage.

Only weeks earlier, the trajectory had appeared different. On June 22, five days after the MoU, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions authority, issued General License X, the first broad authorization of transactions in Iranian crude since the 1970s. Covering production, shipping, insurance and dollar payments, it briefly restored a legal framework for Iranian oil exports. It lasted fifteen days. On July 7, after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait, OFAC revoked it. American strikes resumed, and the naval blockade of Iranian ports was reimposed on July 14.

The episode exposed the structure beneath the trade. Iranian crude reaches the market through two systems governed by institutions with different interests and capacities. The formal channel, operated by the Ministry of Petroleum and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), holds the statutory monopoly and would gain most from relief, since it depends on legal access to shipping, insurance, banking and counterparties. The parallel channel, operated by the IRGC, thrives precisely where those conditions are lacking. Both deliver into the same market, through intermediaries, transshipment and trading companies that change faster than enforcement can follow.

That market is China, whose regulatory conditions constrain both systems. The Middle East supplied 57% of China’s seaborne crude imports in 2025, and most crude leaving Hormuz goes to Asia, with China by far the largest single buyer. The closure hit hard: June crude imports fell 41.3% year on year to a decade low, and refinery throughput dropped to its weakest level since 2021. Beijing has called for normal transit to resume, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi raising the matter with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi repeatedly.

China nonetheless remained the destination for virtually all Iranian seaborne crude. Kpler data record it as taking 96.2% of Iranian loadings in 2024, 99.8% in 2025, and the entirety from May 2026 onwards.1 What changed was the volume. The blockade of Iranian ports cut loadings to 271,000 b/d in May 2026, the lowest since June 2020, against a 2025 average of 1.68 million b/d; in July they recovered to about 1.32 million b/d, a fifth below the pre-war level, before the reimposed blockade brought them to zero in September. The war altered how much oil Iran could export, not who bought it.

The continuity conceals a redistribution of control. American sanctions on Iranian oil have been enforced without interruption since 1995-96,2 European ones from 2012 to 2016 and again since the September 2025 snapback. Their pressure has weakened the Iranian institutions that relied on conventional commercial infrastructure and favored an apparatus able to operate through opaque networks and to shape, by coercion, the environment in which oil moves. The path that led to the war, and the war itself, did not alter Iran’s dependence on China, which sanctions had already entrenched. They may instead have further transformed who, inside Iran, is best positioned to govern it.

This article applies ChinaMed’s China Policy Stakeholder Mapping methodology to analyze this shift.3 It examines two Iranian stakeholders – the Ministry of Petroleum and NIOC, which retain statutory authority but are losing operational control, and the IRGC, whose sanctions-adapted export system has progressively gained ground on the formal channel – against the Chinese regulatory conditions that determine whether either can keep supplying the Chinese market. The question is not why Iran depends on China, but who, within the Iranian system, increasingly sets the terms on which that dependence yields revenue.

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NIOC and the Ministry of Petroleum: Statutory Authority, Diminished Reach

On paper, the Ministry of Petroleum and NIOC remain the sovereign authorities over Iran’s oil sector. In practice, they no longer govern the conditions under which Iranian crude reaches its buyers. The institutions that formally own the oil do not control the networks through which it is sold, transported and paid for. That gap defines NIOC’s position in the relationship with China.

NIOC’s authority predates the Islamic Republic. The 1974 Petroleum Act entrusted the exercise of national sovereignty over Iran’s petroleum resources exclusively to the company. After the 1979 revolution, a Ministry of Petroleum was created to oversee the sector, and the 1987 Petroleum Act assigned it that sovereignty. But the transfer remained largely formal: for decades, NIOC kept most of its prerogatives.

That ambiguity was resolved in 2011-2012, to the advantage of the IRGC. The Guard’s engineering conglomerate, the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which grew out of its wartime corps of engineers and was granted a near-monopoly over reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), entered the oil and gas sector in the mid-2000s. From 2006, the Ministry awarded it South Pars contracts, some without tender, and sanctions accelerated the trend as foreign partners withdrew: in 2010, phases previously contracted to Shell and Repsol went to an IRGC-led consortium. By May 2012, Khatam al-Anbiya held 51 upstream and downstream contracts.4

But the decisive shift was institutional. In August 2011, Rostam Ghasemi, Khatam al-Anbiya’s former commander, became Minister of Petroleum. The IRGC gained the stewardship of the body supervising NIOC. In May 2012, the Majles adopted the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Ministry of Petroleum, which subordinated NIOC to the Ministry. The Minister would now chair its General Assembly and appoint its Managing Director, who also serves as Deputy Minister.5 It also lets the Ministry award contracts without tender and advance funds to domestic contractors, Khatam al-Anbiya first among them. NIOC thus lost its autonomy not to the state in the abstract, but to a Ministry then headed by a former IRGC commander. Ghasemi left office in 2013, but the law remains in force, and his successor, Bijan Zanganeh, undertook efforts to accommodate IRGC-linked firms.

Exports followed a different course. Iranian contractors could replace foreign companies in upstream projects; but no Iranian firm could replace the foreign shipowners, insurers, banks and traders needed to export crude. NIOC sold through Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), its overseas trading arm, whose affiliates and front companies in Switzerland, Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Emirates preserved that access. The U.S. Treasury identified four of them in 2012. Each subsequent round of sanctions made that access costlier, and by 2018 the erosion that had already reached NIOC’s upstream extended to its exports.

After the American withdrawal from the JCPOA, Executive Order 13846 restored, from November 2018, the exposure of non-U.S. persons to secondary sanctions for supporting NIOC and NICO. NIOC’s designation under Executive Order 13224 in October 2020, alongside the Ministry and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), placed the formal channel under counterterrorism authority. From then on, NIOC had to sell in the same clandestine environment as the IRGC, partly through the Guard’s own structures. According to Reuters, NITC now transfers crude at sea onto IRGC-operated vessels bound for China. U.S. Treasury actions now name NIOC and NICO alongside the networks that ship IRGC cargoes. The two channels have become hard for enforcers to separate, but they remain politically distinct.

NIOC’s interest in relief is correspondingly unambiguous. A relaxation of sanctions would lower freight and insurance costs, restore access to finance, reopen an upstream sector starved of capital since the late 2000s and now operating obsolescent infrastructure. It would also realign the company’s legal standing with its operational means. General License X matched these interests very closely.

Within the ChinaMed stakeholder framework, NIOC therefore sits at the periphery of the winning coalition, subordinate to its core – the Supreme Leader and the security establishment, the IRGC foremost. Its indispensability is operational rather than decisional: the leadership relies on the export system NIOC administers, but the core coalition sets the terms on which that system operates. Its position towards China follows: it is in favor of stronger relations, but by necessity, since dependence on Chinese buyers reflects the closure of alternatives, not a preference among them. Toward the United States and the European Union, its position is the mirror image – formally hostile, materially interested in normalization. NIOC implements a Look East orientation that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made a foreign policy priority in 2018.

The dependence is thus twofold. On Chinese demand, because sanctions narrowed NIOC’s customer base; and on decisions taken elsewhere in Tehran for the conditions of reaching it. The Islamabad Memorandum’s economic provisions would benefit the formal channel most, yet none of the obstacles to their implementation lie within its control. Authority over Hormuz rests with an institution whose own export networks would gain little from relief.

The Shahid Purja’fari Headquarters: The IRGC as a Sovereign Operator

The IRGC occupies the opposite position. It has no statutory role in the oil industry, yet it increasingly controls the infrastructure through which a substantial share of Iranian crude reaches the market. Its power lies in its ability to operate where legal ownership has become hard to exercise.

This role predates the 2026 war. Over the past decade, and especially since U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, the IRGC has built an export architecture spanning oil allocation, trading companies, logistics, shipping and financial intermediaries. At its center is the Shahid Purja’fari Oil Headquarters,6 set up, according to Reuters, by Qasem Soleimani and initially run by Rostam Ghasemi. OFAC’s designation of three of its officials on May 11, 2026 named it for the first time in a U.S. enforcement action. Sources cited by Reuters in December 2024 estimated that the Guard controlled up to half of Iran’s oil exports, against a fifth three years earlier.

The difference from NIOC is one of organizational logic. NIOC was built as a conventional state oil company and adapted to sanctions later. The IRGC’s system was built for sanctions, in stages. Around 2013, the government began paying the Guard and its Qods Force partly in crude, which they had to market themselves. After the 2018 sanctions reimposition, Qods Force networks – one of them overseen, according to OFAC, by Ghasemi – moved crude to buyers in China, Russia and Syria through intermediaries that concealed its origin. From 2020, Shahid Purja’fari turned these practices into a systematic commercial architecture.

Sanctions thus shape the IRGC’s activity more than they constrain it. They do carry a cost: buyers demand a discount for the added legal and reputational risk, estimated at $1-2 to around $5 a barrel, sometimes $8 – but the cost doubles as a competitive edge, since buyers willing to absorb the risk receive cheaper oil.

The entire model depends on opacity. Vessel ownership is obscured, transponders are disabled or manipulated, cargoes are transferred at sea, and front companies in the Emirates, Turkey, Hong Kong and mainland China interpose layers between seller and buyer. U.S. enforcement has repeatedly targeted these networks. Yet opacity is an organizational asset rather than just a necessary evasion technique. NIOC must identify its counterparties in order to insure, finance and enforce its contracts. The IRGC distributes those functions across a network in which no single intermediary carries the whole transaction, and in which designated entities are replaced faster than they can be identified. Sanctions have therefore produced churn. Opacity also resists measurement: the “up to half” figure is an estimate; the exact share of oil exports moving through the Guard’s channel remains unknown.

Chinese demand is central to this resilience. Crude allocated in lieu of cash must be sold, and the allocation has become a major budget item: the 2025-26 budget bill gave the armed forces 47% of the oil export revenue allotted to the general budget, against 43% for the government. Selling crude is thus a condition of the Guard’s own financing. China’s independent refiners – above all the Shandong teapots, whose thin margins make discounted feedstock worth the legal risk – provide the demand on which this financing rests. NIOC and the IRGC thus reach the same market for different reasons: NIOC because its other customers have left, the IRGC because its funding depends on buyers who tolerate opacity. They also compete for it: by the lower estimate, the Guard sells $1-2 a barrel below NICO, and a trading source told Reuters that export revenue is split roughly evenly between the two.

Within the ChinaMed framework, the IRGC’s position inverts NIOC’s at every point. It belongs to the core of the winning coalition, combining coercion, economic resources and direct access to the Supreme Leader – access the war has strengthened, Mojtaba Khamenei appearing increasingly dependent on the organization that forced through his accession. Its interest is primarily security-related and secondarily economic, oil revenue funding its operations. It is in favor of stronger relations with China, but by design: its position derives from a funding model that presupposes a sustained Chinese demand. It shapes both the goals and the implementation of policy, and can act alone, its coercive capacity shaping the environment in which oil moves, while its commercial network sells with considerable autonomy from the petroleum bureaucracy. For such an actor, the framework’s line between formulating and implementing policy is difficult to sustain.

Hormuz makes this overlap consequential. The Persian Gulf Strait Authority, established on May 5, 2026 and designated by OFAC on May 27 as an IRGC-linked mechanism for regulating and monetizing maritime traffic, made Iranian permits a condition of passage and turned access to the Strait into leverage. The Guard’s conduct there does not appear aimed at keeping the China trade clandestine: its purposes seem to be bargaining power and regime security, with opacity as a by-product. The attacks on commercial vessels that preceded the revocation of General License X on July 7 fit this reading. They followed repeated U.S.-escorted transits through the Omani channel, despite an Iran-Oman arrangement routing traffic through Iranian waters, and read best as a signal to Washington during ongoing negotiations. Their effects were nonetheless twofold: they removed the prospect of a revived formal channel, where the IRGC’s advantage is weakest, and brought back the blockade, after which no Iranian crude cargo reached China through the Strait. Whether the first effect was sought cannot be established; the second suggests that Chinese demand, however vital, weighs little in the Guard’s security choices.

The IRGC has not replaced NIOC, and the two systems remain intertwined: the cargoes it sells originate in fields NIOC operates and leave from terminals it administers. What separates them is organizational advantage. As formal channels lose effectiveness, the premium goes to whoever can absorb legal risk, conceal counterparties and keep cargoes moving. Under sanctions, sovereignty over oil belongs to whoever can make it move.

The balance between the two channels also shapes the nature of Iran’s relationship with China. Through NIOC, oil becomes part of an opaque but still state-to-state exchange. According to sources cited by Reuters, a buyer working for the Chinese state-owned trader Zhuhai Zhenrong paid for crude bought from a NIOC-linked company into a China-based entity, ChuXin, which directs around 70% of the proceeds to Chinese companies building infrastructure in Iran. It sends the remainder to a vehicle operated by entities acting for China’s Ministry of Commerce and Iran’s central bank, which uses the funds to pay for imports approved by the central bank. The IRGC’s channel works differently. It turns oil into revenue that the Guard distributes itself, reducing China to a market. As the IRGC’s share increases, more of China’s payments bypass the Iranian state’s own allocation mechanisms. The actor closest to the core of the coalition, moreover, has the least to gain from a normalization that would let Iran diversify its customers. The IRGC’s growing influence therefore tends to deepen Iran’s dependence on China, even though Chinese interests appear to place few constraints on it, as Hormuz suggests. In its energy dimension, Iran’s China policy appears less a strategy towards Beijing than the result of how control is distributed within Iran.

China’s Calibrated Engagement

Neither system operates on terms of its own making. The conditions governing access to the single external market are set in China – by regulation, the structure of its refining sector, and its buyer’s risk tolerance. China thus indirectly sets the parameters within which the competition between NIOC and the IRGC takes place.

Beijing has long opposed secondary sanctions as illegitimate extensions of U.S. jurisdiction, while systematically prioritizing the continuity of its own energy supply. Its interest in Iran is not only commercial: throughout the war, Chinese diplomacy defended Iran’s sovereignty and security, Wang Yi calling it unacceptable to kill the leader of a sovereign country and instigate a change of government. Yet Beijing has no preference between the Iranian sellers. A Chinese state-owned trader, Zhuhai Zhenrong, has reportedly dealt with NIOC’s channel; but independent refiners buy from whoever offers the better terms, the Guard’s intermediaries included. What matters to Beijing is that Iranian oil keeps flowing, not who sells it.

China contains the risk of this trade through the structure of its refining sector. Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018, the state-owned majors, exposed to the dollar system, have largely stopped buying Iranian crude, leaving it to independent refiners concentrated in Shandong. This division of labor is a matter of policy. Beijing opened crude imports to the independents only in 2015, and still controls their access through import quotas. In April 2026, it reportedly granted them extra quotas precisely to import the sanctioned crude the majors cannot take. The arrangement secures discounted supply while keeping China’s systemic firms at a distance. The result is a narrow interdependence: Iranian sellers need buyers willing to take sanctioned crude; the teapots need feedstock cheap enough to compensate for legal and logistical risk. No state-to-state transaction is required – traders, front companies and shipowners mediate it.

That arrangement, long sustained by Beijing without acknowledgment, was tested on April 24, 2026, when the U.S. Treasury designated Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) and some forty shipping companies and vessels linked to Iran’s shadow fleet. Hengli, in Liaoning, is one of China’s largest refining complexes, far above the ordinary teapots in scale. American pressure had reached a much larger segment of China’s refining industry. Beijing responded on May 2, the Ministry of Commerce issuing its first Prohibition Order under the so-called “Blocking Rules” promulgated in January 2021, designed to counter the improper extraterritorial application of foreign laws.7 The Order prohibits Chinese entities from complying with the relevant U.S. measures against five refiners and gives them a right to sue, in Chinese courts, banks and insurers that withdraw on American grounds.

The Order anchors the Shandong channel in Chinese law. Refineries now operate under an explicit prohibition on complying with U.S. secondary sanctions, which raises the cost, for any third-country bank or insurer, of disengaging. It also formalizes a posture that had previously operated through silence. Cui Fan, a professor who has advised the Ministry of Commerce, warned that allowing the American measures to continue would “disrupt the stability of China’s energy supply chain.” But the measure is not framed as a service to Tehran. It asserts that companies operating under Chinese jurisdiction should not comply with restrictions Beijing considers an improper extension of American law, formalizing a principle of sovereignty while protecting a domestic commercial interest.

The limits of the instrument are equally important. Issued twelve days before the Trump-Xi summit of May 14-15, the Blocking Order creates no general exemption from U.S. sanctions, guarantees no access to international banking, shipping or insurance, and protects none of the Iranian networks that bring crude to China. Beijing can make compliance unlawful only under Chinese law. The measure is therefore best understood as “selective formalization”: a previously tolerated trade acquired an explicit domestic legal basis once U.S. enforcement began to hurt significant Chinese companies. It places China on Tehran’s side against secondary sanctions, as Chinese diplomacy had done throughout the war, but within bounds that shield China’s own systemic actors. Beijing wants to show it cannot be coerced, while keeping its major banks and companies clear of exclusion from the international financial system.

A second limit lies in the commercial conditionality of Chinese demand. The blockade sharply reduced Iranian loadings and disrupted a wider Gulf supply system on which most Chinese refiners depend. Beijing, while calling for freedom of navigation, has stayed out of the bargaining over the Strait. When Hormuz reopened in late June, the teapots themselves turned away from Iranian crude. According to traders cited by Reuters, they bought 16 to 20.5 million barrels from Qatar, Iraq and the UAE, partly through Chinese state traders – their largest purchases of non-sanctioned Gulf oil since the war began – at discounts of $5-8 a barrel to Brent, while discount on Iranian Light held at $2-3 and Iranian cargoes accumulated at sea. The buyers on which both Iranian channels depend follow price.

The result is a calibrated engagement with an inherent tension. Beijing has moved from tacit support for Iranian trade to the formal protection of select Chinese buyers, a protection that stops where Chinese jurisdiction does: it covers the Chinese end of the trade, not the Iranian sellers, the shipping companies designated with Hengli, or passage through Hormuz. Beijing seeks the continuity of Iranian supply on acceptable terms, not of the arrangements, clandestine or formal, that currently deliver it – and thus not of the constraints that made the IRGC’s system indispensable.

Conclusion

The mapping shows who governs Iran’s oil relationship with China, and how that has changed. Control has shifted from the institution that owns the oil to the one that can move it. The sector remains formally a state monopoly, but ownership, execution and constraint are now disaggregated. NIOC retains statutory authority, the IRGC controls much of the infrastructure that brings oil to market, and Chinese actors set the trade’s conditions. No single institution governs the relationship in its entirety.

This shift affects the substance of Iran’s China policy, not only its execution. The Look East policy is set at the top of the system, but what it means in the oil sector depends on who sells. Through NIOC, a state-supervised exchange of crude for Chinese construction and goods. Through the IRGC, revenue the Guard allocates to its own priorities. The stakeholder gaining ground has the least interest in the normalization that would loosen Iran’s dependence on China.

The war appears to have consolidated this configuration. The succession has tightened the alignment between coercive power and economic extraction, subordinating revenue generation to regime security. Limited sanctions relief would not, by itself, alter this structure. It would restore some operational capacity to the formal channel without removing the advantages the IRGC accumulated under prolonged constraint, which are now embedded in the organization of the trade. A return to pressure would widen them further. Either way, the balance moves in the same direction: the IRGC prevails because it is structurally adapted to sanctions, opacity and legal risk; NIOC loses ground because it is not.

The Chinese position, meanwhile, has moved from tacit support to selective formalization. It sides with Tehran against secondary sanctions and externally imposed regime change, but protects the Chinese end of the trade rather than Iran’s networks. The Blocking Rules apply an established doctrine once sanctions hurt significant Chinese companies; Iran is their most visible test case. On the Strait, the same defense of its own interests places Beijing beside Washington: the consensus concluding Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States in September states, in its point on Iran, that “no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways.” Beijing’s calibration appears to track the wider state of U.S.-China relations.

A Chinese decision to close the teapot channel would strike at the IRGC’s system from outside. Beijing’s refining policy points towards consolidation: it has sought to cut the number of independent refiners, capping national refining capacity and ordering the smallest units closed. A rapid closure nonetheless looks unlikely. Iranian crude, one of the cheapest feedstocks on which the teapots rely, made up between half and two-thirds of the intake of Shandong’s small independents in 2024. The teapots are the mainstay of local economies in a province of some 100 million people, whose authorities, reliant on their taxes and jobs, have repeatedly blunted consolidation drives and raised their tax rebates as recently as 2025. During the Hormuz crisis, Beijing itself told them to keep running and granted extra import quotas. At about 13-14% of China’s crude imports,8 Iranian oil is not decisive for China as a whole, but it is for Shandong’s economic balance. Beijing’s short-term priority is to keep these refineries supplied; any reconfiguration of the import system belongs to the longer term.

The system’s Iranian foundations are no less durable. Even if diplomacy were to resolve the nuclear and Hormuz questions and restore sanctions relief, the Purja’fari system would not disappear. Its survival rests on politics rather than commerce. The IRGC fought the war, generated much of the leverage that brought Washington back to the negotiations, shaped Khamenei’s succession, and now stands as the principal pillar of regime cohesion. An organization so placed is unlikely to dismantle the commercial infrastructure that finances its autonomy because legal trade resumes. Relief would revive the formal channel without eliminating the parallel one. The two would coexist.

Nor would normalization rapidly displace the clandestine network. International shipowners, banks and insurers would return cautiously, while the established Chinese channel would continue moving cargoes. China would probably remain the largest single buyer of Iranian crude.

The decisive question, then, is not whether Iran will keep selling oil, but through whom – and the answer defines what its relationship with China consists of. Under any settlement currently conceivable, the Islamic Republic is likely to retain a dual export architecture. What is contested in Tehran is the seller. The customer, for as long as sanctions endure, is not.

Theo NENCINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Lecturer in International Relations and a PhD Candidate at Sciences Po Grenoble and the Catholic University of Paris. His research focuses on Iran-China relations, approached from a long-term systemic perspective and through a multilevel analysis, both with regard to Iran’s strategic thinking, political complexity and regional integration dynamics, and China’s foreign policy toward the Middle East.

By Francesco Scala

On September 1, Xi Jinping began his three-day state visit to Egypt, returning to the country after more than a decade. Shortly before his arrival, an article signed by the Chinese President was published across Egypt’s flagship state-owned dailies – Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, and Al-Gomhuria. Xi’s article highlighted the 70^th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt, and unsurprisingly, struck a celebratory tone, emphasizing the two countries’ long civilizational histories, their commitment to “win-win” cooperation, Egypt’s crucial role in China-Africa and China-Arab relations, and the achievements and shared stances that have come to define the relationship.

Xi was hardly the sole voice praising China in the Egyptian press. Egyptian officials were equally eager to underscore the importance of both the visit and the bilateral relationship. Egypt’s State Information Service (SIS), the Egyptian Presidency’s official media organ, went as far as to publish a book specifically for the occasion, authored by its chairman, Ambassador Alaa Youssef.1

Beyond the platitudes of Egyptian and Chinese officials, the visit attracted significant attention from international media, particularly elsewhere in the Middle East. In an explainer on Xi’s visit for Al Jazeera, journalist Usaid Siddiqui noted how the economic relationship has expanded since 2014, when the two countries elevated their ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” China is now Egypt’s largest trading partner in non-petroleum goods, with bilateral trade reaching nearly $20.7 billion by the end of 2025. The stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in Egypt has also risen to $1.85 billion in 2024, with Chinese investment concentrated in areas such as Egypt’s New Administrative Capital and the Suez Canal Economic Zone, the latter at the center of several memoranda of understanding signed during Xi’s visit.

Siddiqui, like many others, also placed the visit in its regional context. Xi arrived in Cairo amid the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye’s decision to sign the Mecca Agreement, a mutual defense pact. Egypt had been identified by many observers, including Chinese analysts, as a potential participant. However, Cairo’s longstanding military and security dependence on the U.S., and its complicated relationship with Israel, likely made any straightforward realignment unlikely in the short term.

International coverage of Xi’s visit also noted China and Egypt’s convergence on issues including Taiwan, the Nile and the wars in the Middle East alongside bilateral currency swaps and military cooperation, most notably the recent Eagles of Civilization 2026 joint air force exercise. Yet it was the growing technological dimension of the relationship that attracted extensive attention. Several outlets highlighted cooperation in satellite assembly, telecommunications equipment and, above all, artificial intelligence. Outlets like Al Jazeera, The New Arab, Al Hurra and Al Monitor have all framed these developments as part of the wider technological competition between China and the United States.

Here, Zayed University’s Jonathan Fulton, writing in his China-MENA Newsletter, offered a different perspective. The U.S.-Egypt relationship, he argued, is “very sturdy and important,” spanning a breadth of issues that China “isn’t anywhere close to” matching, even as Beijing has become an important complementary partner.

The question, then, is how Egyptian experts themselves understand this expanding relationship. Do they see Cairo as being drawn into a contest between Washington and Beijing, or as using ties with both powers to widen its own room for maneuver? The Egyptian commentary examined in this issue of the ChinaMed Observer points more clearly toward the latter interpretation.

Xi’s visit was welcomed by Egyptian analysts as an opportunity to deepen both political and economic ties with Beijing, with several of them portraying Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and his cabinet as having successfully navigated great power competition by leveraging Egypt’s distinctive geographic, demographic and economic characteristics. While this interpretation should be read with a grain of salt given the constraints of Egypt’s media environment, Xi’s decision to travel to Cairo, and the concern the visit received from Western outlets, underscore Egypt’s growing value as a partner that both Beijing and Washington have an interest in courting, especially in strategically sensitive sectors such as artificial intelligence.

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Politics: a Delicate Balance of Power

By analyzing the Joint Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the three-day visit,2 it is possible to identify key foreign policy priorities shared by the two parties, namely “strategic hedging” and “independence from foreign policy patrons,” concepts that resonate deeply into the Egyptian media environment.3As Dr. Ahmad Qandeel – Deputy Director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a leading independent “state-friendly” Egyptian think tank – pointed out:

“Egypt and China are both members of BRICS, and Egypt is a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, yet Cairo maintains deep strategic ties with the United States and Europe. I see no contradiction in this: for the world that best suits China is not necessarily one that revolves around Beijing, but rather one that does not revolve entirely around a single capital. This aligns with Egypt’s interest in diversifying its options without becoming beholden to specific geopolitical blocs.”4

Building upon the same premises, Muhammed Sabreen, a managing editor at Al-Ahram, offered a more “geopolitical” interpretation:

‘While Egypt may not be the largest Arab economy, it combines […] attributes rarely found together elsewhere: a strategic location bridging Asia, Africa, and Europe; the Suez Canal; a massive domestic market; an expanding industrial base; extensive networks across the Arab world and Africa; and a direct political role regarding the issues of Palestine, Sudan, Libya, and the Red Sea. […] For its part, Beijing views Egypt as a partner capable of […] accessing markets and regions that China cannot reach as easily through its own direct bilateral relations.”5

In Cairo, Xi also introduced China’s Regional Security Initiative, a four-point plan that places regional actors at the heart of the project. Qandeel contrasts the Chinese approach with the American concept of “umbrella,” which “belongs to the party holding it.” As he put into words:

“The choice of Cairo as the venue to announce the Chinese regional security initiative carries special significance. Egypt is […] a key player in the equations concerning Palestine, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean, maintaining balanced relations with China, the United States, and various regional powers. […] Egypt’s interest lies not in replacing one international partner with another, but rather in establishing an open system that expands its room for maneuver and safeguards regional security against the shifting priorities of major powers.”6

Economics: an Already Fruitful Partnership Set to Intensify

As for the economic outcome of Xi’s visit to Cairo, Egyptian commentators reacted positively, pointing out a major qualitative shift in the Cairo-Beijing partnership toward localization and transfer of technologies, in line with Egypt’s Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Writing about this strategy, Muhammed Sabreen cited plans of a major Chinese aluminum company to invest up to $2 billion in an integrated industrial complex within the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZONE) as an evidence that: “China is no longer content with merely selling its products to the Egyptian market; Chinese investments are gradually moving toward manufacturing, production, and exporting.” Crucially, Sabreen noted that the Egyptian government stipulated that the project must include the transfer of expertise and advanced technology, and rely on clean energy.7

According to Muhammad Al-Muhandis, Chairman of the Chamber of Engineering Industries at the Federation of Egyptian Industries, the Egyptian–Chinese industrial zone in the SCZONE can bolster Egypt’s domestic supply chains by reducing its reliance on imports, while attracting investments in vital sectors such as home appliances, feeder industries, automotive manufacturing, and renewable energy:

“Cooperation with the Chinese side aims to leverage the advanced technological expertise and competitive production capabilities of Chinese companies to localize the manufacturing of production components and reduce reliance on imports.”8

Furthermore, the two parties agreed to increase the value of the existing currency swap agreement, raising it from approximately RMB 18 billion to the 30 billion agreed upon during the presidential visit. Providing a direct liquidity mechanism in both currencies can enable businesses and banks to conduct commercial transactions with greater flexibility, while fostering an environment more conducive to companies wishing to establish trade relations with the other party, with the ultimate goal of increasing the already substantial number of Chinese firms in the SCZONE (approximately 200).9

The agreement was reached at a pivotal moment in trade relations between Cairo and Beijing: the data provided by Abdel Aziz Al-Sharif, First Undersecretary of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade, show that the value of Egyptian exports to China grew by 55.2%, reaching over “$660 million during the period from January to July 2026, compared to $425.6 million during the same period in 2025.”10

Against this backdrop, capital market and investment expert Atef Al-Sherif argued that the significant amount in announced Chinese investments, “exceeding $52 billion,” alongside a record 30 new projects in 2025, underscores Egypt’s “pivotal role as a regional hub for trade and investment and a key corridor for the Belt and Road Initiative.” He further emphasized that establishing a practical framework to implement the joint agenda reflects the seriousness of both sides in translating mutual understanding into tangible projects on the ground.11

Focus: AI, a Risk-Packed Strategy

Through Vision 2030, Egyptian policymakers are convoying efforts and resources in the development and localization of cutting-edge technologies, mainly artificial intelligence and cloud computing facilities, with national data centers at the core of this strategy. Egypt’s AI ambition parallels initiatives pursued by other regional powers seeking to strengthen digital sovereignty. In this context, the timing of two developments during Xi’s visit reveals the opportunities and risks facing Cairo as it pursues this agenda amid intensifying U.S.-China competition.

Coinciding with Xi’s visit, Egypt’s National Telecommunication Institute signed an agreement with the American technology conglomerate Cisco Systems to train Egyptian faculty members and independent lecturers in data networks, cybersecurity, operating systems and AI, in order to increase the number of instructors qualified in these subjects.12

Meanwhile, at the conclusion of the three-day visit, Egypt and China issued a joint communiqué pleading to expand cooperation on advanced technologies, including cloud computing, data centers, the data-driven economy, and semiconductors, while facilitating the transfer of technological expertise in computing and digital manufacturing.13

The juxtaposition is striking as it illustrates the room for maneuver available to Cairo between great powers. While the Cisco agreement presents concrete commitments to developing Egypt’s AI-related human capital, the China-Egypt joint statement has established a broader framework for future collaboration. Aly Mahmoud, a managing editor at Al-Ahram, enthusiastically interpreted the two agreements as evidence of what he describes as a “hybrid” Egyptian approach to AI – one that draws on technological expertise from both the United States and China:

“In short, by leveraging its relationships with the two competing powers in this sector, Egypt has successfully tapped into the expertise of both nations to craft a unique, ‘hybrid’ program in information technology and artificial intelligence. The resulting framework is fully secure and ensures Egypt’s digital sovereignty with the highest standards of safety and operational efficiency, while bypassing the restrictive measures Washington imposes to block the transfer of its chip-manufacturing and AI-specific data chip technologies to various countries, most notably China.”14

Yet, the flexibility that allows Egypt to draw on both sides of the great power rivalry may also expose it to the pressures generated by that competition. The experience of the Emirati AI company G42 offers a warning of how quickly the room for maneuver may narrow: after securing multi-million dollars agreements with Chinese entities across multiple sectors15 while also relying on U.S. technologies such as VAST Data’s computing infrastructure,16 mounting scrutiny from U.S. national security agencies led it to divest from all its Chinese investments in order to maintain access to American technology.

The G42 precedent remains relevant as Egypt continues to pursue its strategy of becoming a regional hub for AI development. According to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, the sector recorded a growth rate of 24.3% during the fourth quarter of the 2025-26 fiscal year, the highest rate on record.17 This growth was mainly driven by software development and outsourcing, underpinned by Egypt’s young and highly skilled workforce and its growing pool of programming and technical talent. For Ahmed Hassan Elzaher, CEO of Egypt’s IT Industry Development Agency, this human capital is a key driver of the country’s AI ambitions:

“Egypt graduates around 50,000 engineers and computer science graduates annually. This creates one of the largest technical talent pools in the MENA region — multilingual, cost-competitive, and increasingly specialized in digital technologies. […] Our scale allows companies to build AI implementation teams quickly, particularly in applied engineering, data analytics, NLP, and AI system integration. Through structured upskilling programs and partnerships with global technology providers, we are transitioning from general ICT capacity to AI-specialized expertise.”18

As Egypt’s AI ecosystem continues to expand, these strengths make it an attractive partner for investments and cooperation in critical technologies. So far, Cairo has been able to leverage its independent foreign policy to draw technological benefits from both sides of the U.S.-China competition. Yet the G42 precedent serves as a cautionary example about the long-term risks of becoming caught amid great powers.

Conclusion

Overall, Xi Jinping’s milestone visit to Cairo underscores Egypt’s evolving role as an adept practitioner of strategic hedging rather than as a pawn in a rigid bipolar rivalry. The national and international press appear to share this view, highlighting Al-Sisi’s efforts to leverage the country’s strategic positioning amid geopolitical escalation between Washington and Beijing and continuing turmoil in its neighborhood. As Carnegie’s Director of the Middle East Program Amr Hamzawy put into words, “Cairo is diversifying its partnerships and cooperation schemes, including in all military and technology matters, without binding itself to a patron superpower.”

This approach has become visible in the evolution of Egypt-China relations, elevating what was once a largely transactional relationship into a broader political, economic and technological partnership. Egyptian commentators view Cairo’s geographic and demographic assets as key enablers of its industrial and AI ambitions. The expansion of the Chinese-Egyptian industrial zone along the SCZONE strengthens Cairo’s efforts to localize production; whereas in the digital sphere, cooperation with both Beijing and Washington provides access to expertise and capabilities in areas such as AI and cloud computing.

Nevertheless, the current and widely praised diplomatic equilibrium is not without risks as Egypt ventures deeper into a highly securitized domain fiercely contested by global powers. The precedents set by other regional players such as G42 suggest that maintaining an uncompromised technological ecosystem while relying on competing foreign tech giants is an increasingly delicate act. Western regulatory scrutiny and stringent embargoes regarding technology transfers could easily disrupt Cairo’s ambitious trajectory. Moving forward, Egypt’s primary challenge will be to ensure that its technological pluralism does not trigger retaliatory diplomatic friction, transforming its digital sovereignty from a strategic asset into a vulnerability.

Francesco SCALA is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He holds a Master’s Degree in Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale.” His research focuses on the media coverage of China in Gulf countries.

By Eva Ragozzino

The five-month U.S.-Iran war remains at a stalemate, as reciprocal U.S. port restrictions and Iranian pressure on shipping continue to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Gulf unity is under strain, with countries pursuing different strategies to safeguard their interests and security amid an increasingly uncertain regional situation.

Against this background, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” (henceforth Mecca Agreement) on August 7, 2026, building on a previous mutual defense pact signed between Islamabad and Riyadh in September 2025.

In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we look at how Chinese experts are reacting to these developments. We find that Chinese experts generally view the Mecca Agreement as an important, if still largely symbolic, first step toward a more autonomous and flexible regional security order – one shaped by shifting alliances and pragmatic cooperation, but whose durability and effectiveness remain uncertain. Some experts also highlighted the potential for the agreement to strengthen indirect channels for Chinese engagement within the emerging regional security architecture.

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The End of the Old Regional Order

Since the beginning of the war, there has been an ongoing discussion about what the region will look like at the end of the hostilities. In general, Chinese experts have long expected or, some could say, hoped to see Middle Eastern countries pursue greater strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, with many identifying the current conflict as a clear catalyst for this shift.

After all, the limits of American power have become evident. The disruptive nature of U.S. policy under Trump has raised questions about both the reliability of American power and the space this creates for its adversaries.

In an article published by Ai Sixiang, Ding Xueliang, Professor at the Department of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, observed that:

“In terms of international affairs, most of Trump’s actions have been ignorant and foolish, with only a very few being reliable. For those governments that view the United States as an adversary, they should be grateful for the choice made by American citizens in 2024, allowing Trump to return to the helm of the world’s leading power’s foreign and military affairs. If we, as bystanders, can see this, the Iranian leadership can surely see it too.”1

Niu Xinchun, Vice-President of Ningxia University and Executive Director of its China-Arab Research Institute, added that if mutual deterrence between Israel and Iran underpinned the old order, the current conflict not only disrupted that balance, but might have also given Tehran an opportunity to reshape the region:

“Although severely weakened, Iran has regained its strategic deterrent capability against the U.S. and Israel, and control of the Strait of Hormuz has become a key strategic asset. Meanwhile, Iran awaits changes in the international situation.

On the one hand, the great power rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia may develop in a direction favorable to Iran; on the other hand, the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran violate international law and basic norms of international relations, alienating many supporters. Israel’s military expansionism and adventurism may backfire.”2

Whether Iran will be successful, however, is far from certain. Nor is it clear how other countries in the region will position themselves amid the reconfiguration of existing alliances.

On this note, Tang Zhichao, Director of the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued that the traditional anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Iranian camps in the Middle East have become increasingly blurred:

“The anti-American and anti-Israeli camps are shrinking, the US-backed anti-Iran regional alliance is disintegrating, and the Iranian-led regional ‘axis of resistance’ has been severely weakened. Regional countries are increasingly forming alliances based on their own development strategies and core regional issues, leading to frequent changes in alliances.”3

The growing fluidity of regional alignments is particularly evident among the Arab Gulf states, which have recently pursued more proactive yet divergent security policies to mitigate risks amid the current crisis, moving away from their previous tendency to adopt a wait-and-see approach.4

Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, explained that policy divergence among Arab Gulf states reflects differences in their interests, as well as their pursuit of diplomatic pragmatism and diversification in the context of declining U.S. hegemony and security commitments.5

Overall, Chinese experts consider that these shifts reveal a significant rupture in the old strategic balance and point toward a restructuring of the Middle East order. The Mecca Agreement builds on security ties that had already deepened before its signing, including Pakistan’s 2025 defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and the ratification of its defense pact with Kuwait in July 2026.

The First Steps toward a Common Defense Framework: The Mecca Agreement

It is against this background that Chinese experts have largely interpreted the Mecca Agreement as consistent with the regional scenario that they long anticipated, and in some cases, hoped for.

For instance, Yan Xuetong, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, argued that the Iran war has made Middle Eastern countries that rely on the U.S. for defense and security question its willingness and ability to provide a protective umbrella: “If the U.S. military can’t even protect its own bases, how can it protect these countries?,” he asked.6

According to Li Zixin, an assistant researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, the Mecca Agreement differs from the “defense solution” proposed by the U.S. in two ways. On the one hand, in contrast to the hierarchical relationship between Washington and its regional allies, it offers a more equal and cooperative relationship. On the other, the agreement may facilitate resource pooling and mutual support among its members in a geopolitically fragmented region.7

While the Mecca Agreement has been described by many as a Middle East version of NATO, Chinese experts do not expect this pact to truly work as NATO. The Mecca Agreement stipulates that “an armed attack against any one of the three countries should be considered an attack against all three,” echoing Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet, Li observed that the three parties remain cautious about how this provision would be implemented in practice, arguing that, in the context of “hot war,” it would be unrealistic for the agreement to include specific clauses or triggering conditions.8

Kong Dejun, a researcher at the Institute of Mediterranean Studies at Zhejiang University of Foreign Languages, also concurred that it is too early to speak about a full-fledged “Islamic NATO,” noting that “the main security directions faced by the three countries are not completely consistent” and that military obligations have yet to be transformed into permanent implementation mechanisms.

“The significance of this agreement is here: the principle of common defense has been established, the ministerial committee and the permanent secretariat have begun to be set up, and cooperation has remained open to other countries […]

The extent to which joint command, air defense and anti-missile defense, intelligence sharing, military reinforcements and military-industrial coordination can be developed remains to be tested by reality.”9

In this context, Türkiye, which is also a NATO member, makes an interesting case. Guo Bingyun, associate professor at the School of International Relations of Sichuan International Studies University, outlined the economic incentives that contributed to Ankara’s joining the agreement, arguing that extending Turkish defense commitments to the Gulf and South Asia can significantly expand its strategic depth and arms market:

“Türkiye’s defense industry has advantages in areas such as drones, ships and munitions. The agreement explicitly mentions joint defense industry projects and counter-terrorism cooperation, opening the doors to Saudi funding and Pakistani technology […]

By allying with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Türkiye strengthens its collective deterrence against potential threats and enhances its voice in the Islamic world and global affairs. Meanwhile, its NATO membership and the obligations of the new agreement are officially defined as non-conflicting and complementary.”10

According to Guo, the Mecca Agreement is also likely to complicate Israel’s regional strategy, with Turkish military power and Pakistani nuclear deterrence objectively increasing the potential costs of any unilateral Israeli military action.11 Moreover, given the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations since 2023 and the absence of formal diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, the Mecca Agreement may also undermine Israeli efforts to integrate into the region’s security framework and advance normalization through the Abraham Accords.12

More broadly, Sun Degang argues that ultimately, the Mecca Agreement’s symbolic value is much more important than its tactical effectiveness: it is all about signaling to Washington and Tehran.13

On the Iranian side, soon after the announcement of the defense pact, former commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Mohsen Rezai was appointed Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council on August 9.

Qiushi, the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, described Iran’s reaction to the Mecca Agreement as “most nuanced.” While the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the pact by underscoring the importance of “security autonomy” and downplaying concerns that the agreement could be directed against Iran, Rezai also warned Saudi Arabia that, “just as years of unilateral dependence on the U.S. had not brought it security, neither would the Mecca Agreement.”14 This ambivalence, according to Qiushi, “reflects Tehran’s complex mentality of both welcoming the weakening of U.S. influence and fearing that the new alliance might encircle Iran.”15

Despite the timing of Rezai’s appointment, however, it should not necessarily be read as a direct response to the Mecca Agreement. Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, noted that Rezai’s broad influence could allow him to better coordinate major issues in Iranian foreign diplomacy, while the appointment resulted from internal power dynamics within the political establishment.16

As for the United States, Li Zixin noted that Washington will probably tolerate the Mecca Agreement for the time being, given its longstanding security cooperation with all three members. However, should cooperation among the three begin to develop in ways that challenge or seek to replace U.S. influence, Washington may intervene to contain it.17

Prospects for Broadening the Agreement

One of the most debated issues among Chinese experts was whether other countries in the region would join the Mecca Agreement.

During the last few months, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan and Egypt have built a coordination mechanism known as the “R4” to discuss regional security, particularly the impact of the U.S.-Iran war. Egypt’s participation in this framework made its inclusion in the Mecca Agreement a natural expectation.18

According to Guo Bingyun, while Egypt’s future accession is a concrete possibility, Cairo’s current caution is due to two key aspects. First, the Mecca Agreement’s collective defense obligations are difficult to reconcile with Egypt’s policies prioritizing domestic stability and economic recovery. Second, as a signatory of the Camp David Accords, Egypt maintains a high degree of military and security dependence on the U.S. and a complex relationship with Israel.19

Clearly, the Mecca Agreement is not limited to trilateral cooperation, but is envisioned by its founders to become a broader model for regional security cooperation. Other countries, including Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and Azerbaijan, have also been mentioned as potential future participants. As Li Zixin noted, one of the main purposes of the agreement is to “set an example” for other countries in the region:

“Right now it’s more about emphasizing a concept, a future direction for development. If this form of cooperation gains widespread recognition among countries in the region, it’s worth paying close attention to whether the relevant clauses will be further solidified or supplemented with new content after the end of the U.S.-Iran war.”20

Pakistan’s institutionalized entry into the Middle East security architecture also raised the possibility that the Mecca Agreement could extend to countries outside the region.

Qiushi observed that with the Mecca Agreement, “the geographical boundaries of Middle East security issues are extending from the Middle East itself to a trans-regional security network covering the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and even South-Asia.”21

Against this backdrop, some Indian media have even speculated that China might join the agreement, if invited. In response, Liu Zongyi, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, argued that the three signatories are unlikely to extend such an invitation and that, in any case, China would probably refuse. According to Liu, the assumption that Beijing would accept a hypothetical invitation reflects Indian media’s “anxiety” and tendency to “view China as its biggest threat and adversary”:

“China’s position is clear: it will not participate in military agreements or alliances. Pakistan fully understands China’s relevant positions and therefore will not push for China’s participation in such defense agreements.”22

Liu nevertheless highlighted that China could pursue normal defense equipment cooperation with the signatories, particularly Pakistan. He argued that the agreement not only strengthened Pakistan’s role in the regional security architecture and enhanced its diplomatic influence, but could also allow Islamabad to play a key role in China’s arms system exports.

“[Pakistan] could play a bridging role between China and the Middle East and the Islamic world, while also receiving support from China in its industrialization, Saudi Arabia’s funding and Türkiye’s military industry’s assistance.”23

Conclusion

Chinese experts broadly interpreted the Mecca Agreement as both a consequence of the collapse of the old regional order and an early attempt by Middle Eastern states to develop greater strategic autonomy. Although they recognized the agreement’s current limitations – including different security priorities among its members and uncertainty over the implementation of its collective-defense provisions – they see it as a potentially important framework for more flexible, multidirectional regional cooperation.

It is also notable that some Chinese analyses highlighted how Pakistan’s participation in the Mecca Agreement strengthens an indirect channel for Chinese influence: Islamabad can connect China to the emerging Middle Eastern security architecture, while potentially facilitating Chinese defense-equipment exports and broader cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and other future participants. In this sense, the agreement is interpreted not only as a regional response to declining confidence in the United States, but also as a development that could expand China’s influence through existing partnerships.

Eva Ragozzino is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa from the University of Naples “L’Orientale,” specializing in East Asia and Chinese studies. Her research interests include China’s foreign policy and Sino-Middle Eastern relations.

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By Leonardo Bruni1

On July 31, approximately 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave on the North African coast. Overwhelmed, Ceuta became the center of the most recent of a series of EU border crises, including the 2023 Lampedusa crisis, the 2022 Ukrainian refugee crisis, the 2021 Belarus border crisis, and, before that, the 2015 European migrant crisis.

However, unlike those previous episodes, the Ceuta crisis showcased a surprising lack of EU solidarity. Rather than providing or even expressing support, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called for Spain to be suspended from the Schengen Area. She blamed the influx, which left 88 people dead, on Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s recent amnesty scheme which provided a pathway to legal status for up to 1.2 million undocumented migrants and asylum seekers.

Meloni was far from alone. Twenty-two EU leaders signed a letter expressing “serious concern,” explicitly linking the crisis to Madrid’s migrant regularization plans, while several also endorsed Spain being suspended from Schengen. All this despite Ceuta (and its sister enclave of Melilla) already operating under a distinct border regime requiring checks before entry into the rest of the EU; there being no legal mechanism for suspending a member state from Schengen; and the overwhelming majority of those who entered Ceuta having already been returned to Morocco, with none allowed onward to mainland Spain.

Sánchez has condemned the “selfish, polarizing and unlawful reaction,” but the episode has led POLITICO to describe him as “effectively a pariah in the bloc,” arguing that Ceuta revealed “how thin Europe’s patience has worn” with the Spanish PM, one of the very few left-wing leaders left in the European Council. Interestingly, the news outlet suggested that this “frustration” with the Spanish PM may also be connected to China, as Sánchez has “infuriated” other European leaders by “pursuing a softer line” on Beijing.2

, Chief Europe Correspondent for the South China Morning Post, also made a connection between Ceuta and China. But rather than the intra-EU crisis being the result of Madrid’s friendly policy toward Beijing, he views the lack of solidarity to a member state under hybrid attack as being motivated by party politics. For Bermingham:

“This does not bode well as they stand on the precipice of a trade war with Beijing. Does Brussels still believe a ‘solidarity fund’ can convince capitals to band together to take on China? You can hang as many big-character posters on the side of EU buildings as you like, but we are currently seeing zero solidarity; zero unity.”3

On this note, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines how Chinese officials and media have framed the Ceuta crisis, and if Chinese analysts see it as evidence that internal EU divisions could weaken the bloc’s ability to respond to external threats, such as China’s assertive trade policies.

The analysis finds that Chinese officials have largely avoided commenting on the crisis, likely reflecting Beijing’s interest in preserving positive relations with both Spain and Morocco, two increasingly important partners for China. Consequently, Chinese state-aligned media has similarly remained close to the official narratives advanced by Madrid and Rabat. While more “independent” and “outspoken” Chinese news outlets have offered a wider range of explanations for the crisis than their more government-aligned counterparts, they converge on one central argument: the episode has exposed tensions in EU solidarity. This coverage also carries some sympathy toward Spain, portraying Madrid as facing disproportionate criticism from other EU members.

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China’s Careful Silence on the Crisis in Ceuta and its Causes

Several European officials and commentators – especially on the right – have blamed a recent Spanish Supreme Court ruling restricting the immediate return of migrants arriving by sea for creating a “pull factor.” However, it must be noted that this decision does not cover Ceuta or Melilla, Spain’s – and the EU’s – only two (very militarized) land borders with Africa.

Sánchez has instead argued that the crisis was manufactured by trafficking gangs that deliberately misrepresented the ruling on social media. Moroccan authorities have echoed this explanation. The two sides have in fact maintained coordination and rather cordial official rhetoric, with Madrid careful not to blame Rabat for what it described as “a violation of Spain’s territorial integrity.”

That restraint has not prevented others from drawing a different conclusion. Several analysts, journalists and Spanish officials have contended that Moroccan authorities either tolerated or actively facilitated the crossings. This accusation is not without precedent. Beyond its claim that Ceuta and Melilla are occupied Moroccan territories, Rabat has previously used migration pressure as a diplomatic instrument, particularly in disputes over Western Sahara. Some observers have thus speculated that the crisis was linked to Sánchez’s recent visit to Algeria, Morocco’s regional rival and main backer of the Polisario Front.

Another interpretation, reported by Al Jazeera, situates the episode within Morocco’s close ties with the United States and Israel under the Abraham Accords. According to this reading, the migrant surge was linked to Madrid’s strong pro-Palestine stance, its criticism of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, and its resistance to U.S. President Donald Trump’s demands for increased European defense spending.4 U.S. Vice-President JD Vance offered a different explanation, blaming the events in Ceuta on “far-left globalist policies.”

China, by contrast, has conspicuously avoided endorsing any of these competing narratives, or assigning responsibility. During the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s regular press conference on July 31, spokesperson Mao Ning was asked about Beijing’s position on the crisis. Her response was surprisingly brief:

“China is against all forms of illegal migration. At the same time, we believe relevant parties should enhance coordination and properly handle the issue.”

This was the entirety of Beijing’s official reaction.

As RUSI Associate Fellow Sari Arho Havrén observed on X, this response lacks condolences, did not affirm Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta, and implicitly placed Spain and Morocco on equal footing. For Havrén, this lack of solidarity toward Spain, China’s premier partner within the EU, reflects both China’s growing relationship with Morocco (a trend we have documented extensively in a recent ChinaMed report) and sensitivity over Ceuta as a disputed territory.5

However, it must be said that framing two sides on an equal footing, even when one party is widely perceived as the aggressor, is consistent with China’s diplomatic playbook, as shown in the cases of Russia-Ukraine and Iran with the Gulf states. Additionally, while Havrén contrasts China’s curt response with the European Commission’s declaration of “full solidarity” with Spain during the 2021 Ceuta crisis, on this occasion, China’s response, while brief and neutral, was not critical, unlike those from allies and fellow EU member states.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement also conspicuously avoided addressing the possible causes of the migrant wave. Yet most (but not all6) of the Chinese media ecosystem – which provided extensive coverage of the Ceuta crisis – could not entirely sidestep the issue.

A Xinhua explainer (also available in English on CGTN) largely echoed the line advanced by both Sánchez and Moroccan authorities, arguing that “migrant-smuggling networks had deliberately amplified false information on social media,” citing a Moroccan scholar, Mohammed Zakaria Aboudahab of Mohammed V University.7

Other interpretations, including claims that Spain’s policies acted as a pull factor or that Morocco sought to punish Sánchez for his rapprochement with Algeria, were mostly absent. This was true across other major outlets, including Guangming Daily, Shangguan News, and Guancha, which likewise only entertained the official Spanish and Moroccan explanation.8 Even when covering the accusations by other European leaders such as Meloni, these outlets immediately juxtaposed them with Sánchez’s rebuttals and factual reporting on the legal context of Ceuta and the Schengen Area.

Even experts appeared reluctant to engage with other explanations. In an interview with Jiefang Daily, Jian Junbo, director of Fudan University’s Center for China-Europe Relations Studies, was asked about the speculation that the migrant surge could represent Moroccan “retaliation” against Spain. Jian seemingly set aside these “contingent circumstances” to instead discuss how the crisis was deeply rooted in structural inevitabilities.9

Equally absent was the narrative linking the crisis to the U.S. and Israel, despite Chinese media typically not being shy to blame both countries. The sole exception was The Paper, known internationally for its English-language sister publication Sixth Tone and generally regarded as having greater editorial flexibility. Nan Boyi, in an article for The Paper, and Zhang Wuwei, on the outlet’s 907 Editorial Department podcast, openly discussed allegations that Moroccan authorities had facilitated or deliberately tolerated the crossings as a diplomatic bargaining tool, accusations of anti-black racism by Moroccan police, violence by the Spanish Guardia Civil, as well as the “Israel factor.”10

The Paper also published an analysis by Zhang Lubo, a special correspondent for the outlet and Associate Researcher at the Institute of Mediterranean Studies of Zhejiang International Studies University. Beyond social media and its role spreading misinformation about legal rulings, idealized images of life in Europe and practical guides for migrating illegally, Zhang hypothesizes that Morocco deliberately relaxed restrictions to create an opportunity for a “smuggling rush.” Noting past accusations against Morocco regarding the 2021 Ceuta crisis, Zhang explained the concept of the “weaponization of immigration.” For him:

“The Spanish enclave of Ceuta, located only “a step away” from Morocco, represents a permanent geopolitical pressure point for Spain. In other words, if border control becomes a diplomatic tool, it would mean that Morocco has long-term leverage to influence Spain and even the EU. In that case, the migration issue would extend into the realm of diplomatic bargaining, and even into matters of national security and regional order.”11

Despite this notable exception from The Paper, an outlet with a relatively distinct status, the editorial consistency from the rest of the Chinese press suggests a deliberate effort to avoid antagonizing either Madrid or Rabat, two increasingly important partners for Beijing. Yet one theme was consistently present across all Chinese media coverage and expert commentary: this crisis has exposed divisions within Europe.

Europe’s Fault Lines Exposed

Across all Chinese media coverage of the Ceuta crisis, one recurring theme was EU division. Most of the focus, however, was not on the bloc’s geopolitical cohesion, but rather the strains the migrant influx exposed about the bloc’s migration governance and the Schengen system.

Writing in Guangming Daily, journalist Wang Tianyang argued that the dispute eroded the mutual trust on which Schengen depends and could have lasting repercussions for its future. Journalist Wu Yuzhen, writing for Shangguan News, suggested that the divergent responses have “torn apart the superficial unity of Europe.” According to Wu, these divisions, “coupled with xenophobic sentiments, have led to the increasing politicization of migration issues, raising the bar for reaching consensus and exacerbating the chaotic governance situation,” while doing little to address the underlying reasons why migrants continue to come to Europe.12

Wu Huiping of Tongji University’s German Studies Center, speaking to Xinhua, noted how different migration pressures depending on geography have led to varying attitudesamong EU members: southern frontline states continue to demand greater burden-sharing, while several Central and Eastern European countries remain firmly opposed to mandatory migrant relocation. The Xinhua article further argued that migration, and the Ceuta crisis in particular, has become increasingly politicized. Alongside the far-right, even mainstream parties have started to adopt tougher positions on immigration to expand their electoral support, further fragmenting European migration governance.13

This interpretation was widely echoed by Chinese scholars and across the entirety of the mainstream Chinese press.14 In a joint interview with Wenhui Daily, Wu Huiping and Ding Chun, director of Fudan University’s Center for European Studies, likewise portrayed the EU’s migration challenges as structural rather than episodic. Both rejected the claim that Spain’s policies triggered the crisis, arguing instead that migrant numbers have declined over the past decade and that the deeper problem lies in the EU’s failure to coordinate among member states with different demographic and economic realities.15

For Ding, these structural divisions, reinforced by the rise of far-right parties, make a genuinely common European migration policy unattainable, including the implementation of the EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum, which replaces the Dublin Regulation’s “first country of entry” system. Looking ahead, he predicted that Europe would continue to harden its external borders, rely more heavily on North African partners to contain migration, and resort more frequently to temporary border controls within the Schengen Area.16

Cui Hongjian, professor at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University, offered a very similar assessment in comments to the Global Times, but also added that:

“the political fallout from criticism of the Sánchez government by officials in the US could extend well beyond the migration crisis itself. If the issue continues to be exploited for political purposes, it risks further straining Madrid’s relations with Washington and could lead to broader diplomatic tensions.”17

The Global Times was among the few outlets that did not frame the Ceuta crisis solely as an intra-EU migration management issue. While highlighting divisions within the EU and the rise of the far-right, the nationalist tabloid placed slightly more emphasis on the wider diplomatic context, particularly the way the crisis was being used by Washington for its ideological ends.18 At the same time, it acknowledged that Sánchez’s stance on migration, despite reflecting legal and practical realities and retaining some European support, has left him increasingly “out of step” with the bloc’s overall rightward shift.19

In an opinion piece for the Global Times (that was translated into English), Dong Yifan, an associate research fellow at the Academy of International and Regional Studies of Beijing Language and Culture University, offered the clearest defence of Spain. While emphasizing that the protection of human rights and dignity remains “an essential component of EU identity,” Dong argued that Spain had “bucked the trend amid Europe’s broader rightward shift on migration” by recognizing “the various benefits legal immigration brings to its national economy and labor market.” He further maintained that the security concerns raised by other EU member states over Spain’s handling of the Ceuta crisis were “devoid of practical foundation.” In his view:

“the bickering among member states over the Ceuta crisis reflects how political headwinds are continually squeezing the space for compromise, coordination and mutual support on EU refugee and migration policy. This persistent governance dilemma and societal anxiety are bound to add fuel to the fire of Europe’s ongoing political rightward shift.”20

Jian Junbo reached a similar conclusion, arguing that the criticism directed at Spain was not about Madrid itself or the “mixed reputation” of the Sánchez government within the EU. Rather, it reflected the fact that migration has become one of the EU’s most politically contentious issues, through which the far-right may gain more influence and power.21

Zhang Lubo, writing in The Paper, moved beyond the conventional divide between left-wing support for openness and integration and right-wing demands for stricter controls and deportations. He underscored “a third, increasingly influential approach [which] seeks to externalize border management by preventing migrants from reaching Europe in the first place through partnerships with countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.”22

Zhang argued that this approach, which many Chinese analysts view as the most likely future direction of EU migration policy, has gained momentum and broader acceptance across the political spectrum after the Ceuta crisis. The episode has reinforced the framing of irregular migration as a national security – or even “hybrid” – threat requiring intervention before migrants reach EU borders. As such, rather than weakening European integration, Zhang sees the crisis as consolidating externalized border control as the EU’s most viable response. As he concludes:

“From this perspective, the 2026 Ceuta crisis may represent the beginning of a new phase in European border governance. Its defining features include the direct deployment of military forces, the swift reintroduction of border controls by member states, and the European Commission’s rapid intervention to coordinate the response. Looking ahead, debates over migration are likely to shift away from the traditional ideological divide between openness and restriction, or between the left and the right, and instead focus increasingly on questions of state capacity and the effectiveness of migration governance.”23

Conclusion

The official Chinese response to the crisis in Ceuta likely reflects in its scarcity a careful balancing act. By avoiding discussing responsibility or causes of the migrant surge, Beijing showed its interest in maintaining good relations with both Spain and Morocco. Chinese state-aligned media largely followed the same line, echoing the narratives advanced by Madrid and Rabat while avoiding interpretations that could place either partner in an unfavorable position, for instance blaming U.S. and Israeli influence on Morocco.

However, at the relative extremes of the Chinese media ecosystem, more differentiated views were expressed. More “investigative” outlets, The Paper in particular, acknowledged allegations of Moroccan involvement. Meanwhile, more nationalist publications expressed greater sympathy for Spain, defending against criticism from other EU member states, the far-right and the Trump administration. Together, these perspectives – although only permitted within the relative margins of the Chinese media landscape – suggest interest in two themes: the potential weaponization of migration as a diplomatic tool and concern for Spain and the implications of Europe’s rightward political shift.

Although the weakness of European solidarity was a recurring theme, Chinese observers largely framed the Ceuta crisis through the lens of migration governance rather than as evidence of the EU’s broader dysfunction. Unlike many Western critics, Chinese analysts did not attribute the crisis to Spanish policies. Instead, they interpreted Ceuta as a manifestation of structural tensions between member states and between the Global North and Global South.

Where Chinese experts differed most was whether these tensions could ultimately be managed. This debate mirrors the wider discussion in China about the EU’s future, particularly its capacity to remain a coherent actor in its relationship with China. The dominant view portrays the EU as politically fragmented, increasingly aggressive, institutionally constrained, and led by weak political leadership, leaving member states vulnerable to external divide-and-rule tactics. Yet a small minority continue to argue that the Union retains a narrow window of opportunity to adapt and strengthen its internal cohesion.24

This debate is reflected in Chinese assessments of the Ceuta crisis and European migration governance. Most Chinese experts argued that a real, effective common EU migration policy is impossible due to divisions between Southern European and Central and Eastern European states, exacerbated by the rise of far-right parties. A few viewed the crisis as accelerating a different trajectory: the emergence of irregular migration as a security or “hybrid” threat that could legitimize further externalization of EU borders. Therefore, Chinese assessments of the crisis in Ceuta were not uniformly pessimistic about the EU’s ability to adapt – though, for now, most are.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

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Foreign Affairs — “China Is Sabotaging the World That Enables Its Rise” by Enrico Fardella and Sergey Radchenko

“Great powers encounter danger when they cease to view success as the product of contingency and effort and begin to view it instead as the expression of historical destiny. If Beijing falls into this trap, and refuses to heed Western warnings, it will trigger a vicious trade war that will leave the world much worse off, and the dream of China’s national rejuvenation in tatters.”

ChinaMed Director Enrico Fardella, together with (Johns Hopkins SAIS), co-authored this article for Foreign Affairs, analysing the causes and global consequences of China’s trade and economic policies.

[Available on Foreign Affairs, click here to read]

Foreign Policy — “U.S.-China Relations Are More Volatile Than Ever” by Andrea Ghiselli and Andrew Scobell

“Neither strategic trust nor friendship is sufficient for stability, and despite the seemingly positive top-level sentiment, cooperation between the US and China is now more challenging and precarious than ever.”

ChinaMed Head of Research , together with Andrew Scobell (MERICS; Georgetown University), co-authored this article for Foreign Policy discussing current dynamics in U.S.-China relations.

[Available on Foreign Policy, click here to read]

Foreign Affairs — “The Gulf’s China Problem” by Mohammed Alsudairi, Andrea Ghiselli and Aaron Glasserman

“During this year’s Iran war, China again declined to use its considerable leverage to keep the Iranians from attacking China’s Gulf partners—a move that especially concerned Saudi Arabia, which felt that Beijing should come to its defense because China was the guarantor of its reconciliation with Tehran.”

ChinaMed Head of Research , together with Mohammed Alsudairi (Australian National University) and Aaron Glasserman (Columbia University), co-authored this article for Foreign Affairs dicussing China’s approach to the Gulf amid the U.S.-Iran War.

[Available on Foreign Affairs, click here to read]

In addition, Director Enrico Fardella was featured in Il Foglio’s (Italian-language) article “L’economia cinese rallenta, la repressione no,” while Research Fellow Theo Nencini was quoted by TRT World for the piece “Iran’s power struggle: Are hardliners blocking diplomacy with the US?”

By Veronica Turrini and Leonardo Bruni

With the ceasefire between the United States and Iran having fully broken down, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer looks back at the Iranian debate on China during the months of the fragile truce. We examine how Iranian commentators assessed Beijing’s role during the conflict and ceasefire, and how they believe Tehran should approach relations with China moving forward.

The Iranian media debate on China has traditionally been quite polarized, with “reformist” commentators often expressing open disdain for closer ties with Beijing. However, the first phase of the 2026 U.S.-Iran war, often referred to in Iran as the “Forty-Day War” or “Ramadan War,” appears to have reinforced a shift that began with the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. For much of the Iranian commentariat, China is now an indispensable partner whose support Tehran must leverage. While no one argues that Iran should depend solely on China; the debate has now turned to how Tehran can develop a more effective and balanced partnership with Beijing, a true alliance – one that can provide genuine support against U.S. hostility, contribute to national economic development, and reshape a new regional order.

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The Evolution of the Iranian Debate on China

In a previous ChinaMed Observer, we argued that the Twelve-Day War of June 2025 shifted the Iranian debate on China. American military aggression and European acquiescence dealt a blow to the reformist argument that Iran’s future lay in rapprochement with the West – a camp that had long viewed China with skepticism. Yet, the war did not simply settle a once-polarized debate in favor of the “hardliners” championing Tehran’s “Look East” strategy. Instead, a consensus developed across much of the Iranian commentariat: China did not fail Iran as much as Iran failed to understand China.

Rather than blaming China for its muted response during the Twelve-Day War, many Iranian experts argued that successive Iranian governments – including that of President Masoud Pezeshkian – had misread China’s strategic priorities. Tehran had an exaggerated belief of its importance within Beijing’s global agenda while failing to build a partnership that extended beyond the export of discounted oil. The common policy prescription was therefore not disengagement from China, but rather a cautious doubling down of ties with Beijing (without ruling out engagement with other partners).

However, this is no small feat. As noted in our interview with Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Iran’s weak relationship with China is due to deep structural constraints. Unlike the Gulf states, and even Iraq, Iran remains burdened by sanctions, financial isolation, and an underdeveloped investment environment.

If the Twelve-Day War shattered remaining illusions about the West, the 2026 conflict appears to have buried them altogether. This time, however, Iran came out of first phase of the war in a position of relative strength, with continued effective control over the Strait of Hormuz and the unbridled capacity to strike both Israel and Gulf Arab states. As such, Iranian analysts have recast the Forty-Day War as strategic inflection point, reinforcing the conclusion among many Iranian elites that Washington cannot be relied upon and that Beijing must become Tehran’s indispensable strategic partner.

This view was quite common within official circles during the months of the ceasefire. It was articulated clearly by Babak Negahdari, head of the Majlis Research Center, the research arm of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis, the country’s unicameral parliament). Speaking at an elite hearing on the consequences of the war and Iran’s new opportunities in the international arena, Negahdari argued that “the martyred leader always advocated and pursued the expansion of relations with China, and he personally followed up on relations with China across successive governments.” He also credited the current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei with continuing this strategic orientation, which he judged as a response to the fundamental difference between relations with Beijing and Washington: unlike with United States, relations with China are conducted “on an equal footing, between equals.”1

For Negahdari, closer alignment serves Beijing’s interests as well, as he framed the war as part of a U.S. strategy to undermine Chinese interests in the region. For Iran, however, deepening relations with China is a strategic necessity. Negahdari claimed – presciently, in hindsight – that the June 2026 U.S-Iran memorandum of understanding would not constitute a lasting resolution. According to him, the Forty-Day War was merely one chapter of a much larger conflict, arguing that Iran must seek a stronger and more comprehensive partnership with China as a result.2

A concrete indication of Tehran’s intention to prioritize relations with Beijing came on May 17, when Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s parliament, was appointed by the Supreme Leader as Iran’s Special Representative for China. According to Negahdari, Qalibaf was selected because of his pragmatism and the importance he attaches to expert-driven policymaking. In his view, the appointment represents a turning point in Sino-Iranian relations.3

Firstly, with the Supreme Leader absconded, Qalibaf has arguably become the regime’s de facto wartime leader, making his direct involvement in the China file a strong signal that Tehran views the relationship as a priority. Even more significantly, he appears to have taken in much of the criticism directed at Iran’s previous approach toward China. During a June 17 meeting with representatives of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, he acknowledged that Tehran had so far failed to fully capitalize on its relationship with Beijing. He called for reforms and the development of the logistic, transportation, and infrastructure capacity needed to establish stronger economic links with strategic partners like China.4

China as a Mediator, Ally and Untapped Partner

Interestingly, unlike elsewhere in the region, the possibility of direct Chinese military support to Iran has received remarkably little attention from Iranian analysts, even though Iranian media outlets have reported on international allegations.5 Likewise, there has been little discussion if China has leverage over Iran or if China has come out of the war as victor. For almost all Iranians, regardless of political stripe, if the war has winner, it’s Iran, first and foremost.6 Instead, the debate has focused on a different question: how much did China actually contribute to Iran’s perceived victory?

Two sometimes overlapping interpretations have emerged on China’s role in the war and the ensuing peace negotiations. The first, more positive outlook emphasizes Beijing’s diplomatic support for Iran, particularly its opposition to what Iranian commentators describe as “anti-Iranian resolutions” at the United Nations. The second stresses the limits of Chinese support, arguing that Beijing’s extensive economic and diplomatic ties with the Gulf Arab states constrained how far it was willing to align itself with Tehran, particularly on issues such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.7

Representing this more skeptical interpretation, Kioomars Ashtarian, associate professor of public policy at the University of Tehran, argued that many Iranian commentators failed to grasp the “subtle but fundamental” distinction between an ally and a mediator. Writing in the reformist daily Shargh, Ashtarian claimed that China has primarily acted as the latter, pursuing regional stability only insofar as it serves its own interests, including by opposing Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz.8

A similar view came from journalist Hani Rastegaran, writing for Shargh shortly before the May 2026 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing. He cautioned against placing excessive faith in China as a mediator, hypothesizing that Beijing may pursue a “grand bargain” with Washington. In his view, China “does not necessarily see U.S. involvement in Middle East crises as completely contrary to its interests,” particularly if it diverts American attention and resources away from East Asia and Taiwan.9

Offering a more favorable assessment, Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Tehran, argued that Beijing provided truly meaningful diplomatic support during the war. In an analysis published by the Tehran-based Center for Scientific Research and Strategic Studies for the Middle East, she presented China’s actions as evidence of Beijing’s role as a responsible international actor. At the same time, she implicitly acknowledged that Chinese support was due to its own interests: Beijing’s need for a stable regional environment to protect and expand its investments. Moreover, despite China’s efforts to diversify its energy sources, the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical vulnerability (before the war, approximately 56% of fossil fuel exports to China passed through this waterway). As such, regional stability and constructive relations between Iran and the Gulf states are not solely diplomatic preferences for Beijing, but national interests.10

For Yazdanshenas, the war has also created a strategic opening for China. By demonstrating to Gulf states that reliance on the U.S. does not necessarily guarantee security, and in fact creates new vulnerabilities, the conflict has strengthened Beijing’s influence in the region. According to her, this shift also benefits Iran: its demonstrated resilience has reinforced its perceived strategic importance for China. She thus argues that Beijing will help improve ties between Iran and its Arab neighbors as well as support the new mechanisms proposed by Iran and Oman regarding fees for safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.11

Hamed Vafaei, director of the University of Tehran’s Asia Research Center and co-director of the university’s Confucius Institute, offered a similar positive assessment of China’s wartime diplomacy in an interview with Tabnak News Agency. He rejected the argument that China was passive during the conflict, criticizing expectations that Beijing would provide overt battlefield support. Such expectations, he argued, stem from a misunderstanding of Chinese foreign policy principles. From Vafaei’s perspective, “China was one of the most active countries,” noting that Foreign Minister Wang Yi held more than thirty phone calls with Arab, Iranian, American, European and Israeli officials, as well as Beijing’s decision to dispatch envoys and a special representative – a level of engagement unmatched by Russia, the U.S., or European states. For him this diplomatic outreach demonstrates:

“On the one hand, that the Chinese are willing to play a role, and on the other hand, that various countries such as Iran, the United States, and even the Arabs expect China to act as a counterweight.”12

According to Vafaei, the result of this diplomatic outreach was the five-point plan proposed by China and Pakistan, which he judges as somewhat tilted toward Arab positions. He posited that this was partly the result of Iran’s limited diplomatic engagement with Beijing during the conflict, especially when compared to the extensive dialogue China maintained with Arab governments. As he revealed, he had “insisted that someone from the Islamic Republic also go and meet with this special representative, but unfortunately, that did not happen.”13

The Hormuz Blockade

Across much of the preceding commentary, one issue repeatedly surfaced: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s most powerful geopolitical card. However, Iranian commentators were divided over how China views Tehran’s control of the Strait. Some argued that Beijing is prepared to support Iran’s greater control over maritime transit.14 Others contended that China fundamentally opposes any disruption to shipping but may have to be forced to accommodate a new strategic reality if Iran succeeds in imposing it.15

Closely linked to this debate is the issue of how the blockade is affecting China. While some analysts portrayed such a scenario as a potentially devastating blow to the Chinese economy – albeit one that would inflict comparable damage on the world economy as a whole16 – others reached a different conclusion. Mohammad Hossein Emadi, Iran’s former vice minister of agriculture (1996–2004) and a former ambassador, reasoned that a prolonged disruption of the Strait may ultimately strengthen China’s global position. In his view, Beijing’s vast strategic reserves provide it with greater room for maneuver, allowing China to exert pressure on India and Southeast Asian states through energy and trade leverage. At the same time, a crisis in the Strait could accelerate trends favorable to Beijing, including global de-dollarization and the green energy transition.17

Regardless of these competing assessments, Iran declared that China is expected to receive preferential treatment under its proposed transit fee system for navigation through the Strait. Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, Iran’s ambassador to China since May 2025, indicated this in early July during the World Peace Forum in Beijing, stating that “for friendly and allied countries, among which China, facilitations and special considerations will be taken into consideration.”

The Iranian Leadership is Still Not Doing Enough

However, for some Iranian analysts, preferential treatment in the Strait of Hormuz alone is insufficient to secure China’s long-term attention or support. For Hamed Vafaei, the lesson of the war is that Iran must adopt a far more ambitious strategy toward China. Tehran, he argued, has too often reduced the relationship to narrow economic exchanges, particularly oil exports, while other regional actors have expanded cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and green energy. The goal, he stresses, is not dependence on China, but a partnership built around Iran’s own interests. In his view, Tehran has realized this fact (according to him “there is almost no one in Iran now who says we should not work with China”18), but a gap remains between understanding and action.19

In an interview with the Iranian Students’ News Agency, Vafaei argued more forcefully that cooperation with China is “not a choice, but a necessity.” In his view, Beijing had already demonstrated its willingness to play a meaningful role during the war with its intensive diplomatic engagement, asking rhetorically: “If we do not call this China’s willingness to play a role, then what should we call it?”20

For Vafaei, the main shortcoming therefore lies not with China but with Iran’s own diplomacy. “We cannot simply sit and ask why China is not doing anything; we are the ones who have to tell China what to do.” Rather than expecting Beijing to align automatically with Tehran, Iran must end its passivity identify concrete areas of convergence and engage China on the basis of its “progressive doctrine of non-alignment.” More fundamentally, Vafaei argued that Iran has yet to present China with a coherent vision for a new regional order. Such a framework, he contends, should be developed jointly by Iran and the Gulf Arab states, whose shared interest in regional stability aligns with China’s own interests.21

However, not all commentators are just as optimistic about Iran’s ability to seize this opportunity. In an interview on the Azad podcast, Mehdi Kharratiyan, director of the Institute for Policy Revival, argued that Tehran has repeatedly squandered favorable diplomatic openings. He pointed to May 2026 when Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin both visited Beijing while Xi Jinping travelled to Pyongyang, creating what he views as an unusually positive diplomatic environment that Iran failed to exploit. Kharratiyan also noted that Russia indicated both Moscow and Beijing were prepared to support Iran during the negotiations in Islamabad. He criticized the Iranian negotiating team, describing its performance as weak, having failed to mobilize the backing of the major powers to strengthen Tehran’s bargaining position. Implicit in his criticism is the view that the proposal made by Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, was never pursued with sufficient political determination.22

Hossein Qaheri, head of the Iranian and Chinese Strategic Studies Think Tank, offered a similarly critical assessment of Iran’s approach to Beijing. In an interview with Eghtesad 120, he argued that Tehran failed to clearly define what it expects from the relationship. In his view, the Islamic Republic has traditionally turned toward China during moments of need but neglected the partnership once immediate threats receded, because, according to him, “[Iranians] are intrinsically in love with the West.” Qaheri therefore claimed that Iran requires a structural change in how it manages ties with Beijing. The ambassador to China, he contended, should be a high-level representative with sufficient authority to shape policy rather than a conventional diplomat. As such, regarding the nomination of Qalibaf as Iran’s new Special Representative for China, he affirmed that his success would depend on whether the position is used to develop a clear strategic vision of what Iran wants from China.23

A more unconventional proposal for achieving a durable partnership with China comes from Kioomars Ashtarian. In a twist on the commonplace view that China has leverage over Iran, he instead argued that Iran, paradoxically, can strengthen its position with Beijing by maintaining greater autonomy rather than seeking closer alignment. Iran should operate independently regarding the Strait of Hormuz and use its “power of destruction,” its ability to make regional economic development and energy trade impossible without Iranian participation, to demonstrate its indispensability. Only by showing Beijing that its own economic and strategic interests depend on Iran, he argued, can China be persuaded to move from the role of mediator to that of a genuine strategic ally. As Ashtarian writes:

“If Iran can firmly establish the understanding that the region’s “glass palaces” of development cannot be built upon the “mud huts” of Iran’s underdevelopment through sanctions and exclusion, […] China may reconsider the scale and direction of its investments in the Persian Gulf and ultimately emerge as a strategic partner to both Iran and the Gulf Arab states.”24

At the same time, some analysts caution against making China the centerpiece of Iran’s foreign policy. Rahman Qahremanpour, an academic and policy analyst, maintained that Tehran should keep its possibilities open, remaining willing to cooperate with all countries willing to invest in Iran, including China, the U.S., and other major powers. In his view, Iran should avoid dependence on great powers and instead speak with middle powers, which provide greater room for maneuver. A great power like China, he argued, represents a resource but also a constraint because it can support Iran but also limit its options when its own strategic interests require it. Considering how China’s global influence continues to expand, Qahremanpour warned that Iran should be careful not to give the false impression that negotiations with the United States equal getting closer China and fully aligning with them.25

Conclusion

While maybe excessively emboldened by its successes in the Forty-Day War and the subsequent negotiations with the U.S., the conflict has reinforced the belief among Iranian commentators that Tehran must reassess its foreign policy priorities. Even prior to the resumption of hostilities, China was viewed across much of the Iranian political and expert landscape as one of Iran’s – if not its only potential strategic partner. The debate is thus no longer mainly about whether Iran should engage more with Beijing, but rather about whether China is willing to move beyond a pragmatic partnership to become a genuine ally for Iran.

Many Iranian commentators argue that China provided very meaningful diplomatic support during the conflict, demonstrated a willingness to assume a more active role in the region and even showed a willingness to back Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz. However, in their view, it is Tehran which has failed to translate this opening into concrete gains. The main obstacles, they argue, are Iran’s own diplomatic shortcomings: passivity, bureaucratic inefficiencies, weak negotiation strategies, and a tendency to reduce the relationship to oil exports rather than developing a region-wide strategic agenda.

Others remain more cautious. They argue that China’s actions during the war were ultimately due to its own interests, such as its need for regional stability, secure energy supplies, and good relations with the Arab states – and, to a certain extent, Washington. From this perspective, Beijing may support Iran when their interests overlap, but it is unlikely to fully align itself with Tehran at the expense of its core and regional interests, as illustrated by its statement over the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. These voices therefore warn that Iran should avoid dependence on China advocating instead for a network of partnerships, particularly with middle powers.

Nevertheless, even among these more skeptical voices, criticism is directed primarily at Tehran rather than Beijing. The central question is not whether China should be trusted unconditionally, but why Tehran has been unable to better leverage China. A few argue that Iran’s leverage lies in demonstrating its autonomy and capacity to impose costs when necessary, thereby convincing China that Chinese regional interests cannot be secured without accommodating Iran’s position. For most analysts, however, the challenge is less confrontation than transformation, turning China from a cautious mediator into an ally by presenting Beijing with a clear vision of Iran’s future regional role and by creating the institutional conditions necessary for deeper economic, diplomatic and strategic cooperation, not only between China and Iran, but also, with Beijing’s support, between Iran and the Gulf Arab states.

The appointment of the increasingly politically central figure of Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf as Iran’s special representative for China appears to reflect a recognition of these shortcomings. According to most Iranian experts, whether his nomination becomes a genuine turning point for relations with China will depend on Tehran’s ability to establish clearer objectives, improve coordination among state institutions, remove barriers to Chinese investment, and move beyond a transactional relationship. This ambition appears to enjoy broad support across the Iranian political spectrum; as “there is almost no one in Iran now who says we should not work with China.”

Veronica TURRINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Civilisation of Asia and Mediterranean Africa from Ca’ Foscari University in Venice, as part of which she did an academic exchange at the University of Tehran. Her research focuses on media coverage of China in Iran.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

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RUSI Guest Commentary - ”China Has Not Escaped the Middle East. It Has Learned to Live with the Risk” by Andrea Ghiselli

“China’s energy security strategy is working better than many expected. Not because China has escaped dependence, and not because it can control the Gulf. It cannot. Another prolonged Hormuz closure would still hurt China badly… While China has not escaped the Middle East, it has learned to live with the risk and to make that risk less strategically decisive.”

In this guest commentary for RUSI, ChinaMed Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli examines China’s energy security strategy in the Middle East and its resilience amid recent regional tensions.
[Available on RUSI’s website, click here to read]

Stimson Center -“The Sino-Moroccan Green Partnership in the Shadow of the Iran War” by Amanda Chen

“The convergence of Rabat’s green ambition and Chinese technological know-how fostered a growing Sino-Moroccan partnership aimed at bolstering Beijing’s energy resilience while accelerating the Kingdom’s path toward decarbonization. As the conflict in Iran continues to test global resilience, Chinese renewable projects in Morocco retain prospective value, but remain structurally limited to temper Rabat’s vulnerability to Gulf energy disruptions.”

ChinaMed Project Officer and Research Fellow Amanda Chen explores the role of Chinese green investments in Morocco and their implications for global trade, energy security, and supply chain dynamics in a rapidly changing international environment.
[Available on the Stimson Center’s website, click here to read]

Middle East Council - “The U.S.-China Summit and the Future of the Middle East” featuring Enrico Fardella

“China’s economic model is structurally dependent on weak domestic consumption and large manufacturing surpluses, generating an intrinsic dependence on external demand. The problem with global imbalances is that someone has to absorb these imbalances, which creates an intrinsic push in China’s diplomacy toward the Gulf as an alternative absorber, as Western markets— particularly the U.S. market —are becoming more defensive.”

ChinaMed Director Enrico Fardella, alongside Chuchu Zhang (Fudan University) and Ahmed Aboudouh (Chatham House; Emirates Policy Center), took part in a Middle East Council online panel discussion examining the implications of U.S.-China relations for Gulf states after the Xi-Trump summit.
[Available on Youtube, click here to watch]

The ChinaMed Research Team is happy to announce that our latest report, The Sino–Moroccan Rapprochement: An Analysis of Geoeconomic Convergence, Diplomatic Calibration and Media Narratives in a Changing Maghreb, is now available.

In this ChinaMed Report, Amanda Chen, Bianca Pasquier and Imane Ezzehouany examine the Sino–Moroccan rapprochement. Driven by a convergence between China’s efforts to secure its role in global value chains and Morocco’s export-led economic model, this pragmatic engagement has accelerated since Rabat’s accession to the BRI in 2017, particularly in the renewable energy, infrastructure, and logistics sectors.

Tanger Tech City, an industrial free zone co-developed by Chinese and Moroccan firms, has developed into a flagship BRI project that has attracted investments from major Chinese EV component and battery manufacturers. Strategically located between the Tanger Med port and Atlantic corridors, the Tech City seamlessly integrates industrial capacity with global trade routes.

Morocco’s rise as a middle power and growing importance in China’s regional strategy has turned into diplomatic leverage that appears to have recalibrated Beijing’s longstanding neutrality on the Western Sahara conflict. Without endorsing Moroccan sovereignty, Beijing has increasingly accommodated Rabat’s position while carefully managing its partnership with Algeria.

Against this backdrop, disruptions catalyzed by the Hormuz blockade have internationalized the Western Sahara issue as external actors reevaluate the region as an alternative corridor for energy and trade flows. Consequently, Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal for resolving the conflict has gained further traction as a viable framework for promoting economic security and regional stability.

Amid the shifting balance of power, the Sino–Moroccan rapprochement has become a prism through which French, Algerian, Tunisian and other external actors are reassessing their strategies to adapt to and harness the geopolitical momentum in the Maghreb.

This report was jointly produced by the ChinaMed Project, T.wai - Torino World Affairs Institute and John Cabot University in Rome.

Chinamed Report The Sino Moroccan Rapprochement

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While much of this report has already been published in previous editions of the ChinaMed Observer, this full report also includes new region-wide considerations in the introduction and conclusion. We encourage you to download it and have a read!

While data collection is still ongoing (this is a long-term project, and the full dataset is still being prepared for publication on our website1) we are pleased to offer an early snapshot of our findings through a case study authored by Ivana Rudinac, one of the minds behind this framework. In light of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s recent visit to China, she examines how different actors in Serbia responded to the deadly collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, a tragedy connected to a major China-backed infrastructure project.

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By Ivana RUDINAC

The modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest railway has been presented as one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure projects undertaken in Serbia over the last decade. As with other large-scale China-backed infrastructure projects, it has also been leveraged for political gain. However, the collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad railway station on November 1, 2024, killing sixteen people, exposed the underlying mechanisms through which such projects are negotiated and implemented, as well as the weakened or bypassed accountability channels.

The incident triggered one of the largest and longest-lasting protest movements that Serbia has seen since the country’s democratic transition in 2000. However, despite the important role of Chinese financing and contractors, the collapse remained primarily a domestic political crisis. A year and a half later, Serbia–China relations remain largely intact, reflecting the approach adopted by the key stakeholders of Serbia’s China policy.

Within days of the collapse, then Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević traveled to Shanghai for the China International Import Expo and signed a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese automotive parts supplier Minth. When meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Vučević said he did not want to join the “hysteria” against Chinese companies.2 The project has gone ahead and in October 2025, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić inaugurated the Novi Sad–Subotica section of the railway.

Building on the findings of our research project on the local stakeholders shaping Mediterranean countries’ China policy (for more on the methodology see here), this piece reflects on the Novi Sad tragedy through the Belgrade–Budapest railway project. Three groups of stakeholders emerge. At the center is the political core of the ruling coalition, led by President Vučić and Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which strategically drives and promotes China-backed infrastructure. The broader “winning coalition,” comprising actors within or aligned with the government – ministries, state enterprises, and contractors – facilitates project implementation. On the other hand, the collapse triggered a bottom-up challenger coalition of civic actors, students and investigative journalists, who have been demanding greater transparency and domestic accountability in these deals. The sections below outline the context and background of the project and then examine each of these stakeholder groups in turn.

Context: The Belgrade-Budapest Railway

The renovation of Novi Sad railway station was part of a much larger infrastructure project: the modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest railway, one of Serbia’s flagship transport investments and a central example of its infrastructure cooperation with China. The project was first agreed in Belgrade in 2014 at the summit between China and sixteen Central and Eastern European countries (the “16+1,” as it was known at the time). In November 2015, the governments of China, Hungary, and Serbia signed cooperation documents for the modernization of the Hungarian–Serbian railway line.3

Planned as a 350-kilometre high-speed connection between Budapest and Belgrade, of which 184 kilometers lie in Serbia, the railway has been presented as a strategic project that would reduce the travel time between the two capitals from eight hours to under three, but also make it compliant with European Union standards. There was a clear demand for modernization, as Serbia’s railway infrastructure had long suffered from underinvestment, leaving significant connectivity gaps.

The Serbian section was divided into three main parts. Two of these sections – Belgrade Center–Stara Pazova and Novi Sad–Subotica–State Border/Kelebija – were assigned to a Chinese consortium consisting of China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company (the remaining Stara Pazova–Novi Sad section was implemented by Russian Railways International). The Belgrade–Stara Pazova section was based on a $350.2 million Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract, 85% financed through a $297.6 million China Eximbank Preferential Buyer’s Credit, which entered full operation in March 2022. The Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija4 section was later contracted through a much larger $1.16 billion EPC agreement with the same Chinese consortium, again 85% financed by China Eximbank, through a $988.4 million Preferential Buyer’s Credit.

As reported by Radio Free Europe, parts of the Belgrade–Budapest railway initially benefitted from EU-funded technical preparation. The EU financed a €300,000 feasibility study for the Stara Pazova–Novi Sad subsection, for which the European Investment Bank was originally expected to provide financing. In 2011, however, Serbia informed the EIB that the loan would instead be sourced from Russia. The EU also provided nearly €4.8 million for technical documentation for the Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija section, designed for speeds of 160 km/h. However, Serbia later opted for Chinese financing and contractors after deciding to upgrade the line to 200 km/h, a shift Serbian authorities justified by reference to new technical ambitions and available financing.

The renovation of Novi Sad railway station was part of the wider modernization of the Belgrade–Budapest corridor, and specifically of the China-backed Novi Sad–Subotica–Kelebija section. This matters because the station’s reconstruction was embedded in the same broader model that has shaped several major infrastructure projects in Serbia: large state-to-state agreements, foreign loans, foreign contractors, strategic political visibility, and limited public insight into the contractual and implementation details. Understanding how this model operates, therefore, requires looking at the stakeholders who drive, implement, and contest it.

Who Sets the Direction: The Politics of Infrastructure in Serbia

Infrastructure development has become a central pillar of the Serbia’s ruling coalition, with electoral politics increasingly organized around a political economy of growth, connectivity, and public investments. The Belgrade–Budapest railway was therefore not only a transport project but also a source of political capital for the top of the ruling coalition. In March 2022, during an election campaign, President Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán became the first passengers to arrive at the ceremonially inaugurated Novi Sad station, even though construction works had not yet been completed. “If we continue at this pace, Serbia will be connected by a network of the most modern railway lines,” Vučić said at the event.5

The station was later closed for further works before being reopened on July 4, 2024, when then Minister of Construction, Transportation and Infrastructure Goran Vesić announced that the final passenger section had been opened, making the station “fully functional.” The event, attended by senior officials including then Novi Sad mayor Milan Đurić and the Vojvodina province president Maja Gojković, was once again framed as evidence of successful infrastructure delivery, with Vesić thanking Chinese partners and domestic companies.6

After the station canopy collapsed in November 2024 killing sixteen people, the ruling coalition’s initial response was to contest responsibility. President Vučić claimed publicly that the canopy had not been subject to reconstruction, stating: “Structurally, the canopy was unfortunately not reconstructed. If it had been, the tragedy would never have happened.”7 As reported by the pro-EU news and web portal European Western Balkans, pro-government media and some officials, most prominently former Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, advanced an alternative narrative framing the canopy collapse as a possible, or even deliberated, act of sabotage rather than the result of negligence.8 Under sustained public pressure, Prime Minister Vučević resigned in January 2025.

Despite sixteen deaths, mass protests, ministerial resignations, and ongoing corruption investigations, in October 2025 President Vučić inaugurated the Novi Sad–Subotica section, completing Serbia’s part of the Hungary–Serbia high-speed railway.9 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Adrijana Mesarović described the railway as a symbol of Serbia’s modernization, regional connectivity, and friendship with Hungary, while thanking “Chinese friends” and crediting Vučić’s leadership for the completion the strategic infrastructure project.10 The opening demonstrated that the Novi Sad collapse, while triggering the most serious domestic accountability crisis the regime has faced since coming to power, did not fundamentally interrupt Serbia’s China-backed infrastructure agenda. However, the question of how the agenda was implemented, and who was responsible when it failed, is closely linked to the institutional arrangements that shaped the project from the initial stages.

The Implementation Chain: Layers of Accountability

Investigative journalists, experts, and NGOs had warned for years about the governance risks surrounding China-backed infrastructure projects in Serbia. The core concern is that interstate agreements provided a legal basis for major infrastructure projects to be contracted outside Serbia’s domestic public procurement framework. The anti-corruption NGO Transparency Serbia flagged this pattern in 2021,11 citing the Belgrade–Budapest railway as an example of large infrastructure projects financed through international arrangements and contracted outside standard competitive procedures, thereby limiting public scrutiny over contractor selection and pricing.

Serbia’s Ministry of Construction acted as the main signatory, permit issuer, and institutional gatekeeper throughout the project’s implementation. Three successive ministers oversaw different phases of the project, Zorana Mihajlović, Tomislav Momirović, and Goran Vesić, all senior figures within the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) during their respective tenures. Local Novi Sad outlet 021 reported that the Ministry repeatedly refused to disclose reconstruction documents for the railway station, first citing objections from the Chinese consortium and later the requirements of the state-led investigation.12 Investigative journalists documented that the contract expanded substantially over time, with a significant gap between early estimates and later stated costs – a gap that, in the absence of a public tender, was not subject to any meaningful market test.13

The collapse triggered several parallel legal proceedings, but more than a year later, no final convictions had been reached. The public-safety case against former Minister Vesić and other state officials has been progressing slowly through the courts. Meanwhile, a separate corruption investigation has implicated former Ministers Vesić and Tomislav Momirović in alleged financial irregularities related to the railway reconstruction project.14 It is unclear whether representatives of the Chinese CRIC-CCCC consortium were ever formally questioned by the Serbian authorities. Much of what is publicly known about how the project was organized was compiled by investigative journalists and the informal Inquiry Commission, both of which operated largely outside of formal state structures. Their findings revealed that the Chinese consortium held primary contractual authority, while responsibility for actual construction was handed over to Serbian subcontractors, who in turn subcontracted further to other companies. Each layer dispersed both execution and risk further from any meaningful oversight. The third group of stakeholders sought to contest precisely this opacity.

Pressure from Below: The Bottom-Up Coalition

The collapse triggered the formation of a coalition of challengers operating largely outside formal institutions and the ruling coalition, comprising experts, journalists, students and citizens. Although in their engagement they often highlighted how the Chinese financing model has facilitated prevailing patterns of governance, their demands were primarily directed at the Serbian government and the ruling coalition rather than at China.

An independent inquiry commission, convened in the aftermath of the incident and operating outside of formal state structures, characterized the collapse as the result of a disorderly project environment, rather than a technical failure. Comprising university professors, civil engineers, legal experts, economists, media experts and retired judges, the commission’s report documented inflated costs, poor sequencing, inadequate supervision, and premature opening, contextualizing the case within broader concerns about institutional dysfunction and political accountability.15

Investigative media outlets compiled much of the public record, exposing inconsistencies in project documentation, permit status, inspection procedures, pricing, and subcontracting chains, often under visible pressure, including intimidation and political attacks.16 Transparency Serbia found that documents released under public pressure remained incomplete, with key contractual materials missing.17 Legal experts reinforced this assessment from a different angle: even where procurement exemptions rested on Serbia’s agreements with China, it was Serbian institutions that adopted, implemented, and defended those exemptions.18 Annex 2 to the Serbia-China cooperation agreement, which inserted the non-tender clause, was adopted by the SNS-majority Serbian parliament in August 2013.

The student and civic protest movement brought the issue of accountability to the fore. Starting on the evening of the collapse, the movement grew to become one of the largest in modern Serbian history. Students blockaded faculties at dozens of universities for months. The protests, under the slogan of “Corruption kills,” continued for over a year, drawing hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. The protesters’ demands were: all contracts should be published, attacks on protesters should be prosecuted, charges against detained demonstrators should be dropped, and infrastructure across the country should be inspected. The protests transformed the significance of the collapse, elevating it from mere tragedy to a symbol of a governing system where responsibility is displaced. However, they also revealed the limitations of public outrage within a political system capable of absorbing it.

Conclusion

What, then, does this analysis suggest about the future of Chinese-financed infrastructure in Serbia? While the stakeholder analysis indicates continuity, it also shows increasing contestation over the future terms of cooperation.

In the short term, economic cooperation with China is likely to remain intact. The ruling coalition has demonstrated a strong capacity to absorb reputational damage while preserving the underlying financing and contracting model. This model is deeply embedded in the political logic of the current regime: large infrastructure projects provide both visible evidence of government delivery and opportunities for political and economic rents. The arrangement also serves China’s interests. Because responsibility for implementation failures falls primarily on Serbian institutions, Chinese partners remain relatively protected from domestic political pressure. As long as the current coalition remains in power, which, given the ongoing political crisis, is no longer a certainty, the structural incentives sustaining these arrangements will persist and may even intensify. A regime facing growing political pressure has an especially strong need for the legitimating power of large and visible infrastructure projects.

At the same time, the Novi Sad collapse has changed the informational and political environment in which future projects will be negotiated. Civic actors, investigative journalists, and independent experts have accumulated expertise, visibility, and public credibility that were largely absent when the Belgrade–Budapest railway was initially agreed. Future infrastructure agreements are therefore likely to face greater scrutiny, increasing the political costs of the opacity that has characterized the existing model. Pressure for greater transparency is unlikely to originate from the Chinese side, which has little incentive to impose additional accountability requirements on a willing Serbian partner. Instead, such pressure as emerges is likely to come from domestic actors. The central question is whether this pressure will become strong enough to change the terms on which future deals are concluded, or whether it will merely make their political, social, and economic costs more visible.

The most plausible trajectory is therefore not an end to cooperation but growing domestic pressure over its governance.

Ivana RUDINAC is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from Central European University, where she is currently pursuing a PhD in Political Science. Her dissertation explores how development finance affects governance and reshapes state-society relations in recipient countries, with a focus on China’s development engagement in the Western Balkans. Her broader research interests include international development, governance, and the policy and politics of aid and investment - particularly the competing modalities between China and DAC donors.

By Imane EZZEHOUANY and Amanda CHEN

As Chinese manufacturers expand their presence in Morocco, concern is mounting in Europe and the United States that the Kingdom may become an “industrial platform” for China to circumvent trade restrictions. EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič framed the relocation of Chinese production to the Southern Neighborhood as a “big issue for the European economy,” arguing that Chinese overcapacity may be channeled into the bloc via third-party trade partners.1

Yet this is not the whole story. In Morocco, the expansion of China’s economic footprint is widely perceived as benefiting local development by generating employment opportunities and attracting industrial investment, especially in the emerging sectors of green technologies. Rather than a passive recipient of Chinese capital, Rabat has actively sought to channel these investments toward its own industrialization and decarbonization objectives.

This ChinaMed Observer examines the evolution of Sino–Moroccan economic ties following Morocco’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), focusing on Tanger Tech City as an emerging platform for green manufacturing driven by a convergence of geoeconomic interests between the two countries.

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The Foundations of a Geoeconomic Partnership

China and Morocco established a strategic partnership in 2016, during King Mohammed VI’s state visit. The following year, Rabat became the first African country to join the BRI. Since then, the value of Chinese assets in the Kingdom almost reached $750 million in 2024. Although Algeria continued to host larger volumes, Chinese FDI stock in Morocco increased more than fivefold over the same period, recording the strongest relative growth trajectory.

This rapid expansion strongly reflects Morocco’s attractiveness as an emerging industrial platform for Chinese manufacturers.2 The trend was driven less by traditional development finance than by private firms aligning their overseas strategy with Beijing’s new national priorities: the globalization of China’s renewable energy industry and the consolidation of the green value chain.3

Morocco holds over 70% of the world’s phosphate reserves, a key component of lithium-iron-phosphate batteries, alongside deposits of cobalt, manganese, nickel and copper.4 Combined with the Kingdom’s renewable energy potential and free trade access to European and American markets, this mineral endowment has made Morocco an attractive destination for Chinese industries linked to the green transition.

Chinese technological know-how aligns with Rabat’s decarbonization goals and ambition to become a regional hub for renewable energy production.5 Chinese firms are already involved in major projects, including the Noor solar complex in Ouarzazate6 – the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant – and a wind turbine blades factory in Nador for export and domestic needs. These strategic investments positioned Chinese companies as key players in Morocco’s path toward decarbonization.7

At the industrial level, Chinese EV component and battery manufacturers that have nearshored to Morocco benefit not only from proximity to mineral resources, but also from Rabat’s export networks and integrated automotive ecosystem spearheaded by Stellantis/Peugeot in Kenitra and Renault in Tangiers that have positioned it as Africa’s top car manufacturer.8 From Beijing’s perspective, relocating part of its EV manufacturing capacity to Morocco may act as a potential avenue for circumventing trade restrictions from the European Union and the U.S., with both of which Rabat enjoys free trade agreements.

On its part, Rabat has implemented a supportive policy framework. The 2022 Investment Charter further enhanced the country’s attractiveness by providing investment incentives to domestic and foreign firms alike. This convergence fostered a growing partnership that strengthens Beijing’s position in emerging value chains while accelerating the Kingdom’s path toward a net-zero economy.

In this context, Tanger Tech City, a flagship BRI project co-developed by Chinese and Moroccan stakeholders, has become a preferred destination for Chinese industrial investment. Although segments of the Moroccan press often echo European narratives that portray Chinese investments as opportunistic attempts to circumvent tariffs, Moroccan experts across political orientations generally view Tanger Tech City as a national enterprise for stimulating economic growth, improving infrastructure, and encouraging domestic production in the emerging sector of green technologies.

Tanger Tech City and the Political Economy of the BRI

The Mohammed VI Tanger Tech City was launched in 2017, the same year Morocco joined China’s BRI. Spanning over 2,167 hectares, it is among the largest industrial parks in the Kingdom – comprising a free trade zone and an urban settlement.9 From its inception, the project was expected to attract up to $10 billion from 200 Chinese companies operating in high-value-added sectors such as aeronautics, automobiles, and communication and information technology, alongside creating 100,000 jobs and providing housing for 300,000 residents within a decade.10

Despite the ambition, however, the project remains in the development phase due to initial disputes over asset distribution between the first Chinese partner and the local sponsor, BMCE Bank of Africa.11 This challenge reflected broader host-country sensitivities regarding control, ownership and sovereignty concerns related to BRI infrastructure. With regard to the dispute, the former president of the Tangier Region, Ilyas El Omari, asserted:

“The company that will own the city and build it needs to be Moroccan. We welcome Chinese companies but only as investors.”12

Moreover, the site’s susceptibility to flooding created technical hurdles that further deterred companies from moving in.

At this critical juncture, the Moroccan state intervened by signing a new agreement with state-owned China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), which acquired a 35% stake in the project. Moroccan stakeholders retained majority control through BMCE (25%), the Tangier-Tetouan-Hoceima regional government (20%) and the Tanger Med Special Agency.13 Following this restructuring, nearly 30 companies have signed contracts with the Tanger Tech Development Company (SATT),14 including 12 Chinese investors from the electric vehicle and battery sectors.15

Tanger Tech City thus performs a dual geoeconomic function. On the one hand, it facilitates the expansion of Chinese industrial presence along the BRI by operating as a gateway to Western markets thanks to Morocco’s strategic location and free trade agreements. On the other, Chinese capital and localised production can support Morocco’s industrial development and domestic value-capture.

A Sino-Moroccan “Corridor” for Automotive Electrification

Positioned on the Strait of Gibraltar between Africa and Europe, Tanger Tech has often been described as the North African counterpart of Shanghai, the world’s largest and busiest container port. The comparison reflects both Rabat’s ambition to position itself as a critical logistics hub and Chinese efforts to retain access to global markets.

From the Tech City, Chinese companies facing high tariffs applied to products originating from China may export to the EU and the U.S. without trade barriers. In a statement released to the Moroccan independent news magazine TelQuel, former Chinese Ambassador to Rabat Li Changlin noted:

“Our companies faced difficulties in Europe and chose to thrive in Morocco.”16

Early investors in the Tech City include Sentury Tire, which established a radial-tire manufacturing plant in 2023, alongside Bonsing Corporation (automotive textile coating), Haomei Material (aluminum profiles), Hailing Group and Lingyun Industrial (automotive components).17 Taiwan-based Froch Enterprise, a stainless-steel producer, also announced a $30 million investment to set up a local subsidiary.18 More recently, both Chinese lithium battery giants Shinzoom and its competitor BTR New Material have established cathodes and anodes plants projected to start production in 2026.19

While Morocco already hosts Western automotive manufacturers like Renault and Stellantis/Peugeot, Chinese firms are contributing to the electrification and diversification of the automotive value chain by localizing parts of production to the Kingdom.

Due to its proximity to Tanger Med, Africa’s largest container port, the Tech City functions as a strategic industrial-logistics corridor linking production to export routes. In this configuration, the flagship BRI project may also enhance the supply chain resilience of Chinese firms as global trade continues to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope amid volatility in the Gulf and the Red Sea. Under these conditions, the Sino–Moroccan platform may emerge as a stable alternative, bolstering both Rabat’s position as a logistics hub and China’s continued access to global value chains.

Strategic Resilience amid External Pressure

The economic entanglement between Beijing and Rabat has unfolded amid growing US-China trade frictions. While these tensions have enhanced Morocco’s attractiveness to Chinese investors, they have also raised concerns among local actors regarding the long-term reliability of the free trade agreements that underpin the Kingdom’s export-oriented economic model. Hassan Sentissi, President of the Moroccan Association of Exporters, lamented that the recent 10% tariffs imposed by the U.S. on Moroccan exports have been a disappointing setback for Moroccan companies engaged in international trade.20

Similarly, the European Commission’s decision on March 14, 2025, to impose countervailing duties on Moroccan exports of aluminum wheels also drew attention.21 As a clear consequence, Dika Morocco Africa, a subsidiary of the Chinese Citic Group, suspended the construction of its fourth aluminum factory in Kenitra, and redirected investments to Portugal in order to bypass these measures.22

These U.S. and European tariffs were interpreted as aimed at curbing Chinese economic influence rather than a direct challenge to Morocco itself. Yet, the President of the Moroccan Automotive Federation Adil Zaid warned that even limited measures targeting only specific products “could have a far more significant impact on Morocco’s appeal as an industrial hub” if extended to other strategic sectors.23

Positioned as a new industrial frontier, Tanger Tech City finds itself caught at the intersection of global trade rivalries and Morocco’s national development objectives. While Moroccan media have consistently highlighted the project’s potential to attract foreign and especially Chinese capital, generate employment, and consolidate the Kingdom’s role in the emerging industries, Rabat must contend with growing European and American scrutiny of Chinese geoeconomic influence in the region.

Yet, persisting volatility in global supply chains amid the Hormuz blockade may strengthen Morocco’s diplomatic leverage as external actors, and European partners in particular, accelerate decarbonization strategies reliant on access to its renewable energy base and logistical corridors. In this sense, the Sino-Moroccan partnership was driven not only by shifts in the international economy, but by Rabat actively positioning itself to shape emerging trade and industrial networks linking Africa, Europe, and Asia.

Imane EZZEHOUANY is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in History, Cultural Heritage, and International Studies at the University of Cagliari. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a second Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Cagliari, where she was subsequently involved in various academic projects as a researcher. Her research focuses on the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for North Africa.

Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds degrees from SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her research spans Chinese diplomacy, global value chains, and the nexus between geoeconomics and conflicts in the MENA region.

By Imane EZZEHOUANY, Bianca PASQUIER and Amanda CHEN

For decades, China has maintained a position of cautious neutrality on the Western Sahara conflict, balancing its relations with both Morocco and Algeria while supporting UN-led processes. Yet, the territorial dispute has become embedded within great power rivalry – a trend accelerated by the disruptions precipitated by the Iran War – as global actors view the mineral-rich region through the prism of geoeconomic competition and strategic connectivity.

As the United States seeks to preserve influence along the Atlantic corridor by encouraging a rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers, China has simultaneously come to view the region as a pillar of its long-term energy strategy, one that hinges upon a predictable and stable security environment. These dynamics, and the rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years, have raised questions over whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco’s autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.

Against this backdrop, this ChinaMed Observer examines the evolution of China’s position on Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb. More broadly, this issue continues our ongoing series exploring China’s approach toward frozen and underexamined conflicts in the Mediterranean region (you can check out our recent analysis on Libya here).

A Brief History of the Conflict

Origins of the Western Sahara War (1975–1991)

The Western Sahara conflict dates back to the end of Spanish colonial rule in 1976, when both Morocco and Mauritania laid territorial claims to the region. Both countries entered into armed conflict with the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi political and military organization supported by Algeria that seeks the independence of Western Sahara.1

Ahead of the Spanish withdrawal, Morocco and Mauritania had requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify the legal status of the territory. While the ICJ acknowledged the existence of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultans of Morocco and certain tribes in Western Sahara, stating that the territory was not a Terra Nullius before Spanish colonization, it concluded that such ties did not constitute claims for territorial sovereignty under international law.2

Morocco rejected the judgment, arguing that the Court ignored the concept of bayʿa, the “act of allegiance” to the leader, in Islamic jurisprudence and within the Moroccan monarchical system.3 A few months later in November 1975, King Hassan II organized the “Green March,” during which nearly 350,000 unarmed Moroccans entered Western Sahara to assert the Kingdom’s territorial claim. The four-day march forced Spain to the negotiating table and precipitated the Madrid Agreement with both Morocco and Mauritania, to whom it delegated administrative responsibilities in the process to “decolonize the Territory of Western Sahara,” while affirming that the views of the local population would be respected.4

However, politically and practically, this paved the way for Morocco and Mauritania to take control of the territory after Spain’s withdrawal in 1976. The Polisario Front rejected the partition and launched a war of independence against both countries by proclaiming the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in the same year.5 While Mauritania withdrew in 1979, over the years, Morocco has built a defensive wall known as the “sand berm,” encircling over 80% of the territory, with the remaining 20% under Polisario control. Since the eruption of the conflict, several Sahrawi refugees also fled into neighboring Algeria, where their descendants continue to live to this day relying on international humanitarian aid.

From MINURSO to Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal

In 1991, a ceasefire was announced by the United Nations Security Council (res 690/1991) with the establishment of MINURSO, a UN mission tasked with overseeing the organization of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. However, the referendum was repeatedly delayed due to Morocco and the Polisario’s disagreement over the eligibility criteria for Sahrawi voters, leading to a prolonged political stalemate.6 The repercussions of the impasse were not confined to the territory, but affected the geopolitical equilibrium of the entire region.

Due to Algeria’s long-standing support for the Polisario, the Western Sahara issue remains among the main drivers of its diplomatic tension with Morocco. Rabat has long been wary of Algiers’ role in the conflict, maintaining that its political, logistical, and diplomatic support for the Polisario makes it a key actor in the dispute.7 Jawad Kerdoudi, President of the Moroccan Institute of International Relations (IMRI), asserts that Algeria’s refusal to recognize itself as a party to the conflict makes it “responsible” for the impasse.8

In this context, regional tension and fundamental disagreements between Rabat and the Polisario/Algiers significantly undermined MINURSO’s mission. According to Riccardo Fabiani, North Africa Director of the International Crisis Group, “There were so many diplomatic and bureaucratic obstacles to the implementation of the referendum that it has become unattainable.”9 Sarah Zaaimi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program, further criticized the mission for “remaining paralyzed for years”.10

Since 2007, Rabat has shifted its approach by promoting an Autonomy Proposal for Western Sahara to be recognized under Moroccan sovereignty. This initiative has shifted the focus of the dispute from holding a referendum on independence as originally mandated by MINURSO, to finding a “mutually acceptable” political solution, which Morocco asserts is only possible through its autonomy plan.11 Yet, the Polisario has maintained its demands for a referendum and rejected the Moroccan initiative. For its part, Rabat does not recognize the Polisario’s claim to self-determination, which further stalls mediation efforts over the conflict.

The Abraham Accords and Growing Support for Rabat’s Position

Tensions have grown since November 2020, when the ceasefire broke down after Morocco used force to remove unarmed Sahrawi protestors in a UN-monitored buffer zone on the border with Mauritania. Hostilities were brief and no casualties were reported, since both the Moroccan army and Polisario fighters retreated almost immediately.12 The international community reacted with caution, as even Algeria urged both parties to avoid further escalation.13

In December, the first Trump Administration recognized Moroccan sovereignty on the territory as part of the Abraham Accords in exchange for Morocco normalizing its relations with Israel. Although the development led Algiers to break diplomatic relations with Rabat in 2021 over its perception of Moroccan-Israeli ties as a national security threat, Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara dispute has since continued to garner international support.

Over the past years, Morocco has encouraged the opening of consulates in the territory and accelerated its large-scale infrastructure and development projects in the Western Saharan cities of Laayoune and Dakhla under the banner of its Atlantic Initiative.14 By leveraging diplomatic outreach and geoeconomic incentives, especially among land-locked Sub-Saharan states seeking maritime access, Rabat has bolstered its sovereignty claim with growing international support.

According to Morocco’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Omar Hilale, more than 120 countries today endorse Morocco’s Autonomy Plan as a serious, credible basis for resolving the issue.15 Egypt and land-locked Mali were the latest countries to present their support. Following Rabat’s historic success at the UN Security Council with the adoption of Resolution 2797 in October 2025, an emerging international consensus around Morocco’s position on Western Sahara appears to be prompting even China to recalibrate its traditional approach toward the conflict amid the shifting regional balance of power.

China’s Evolving Position on Western Sahara

From Early Revolutionism to Diplomatic Neutrality

Beijing has historically adopted a position of diplomatic neutrality toward the Western Sahara conflict, refraining from explicitly taking sides between Rabat and the Algiers-backed Polisario, consistently declining to recognize either claim.16 Yet, this may appear odd when considering that in the early years since its foundation, China had supported anti-colonial struggles and national liberation movements in Third World countries through arms transfers and by training foreign fighters with its People’s Liberation Army.

For instance, China had not only supported Algeria’s provisional government since 1958, but also supplied it with weapons in its war of independence against France. Yet, this kind of military and political assistance was not offered to the Algiers-backed Polisario Front. Beijing’s differing approach toward the Algerian decolonization movement and the SADR were a result of a profound shift in its foreign policy in the 1970s. China was transitioning from the international revolutionism of the Mao era to a posture of peaceful development driven by economic growth under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

When the Western Sahara war broke out in 1975, Beijing had just regained its seat at the UN Security Council17 and was adjusting its role within the international system from that of a revisionist/challenger to that of a normative player. In this context, Wu Wanjun from Sun Yat-sen University and Pedro Sobral from Zhejiang Yuexiu University of Foreign Languages interpreted Beijing’s “non-interference” policy toward Western Sahara as a result of this pragmatic shift, aiming at maximizing Chinese economic interests in North Africa while balancing relations with both Morocco and Algeria.18

As a consequence, despite the Polisario’s self-identification as a “national liberation movement,” China did not extend the same level of ideological and material support it had previously provided to other national liberation movements. Moreover, Wu and Sobral argue that perceived similarities between Taiwan and Western Sahara as separatist regions supported by foreign powers may have consolidated a consensus between Beijing and Rabat, where “both sides remain neutral and do not interfere in each other’s domestic issues.”19

In spite of China’s position of diplomatic neutrality and support for MINURSO’s mandate by providing peacekeeping personnel to the mission, Moroccan, Algerian and Sahrawi commentators have interpreted Beijing’s stance as a form of veiled support for either claim.

In this regard, Fadoua Ammari from Hassan II University in Casablanca and Rida Lyammouri from the Policy Center for the New South have noted that Polisario representatives were excluded from the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) despite their African Union membership. In their view, “participation in these summits is structured around China’s diplomatic recognition policy, which excludes the SADR as a legitimate government of a sovereign state.”20 Atalayar, a Spanish-based publication focused on Maghreb–Europe relations, went as far as suggesting that by excluding the Polisario, this China–Africa summit clearly supported “Morocco’s territorial integrity.”21

These comments did not go unnoticed, spurring reactions from the Algerian and the Sahrawi press. Writing for the Algerian channel Al24 News, Latifa Ferial Naili critiqued Moroccan media’s “falsely claimed victory” by clarifying that the SADR has never participated in FOCAC due to it being a bilateral mechanism between China and select African countries, and not a multilateral event involving the entirety of the African Union.22 23 For its part, The Sahara Press responded to the perceived Moroccan media campaign by emphasizing that:

“China has constant and unwavering positions on the issue of decolonization in Western Sahara … reflected in the statements of representatives of this country at the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, as well as in the communiqués issued by the Chinese authorities on many occasions.”24

This divergence in interpretations raises a broader question about the extent to which China’s professed neutrality may be masking a more calibrated form of managed, strategic ambiguity.

Deepening Sino-Moroccan Relations: a Test for Beijing’s Neutrality?

From 2016 onward, China’s position on Western Sahara evolved from a strict, declarative neutrality to a managed ambiguity that increasingly aligned with Morocco’s diplomatic strategy while preserving Beijing’s ties with Algeria. A key inflection point was King Mohammed VI’s visit to Beijing in 2016, which took place at a critical moment for Morocco. Just weeks earlier, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had described Morocco’s presence in the territory as an “occupation,” a position that Washington also appeared to support at the Security Council.25

In this context, the visit heralded a new orientation in Moroccan diplomacy toward strategic diversification while maintaining traditional alliances with the United States and Europe. In Beijing, Mohammed VI and President Xi Jinping elevated bilateral ties to a “strategic partnership” and signed fifteen cooperation agreements. In 2017, Morocco became the first African country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. The political significance of this sequence was not only the scale of economic cooperation, but Rabat’s expectation that deeper ties with China might, over time, foster greater diplomatic receptiveness on Western Sahara.26

As China’s economic presence in Morocco expanded, maintaining strict neutrality became increasingly difficult in practice. Officially, Beijing’s doctrine remained unchanged: China continued to affirm support for a UN-led process based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference. Yet, since 2018, its behavior at the UN began to show small but meaningful adjustments.27 China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 2440, which introduced the idea of “a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution ... based on compromise”28 – terms seen as more compatible with Morocco’s autonomy proposal.

Meanwhile, China’s expanding economic footprint in both Morocco and Algeria made strict neutrality even more complex. To manage it, Beijing adopted a policy where caution prevailed whenever projects touched contested zones.29 Reports documented Chinese purchases of Western Saharan phosphates between 2018 and 2021, after which sourcing stopped.30 Beijing also showed hesitation over the Gâra Djebilet project – among the world’s largest iron ore reserves – located in Algeria’s Tindouf Province, home to Sahrawi refugee camps and a long-standing source of tension between Rabat and Algiers over mining rights.31 By adopting this approach of strategic caution, China was carefully protecting both relationships while avoiding steps that could be interpreted as political alignment.

When Algeria broke diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 over Rabat’s actions on Western Sahara and its normalization with Israel, Beijing again supported UN Security Council Resolution 2602, a text widely considered as favorable to Morocco’s autonomy proposal.32 While the vote was not a formal endorsement of Rabat’s claims, it nevertheless reflected Beijing’s transition toward a more flexible and pragmatic neutrality.

France’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in 2024 deepened Algerian perceptions of strategic encirclement. In this tense environment, President Xi’s stopover in Casablanca in late 2024 was widely interpreted in Morocco as a political signal.33 In Algeria, instead, frustration grew that Beijing’s position did not reflect the depth of Algerian support for China on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet.34 Reflecting these frustrations, the Algerian ambassador to China reportedly conveyed to Yahia Zoubir, a prominent expert on China–North Africa relations, his dissatisfaction with Beijing’s ambivalence:

“We have supported China on many issues, including China gaining a seat at the UN. We told our Chinese partners that Western Sahara is a different question from Tibet or Xinjiang to no avail.”35

At the same time, however, Chinese officials also sought to reassure Algeria of the importance Beijing attached to the bilateral relationship. In an interview with Zoubir, a former Chinese ambassador to Morocco observed that “ties with Algeria are more important and more comprehensive than those with Morocco.”36 China therefore sought to balance its commitments, navigating a landscape where both Algiers and Rabat expected their partnerships with Beijing to translate into more definitive diplomatic support.

This careful behavior became especially visible on October 31, 2025, when China abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 2797, which endorsed Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal as the framework for resolving the conflict. Fu Cong, China’s UN representative, justified the abstention by citing imbalances in the draft, but Moroccan observers saw it as a diplomatic success: China neither opposed the text nor shielded Algeria’s preferences.37 Neutrality had not disappeared, but it had become more flexible and strategically calibrated.

A similar pattern appeared in the security domain. While Algeria purchased advanced Chinese arms after the war in Ukraine constrained Russian supplies,38 Morocco also acquired Chinese combat UAVs in 2025 as part of its efforts to diversify military suppliers.39 Even reports of Polisario members using commercially available Chinese drones illustrate how China’s technological footprint reaches all sides without translating into political alignment.40

Taken together, developments since 2016 reveal a real evolution. By moving beyond mere declarative neutrality, China has adopted a policy of managed ambiguity: a calibrated stance where its investments, diplomatic behavior, and cautious silences shape an environment increasingly compatible with Morocco’s autonomy narrative; while still preserving the balance necessary to maintain its partnership with Algeria. Ultimately, this approach allows Beijing to influence the regional order to suit its interests without assuming the political costs or risks of a formal alignment.

Looking Ahead: China and the Shifting Regional Balance of Power

While China has maintained a balance of interests since 2016, its policy now intersects with a broader recalibration of power across North Africa. The Western Sahara conflict has evolved beyond a regional territorial dispute, recast as a central theater in a new “Cold War” defined by competing global alignments.41

As traditional Western influence faces the challenges of a fragmented Mediterranean policy, China and Russia have consolidated their presence, treating the region as a strategic pivot. Consequently, the fate of Western Sahara now conditions the viability of critical international assets – including Atlantic maritime gateways, trans-Saharan energy corridors, and connectivity routes that link the Sahel to global markets.

American Diplomacy and the Limits of Mediation

In this context, American diplomacy actively started to encourage a settlement between Morocco and Algeria. Washington’s urgency appears driven by a strategic concern that prolonged instability could create openings for rival powers along the Atlantic façade – a maritime sphere that has historically remained within the Western security orbit.

The United States has organized several confidential meetings since last autumn, aimed at finding a formula that addresses Morocco’s autonomy proposal while maintaining a meaningful role for Algeria.42 The first-ever U.S.-Algeria military cooperation agreement signed at the start of the second Trump administration suggests that Algiers may be recalibrating its own strategic alliances, potentially moving toward a framework that could lead to regional pacification.43

While these diplomatic moves could lead to a more stable environment, both governments face significant internal challenges. Raouf Farrah, an Algerian political science researcher, observed in the Middle East Eye that a visible gap persists between state policies and domestic public opinion, particularly regarding the role of external powers in the region.44

In Morocco, the normalization with Israel and the resulting strategic trade-offs have created friction with a population that maintains a strong alignment with the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, for the Algerian leadership, any perceived shift on Western Sahara risks contradicting the long-standing revolutionary principles and anti-colonial narrative that underpin its domestic legitimacy. This internal friction could make any formal agreement brittle or difficult to implement in the long term.

What Role for China?

Ultimately, the drive for stability in North Africa is not exclusive to Western interests; it has also become a structural necessity for China. Zhang Chuchu, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, observed that Beijing increasingly views North Africa as a “new fulcrum for energy security” — a trend that made Jonathan Fulton raise the question of whether the region is becoming a “Second Gulf” for Chinese interests.45 To protect its long-term investments — ranging from Moroccan green hydrogen to Algerian hydrocarbons — a predictable security environment is now paramount.46

Indeed, the March 2026 Iran War and the resulting maritime blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have accelerated this transition. While the United States seeks to stabilize the area to limit rival influence, China is focused on securing alternative energy supply chains that are geographically insulated from the current volatility of the Gulf. In this context, while Algeria’s role as a vital energy supplier could grant it renewed diplomatic weight, Morocco remains structurally exposed to energy shocks and domestic pressure.47 Yet, despite Algiers’ energy leverage, Rabat has maintained significant diplomatic momentum regarding its autonomy plan, including efforts to link the Polisario to Iran in order to secure further American support.48

In this evolving geopolitical environment, Beijing is expected to maintain its strategy of cautious hedging while gradually accommodating the emerging international consensus surrounding the Moroccan position. Given the intractable nature of the territorial dispute,49 China is unlikely to assume an overt role as a mediator despite its growing regional interests. The Maghreb remains in a delicate transition where the pursuit of energy resilience and maritime security continues to clash with rooted local rivalries. While China will continue to expand its economic interdependence with both sides, it will likely defer to other powers – such as the United States – to manage the political complexities of the mediation process.

Imane EZZEHOUANY is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in History, Cultural Heritage, and International Studies at the University of Cagliari. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a second Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Cagliari, where she was subsequently involved in various academic projects as a researcher. Her research focuses on the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for North Africa.

Bianca PASQUIER is Project Officer and Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Sciences at the University of Turin and holds a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include the foreign policies of MENA countries and the media coverage of China in North Africa.

Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds degrees from SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her research spans Chinese diplomacy, global value chains, and the nexus between geoeconomics and conflicts in the MENA region.

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By Amanda CHEN

China’s economic interests and energy security hinge upon a relatively stable Middle East since the region was designated as an extension of its periphery during the Third Plenum in 2013. While previous escalations had been geographically contained, the Gaza War, the recent U.S.-Israeli joint offensive and Iran’s retaliation have regionalized the crisis from the Gulf to the Levant – generating persistent uncertainty, mass displacement in Lebanon, and wider disruptions to global food, economic and energy security.

As Beijing prepares to host the Second China–Arab States Summit later this year, developments in the Iran War will inevitably shape the conference agenda. This is especially true as Chinese diplomacy is being tested not only by the scale of violence in the region, but also by Arab states and publics’ expectations of what a responsible major power should do. After all, the widely invoked notion that “with great power comes great responsibility” was echoed by Beijing itself. As Chinese FM Wang Yi noted, “In 2026, with the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan, China’s major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics should accomplish more.” The question is, how?

Having explored Gulf and “resistance-aligned” Arab perspectives in our previous ChinaMed Observer, this issue features an interview between Research Fellow Amanda CHEN and Palestinian scholar Razan Shawamreh focusing on the Levantine front – which has so far remained underexamined in the China–MENA expert commentary. Shawamreh candidly interprets Beijing’s current posture and its strategic limits, before exploring possible ways to bridge the gaps between regional expectations and China’s Middle East policy.

Dr. Razan Shawamreh is a scholar of Chinese foreign policy with a regional focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Her research explores China’s diplomatic, economic, military, and soft power engagement across the region. She was selected as a member of the MESA Global Academy and serves as a lecturer at the American Arab University. You can follow her on X (formerly Twitter) @RazanShawamreh.

The interview was conducted in written form and finalized on April 8, in the immediate aftermath of Trump’s announcement of a two-week ceasefire with Tehran, all while Iranian missiles continued to rain on Arab Gulf states and Israel conducted its deadliest strikes to date on Beirut, killing at least 203 people in the Lebanese capital. While accounting for these developments, Shawamreh’s analysis ultimately transcends near-term trajectories to examine Beijing’s strategy, and the region’s interests and expectations shaping China–Arab relations.

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Amanda CHEN: How do you interpret China’s posture in the war?

Razan Shawamreh: A useful starting point for understanding China’s posture may come from the Chinese proverb “Sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight.” In my view, this logic explains Beijing’s position toward the ongoing war: it has no interest in rescuing the U.S. as it sinks under the weight of its own mistakes. This became clear when Beijing deflected Trump’s request for direct Chinese intervention. Rather, China has operated within strict diplomatic boundaries from the outset, with a rhetoric emphasizing a “cessation of military actions” and the “resumption of dialogue,” coupled with cautious engagement.

There are differences, however, when this rhetoric is compared to that issued during the “Twelve-Day War” in 2025. While Beijing then issued explicit condemnations, it now avoids condemning American-Israeli strikes on Iran, opting instead for expressions of “high concern.” This restraint likely stems from direct U.S. involvement and a desire to avoid provoking the Trump administration ahead of the rescheduled May summit and sensitive economic negotiations. Explicit condemnation has been reserved only for attacks on civilians and the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative further illustrates this cautious approach. Notably, the document omits the war’s causes and fails to name the U.S. or Israel. By focusing on humanitarian aid, infrastructure protection, and maritime security, the initiative seems more like conflict management than resolution, or at best, a diplomatic off-ramp for all parties toward de-escalation, if they want. At this stage, this proposal is not to resolve the conflict. It intends to offer a platform for negotiation, and we should not expect more. A way for parties to move down the high tree they climbed.

This initiative, I think, remains largely confined to broad normative principles. By emphasizing conflict management rather than resolution, it functions more as a statement of intent than an actionable peace plan. Crucially, it avoids identifying aggressors or distinguishing between offensive and defensive actions, which undermines accountability. It also lacks essential implementation mechanisms: there are no provisions for sanctions, monitoring, verification, or enforcement, nor any peacekeeping or guarantor structure. As a result, while the initiative aligns with international law and diplomatic norms, it does not address the fundamental political realities required to terminate hostilities.

Indeed, this cautious approach also has its limits. This is evident in China’s veto of the draft resolution proposed by Bahrain on April 7 aimed at reopening and securing the Strait of Hormuz. This veto can be understood through a distinction between the said and the unsaid: China’s official justification on the one hand, and its underlying strategic interests on the other.

Officially, China justified its veto by saying that “the draft resolution fails to capture the root causes and full picture of the conflict in a comprehensive and balanced manner,” referring to the war launched by the United States and Israel. China further stated that these strikes were conducted “without authorization from the Security Council and while negotiations between Iran and the U.S. were underway,” constituting a violation of the UN Charter and the basic norms of international relations.

However, I think that this explanation appears incomplete. In its own initiative with Pakistan, Beijing also avoided addressing the root causes of the conflict or naming the aggressors. This suggests that the veto is also driven by unspoken strategic considerations, namely, China’s economic and geopolitical interests. During the war, Iran appears to have provided China with significant strategic advantages. By leveraging U.S.–China competition, Iran may have strengthened China’s position by offering security guarantees to Chinese shipping through the Strait and maintaining oil exports to China. Iran also signalled its willingness to accept payments in Chinese yuan for shipping passing through the Strait. These developments suggest that China may anticipate a stronger role in the Strait of Hormuz after the war, which could explain its decision to veto the resolution.

At the same time, this position should not be interpreted as being directed against Gulf countries. In previous instances, such as a Bahrain-sponsored resolution (UNSC res 2817) concerning Iranian attacks in the Gulf, China chose to abstain rather than veto, allowing the resolution to pass. This contrast indicates that China’s decision in the Hormuz case is driven by its direct and substantial interests in that specific context.

AC: Do you see an underlying strategy shaping this response?

RS: China’s underlying strategy is one of calculated adaptation rather than intervention. Beijing appears to stick to its strategy of prioritizing economic security over political alignment. Rather than attempting to shape the conflict’s outcome, China is preparing to manage its consequences, manifesting the pragmatic wisdom that it does not matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.

This pattern is evident in Syria, where Beijing normalized relations with the new government less than three months after the collapse of its “longtime friend,” the Assad regime. Similarly, in Venezuela, despite strongly condemning U.S. actions against Nicolás Maduro, reports indicated that China quickly transitioned to trading oil through U.S.-approved channels. The U.S. subsequently labelled these deals as legitimate business, proving that China is willing to operate within U.S.-established power structures to secure resources. This suggests that China’s strategy toward Tehran is not about saving/backing a specific regime, but about ensuring that, regardless of the victor, and whether the regime will prevail or not, Chinese economic interests and energy flows remain uninterrupted.

AC: In a recent article for The New Arab, you argue the war is both a challenge and opportunity for China. On the one hand, it challenges Beijing’s professed “neutrality”. On the other hand, you suggest that from China’s perspective, this may be an “opportunity to reshape international and regional relations” if only the region could emerge more “sovereign and independent.” Could you elaborate more on that?

RS: The current conflict could be seen as a challenge to China because it engulfs countries which have comprehensive strategic partnerships with Beijing: Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Yet, China’s relations with U.S. allies (Israel, UAE, and KSA) have often been more stable than its ties with a sanctioned Iran, even if Beijing views Tehran as a vital partner in its global anti-U.S. hegemony club.

This tension was reflected in China’s abstention from the aforementioned UN Security Council Resolution 2817, proposed by Bahrain on behalf of the GCC and Jordan condemning direct Iranian attacks on Gulf states as a breach of international law. By choosing to abstain, China allowed the resolution to pass, a move that could be interpreted as a quiet “win” for its Gulf partners, and, by extension the U.S., despite Beijing’s refusal to formally condemn Iran, preferring a broader denunciation of attacks on civilians whether in Iran or the Gulf countries.

Regarding the opportunity, Beijing could be seen as applying elements of what could be called the “Sino–Central Asian Model” to the Middle East. With this I mean that China leverages regional instability and rising anti-American sentiment to challenge the existing security order. We saw this playbook in action in 2005, when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization leveraged regional volatility to push for the closure of U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Today, Beijing may be using the war, and the Gulf’s exposure to it, to question the long-term utility of the American security umbrella. When Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Omani counterpart that Gulf states should “oppose external interference, develop good neighborliness, and truly hold their future firmly in their own hands,” he was delivering a message. Beijing is framing U.S. military presence as a primary source of regional vulnerability. The subtext is clear: if the Gulf seeks a deeper partnership with China, it must first move toward a post-American regional architecture by reducing foreign military footprints. In this framework, Beijing remains reactive; the initiative must be taken by regional actors first, only after which China can move to consolidate its presence, a sequence previously demonstrated in Central Asia.

AC: Do you observe differences between Palestinian, Levantine, and broader Arab perceptions of Beijing in the current war?

RS: To understand current Arab perceptions of China, we must recognize a recurring historical pattern in the Middle East. Historically, Arab perceptions have often been shaped by the “liberation rhetoric” of rising global powers seeking to challenge an established hegemon. We see a recurring historical pattern where Great Britain first utilized anti-Ottoman rhetoric, claiming to “liberate” Arabs from “Turkish occupation” during WWI to secure its own regional interests. The United States later entered the region under the banner of “anti-colonialism,” utilizing Wilsonian principles and Roosevelt’s rhetoric to displace European colonial powers. Today, China employs a similar “anti-hegemony” rhetoric to position itself against U.S. dominance.

In this sense, perhaps the primary distinction in regional perceptions is not necessarily found between different Arab sub-regions, but rather in how China is perceived relative to the United States. Recent data, such as the 2025 Arab Opinion Index, suggests that while China’s favourability rose following the events of October 7, 2023, this shift was driven more by a collapse in the credibility of the U.S. and the EU, than by China’s specific interventions. In this context, China is often viewed through the prism of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” appearing as a more attractive partner by default because it is perceived as the only viable alternative to a Western-led order.

However, a significant mismatch exists between regional expectations and China’s actual preferences. After two years of war and China’s relatively passive role toward Gaza, leaders and citizens are more likely to reconsider Beijing’s actual influence. This tested and tried reality suggests that while China’s rhetoric sounds supportive, its power position remains limited. This is now evident in the case of Iran: despite close ties, China’s approach signals that its boundaries are narrower than many in the region initially hoped.

Ultimately, regional favor is constructed not necessarily out of an alignment with the rising power’s specific policies, but out of frustration with the established power. This pattern is repeating: from anti-Ottomanism to anti-colonialism, and now to anti-hegemonism. These powers reshape regional perceptions to reflect their own rising status, often transforming the Middle East into a battleground for Great Power competition. In doing so, they create spheres of influence that prioritize global strategic rivalry over the actual security and developmental needs of the regional populations.

For Palestinians and the broader Arab public, “neutrality” and “anti-hegemony” that fail to deliver tangible change risk being seen not as a revolutionary alternative, but as another chapter in a long history of great power pragmatism.

AC: The Gulf and Levantine fronts appear to differ markedly in both dynamics and implications. Can you elaborate on that, and how this may persist after the war?

RS: The dynamics of the Levantine and Gulf fronts are driven by distinct historical factors that will create divergent post-war trajectories. In the Levant, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, instability is chronic. This region serves as the primary theater for Israel’s settler-colonial objectives and territorial expansion. The absence of a long-term political resolution guarantees a continuous state of conflict. Even as Syria attempts to navigate survival by distancing itself from the frontline, it remains a target for Israeli escalation. Consequently, the Levant lacks indicators of near-term stability, remaining trapped in a cycle of occupation and unresolved territorial struggle.

In contrast, instability in the Gulf is a situational byproduct of the broader confrontation between the U.S., Israel, and Iran. Recent Iranian strikes against Gulf targets represent an unprecedented escalation rather than a manifestation of a permanent state of war. Post-war trajectory is likely to prioritize a rapid return to managed coexistence.

Once the current war on Iran concludes, Gulf states are expected to focus on insulating their economic modernization plans from further shocks. The shape of regional security is the concern of everyone; and ideas range from containment and cooperation with Iran to confrontational posture. Oman and Iran are reportedly engaged in talks regarding a draft protocol to monitor traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Most importantly, a statement made by the Gulf Cooperation Council on April 2, emphasized that the Gulf states want to establish normal relations with Iran and resolve all security issues cordially.

Driven by the need to protect their long-term developmental goals, actors like Qatar and Oman are positioned to lead diplomatic de-escalation efforts between Tehran and the U.S. Ultimately, while the Gulf will move toward insulating itself to restore stability, the Levant will likely persist as a zone of permanent friction due to the fundamental nature of the unresolved conflict at its core. The countries of the Levant will likely follow the GCC’s lead on post-war posture and relations with Iran. These are weak countries and rely on Gulf support, both financially and diplomatically.

AC: China is among the few global actors with friendly relations with all the parties involved in the war. As the ceasefire remains fragile and hostilities continue in Gaza and expand in Lebanon, do you think this position of neutrality is sustainable in the eyes of Arab publics, and Palestinians?

RS: The current war on Iran could be seen as a critical geopolitical expansion of the regional instability that began with the Israeli genocide in Gaza since October 2023. To evaluate China’s position as a “neutral” actor, we must first interrogate the structural nature of that neutrality. In a landscape defined by asymmetrical power, military occupation, and long-standing colonial structures, can any state truly maintain a detached or impartial stance? In simple terms, is neutrality even possible in a context defined by colonialism and occupation? When great powers present themselves as neutral, this may mask moral disengagement, allowing interest-driven policies to operate under the cover of balanced rhetoric. In this sense, neutrality may amount to implicitly siding with the occupier.

In conventional political terms, neutrality implies maintaining an equal distance from all contending parties. However, this claim must be tested against a concrete benchmark. If we take UN resolutions and international law as a minimal baseline, any genuine impartial position should at least uphold core Palestinian rights, including self-determination, statehood in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza, the return of refugees, and the dismantling of settlements. Within this framework, China’s official discourse appears to align with these principles, while also emphasizing Israel’s security and right to exist.

However, in practice, this neutrality becomes questionable when scrutinizing the extent and nature of China’s economic engagement with Israel, particularly its involvement in settlements expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While it is unclear why the Chinese government would allow its state-owned and private enterprises to operate in illegal Israeli settlements, this reality nevertheless suggests a material contribution to the continuation of the colonial reality on the ground. This contradiction reflects what I described as “biased impartiality”: a state where declared diplomatic neutrality is contradicted by economic and material actions that favor the occupying power. Given this gap between rhetoric and practice, such a position is unlikely to remain sustainable in the eyes of Arab publics and Palestinians. As the conflict intensifies, perceptions are shaped less by diplomatic language and more by tangible actions. A neutrality that appears to accommodate or enable ongoing occupation risks being seen not as balanced, but as complicit, therefore undermining the credibility of a rising great power and its global responsibilities in the eyes of Arab publics.

As for the American-Israeli war on Iran, I would argue that China is not a neutral actor; rather, it is a cautious one. I believe that as a rising power with long-term strategic ambitions, China’s actions are dictated by its own interests, which often diverge from those of the regional parties. This strategic caution means that, as an emerging global power, China’s regional policy is dictated by long-term ambitions that often diverge from the immediate survival or security needs of regional actors. After more than two years of devastating warfare in Gaza, followed by Israeli military escalations in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Qatar and now Iran, many in the region are contrasting Beijing’s caution with the more assertive stances taken by other middle powers in the Global South.

For Palestinians and the Arab public, this wait-and-see approach risks eroding China’s credibility as a reliable alternative to Western influence. While the region remains in need of a development partner, it is also a theater of intense insecurity where states seek political partners/allies, not just economic investors. China’s reluctance to engage directly in conflict resolution, exemplified by its preference for joint initiatives with third parties like Pakistan, or its tendency to delegate responsibility to a deadlocked UN Security Council with regard to the Palestinian cause, suggests that while China is a major player, it has yet to assume the role of a decisive political stakeholder. This suggests that its current posture may eventually face a crisis of legitimacy among those who once viewed Beijing as a potential counterweight to the prevailing global and regional order.

AC: If that is the case, to what extent, do you think, might the war drive policy adjustments in Beijing’s approach toward regional actors?

RS: In the short term, I do not foresee a major shift in Beijing’s approach toward Middle Eastern actors. China’s strategic focus is currently consumed by two existential priorities: the security of its energy supply and, more critically, the escalating tensions over Taiwan. The recent, historic shift in Japan’s defense posture has fundamentally altered Beijing’s regional calculus. By explicitly linking Taiwan’s security to its own national survival and asserting a right to self-defense in the event of a change in the island’s status, Tokyo has redefined a territorial issue as an existential threat to the Japanese state. For Beijing, the revival of what it perceives as Japanese militarism, framed under the guise of “survival-threatening situations,” is a far more immediate and dangerous development than any conflict in the Middle East. Consequently, this regional tension necessitates Beijing’s full strategic attention, leaving little room for a policy overhaul in the Levant, Iran or the Gulf.

AC: Finally, if Beijing is unlikely to adjust its policy in the region, how may this affect expectations that regional stakeholders hold regarding China’s role?

RS: There is a persistent gap between rhetoric and reality. Regional stakeholders have always expressed hopes for a more robust Chinese role. It is difficult to find a diplomatic statement from the Gulf or the Levant that does not emphasize the expectation for Beijing to exert more effort to mediate or intervene. However, China has remained largely passive across all regional conflicts since 2023 due to the strategic boundaries mentioned above. As these wars continue without a significant Chinese breakthrough, regional stakeholders are likely to conclude that Beijing lacks the necessary leverage or will to act as a diplomatic guarantor. Consequently, despite their frustrations, these countries will likely remain aligned with the United States as the only power capable of direct intervention.

Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project covering China’s relations with Israel and the Arab Gulf states. She is a graduate of SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her interests include China–Middle East relations, conflict mediation practices, and global philanthropy, with a focus on the role of civil society in shaping these transnational processes.

By Francesca Daniele

On March 11, 2026, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2817. Proposed by Bahrain and backed by fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as Jordan, the resolution condemns “in the strongest terms” Iran’s “egregious attacks” against Gulf states, deeming them a clear breach of international law and demanding their immediate cessation. Far from a purely symbolic rebuke of Tehran’s claim that its actions were an inevitable retaliatory response to U.S. and Israeli aggression, the resolution establishes legal obligations that could, in principle, open a pathway toward enforcement.

With 135 co-sponsors, Resolution 2817 secured unprecedented international support, marking an apparent diplomatic victory for the GCC. Yet, there was no unanimity within the Security Council itself: thirteen members voted in favor, while China and Russia abstained. Moscow had tabled its own alternative, more generic draft that avoided naming specific actors, but it failed to gain traction despite Beijing’s support. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Fu Cong explained the abstention by stating that while Beijing “does not go along with Iran’s attacks against the Gulf Arab states,” the resolution failed to “fully reflect the root cause and the overall picture of the conflict in a balanced manner.” This stance, alongside China’s opposition to the use of force, was behind its subsequent coordination with France and Russia to dilute, delay and veto a follow-up Bahraini draft resolution to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force.

China’s rhetoric and diplomacy have not gone unnoticed in the Arabic media and expert debate. As examined in recent editions of the ChinaMed Observer, Beijing’s abstention reflects its balancing act: preserving its “strategic partnership” with Iran – to oppose the U.S. – while signaling concern over violations of GCC sovereignty, in light of the region’s importance to China’s energy security and economic interests.

This ChinaMed Observer examines how experts in the GCC and pan-Arab media interpreted China’s response to the war. The relatively limited coverage reveals less a unified assessment than a pattern of projection: seeing in Beijing what aligns with their own strategic narratives. The Gulf press often portrayed China as distant yet ultimately benign, lacking affinity with Iran and sharing the GCC’s security and economic concerns. In contrast, alternative pan-Arab outlets framed the conflict as part of a wider global struggle, casting China as aligned with, and allegedly providing military support to Iran and the “resistance.” Between these extremes, a smaller group of experts offered more calibrated assessments of China’s engagement. Yet, what ultimately unites these otherwise divergent readings is a shared conclusion: China is the long-term winner of this unwanted war.

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Is China Still Ambivalent on Iran?

Despite the gravity of the crisis enveloping the Gulf, China’s ambivalent posture has not featured much in the Arab expert debate. This is not to say that Chinese statements or initiatives have gone unnoticed; rather, they have been consistently eclipsed by far more urgent and contentious issues. For instance, Gulf commentators have been engaging in a heated debate on whether GCC states should intervene militarily against Iran, whether U.S. and Israeli actions reflect an unforgivable disregard for Gulf security, whether continued reliance on the American security architecture remains viable, and whether Iran can still be regarded as a credible partner. That such an unusually candid debate is also unfolding within the Gulf’s tightly managed media environment only further reflects the depth of regional unease; revealing diverging positions even within the GCC (for an ongoing overview of this debate check out the Substack The Gulf Nashra).

Within this high-intensity context, China’s diplomatic messaging and mediation proposals, though reported, initially drew scant attention from Arab experts. This indifference has persisted over the past month of war, despite Beijing’s outreach through Special Envoy Zhai Jun and peace proposal with Pakistan. This response was likely less an oversight than a judgment: China’s role is probably seen as lacking credibility.

This is nothing new. As previously observed, Arab expert discourse during the “Twelve-Day War” showed little sustained interest in Chinese mediation efforts. Instead, attention centered on China’s relationship with Iran, probing Chinese rhetoric, and more tellingly, inaction. Beyond condemning U.S. and Israeli strikes, China allegedly provided no material support to Tehran, a restraint that clashed with the supposed depth of Sino-Iranian ties. Beijing is not only the main purchaser of sanctioned Iranian oil, but also supported Tehran – with which it signed a 25-year agreement in 2020 – in joining the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the aftermath, this gap was closely scrutinized by Gulf-based analysts, several of whom viewed Iran’s predicament with thinly veiled satisfaction.

A similar dynamic re-emerged in the early phase of the current war. Coverage by outlets such as Al Jazeera, Asharq Al-Awsat, and the Jordanian daily Al-Ghad mostly sought to explain Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct support to Iran, and apparent effort to maintain diplomatic distance. Much of this reporting, however, relied heavily on Western sources (including the Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal, and The Telegraph) which have framed China as unreliable and having “little to offer Iran beyond statements.” Against the backdrop of early U.S. and Israeli operational successes, including the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, this narrative framed China as ineffectual in shaping outcomes or protecting its partners, raising questions about the credibility of its global ambitions.1

As such, many Arab commentators have reported on, and in some cases even accepted, the Western‑framed idea that the war against Iran may be intended, at least in part, to indirectly undermine Beijing’s energy supply, regional influence, and challenge to the Western‑led order. This narrative has circulated widely as Western observers likely search for strategic explanations for a war that is damaging both the global economy and U.S. reputation.2

Where China drew sustained attention from Arab media was, unsurprisingly, in speculation over potential military support to Iran. For example, the UAE-based news outlet 24.ae, citing Israel’s Channel 12, reported that despite two years of negotiations with Russia and China, Iran ultimately did not receive advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. The implication is clear: both Moscow and Beijing appear content to remain at arm’s length, unwilling to risk direct confrontation with Washington for the sake of Tehran.3

Yet, Ahmed Aboudouh, head of the China Studies Unit at the Abu Dhabi-based Emirates Policy Center, offered a more nuanced assessment shortly before the outbreak of war. Writing for Chatham House in his capacity as an Associate Fellow with its Middle East and North Africa Programme, Aboudouh cautioned against the prevailing Western interpretation that China’s restraint signals unreliability, indifference toward Tehran, or a lack of strategic ambition in the Middle East.4

For Aboudouh, “This assessment… is hasty. It misses the long-term lessons that the 12-day war revealed about China’s position on the nuclear negotiations. It also overlooks Beijing’s main objectives for its future relations with Tehran.” According to him, China’s approach is closely tied to its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran, which may trigger a regional war. Such a war would endanger critical shipping lanes, disrupt China’s energy imports, and expose Gulf states “where China’s commercial interests far outweigh its ties with Tehran.” It could even accelerate nuclear proliferation among Japan, South Korea, and Australia, complicating China’s more immediate strategic environment.

“Given this, it may even be fair to assume that Beijing would tolerate limited US-Israeli strikes on Iran as a negotiating tactic if they could secure a diplomatic breakthrough that resolved the Iranian nuclear issue without triggering an all-out regional war.”

A weakened Iran, whether from U.S. or Israeli military strikes or domestic unrest, may even serve Chinese interests. While Beijing remains opposed to regime collapse which may potentially yield a Western-aligned government, a more fragile Iran is likely to become increasingly dependent on China economically, technologically, and diplomatically.

Chinese Support to Iran: Marginal, Decisive or Unacknowledgeable?

As the war escalated, a growing analytical strand across the Arab world began to frame the conflict as benefiting China, in particular by distracting the U.S. from East Asia and Taiwan.5 This shift appears partly driven by a continued reliance on Western reporting, which adopted this narrative.6 In particular, The Economist’s widely circulating cover, “Never Interrupt Your Enemy When He’s Making a Mistake,” attracted notable interest, reinforcing the portrayal of the war as a costly U.S. miscalculation that could ultimately strengthen Beijing’s global position.7 As analyzed in the previous ChinaMed Observer, this perspective also became popular among Chinese analysts and official commentary, which are increasingly cited in the Arabic press.8

At the same time, a divergence emerged between media within and outside the Gulf with regard to China’s military role in the crisis. An earlier consensus, shared across Western, Gulf, and even Chinese reporting, had held that Beijing was largely leaving Iran to confront U.S. aggression alone. This assumption has since come under scrutiny as Iran proved far more resilient than initially anticipated. Consequently, several Western analysts began to seriously consider how China, alongside Russia, may be providing more direct forms of assistance, including satellite-based and radar targeting support. In recent reports by ABC News and The Washington Post, MizarVision – a Chinese geointelligence AI-firm, has been repeatedly highlighted as a possible channel through which Tehran may be obtaining intelligence that enabled it to accurately target U.S. assets. This interpretation, however, has been contested.9

Despite earlier reliance on Western reporting, these claims only marginally trickled down into Gulf media. In this regard, Ezz El Din Abdel Mawla, the director of research at the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, suggested that even if China had provided intelligence to Iran, its support has so far not played a decisive role:

“I think there is exaggeration about them, as the relations between Tehran and Beijing in this field are very recent and cannot be compared, for example, to the Chinese-Pakistani relations… It appears that Iran is using some Chinese technologies to develop its ballistic missiles and jamming and tracking systems, but it will take some time for Chinese weapons to become a key component of Iran’s defensive and offensive arsenal.”10

Beyond Qatari sources acknowledging Chinese involvement but downplaying it, the rest of the Gulf press remains notably silent on the issue. Even when reporting on MizarVision and its capacity to monitor U.S. military forces, Saudi royal family-owned Al Arabiya stops short of considering whether such intelligence could be shared with Tehran.11 This silence may partly reflect China’s marginality in the war’s operational dimension. However, it may also point to deliberate editorial caution: attributing indirect responsibility to China would risk implicating it in Iranian strikes against Gulf states, thereby complicating relations with a partner still viewed as diplomatically and economically indispensable.

Outside the Gulf, however, a markedly different narrative emerges, particularly in “resistance-aligned” media outlets such as Al Mayadeen, known for its pro-Hezbollah and pro-Iran editorial line. Writing in this vein, Egyptian researcher Ibrahim Younis frames the Iran war as a global struggle:

“the declared objective of destroying the nuclear program and missile capabilities was merely the necessary facade for a broader and more far-reaching project aimed at dismantling the central link connecting Chinese and Russian strategic projects in the heart of Eurasia with the vital sea and land routes in West Asia… this war, in its deep essence, is directed against Beijing and Moscow as much as it is directed against Tehran and the entire axis of resistance.”12

Younis further reports claims of extensive Chinese military support to Iran, ranging from anti-stealth aircraft radar and layered air defense platforms to access to the BeiDou navigation system and expanded electronic warfare cooperation. In his account, this Chinese support explains both the difficulties faced by U.S. and Israeli forces in securing air superiority and Iran’s ability to strike important targets with notable precision, including across the Gulf.

These views may reflect the biases – or, more accurately, aspirations – of resistance-aligned analysts.13 However, such claims extend even to more institutional voices which have also acknowledged the possibility of limited Chinese involvement. For instance, Egyptian Major General Samir Farag, in an interview with Masrawy (while cautioning against inflating this “fierce but limited regional war” into a “third world war”) suggests that China is likely providing intelligence support “from afar” to sustain Iran’s resilience without provoking direct confrontation with the U.S.14

Taken together, these perspectives stand in marked contrast to much of the Gulf press, which continues to portray China as aligned with GCC interests,15 by either dismissing implicitly the possibility of meaningful Chinese support to Iran, or framing any such cooperation as a byproduct of Beijing’s transactional diplomacy, as recently argued by Jonathan Fulton. As such, even when awareness of potential China-Iran collaboration exists in the Gulf, it is often interpreted through this pragmatic lens which refrains from attributing responsibility to Beijing – an assessment that is being taken seriously everywhere else.

Chinese Mediation

When asked whether China helped achieve the recent, very fragile two-week ceasefire, U.S. President Donald Trump said “I hear yes.” Nonetheless, given the conflicting information around this ceasefire agreement, it is worth noting that Chinese mediation efforts, including the five-point plan advanced with Pakistan, have attracted limited attention in Arabic media (even resistance-aligned outlets appear to show greater interest in China’s alleged military role than in its diplomatic initiatives). Moreover, when the proposal is addressed, the focus tends to cast Pakistan rather than China as the primary actor. While there are a few exceptions,16 when Chinese mediation efforts were analyzed, they were generally interpreted through a narrow lens: China is seen as economically motivated yet strategically risk-averse and, as such, not fully committed to enforcing a peace agreement.17

This is the line of Basil Al-Hajj Jassim, writing for the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, who characterized China as a “silent mediator, encouraging de-escalation and exerting discreet pressure on all sides,” but unwilling to bear the costs of direct confrontation with the West – which would expose its firms and economy to sanctions. Although China wishes to contrast U.S. hegemony and secure Iranian oil imports, “its position is governed by a delicate balance: sufficient support to prevent collapse and continuous pressure to avoid escalation.”18

A more critical perspective is offered by Joyce Karam, editor-in-chief of Al-Monitor, who dismissed China’s proposal as a “calculated headline grabber” which “scores points with Global South audiences” amid U.S. missteps. She argued that China lacks both the leverage and the trust required to act as an effective mediator, particularly for actors such as Israel.19

A similarly critical perspective emerges in an in-depth report by the Emirates Policy Center’s China Studies Unit, led by Ahmed Aboudouh. Analyzing the joint Sino-Pakistani proposal, the report concurred that Beijing lacks both the leverage and the security footprint to enforce compliance in any future agreement. Nevertheless, it argued that China’s engagement signals a form of quiet alignment with core U.S. objectives, namely de-escalation and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a global shipping artery rather than an Iranian-controlled chokepoint. In this interpretation, Beijing’s posture reflects a broader risk-management strategy aimed at preserving long-term strategic stability in its relationship with Washington.20

The report also outlines several potential trajectories. Should the war drag on, China may pursue more pragmatic arrangements with Iran, securing access to energy exports and shipping routes in exchange for deeper economic cooperation, including providing dual-use technology and supporting Iran’s defense-industrial recovery. Yet, the report warns that such close ties with Iran risk straining China’s relations with Gulf states following the end of the war, particularly in light of Iranian strikes against GCC states.

Offering a different, nuanced analysis of Chinese mediation is Palestinian researcher Razan Shawamreh. Writing in The New Arab, a London-based, Qatari-funded media outlet, she posited that “from Beijing’s perspective, peacebuilding does not imply direct Chinese involvement in achieving peace, especially in the Gulf region.”21

“This is not a criticism of its policy, but rather an attempt to place the policy in its proper context, to answer the question: Where does China stand on regional wars, such as the war of annihilation in Gaza and the current war, including the attack on the Gulf? For China, regional peace can primarily be achieved by the countries of the region themselves, not by China or any other external party. China’s role is limited to secondary support and facilitation, as was the case in the Saudi-Iranian conflict.”

Analyzing Chinese official discourse, Shawamreh argues that China’s emphasis on “sovereign independence” and opposition to “foreign interference” amounts to an implicit call for reducing, if not ultimately eliminating, U.S. influence, particularly its military presence in the Gulf. For her: “China is attempting to emphasize that the current regional instability is a direct result of the Gulf states’ reliance on the United States for security.”

At the same time, Beijing makes equally clear what it is not prepared to do. It has no intention of offering an alternative “security umbrella,” or assuming the role of regional guarantor (as revealed by it taking two days to issue a public statement on the importance of protecting the Gulf states’ “sovereignty and national security”). This position reflects a consistent strategic posture: China does not see itself as a global security provider or “policeman.” Instead, it places responsibility for stability squarely on regional actors themselves:

“China’s calls for what it terms ‘sovereign independence’ and the need to limit ‘foreign interference’ are significant. This call not only encourages regional states to become self-reliant but also reflects a broader Chinese vision for reshaping regional balances away from American military hegemony, a logic Beijing has previously employed in Central Asia.”

From this premise, Shawamreh outlines two possible post-war trajectories. In the first, China may gradually expand its security engagement in the Gulf, but only if regional states themselves move away from reliance on the U.S. Such a shift, however, would not emerge through direct Sino-American confrontation; rather, Beijing appears to be waiting for structural conditions, its economic pull and evolving regional insecurities, to erode U.S. primacy over time. In the second scenario, Beijing’s cautious approach could instead reinforce Gulf dependence on Washington, particularly if regional actors perceive Beijing as unwilling to assume meaningful security responsibilities. The viability of this path, however, hinges largely on U.S. priorities: should Washington’s energy calculus shift, for instance, through reduced dependence on Gulf oil, its incentives to sustain costly security guarantees may weaken, potentially leaving a vacuum that no external power is willing to fill.

What emerges from this analysis is that China’s diplomatic restraint should not be read as indifference or unreliability. Rather, it reflects a deliberate long-term strategy aimed at reshaping regional balances away from U.S. military hegemony without jeopardizing Beijing’s broader relationship with Washington. As Shawamreh concludes, “the real problem lies not in the Chinese position itself… but rather in the flawed interpretations that attempt to ‘Westernize’ China” by projecting expectations associated with the U.S., despite Beijing making clear it will not provide unconditional security guarantees. Accordingly, sustainable Gulf security will not result from substituting one external patron for another, but from the development of indigenous capabilities. Only when security becomes a project articulated and implemented within the Gulf itself will external powers, “especially Beijing,” be compelled to engage on new terms.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Energy Crisis and the “Petroyuan”

Interviewing Chinese scholars for The New Arab, Ali Abo Mrehil, a China-based Palestinian journalist, relays the view that the postponement of President Trump’s planned visit to Beijing in May may serve as a deadline to conclude military operations, “since it is illogical to direct these operations while in Beijing.”22 As reported by Al Jazeera, Trump had also threatened to cancel the visit unless China contributed naval assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz, with the U.S. President stressing Beijing’s heavy dependence on Gulf oil.23

A similar line of reasoning is advanced by Ahmed Aboudouh in an interview with Libération, where he notes that nearly half of China’s oil imports come from the Gulf. In this context, escalation does not only threaten Hormuz, critical for global oil prices, but also the Bab el-Mandeb, a vital artery for Chinese exports to Europe. While Houthi forces in Yemen have thus far avoided targeting Chinese shipping in the Red Sea, a regional spillover could disrupt this arrangement.24

This narrative of vulnerability is not universally shared. Drawing partly on Western reporting that frames the war as a costly U.S. error, segments of the Arabic press portray China as comparatively insulated – or even advantaged. Al Jazeera notes that China has taken several steps to protect itself from sudden disruptions to energy imports, including building a national strategic oil reserve and promoting alternative technologies to reduce oil dependence.25 Similarly, the Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat went as far as to predict that Chinese oil refineries are unlikely to face any difficulty caused by the current trade disruptions as a result of recent record shipments of Iranian and Russian crude and intensive government stockpiling.26

Notably, the Trump administration’s decision to grant a 30-day sanctions waiver on Iranian oil was justified by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent due to similar concerns: as a measure to prevent China from becoming the primary beneficiary of discounted Iranian exports and preferential access through Hormuz.27

Iran requiring payments in Chinese yuan for secure transit through Hormuz was framed by Sharif Bibi as an arrangement that could test the resilience of the “petrodollar” and herald the arrival of the “petroyuan.” While the U.S. dollar retains dominance due to the yuan’s limited convertibility, capital controls, and comparatively shallow financial markets, yuan-denominated transactions (accounting for only an estimated 2-4% of global oil trade) have gained traction as an alternative benchmark for pricing oil particularly among sanctioned producers such as Iran and Russia. As such, the more plausible trajectory is not displacement but diversification: a multi-currency energy system in which the dollar remains central, while the yuan expands within politically constrained segments of the market. This would nevertheless erode dollar primacy, weaken the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions while enhancing China’s leverage in Middle Eastern energy markets.28

However, not all see a promising future in the Sino-Iranian energy trade, first and foremost, the Saudi media. Given how China’s “teapot refineries” represent the main market for Iranian oil, sold at a significant discount due to U.S. sanctions, Asharq Al-Awsat argues that:

“Iranian oil…has lost some of its price advantage... Market speculation also suggests that Iranian supplies could be removed from the U.S. sanctions list if the military campaign results in the U.S. gaining control of Iranian oil exports. If sanctions on Iranian oil are lifted, independent Chinese refineries are expected to return to their previous purchasing patterns. Russian oil will be their first choice, along with shipments from Brazil and Canada, and offshore Chinese production, according to traders.”29

Aboudouh holds a different position on the latter point:

“I do not think the Chinese can rely on Russia in the long term to compensate for the shortage caused by the war in the Middle East… Moscow does not have the capacity to increase its production to supply both China and India simultaneously”30

Conclusion

Although China has not been a central actor in this war, discussions about its role in the Arabic press often reveal more about observers’ expectations of what an alternative great power should do rather than about Chinese policies themselves. From those emphasizing Western narratives, Beijing appears ineffectual and marginal; from a Gulf-focused lens, it is broadly aligned with peace and regional stability; and from “resistance”-oriented narratives, it is supporting Iran militarily as part of a global struggle against U.S. hegemony.

Even within the Gulf, interpretations seem to diverge. Qatari sources cautiously acknowledge some degree of Chinese support for Iran. Emirati perspectives often seem to frame China and the U.S. as tactically aligned against Iranian escalation. Saudi discourse, by contrast, seems more reserved. Beyond the GCC, Levantine and Egyptian analysts largely discuss China solely in relation to the Gulf, seldom considering Beijing as a meaningful actor in adjacent theatres such as Lebanon or Palestine, likely reflecting political sensitivities.

Despite these differences, a broad consensus is emerging among Arab experts, in lockstep with analysts from the rest of the world. Regardless of the strategic opportunities the conflict might offer, China is unlikely to engage militarily. However, in doing so, Beijing may come out as the ultimate beneficiary of this unwanted war.

Francesca Daniele is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale,” specializing in the Middle East and North Africa. She previously interned at the Italian Embassy in Riyadh. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in the Middle East.

By Andrea Ghiselli

This edition of the ChinaMed Observer returns to the Chinese official narrative and expert debate on the ongoing war in Iran. In a previous issue, we examined initial Chinese reactions: restrained, framed in international law, and calling for dialogue and de-escalation. Moreover, as discussed in an interview with Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, China for the moment is unlikely to take concrete measures to actively support or “rescue” Iran.

Two weeks on, the picture is becoming more defined and, seemingly, more assertive. A closer read of official statements and expert commentary suggests an apparent hardening of Beijing’s position. At the same time, Chinese analysts have become somewhat more optimistic about the resilience of the Iranian regime. For the near-term, they assess Iran’s strategy as effective, but do not see any prospects for de-escalation. Alongside these assessments, a new layer of interesting commentary has begun to shed some light on what the war means for China itself, particularly its implications for its relations with the United States and Iran.

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China’s Evolving Official Position

As ’s has noted, Beijing’s initial response was rather mild and selective. Chinese officials were willing to condemn specific acts, such as the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At the same, however, they stopped short of directly condemning the U.S. or Israel; China was merely “highly concerned,” and Iran’s sovereignty “should” be respected.

In comparison, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) reaction to the U.S. attack on Venezuela was far more explicit:

“China is deeply shocked by and strongly condemns the U.S.’s blatant use of force against a sovereign state and action against its president. Such hegemonic acts of the U.S. seriously violate international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean region.”

While Iran and the ongoing war in the Middle East remain central fixtures of the Chinese MFA’s regular briefings, Beijing’s position has not changed. Over the past few weeks, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on the Middle East Issue Zhai Jun have engaged in much diplomatic outreach, holding phone conversations and meetings with counterparts across the region. Much of this effort has been focused on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, though Wang Yi has also called the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on March 2 and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar on March 3.

Three elements stand out in the readouts. First, Wang Yi’s persistent refusal to directly address Iranian attacks on GCC countries. The Foreign Minister has consistently called for the respect of each country’s national sovereignty, without explicitly naming Iran as a violator.

Second, the issue of Chinese citizens in the region has become prominent. On March 10, the MFA announced that more than 10,000 Chinese citizens have already been evacuated. However, this is just a drop in the ocean. In 2025, more 300,000 Chinese lived in the United Arab Emirates alone. There is not much that China can do beyond asking local authorities to provide support.

Finally, much like Wang Zichen pointed out, Wang Yi consistently expressed opposition to the U.S. and Israeli attacks, including during his call with Israeli Foreign Minister.^[1] However, condemnation has so far remained indirect. For example, in a call with his Omani counterpart, Wang stated that:

“The United States and Israel deliberately provoked a war against Iran, which clearly violated the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.”^[2]

Recent weeks have seen further rhetorical shifts from the Chinese. While Beijing did not describe itself as “shocked” by the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, MFA Spokesperson Lin Jian declared that “China is shocked” when a CCTV journalist raised the death of Ali Larijani, Iranian Secretary of Supreme National Security Council.

A more consequential shift occurred on March 23, when Zhai Jun addressed an event hosted by the China Public Diplomacy Association in Beijing. In outlining his recent diplomatic activities and China’s official position, Zhai largely echoed Wang Yi’s outreach, focused on Arab states and Iran (with no mention of Israel) and reiterated the line that “this is a war that should never have happened.”[3] However, compared to earlier comments by Chinese officials, Zhai’s remarks suggested a hardening of China’s position, as he was much more explicit in assigning blame. To begin with, he stated that:

“Against the backdrop of the widespread expectation for peace and stability among the people of the Middle East and the ongoing new round of negotiations between Iran and the United States, the United States and Israel suddenly provoked a war, rendering diplomatic efforts futile.”

Then, while Chinese officials in the past matter-of-factly stated that the United States and Israel violated international law, Zhai added that:

“The United States and Israel attacked Iran without authorization from the UN Security Council, blatantly violating the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law. China firmly opposes and condemns this. In discussing solutions to the current crisis, it is essential to grasp the root causes and the full picture of this conflict.”

Probably in reaction to the rapidly expanding energy and economic crisis, Zhai said that:

“The current conflict seriously endangers the security and stability of the Middle East, impacts the global economy, energy, and shipping lanes, and threatens the well-being of all countries. Arab countries, especially those in the GCC, are suffering undeservedly. Under no circumstances should the ‘red line’ of protecting civilians be crossed in military conflicts; non-military targets such as energy, economic, and livelihood targets should not be attacked, and the safety of international shipping lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz should not be compromised. China condemns all indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets.”

And yet, for all the rhetorical sharpening, he failed to articulate China’s intentions with regard to its potential role in the conflict. Zhai simply told his audience that:

“As a responsible major power and a sincere friend of countries in the Middle East, China will maintain close communication and coordination with all relevant parties to ‘extinguish’ the tensions, ‘pave the way’ for a ceasefire, ‘build bridges’ for dialogue, and make unremitting efforts to promote regional peace and stability.”

Chinese Experts Discuss the Future of the Regime

Writing in Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s official theoretical journal and news magazine, Tang Zhichao, a senior expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, summarized the impact of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on the Iranian regime:

“The U.S.-Israeli military strikes have severely impacted Iran’s political order. First, the killing of Iranian political and military leaders has jeopardized the government leadership and military command chain. On February 28, the first day of the conflict, Leader Khamenei, along with key leaders such as the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, were killed in attacks. The U.S. and Israel attempted to use ‘decapitation strikes’ to cripple the Iranian leadership and create conditions for regime change.
Second, the attacks on Iran’s political system and government institutions have disrupted the normal functioning of the state apparatus. Since the start of the war, the U.S. and Israel have continuously attacked political and military targets, smeared and attacked Iran’s political system, spread rumors of internal divisions within Iran’s political leadership, sowed discord between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular government army, and instigated a mutiny within the Iranian military, intending to plunge Iran into turmoil and chaos.
Third, they have attempted to create division, endangering Iran’s national unity and territorial integrity. The U.S. and Israel have actively instigated internal unrest in Iran, openly supporting Kurdish anti-government forces in the war, attempting to create national division by introducing civil war and putting pressure on the Iranian government.
Fourth, they have combined ‘color revolutions’ with military action. While militarily striking Iranian public security forces, the U.S. and Israel have attempted to incite the public to engage in ‘street revolutions’ to achieve their goal of overthrowing the Iranian regime.”^[4]

As discussed in our previous issue of the ChinaMed Observer, Chinese scholars initially debated whether the Iranian regime could collapse, even with Khamenei’s death. However, if anything, their assessment has since become more optimistic.

According to Shu Meng, a researcher at the Middle East Research Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei, as the new supreme leader should not be read solely through a dynastic lens. Rather, it reflects a wartime state of emergency and the imperative to ensure regime survival by elevating a candidate capable of quickly securing the loyalty of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and stabilizing both the military and political system.^[5]

A similar emphasis on consolidation emerges in the analysis of Dong Manyuan, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies. In his view, the hardline tone adopted in Mojtaba Khamenei’s first public address serves a clear political function, reinforcing authority and rallying elite loyalty at a moment of acute crisis.^[6] The outcome, Dong suggests, is a significant shift in Iran’s internal balance of power: conservative forces have been strengthened, while reformist and pragmatic factions have been further marginalized.

Writing in Phoenix News, Li Shaoxian, Honorary Dean of the China-Arab States Research Institute at Ningxia University, offered a structured reading of that same speech, identifying three aspects:

“First, he highly praised the united will of the Iranian people, the Revolutionary Guard, and the military to resist; second, he emphasized that the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed; and third, he appealed to Gulf countries and regions, calling on them to expel U.S. military bases. Khamenei’s statement is permeated with a central theme: the unwavering will to resist.
Therefore, things are now complicated. The U.S. wants to end the war, but the initiative lies with Iran, and Iran is not prepared to easily let the U.S. and Israel off the hook.”^[7]

At the same time, Chinese analysts are far from sanguine about the regime’s underlying vulnerabilities. The killing of Ali Larijani on March 17, regarded as the most senior figure eliminated since Khamenei, has heightened concerns about institutional resilience. Li Zixin, Assistant Researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, argued that Larijani’s death disrupts the upper echelons of Iranian decision-making, weakening strategic coherence, resource allocation, and inter-service command structures.^[8]

For Li, Larijani occupied a rare bridging role within Iran’s political system. With extensive experience in both domestic governance and direct nuclear negotiations, he served as a “buffer” between hardliners and pragmatists within Iran. His assassination, Li believes, is likely to tilt the balance of power further toward hardline conservative forces, consolidating their power over diplomatic and security affairs. This will harden Iran’s stance on the nuclear issue, complicating any future diplomatic pathway to resolving the Iranian nuclear impasse.

Other analysts point to structural pressures that extend beyond elite politics. According to Fudan University’s Sun Degang, “the situation in Iran remains far from optimistic.”^[9] Despite recent counter-espionage successes, including the reported arrest of 500 spies, Iran continues to deal with the deep and long-standing infiltration by the U.S. and Israel, both through human and technical means. The penetration of a large number of surveillance systems ensures that Iran’s counter-espionage pressure will remain acute.

At the same time, internal cohesion, while temporarily strengthened, offers only a partial buffer. Dong Manyuan notes that while public support appears to be currently shifting toward Mojtaba Khamenei, this political consolidation does little to resolve Iran’s underlying economic fragilities. Inflation, currency devaluation, rising unemployment, and livelihood difficulties remain extremely thorny issues, ones that are likely to resurface with urgency once the immediate pressures of war begin to recede.^[10]

Dong is not alone in noting these vulnerabilities. Fan Hongda, an acute observer of Iranian politics at Shaoxing University, was in the country shortly before the war broke out.^[11] An article originally published by Jiefang Daily reported some of his observations:

“Shortly after returning home, Fan Hongda wrote an article observing and reflecting on the current situation in Iran. In the article, he wrote: Although there are many uncertainties in the future, for Iran, it is almost certain that 2026 will be the year or starting point for significant changes in the country. […]
On January 27, Fan Hongda arrived in Tehran. His first impression was one of calm. People were going about their lives as usual. On February 11, Fan Hongda observed the grand parade celebrating the victory of the Islamic Revolution on Revolution Street in Tehran. He recalled, ‘Compared to previous years, the number of people participating in the demonstration this year was significantly larger, and the number of security personnel and police along the route was also noticeably increased. The entire demonstration went very smoothly without any incidents.’
Beneath the calm surface, Fan Hongda also vaguely sensed an undercurrent. For example, his China Mobile phone, with international roaming enabled, had no signal. Talking with local people, he could clearly feel their anger and discontent. In Fan Hongda’s words, it was a peculiar sense of disconnect: the streets were calm, but people’s hearts were churning.”

Chinese Experts and What Comes Next

On March 11, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that the only way to end the ongoing conflict between the U.S., Israel and Iran is the recognition of Iran’s “legitimate rights,” alongside firm international guarantees against “future aggression.”

Commenting on these remarks, Niu Xinchun, executive director of the China‑Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, suggested that Iran’s demands are demands made by a victorious nation against a defeated one. According to Niu, the U.S. is currently not ready to sit at the negotiating table as a defeated nation. As a result, he argues, there is no basis for peace talks between the two sides.^[12]

In an article published by Phoenix News, Dong Manyuan argues that that Trump initially sought a temporarily halt to military operations, but two factors undermined this intention: first, the difficulty in persuading Israel, whose war resources were not yet exhausted, to cease hostilities; second, Iran’s explicit statement that the initiative to end the war does not rest with Washington.^[13]

Within Chinese commentary, Israel is identified as the main reason for the war and primary obstacle to peace. Famous commentator “Chairman Rabbit” wrote an entire article for Guanchazhe arguing that “From the very beginning, Trump’s attack on Iran was for Israel’s sake—this was entirely a war waged by Israel” and that “the whole world lives in one world, and the United States lives in Israel’s world.”^[14]

By contrast, Li Weijian, a senior scholar at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, argued that there now exists a “strategic temperature difference” between the Washington and Tel Aviv: Trump faces domestic pressure to end the war, while the Israeli political leadership is incentivizing to prolong it to avoid domestic legal and political accountability.^[15] Therefore, “in the next phase, the U.S. may gradually tighten its support for Israel, forcing it back to the negotiating table, though both sides will need a dignified “exit.”

On this note, Cao Yang of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies wrote that:

“Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy of ‘missiles + drones’ is dragging the U.S. military into a quagmire. Using millions of dollars’ worth of anti-aircraft missiles to intercept drones costing tens of thousands is increasingly costly; even with ample funds, such attrition is unsustainable. Moreover, with U.S. debt exceeding $39 trillion, the U.S., as the world’s leading debtor, rightfully deserves its heavy burden. As long as Iran continues to attack U.S. bases in the Middle East, and even strategic assets related to oil and gas infrastructure, the U.S. will inevitably have to back down and adjust its strategy towards Iran—this is an inevitable outcome.”^[16]

Yet, in the short term, analysts remain divided over the direction of the war. Sun Degang identifies two possible scenarios.^[17] First, the U.S. military may attempt to seize control of Kharg Island, thereby cutting off Iran’s principal oil export terminal and using it as leverage to force negotiations. The second, the U.S. and Israel may attempt to assassinate Mojtaba Khamenei in order to declare victory.

Regarding the first scenario, Li Zixin argues that a potential U.S. ground operation against Iran would likely be limited in scope, more akin to a targeted raid or temporary occupation operation than a full-scale invasion.^[18] That said, experts like Niu Xinchun and Shanghai International Studies University’s Liu Zhongmin remain highly skeptical that occupying Kharg would meaningfully shorten the war.^[19] On the contrary, they suggest it could have the opposite effect.

Chinese attention is also turning to the situation of the Gulf states, which are increasingly exposed to the spillover effects of the conflict. The director of the Center for African and Arab Studies at Zhejiang Normal University Yang Yuxin points out that these countries “are caught in a strategic dilemma determined by their security strategies and geographical locations. They had no intention of participating in the war, but their hosting of U.S. military bases and proximity to Iran has passively placed them on the frontline. Their numerous oil fields, ports, airports, and other economic facilities make them highly vulnerable targets in the conflict.”^[20]

Now, their security model is in crisis. As Yang writes:

“The deep-seated structural pressures facing the Gulf states are becoming increasingly apparent. For a long time, the Gulf states have relied on a security-development model of ‘trading internal development space for U.S. security guarantees.’ They have housed numerous U.S. military bases and purchased hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of advanced U.S. defense equipment. They rely on U.S. security guarantees to deter adversaries and protect the Gulf region in the event of conflict. But this crisis has exposed the fundamental contradiction of this model; precisely because these countries host U.S. military bases, they have become targets for Iranian missiles and drones.
Finding a new balance between ‘alliance security commitments’ and ‘strategic autonomy,’ and reducing over-reliance on a single external power, has become a crucial issue that the Gulf states must confront and resolve. For the Gulf states, the real challenge lies not only in dealing with the current conflict, but also in how to reconstruct a more sustainable and autonomous security architecture in the post-conflict era.”

Li Weijian advances a similar point. He suggests that “in the process of the transition between the old and new regional order, more and more Middle Eastern countries hope to break free from ‘proxy games’ and move toward regional reconciliation and independent development. Focusing on internal governance and development, and breaking the security dilemma dominated by external powers, is the only truly possible path.”^[21]

What About China?

Tang Zhichao wrote that Beijing’s stance is clear:

“it maintains that national sovereignty must be respected, as sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current international order. The sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran and other Gulf states should be respected and inviolable. China maintains that Middle Eastern affairs should be decided autonomously by the countries in the region, and that orchestrating ‘color revolutions’ and regime change is unpopular. China advocates that all parties return to the negotiating table, resolve differences through equal dialogue, and strive to achieve common security.”^[22]

That said, it seems unlikely that China’s declaratory framework will translate into any concrete action. Indeed, a growing strand of Chinese commentators have expressed the idea that this war is not about China. Chairman Rabbit and Zhou Bo’s Guanchazhe articles offer the clearest formulation of this belief.^[23] Zhou approvingly mentioned Kyle Chan’s Foreign Affairs article titled “China Is Winning by Waiting”^[24] and stated:

“This is indeed true. Reportedly, dozens of ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have updated their destination signals to indicate that they are registered in China or have ties to China.
This is an unintentional advertisement for Beijing: security is linked to China, and chaos is linked to the United States. In 1994, U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake designated North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Iraq as ‘rogue states.’ Today, between Iran and the United States, whose behavior is more like that of a ‘rogue state’? Which U.S. official can still talk about a ‘rules-based international order?’”^[25]

Interestingly, while Zhou interprets the postponement of Trump’s trip to Beijing as a sign of the U.S. President’s weakness, Fang Ning of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences hints that China might also not have wanted Trump to visit at this time:

“From the U.S. perspective, the conflict with Iran remains tense, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces may not have time for a foreign trip. From China’s perspective, inviting the other side’s president to visit during a large-scale U.S. attack on Iran may not be appropriate, as Iran is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has friendly relations with China.”^[26]

As for the trajectory of Sino-Iranian ties, Fan Hongda is the only one who briefly discussed their future. While a retired Chinese diplomat told the South China Morning Post that “Beijing’s economic leverage would keep Tehran engaged regardless of political shifts,”^[27] Fan expressed some doubts. Reflecting on his recent trip to Iran, he wrote that:

“[the Iranians] are considering domestic reforms, exploring how to make the country develop more healthily, and discussing different paths; many have a strong interest in the Chinese path. On the other hand, in the diplomatic arena, whether to improve relations with the West and how to handle attitudes towards countries like China are also key topics of discussion […] Many Iranian scholars are reflecting on past foreign policies, including whether the policy toward China was appropriate, and even whether the previous government missed opportunities to deepen relations with China.”^[28]

Conclusion

In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we continued to track the evolution of the Chinese narrative surrounding the war in Iran. Overall, China’s official position seems to be hardening, though the different choices of words might not necessarily reflect a meaningful reorientation in policy or Beijing’s point of view, especially as any shift is more about degree than substance.

At the level of expert discourse, Chinese analysts have become somewhat more confident in the Iranian regime’s resilience, even as they acknowledge severe structural constraints. Iran still faces enormous domestic problems, which the war is likely to intensify rather than resolve. Moreover, even if Tehran’s strategy appears effective, there is little expectation among Chinese commentators of an imminent end to the conflict.

Finally, the discussion reveals partial but important insights into China’s own perspective about the war’s broader implications for Beijing’s relations with the United States and Iran. There is no doubt that they reflect the views of at least a part of the Chinese elite. However, especially today, Sino-Iranian ties, and China’s relations with the Middle East more broadly, have become increasingly sensitive topics. As such, the reader must be aware there are possibly significant “known unknowns” in the available discourse, with certain positions, disagreements, or policy debates remaining deliberately obscured.

Dr. Andrea GHISELLI is Head of Research of the ChinaMed Project. He is also Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology of the University of Exeter. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy making and China’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs – People’s Republic of China, “Wáng Yì tóng yǐsèliè wàizhǎng Sàěr tōng diànhuà” 王毅同以色列外长萨尔通电话 [Wang Yi spoke by phone with Israeli Foreign Minister Sa’ar], March 13, 2026, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202603/t20260303_11868031.shtml.

[2] Wang repeated the same formula when talking with other regional leaders. Ministry of Foreign Affairs – People’s Republic of China, “Wáng Yì tóng āmàn wàijiāo dàchén Bādé’ěr tōng diànhuà” 王毅同阿曼外交大臣巴德尔通电话 [Wang Yi spoke by phone with Omani Foreign Minister Badr], March 2, 2026, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/202603/t20260302_11867264.shtml.

[3] Xinhua News Agency, “Zhōngguó zhèngfǔ zhōngdōng wèntí tèshǐ tán zhōngfāng duì zhōngdōng júshì de lìchǎng” 中国政府中东问题特使谈中方对中东局势的立场 [China’s Special Envoy on Middle East Issues Discusses China’s Position on the Middle East Situation], ChinaNews,com, March 23, 2026, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2026/03-23/10591524.shtml.

[4] Tang Zhichao, “Měi yǐ yī chōngtú de shēncéng dòngyīn jí kěnéng zǒuxiàng” 美以伊冲突的深层动因及可能走向 [The underlying causes and possible trajectory of the US-Israel-Iran conflict], Qiushi, March 16, 2026, https://www.qstheory.cn/20260314/b1355f9a70b24d968eed3a8f5b424405/c.html.

^[5] Sohu, “Zhuānjiā fēnxī měi yǐ yī zhànshì zǒuxiàng: Chángqí duìkàng kěnéng huì ràng měiguó fùchū gèng gāo chéngběn” 专家分析美以伊战事走向：长期对抗可能会让美国付出更高成本 [Experts analyze the trajectory of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict: long term confrontation could impose higher costs on the U.S.], March 9, 2026, https://www.sohu.com/a/994152471_161795.

[6] Xingyuan Chemical Industrial Park Research Institute, “Yīlǎng fēngsuǒ shíyóu mìngmài chùfā quánqiú shíhuà wéijī, yóujià biāo zhǎng 200 měiyuán huò chéng xiànshí!” 伊朗封锁石油命脉触发全球石化危机，油价飙涨200美元或成现实！[Iran’s blockade of oil lifelines has triggered a global petrochemical crisis, and a surge in oil prices to $200 may become a reality!], Sina, March 19, 2026, https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/5952915705/162d248f906702n0jo?froms=ggmp&.

[7] News Today, “Mù jié tǎ bā shǒu fèn shēngmíng guànchuānzhuó jiāndìng dǐkàng de yìzhì, tè lǎng pǔ xiànzài jìngdì gāngà, qíhǔnánxià”穆杰塔巴首份声明贯穿着坚定抵抗的意志，特朗普现在境地尴尬、骑虎难下[Mujtabah’s initial statement was filled with a resolute will to resist, leaving Trump in an awkward and difficult position], Phoenix News, March 13, 2026, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8rSxTOHMEvN.

[8] Chen Meng and Shan Shan, “Shǎn píng︱ yīlǎng zuìgāo guójiā ānquán wěiyuánhuì mìshū lā lǐ jiǎ ní zāo xí shēnwáng duì dāngqián júshì yǐngxiǎng jǐhé?” 闪评︱ 伊朗最高国家安全委员会秘书拉里贾尼遭袭身亡 对当前局势影响几何？[Quick Commentary | What impact will the assassination of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Larijani have on the current situation?], Sina, March 18, 2026, https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1645705403/621778bb02001gwra?froms=ggmp&.

[9] An Zheng, “Lā lǐ jiǎ ní yùcì, měiguó gèng nán “tuōshēn”?” 拉里贾尼遇刺，美国更难“脱身”？ [With Larijani’s assassination, is it even harder for the U.S. to extricate itself from the situation?], Jiefang Daily (originally from Liberation Daily), March 19, 2026, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2026-03-19&id=499038&page=04.

[10] Phoenix TV, “Mù jié tǎ bā shàngrèn, bù lòumiàn zhǐ fālìng, měi yǐ yǐ jiāng qí liè rù “qīngchú míngdān”? | Fènghuáng jùjiāo” 穆杰塔巴上任，不露面只发令，美以已将其列入 “清除名单”？｜凤凰聚焦 [Mujtabah takes office, issuing orders without making a public appearance; have the U.S. and Israel already added him to their “purge list”? | Phoenix Focus], March 12, 2026, https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260312A08AO200.

[11] Zhu Lingjun, “Gāng cóng yīlǎng huílái, zhè wèi shàoxīng jiàoshòu guānchá dàole shénme?” 刚从伊朗回来，这位绍兴教授观察到了什么？[Having just returned from Iran, what did this professor from Shaoxing observe?], Shanghai Observer (originally from Jiefang Daily), March 12, 2026, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1080276.

[12] See note 6, Xingyuan Chemical Industrial Park Research Institute, Sina, March 19, 2026, https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/5952915705/162d248f906702n0jo?froms=ggmp&.

[13] Phoenix TV, “Cóng shùzì hǎixiào dào fēngsuǒ shíyóu mìngmài, yīlǎng xīn lǐngxiù de fǎn shā pái” 从数字海啸到封锁石油命脉，伊朗新领袖的反杀牌 [From the digital tsunami to the blockade of oil lifelines, Iran’s new leader’s counter-strategy], March 16, 2026, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8rY6sas3w95.

[14] Chairman Rabbit, “Tù zhǔxí: Tè lǎng pǔ dǎ yīlǎng shì zhēnduì zhōngguó me?” 兔主席：特朗普打伊朗是针对中国么？[Chairman Rabbit: Is Trump’s attack on Iran aimed at China?], Guancha, March 6, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/TuZhuXi/2026_03_06_808952.shtml.

[15] Li Jiabao, “Duì yīlǎng dòngwǔ, měiguó xiànrù nítán” 对伊朗动武，美国陷入泥潭 [The US has become bogged down in a military conflict with Iran], People’s Daily, March 18, 2026, https://www.peopleapp.com/column/30051663778-500007398002.

[16] Cao Yang, “Yīlǎng dǎodàn cúnliàng hái néng dǎ duōjiǔ?” 伊朗导弹存量还能打多久？ [How long can Iran’s missile stockpile last?], Guancha, March 23, 2026, https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=1620575.

[17] See note 9, An Zheng, Jiefang Daily (originally from Liberation Daily), March 19, 2026, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2026-03-19&id=499038&page=04.

[18] CRI online, “Shǎn píng | yībiān shuō ‘jiàngjí’ tóngbù yòu “zēng bīng” měiguó dǎ di shénme suànpán?” 闪评 | 一边说“降级”同步又“增兵” 美国打的什么算盘？ [Quick Commentary | While saying “downgrading” it, the US is simultaneously “increasing troop numbers.” What is the U.S. up to?], Sohu, March 21, 2026, https://m.sohu.com/a/999427243_115239?scm=10001.325_13-325_13.0.0-0-0-0-0.5_1334.

[19] Liao Qin, “Shēndù | zhànzhēng zhòngxīn zhuǎnyí, hù niē duìfāng ruǎnlèi,’hǎixiá pái’VS ‘xiǎo dǎo pái’, shéi huì yíng?” 深度 | 战争重心转移，互捏对方软肋，“海峡牌”VS“小岛牌”，谁会赢？ [In-depth analysis | The focus of the war has shifted, with each side exploiting the other’s weaknesses. “The Strait Card” vs. “The Island Card”: Who will win?], Shanghai Observer, March 15, 2026, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1081894.

[20] Yang Yuxin, “Yángyùxīn: Hǎiwān guójiā chéng chōngtú qiánxiàn,“yǐ měiguó ānbǎo huàn nèibù fāzhǎn” móshì chèdǐ dòngyáo?” 杨玉鑫：海湾国家成冲突前线，“以美国安保换内部发展”模式彻底动摇？ [Yang Yuxin: Gulf countries become the front line of conflict, and the “trading U.S. security for internal development” model is completely shaken?], Guancha, March 17, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/yangyuxin/2026_03_17_810333.shtml.

[21] See note 15, Li Jiabao, People’s Daily, March 18, 2026, https://www.peopleapp.com/column/30051663778-500007398002.

[22] See note 4, Tang Zhichao, Qiushi, March 16, 2026, https://www.qstheory.cn/20260314/b1355f9a70b24d968eed3a8f5b424405/c.html.

[23] See note 14, Chairman Rabbit, Guancha, March 6, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/TuZhuXi/2026_03_06_808952.shtml.

[24] Kyle Chan, “China Is Winning by Waiting,” Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2026, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/china-winning-waiting.

[25] Zhou Bo, “Zhōu Bō | tè lǎng pǔ de yīlǎng dǔjú: Jì yíng bùliǎo guónèi, yě wěn bù zhù zhōngguó” 周波| 特朗普的伊朗赌局：既赢不了国内，也稳不住中国[Zhou Bo | Trump’s Iran Gamble: Winning Domestically and Stabilizing China], Guancha, March 20, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/ZhouBo3/2026_03_20_810706.shtml.

[26] Yang Junyuan, “Yīlǎng júshì· dújiā chāi jú︱xuézhě tán zhōng měi zuìxīn juélì: Jiānjué bìmiǎn yīlǎng wèntí “huòshuǐ dōng yǐn”” 伊朗局势 · 独家拆局︱学者谈中美最新角力：坚决避免伊朗问题 “祸水东引” [Iran Situation: Exclusive Analysis | Scholars Discuss the Latest US-China Power Struggle: Resolutely Avoid Shifting the Blame for the Iranian Issue Eastward], Sing Tao Daily, March 17, 2026, https://www.stnn.cc/c/2026-03-17/4042898.shtml.

[27] Zhao Ziwen, “Khamenei is dead. But China’s ties with Iran will endure. Here’s why,” South China Morning Post, March 1 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3345051/khamenei-dead-chinas-ties-iran-will-endure-heres-why.

[28] See note 11, Zhu Lingjun, March 12, 2026, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1080276.

Before getting to this edition of the ChinaMed Observer, we are happy to announce that our report China—Middle East Relations After the Twelve-Day War: An Analysis of Chinese, Israeli, Iranian and Arab Expert Debates is now available in French on ChinaMed.it — translated by Research Fellow .

ChinaMed Report - La Chine en Moyen-Orient à l’issue de la guerre des douze jours: une analyse des débats d’experts chinois, israéliens, iraniens et arabes

By Amanda Chen

One week into the war triggered by the American-Israeli joint offensive on Iran launched on Saturday, February 28, Tehran’s retaliation has already expanded from targeting U.S. military assets to striking Gulf energy and civilian infrastructure. On March 7, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly apologized to neighboring countries on behalf of the Interim Council. However, any tentative hope for de-escalation quickly faded after U.S. President Donald Trump demanded Tehran “unconditionally surrender,” as both Iranian strikes on the Gulf and the American and Israeli bombing campaign intensified. Fears of a wider regional war have also grown as Israel’s offensive has expanded to include Lebanon, where more than 300,000 people were displaced last week.

Tehran’s “comprehensive strategic partner” Beijing has remained absent from the crisis beyond calls for de-escalation, while delegating the immediate security of Chinese nationals and institutions to host countries in the region. More than 3,000 Chinese citizens have evacuated Iran as of March 2, while nationals in Israel were advised to adhere to local security instructions. So far, the once-outspoken Chinese Ambassador in Tel Aviv Xiao Junzheng has not delivered public statements, limiting his activities to visiting Chinese nationals and project sites to assess safety conditions and arrange the departure of those unable to do so.

Despite widespread allegations of covert military cooperation between Beijing and Tehran during and after the first Israel-Iran War in June 2025 – claims refuted by Ambassador Xiao – Israeli experts this time do not expect China to come to the rescue of the Islamic Republic. In contrast to last year, recent analyses have been more cautious. In January, the of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) itself dismissed reports of unconfirmed Chinese military assistance to Iran as part of a “disinformation campaign” by Tehran, amid growing American pressure and threats during the negotiations halted by the current war. This recalibration reinforced the consensus that Beijing is unlikely to meaningfully intervene in the conflict besides dispatching its Middle East Special Envoy Zhai Jun, who arrived in Saudi Arabia on Sunday, March, 8.

This ChinaMed Observer examines the limited debate surrounding China within Israeli commentary, as well as perspectives on the conflict’s implications for Tel Aviv’s relations with the Arab Gulf countries, which for the first week have borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation. Informed by last year’s war and in line with assessments shared by several China-Middle East analysts, Israeli experts do not expect Beijing to intervene on behalf of Tehran, but to monitor developments from a distance – particularly with regard to U.S. military operations and the deployment of artificial intelligence in combat.

As for Israel’s regional standing, moderate voices in the debate warn of the limits of force, arguing instead that Tel Aviv’s long-term “rehabilitation” will depend less on the outcome in Iran than on its policy toward Palestinians and its commitment to the two-state solution.

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Israeli Interpretations of China’s Position

China’s limited response to and non-involvement during the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 appear to have consolidated the belief in Israel that Beijing, under no circumstances, would intervene to support Tehran during wartime. In this context, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ expressions of “concern” over the American-Israeli strikes, along with its condemnation of the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei as violations of Iranian sovereignty and international norms, were interpreted in Israeli commentary as a mere “standard pattern of response.”1

Meny Vaknin, a Research Associate at the Israel-China Policy Center of the INSS, characterized Beijing’s reaction as a calculated attempt to present itself “as a responsible and stabilizing actor” while avoiding any meaningful political cost. At the same time, this restrained posture allows China to “avoid direct diplomatic confrontation with Washington” ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s planned visit to settle bilateral economic disputes later this month (which, as discussed by Wang Zichen of Pekingnology, appears to be going ahead regardless of the war).2

This assessment seems to resonate within the Israeli security establishment. As early as February 19, Oded Ailam, former head of the Mossad Counterterrorism Division and currently a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA), had anticipated China’s restrained stance toward Iran, describing it as a strategy of “asymmetric risk management.”3 In his view, Beijing seeks to minimize its exposure to geopolitical risks while still benefiting from the crisis, particularly by increasing Tehran’s economic dependence on its market. As recently noted by ChinaMed Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli and Research Fellow Theo Nencini, Iran is important for China but not important enough to justify risking escalation with the United States or other powers.

Ailam nevertheless suggested that Chinese involvement could deepen should its core interests in the region be threatened, notably in the event of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a critical artery for Beijing’s access to the region’s energy resources and global trade. Thus far, however, China has shown no indication of military involvement such as escort operations for its tankers. While Iranian interdictions reportedly spared Chinese vessels, skyrocketing insurance premiums and mounting security risks have effectively disrupted commercial traffic through the waterway.4 For the time being, China has stuck to its usual diplomatic playbook by sending its Middle East Special Envoy Zhai Jun to de-escalate tensions, reaffirming Beijing’s consistent position of neutrality and willingness to “engage all parties” to safeguard peace and stability in the region.5

However, as noted by INSS Non-resident Fellow , China’s influence and room for maneuver in the Middle East are precisely constrained by its deep entanglement with both Iran and the Gulf monarchies. In this context, Beijing’s restrained response reflects not only limited military leverage but also the challenge of balancing competing regional interests.6

The War’s Implications for China

Despite the Netanyahu government – alongside the Trump administration – initiating a war that provoked Iranian retaliation against neutral countries and disrupted global trade and energy flows, Israeli experts largely agree that the further weakening and even demise of the Islamic Republic would ultimately benefit not only the Middle East but also distant yet entrenched powers like China, albeit at the expense of the region’s human security.

From a strategic perspective, Ailam argued that an erosion of the U.S. capabilities, “even at the cost of the fall of the Iranian regime,” would only serve Beijing’s broader geopolitical confrontation with Washington.7 Professor Avner Ben-Zaken, a historian and Lecturer at Ono International School, echoed this view, suggesting that China might have “an interest in such a conflict continuing and drawing the United States deeper into the Middle East, hoping that Iran will become what Ukraine became for Moscow” in service of Chinese objectives around the Taiwan Strait.8

Contrary to Beijing’s cautious position, Taipei has explicitly supported the American-Israeli offensive by framing it as part of a broader fight to “eliminate terrorism from the region” while condemning “Iran’s indiscriminate attacks on other countries.”9 Taipei’s representative office in Israel even announced a USD $180,000 humanitarian donation to the town of Beit Shemesh hit by Iranian missiles.10 This political support aligns with Taipei’s effort to deepen technological ties with Israel to develop its own “T-Dome” air-defence system.

In this context, Israeli analysts raised the possibility that Beijing may be closely monitoring the conflict “to draw important military lessons” for future Chinese military expeditions.11 , Founder and Executive Director of the SIGNAL Group (Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership), contended that, from Beijing’s perspective, the war provides valuable insights into its intensifying great-power competition with Washington, particularly by revealing the operational reach of the U.S. military, the effectiveness of American alliances, and the resilience of global energy networks:

“[Chinese] strategists are watching the degree to which the United States can sustain a high-intensity conflict in the Middle East without weakening its deterrence posture in Asia … and whether the United States retains the ability to operate credibly in multiple regions simultaneously.”12

Moreover, Yediot Aharonot Tech Editor Israel Wullman described the conflict as a “live testing ground for Western AI technology,” a field particularly relevant for Chinese strategists who increasingly view artificial intelligence as central to modern warfare.13 Wullman’s observations coincide with growing scrutiny over the alleged use of AI-automated targeting by U.S. and Israeli forces in Iran. As highlighted in ’ summary of Chinese military commentary on the conflict, several analysts have cautioned that AI-driven systems devoid of human oversight risk becoming blunt weapons “harming both sides.”14

As such, the Israeli commentary has framed the military operation in Iran as a testing ground and case study for modern warfare, with technology developed and tested during previous wars, including the Gaza genocide.

Israel’s Relations with the Gulf will Depend not on Iran, but Palestine

Israeli commentary devoted considerable attention to the war’s implications for Tel Aviv’s relations with Arab Gulf states affected by its military offensive, which for the first week have borne the brunt of Iranian retaliation. On the one hand, Israeli experts acknowledged that “the aggression of the Netanyahu government” may further widen the existing wedge.15 On the other hand, a widely echoed hope persists that unrestrained Iranian retaliation may ultimately place “Israel and the Arab states on the same side of the fence.”16

This expectation partly reflects the perception that Arab Gulf states’ longstanding hedging strategy toward Tehran has failed. Moreover, despite brokering the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement three years ago, China’s unreliability in offering a security umbrella akin to that of the United States has been viewed as a potential driver for Gulf governments to further rely on Washington and, by association, consider Israel as an attractive option. For it is also in the Gulf that the intersection of U.S. security guarantees and China’s economic presence is most pronounced.

On this note, INSS Senior Researchers Eldad Shavit and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis argued that, given Washington’s demonstrated sensitivity “to the interests of these states over the past years,” Israel may need to seriously mobilize their support as the campaign continues, by framing its offensive as part of a broader plan to “create a more stable regional order.”17 Similar arguments had appeared in earlier analyses. In November 2025, for instance, INSS Research Associate Yuval Less had called for the establishment of a “common diplomatic front with the countries of the region – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – that are directly affected by Iranian activity.”18

While relations with non-normalized Arab Gulf states remain a desired objective among Israeli experts across the political spectrum, moderate voices caution that Tel Aviv’s standing in the post-war Middle East will not depend on the outcome in Iran, but ultimately, on how it will address the Palestinian issue in its aftermath and in the context of the October 2026 Israeli legislative elections.

Among them, Professor Eli Podeh from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University argued that it is the “Palestinian arena” that will determine whether “the success of the attack on Iran [will] restore Israel’s positive image that prevailed during the period of the Abraham Accord – as a military power worth cooperating with against shared threats.”19 Former Member of Knesset Ksenia Svetlova similarly contended that regional integration hinges upon a fundamental shift in Israel’s “policies toward the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.” Without such changes, she argues, Israel will continue to be perceived as an agent of chaos, rather than “a calculated, pragmatic, and reliable actor.”20

Dr. Omer Zanany, director of the Program for Advancing Israeli–Palestinian Peace at Mitvim (The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies), reinforced the argument, noting that:

As the situation for Palestinians continues to deteriorate, “no arrangement will move forward as long as Israel’s far-right government refuses to advance the vision of two states.”21

Former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council Eran Etzion captured the logic behind these debates in a recent Haaretz op-ed where he warned about the limits of a military action supported by 80.5% of Israelis across political and sectoral gaps (INSS Survey). Instead, he envisioned a post-war policy initiative in which a different Israeli government would seek neither confrontation with Iran under a new regime, nor conflict with the Palestinians and other Arab states, but “join hands with Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia and with the pragmatic elements throughout the region.”22

Gulf perspectives, however, diverge from this outlook. Dr. Aziz Alghashian, Professor at Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (NAUSS) in Saudi Arabia, underscored that with the continuation of the occupation and Israel’s rhetoric of territorial expansion in the region – the so-called “Greater Israel” project (which recently received support from U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee), “prospects of normalization are certainly dead for the foreseeable future.”23

Dr. Ali Alsayegh, Lecturer at the Community College of Qatar, offered a similar assessment in a commentary shared with the author, contending that “the war has only exacerbated Israel’s image as the main threat to regional peace among non-normalized Gulf states, pushing normalization further into the realm of wishful thinking.” According to Alsayegh, Arab Gulf states’ “deliberate and prudent restraint” in response to Iranian aggression, rather than aligning with the American-Israeli offensive, reflects a profound distrust of Israel’s regional ambitions. He further highlights non-normalized Gulf states’ deep skepticism of Israel by stating:

“The fact that diplomatic relations exist with Iran but not with Israel sends an indirect message: while remaining wary of Tehran’s regional intentions, Gulf states see utility in diplomatic relations with Iran and believe a somewhat constructive relationship is possible. No such dynamic exists with Israel.”

Conclusion: Whither China–Middle East Relations?

This overview is far from comprehensive, as much of the Israeli debate focuses on the immediate and practical aspects of the current offensives across Iran and Lebanon. Yet, the findings of this ChinaMed Observer are consistent with earlier analyses identifying the emergence of a region-wide understanding of Beijing’s restrained diplomatic posture in the Middle East’s complex environment. While China is deeply embedded in the region economically, it remains largely absent from its security architecture.

While a more active Chinese role had been generally anticipated by observers following Beijing’s mediation of the March 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the subsequent October 7 attack and the two-year Gaza War – along with its spillover across Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and the Red Sea – have underscored the structural constraints in Beijing’s ability to meaningfully engage with, and de-escalate regional crises.

Israeli commentary interpreting China’s non-intervention in the current war and its marginal role in regional security dynamics ultimately echoes a position long-articulated by most China-Middle East specialists, including Professor from Zayed University in Abu Dhabi and ChinaMed Head of Research . Rather than signalling a decline of Chinese influence, Beijing’s restraint may instead reflect the reality that China never intended to assume a direct security role in the Middle East – nor was such a role necessarily expected by its regional partners, including Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

In this light, the relatively limited attention devoted to China in Israeli commentary may represent a more realistic assessment grounded in a deeper understanding of Chinese foreign policy and Beijing’s (and the region’s) preference for a multipolar international order. Within such a framework, Iran’s unrestrained retaliation has only underscored the need for integrated collective defence mechanisms led by local actors, especially when the American security umbrella repeatedly failed to protect Arab Gulf states from being involved in Israel’s wars.

Under this vision, moderate voices in the Israeli debate continue to emphasize that Israel’s own path toward regional rehabilitation, before integration, will ultimately depend not on military outcomes but on addressing the longstanding Palestinian question, confronting the realities of its decades-long occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands, and meaningfully advancing toward a viable two-state solution.

Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project covering China’s relations with Israel and the Arab Gulf states. She is a graduate of SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her interests include China–Middle East relations, conflict mediation practices, and global philanthropy, with a focus on the role of civil society in shaping these transnational processes.

By Theo Nencini

In the wake of the large-scale Israeli-American military strikes launched on February 28, 2026 – an operation that has thrust the region into open war and claimed the life of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – the institutional and strategic foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran now face unprecedent uncertainty. With simultaneous attacks targeting key figures of the regime, including IRGC Ground Forces Commander Mohammad Pakpour, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, and former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani, among others, Iran finds itself under massive assault while retaliating across the region. Under heavy bombardment, Tehran has struck back with missile and drone barrages targeting U.S. military installations across nearly all neighboring states, Israeli territory, and energy infrastructures in parts of the Gulf – even Oman, until days ago a key mediator with Washington, has been hit for hosting U.S. assets.

As the conflict engulfs the region, Iran’s external alignments have regained central importance – especially its strategic partnership with China. Beyond the immediacy of the war, questions about the endurance, scope, and practical value of the Sino‑Iranian relationship have taken on renewed urgency. Many analysts, both within and outside Iran, regard China as the only plausible external actor capable of supporting Tehran amid mounting international isolation and economic (now military) siege. Yet, despite both capitals describing their ties as a “stable and deepening relationship,” symbolized by the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement of March 2021, the tangible results of that framework remain limited and hard to clearly operationalize. Beijing’s stance – largely declaratory, economically cautious, and politically hedged – suggests that even in this moment of existential peril for Iran, meaningful Chinese backing is likely to fall short of Tehran’s expectations.

However, even prior to these dramatic developments, debate over the substance and limits of China’s relationship with Iran was well underway. It was in this context that ChinaMed Research Fellow Theo Nencini interviewed Esfandyar Batmanghelidj.

The interview was conducted on February 13 and therefore does not account for the current conflict. Nonetheless, it touches upon many dynamics surrounding Iran-China relations from energy trade, sanctions, practical constraints, and internal Iranian debates on engagement with China, offering keys to understand the deeper dynamics shaping the Iranian crisis beyond the war’s immediate tempo.

Esfandyar Batmanghelidj is the founder and CEO of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, a think tank focused on economic diplomacy, economic development, and economic justice in West Asia. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins SAIS in Bologna, has conducted innovative research on the effects of sanctions on targeted economies, and has published peer reviewed research on Iranian political economy, social history, and public health, as well as commentary on Iranian politics and economics. You can follow him on X (formerly Twitter) @yarbatman.

This interview was conducted on February 13 and has been edited for clarity and length.

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Theo Nencini: How do you assess the structural and systemic underpinnings of the Sino-Iranian relationship? More specifically, what do you see as the substantive political, economic, and strategic foundations of this partnership?

Esfandyar Batmanghelidj: The reality is that the underpinnings of the relationship are not very deep, which explains why we haven’t seen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement materialize into more direct political, security or economic support from China toward Iran. If we take a long-term view, the China–Iran relationship has not developed over the past decade, despite how significantly Iran’s strategic position in the region has changed. That lack of a “shift” in China’s own approach to Iran demonstrates the limited willingness of Chinese policymakers to genuinely deepen the partnership.

At present, the most visible aspect of the China–Iran relationship is energy: Iran exports significant volumes of oil to China, supplying roughly 15–20% of China’s crude oil intakes. For Iran, the relationship is far more important as China is its only major oil customer. It’s a somewhat imbalanced relationship, with Iran far more dependent on China than the reverse, especially given Beijing’s very limited support beyond this narrow oil trade.

One of the through lines in my research has been to assess the China–Iran relationship comparatively, especially relative to other countries in the region that also hold comprehensive strategic partnerships with China, like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. What’s really striking is that, over the past decade, those three countries’ cooperation with China have deepened profoundly across security, economic, and political domains.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expanded cooperation through participation in multilateral bodies led by China like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and through increasingly frequent and complex joint military exercises. No comparable expansion has occurred in China’s military cooperation with Iran. Then, economically, it’s obvious that the UAE and Saudi Arabia – which have fast-growing, globally significant economies, maintain a deeper ties with China. I think the most interesting comparison is Iraq, which instantly shows how the trade relationship between China and Iran is quite dysfunctional.

There was a very good Wall Street Journal report on how Iran is exporting oil to China, but the resulting revenues are not readily available to the Central Bank of Iran and, by extension, Iranian importers. Iran’s imports from China are significantly below what they should be, given the size of the Iranian economy. Moreover, what imports do take place are often intermediated by the UAE: Chinese goods are shipped to the UAE first and then basically re-exported to Iran. This may be sufficient to keep the Iranian economy ticking along. However, the fact that Iraq – a much smaller economy with a much less advanced manufacturing sector – is able to enjoy a deeper level of trade with China than Iran shows that China has not succeeded in realizing a true strategic partnership with Iran.

There are many reasons why this is the case, but I think the most significant is that – as widely analyzed – ultimately Chinese companies are very reluctant to engage in Iran as a highly sanctioned jurisdiction. Trading with Iran exposes those companies to significant risk. And that risk is expanding. Under the Trump administration, there have already been instances where large Chinese enterprises, namely refineries, were designated for violations of U.S. secondary sanctions for purchases of Iranian oil.

If there is a Chinese strategic relationship with Iran, it is reflected in the fact that these designations have happened and that China continues to buy the oil. Chinese authorities appear to understand that – primarily for the purpose of maintaining regional security in the Gulf – it is important to continue to these purchases. Doing so contributes to China’s energy security by diversifying the suppliers able to supply domestic refineries. Maintaining this trade in the face of this now more significant sanctions risk is notable, but it is not the same as a proactive effort to support the Iranian economy. At the end of the day, when we look at countries like Iraq, they are enjoying a much deeper and more fruitful economic relationship with China.

TN: So, as I understand it, in your view the main axis – and the main fundamentals – of the relationship are its asymmetry and its essentially dysfunctional character. I recently listened to you on a podcast in which you noted that “the Iranian Central Bank doesn’t have the possibility to access this revenue.” Put simply: where are these revenues?

EB: The revenues that are accruing for Iran’s oil sales are, in reality, a bit all over the place.

I think it’s reasonable to expect, and of course it’s somewhat opaque, that when larger Chinese refineries purchase Iranian oil, some portion of the payments are made to bank accounts in China where Iran maintains some kind of correspondent banking relationship, or where the Central Bank of Iran or Iranian private banks hold accounts. This reflects an older pattern where designated Chinese banks – the most famous being Bank of Kunlun, a subsidiary of the large state oil company CNPC – were tapped with the responsibility of receiving or managing the payments related to oil trade with Iran.

In the case of Bank of Kunlun, this role essentially led to it being sanctioned. However, once sanctioned, it became a “bad bank” that could be used for this special purpose. From the Chinese perspective, at least there was a channel for the payments to be processed. From the Iranian side, the difficulty was that collecting funds in a designated bank made it very easy for anyone to know that these funds are, in the eyes of the U.S., illicit, therefore making it unlikely that the money could be moved out of those accounts very easily.

Since the maximum pressure sanctions began in 2018, Iran has introduced some innovations in how it markets oil, delivers it to customers, and receives payment. There have been two main innovations where China has not been the “architect” or the “inventor”; rather, Chinese demand for this oil was so great that a market solution emerged.

The first and foremost solution is logistical. How do you physically move the oil to China when there’s a lot of scrutiny of Iran’s oil trade and when key transport companies, such as the National Iranian Tanker Company, are designated entities? Iran has ended up relying on a burgeoning number of vessels and shipping companies willing to engage in the sanctioned oil trade. These are the “shadow tankers” we often hear about, whose development began in earnest after sanctions tightened in 2018.

The real trigger for its expansion was the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the energy sanctions targeting Russian oil. Iran has benefited because it drew in a larger number of vessel owners who saw market opportunity and were willing to accept the risks of moving sanctioned oil – some Iranian but most of it Russian.

So, from a logistics standpoint, Iran now has a network of companies willing to engage in deceptive tactics such as changing vessel flags, turning off AIS transponders, operating through shell companies, conducting ship-to-ship transfers and falsifying documents. This has worked in Iran’s favor, giving the refineries receiving Iranian oil the plausible deniability that it is not sanctioned oil. It’s very different if a shadow fleet tanker delivers oil to a terminal in the eastern side of China than if a National Iranian Tanker Company’s tanker shows up with its name clearly there on the side.

Aside from logistics, I think the more significant innovations are financial. Historically, the marketing of Iranian oil was the responsibility of state enterprises like the National Iranian Oil Company and its subsidiaries, which are controlled or overseen by the Ministry of Oil. Over the last seven years or so, as sanctions have tightened, there has been a transition toward a situation where more Iranian oil is coming onto the market and being traded by non-state companies. The Iranian state has effectively subcontracted this activity to intermediary networks that are able to engage in practices designed to hide the nature of the oil they are selling. You have a lot of middlemen that are operating through shell companies in jurisdictions such as the UAE or Malaysia, taking on the risk of purchasing Iranian oil and then reselling it to the final customer.

This brings us back to your question: “where is this money?” When relying on this network of middlemen, payments from the end buyer are typically received by the middlemen themselves. In theory, they are then responsible for repatriating those funds to Iran as payment for the commodity purchased from the Iranian National Oil Company and its subsidiaries. In practice, these companies – and the middlemen who own them – are politically connected to elements within the Iranian state. Famously, the son of Ali Shamkhani is one of the individuals that’s been identified as a key player in this trade.

This places intermediaries in a really extraordinary position: they’re collecting a lot of money that ostensibly belongs to the Iranian state for the sale of Iranian natural resources, yet they get to decide whether or not they bring that money back and make it available to the Iranian central bank and the core of the Iranian economy. The pattern that we have seen is that these companies not only take a significant cut of the trade – because the more middlemen you have, the more they eat into your margin – but at the same time face perverse incentives not to repatriate funds. Given persistent weakness in Iran’s currency market, expectations of future depreciation encourage intermediaries to hold revenues offshore rather than convert and return them. As a result, substantial financial resources that should, in principle, underpin the Iranian state budgets remain dispersed. If you look at the state budget, you’ll see that there’s an estimate for oil revenues based on expected export volumes and average prices.

Functionally, however, these funds are rarely consolidated in one – or even a few – locations at any given time. Instead, they are distributed across a fragmented web of financial arrangements. This fragmentation has become a systemic weakness: while oil is exported in high volumes through relatively consolidated channels, the corresponding financial returns re-enter – if at all – in low volumes and through diffuse pathways.

To the extent that China could help alleviate this problem, it has not taken any steps to try and make life easier for Iranians since the reimposition of maximum pressure sanctions in 2018. They take no responsibility, in part because these workaround mechanisms that kept the oil flowing were not designed by them; the markets came up with those solutions, and China is just benefiting.

TN: Which solutions do you have in mind? Something similar to the Instex instrument proposed by the E3 (France, UK and Germany) in 2019? Or something different?

EB: I think it would have to be simpler than that. The reality is that China already derives the main benefit it seeks from its relationship with Iran: energy supply.

Could Iran potentially be a big market for Chinese exports? Absolutely. But Chinese exporters already operate in virtually every single country in the world. The Iranian economy – roughly 4% of global GDP – is certainly not worth the inherent risk. From Beijing’s perspective, they’re already capturing the full benefit that matters most: oil. That leaves little incentive to devise special mechanisms. It is not a huge loss if they are not present in Iran beyond that, and it’s certainly not worth the risks involved.

There has always been an argument that China’s motivation to stand by Iran would not be economic but geopolitical: that China needed to demonstrate its ability to support countries like Iran in the face of U.S. “hegemonic power,” in order to build credibility as a “new hegemon” that could challenge U.S. dollar supremacy, U.S. security overreach, U.S. dominance of multilateral institutions and the broader international order.

So far, however, China has been very careful in how it defines or assert its own hegemonic ambitions, and it has not considered Iran to be an important arena in which to do so. In the Chinese context, it is important to demonstrate a willingness to compete economically with the U.S. while remaining careful about escalatory actions on the security file.

This is where it becomes very difficult for China to stand by Iran, because the Iran file is ultimately securitized. Every aspect of engagement with Iran ultimately comes back down to a U.S. perception of a national security threat. Even setting aside the deeper Chinese defense cooperation, which has languished over the last decade, with China refraining from providing advanced weapon systems to Iran despite Iran’s obvious need – political engagement has also been more limited than what we might imagine.

The delays of getting Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, due to concerns that a sanctioned and highly securitized country from a U.S. standpoint would undermine the organization’s functionality, is another demonstration that even political engagement has been seen as complicated. There have been foreign minister–level visits to Tehran, but no reciprocal visit by a Chinese premier.

TN: Since Xi Jinping in 2016.

EB: Exactly.

TN: President Raisi also went to China, in February 2023, just before the Beijing deal with Saudi Arabia…

EB: Exactly. In theory, you would expect such visits to be reciprocated. Xi was likely invited to return and has simply not acted on that invitation.

So even politically, engagement is difficult. Economically – where engagement might seem the easiest and most straightforward – any Chinese attempt to engage Iran in defiance of U.S. secondary sanctions effectively challenges a core element of U.S. national security strategy. Chinese policymakers are very reticent to do that. They don’t want to directly position themselves as undermining U.S. national security interests, especially in the Middle East, where in any case it is important for China the risk of conflict.

For example, if a U.S.-Iran conflict were to emerge, would China intervene to help Iran and bog the U.S. down? Based on Chinese policy over the last decade of, my assumption is that Chinese policymakers would not intervene. China might withhold or undermine existing support – for example, by reducing oil purchases –to accelerate the end of the conflict.

China’s interest in the Gulf is that there is no war, given that around half of its imported energy comes from countries exporting through the Persian Gulf. Any protracted U.S.-Iran war would be very harmful – oil prices would be impacted, but even the ability to regularly bring out tankers from the Gulf, particularly if Iran were to target commercial vessels as part of an asymmetric response to sustained U.S. strikes.

For China, such a conflict might damage U.S. credibility, but it would also impose significant costs on Beijing as well due to its vulnerability to Gulf energy supplies. Given that vulnerability, and its reluctance to create direct tensions with the U.S, China would frankly likely prefer that if the US strikes, that they strike decisively and strike hard, limiting Iran’s capacity to respond and ensuring that the war ends quickly. This should be the base case for understanding how China might engage in such a scenario – especially given the absence of meaningful Chinese investment in Iran’s security or military capabilities.

TN: On this issue, I suppose you have read Middle East Eye’s report on the sale of air defense systems from China to Iran, as well as sodium perchlorate – which can serve as a missile propellant – and the BeiDou issue, with China allegedly installing the BeiDou navigation system in Iran instead of GPS. How do you analyze these military developments in light of your emphasis on the caution characterizing China’s Iran policy, and given your view that Beijing consistently benchmarks its relations with the U.S. against those with Iran?

EB: I think the analytical mistake we often make is to overestimate the degree to which actions like the sale of equipment or materials from China to Iran reflect state policy. Take the relatively straightforward case of chemicals used in Iran’s ballistic missile program. The simplest explanation is that companies producing those chemicals in China are looking for customers. It is possible that Chinese authorities, from an export-control standpoint, were aware of those sales and could theoretically have stopped them, but… why would they? The cost of allowing such sales is low.

My point is that the fact that these chemicals are reaching Iran does not reflect a Politburo-level commitment to support Iran’s defense sector. If that were the case, we would see far more support across multiple dimensions, including the kinds of military engagement China has conducted with other countries in the region, for example, joint PLA Air Force–UAE Air Force exercises, something Iran has never enjoyed with the Chinese military.

As for air defense systems, it is possible that some transfers have occurred, but we would expect more evidence. Reports of such sales emerge from time to time, but we don’t often see strong visual confirmation on the ground in Iran. Even where transfers may have taken place following the expiry of the UN arms embargo, these are defensive systems and do not amount to the kind of strategic support Iran would actually need.

Iran potentially faces an existential threat, depending on the appetite of American war planners for a major intervention. In that context, limited forms of support relative to that threat do not make a difference. The Chinese calculation is to provide Iran with a little bit of support here and there, support that ultimately doesn’t alter the balance of power in the region.

We also have to remember that this is partly about China managing its relationship with the U.S., but also with other countries in the Gulf. There is a degree of asymmetrical parity in how the Gulf states and Iran can threaten one another. The Gulf states benefit from the U.S.-backed security architecture: they have advanced weapons systems that they’ve learned to operate with US support; they actually have air forces with aircraft, whereas Iran barely has an air force. The one thing Iran does have is, of course, its ballistic missile capability, as demonstrated in June of last year against Israel. In that sense, the regional balance is relatively stable. From Beijing’s perspective, providing Iran with more capabilities that would augment its missile program and restore the conventional military power it currently lacks would risk destabilizing that equilibrium.

Another consideration is that such support would probably anger the Americans off but also undermine China’s relationship with the Gulf countries. This is the context in which the Saudi-Iran detente and the agreement signed in Beijing should be understood. China’s foremost interest is to find avenues for de-escalation in the region. It doesn’t see the Middle East as an arena to confront the US, but rather as a source of vulnerability. To manage that vulnerability, Beijing needs to ensure that regional actors are able to de-escalate when tensions may get out of hand.

TN: I would like to now analyze with they way in which the Chinese relationship is “used” and understood in Iran. In a ChinaMed Observer co-written by me with Veronica Turrini, we analyzed last summer’s Iranian internal debate about China’s posture during the Twelve Day War. Much of that debate resembled a form of collective mea culpa among Iranian intellectuals, catalyzed by the perception that successive Iranian governments, particularly since the administrations of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, have understood and practiced the relationship with China in an instrumental manner. How do you assess this line of argument? Do you share this view? How do you think Iran has “dealt with” its China policy?

EB: It’s interesting because, like most policy failures in Iran, the debate that emerges tends to reflect divisions within Iranian politics: different actors blame one another for the failure of a key strategic policy area.

In the case of Iran’s policy towards China, two failures are often discussed. First, there’s significant criticism of the Rouhani administration and the reformist–pragmatist current within the Iranian establishment, arguing that they failed to invest in the relationship with China in the aftermath of the nuclear deal. After Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit to Tehran, the claim is that Iran erred by focusing on deepening ties with Europe, even as China was clearly ready to expand its position in the Iranian economy. According to this view, Iran missed an opportunity; the Chinese were jilted and angered that the Iranians turned away from them the minute sanctions were lifted.

This is, in my view, a fairly simplistic argument, advanced largely to undermine the pro-diplomacy line associated with Iranian political figures who prioritized engagement with the U.S. and Europe.

It’s simplistic because, ultimately, we need to consider the structure of the Iranian economy. As it was emerging from sanctions in 2016, Iran’s economy was built primarily on European investment and technology introduced during the first decade of the 2000s. Although there was an enormous opportunity to deepen engagement with China, it was completely natural and sensible to prioritize the economic relationships with European players, since these formed the underlying basis of Iran’s industrial economy at that time. Existing joint ventures and embedded technology were primarily European. There should, of course, have been an effort to draw more Chinese investment, but such investment would have flowed had the sanctions not been reimposed in 2018. It would have simply grown from a lower base, given Iran’s structural ties to Europe.

A second line of criticism, advanced by reformist or pragmatist figures against the hardline establishment, is that the so-called “Turn East” policy, the idea that Iran could move away from the West and pivot toward China and Russia, has proven a complete failure. In particular, the Raisi government, despite facing severe economic pressure, was unable to secure strong economic support from China even after going to Beijing. Some hardliners argue that Iran succeeded in restoring oil exports following the nadir of the maximum pressure campaign around 2019. In reality, however, this appears primarily to have been a function of market dynamics: global oil demand, the emergence of shadow fleet logistics, and financial channels that enabled continued flows. It was not the result of especially effective Iranian diplomatic outreach to China, nor of a strategic bet on Beijing’s part. As such, these developments should not be overinterpreted.

TN: Don’t you think that the Saudi–Iran deal brokered by the Chinese played a role in the surge of Iranian oil exports to China from the spring of 2023? From that moment on, Iranian oil exports to China nearly doubled, rising from around 700 kbd to 1.5 mbd…

EB: Yes, a little bit. China did make some commitments to continue purchasing Iranian oil, in part as a signal to Saudi Arabia. However, in practical terms, 2023 was also when China came out from the COVID lockdowns and oil demand began to recover. It was likewise a year the Russian invasion of Ukraine, by which time much of shadow fleet had emerged.

The issues of this debate in Iran is that both sides are ultimately wrong, because each assumes that Iranian government policy has been a meaningful lever in shaping the China–Iran relationship. In reality, much of what we see in that relationship is driven by bottom-up dynamics, as economic operators in both countries find ways to engage one another. If anything, everyone within the Iranian political establishment is basically guilty of the mistake of not understanding what it would actually take to operationalize a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. There has been a persistent assumption that they need one additional high-level meeting in Beijing or further invitations to senior Chinese stakeholders in Tehran, assuming that these conversations are what really move the needle.

Analytically, there is a widespread tendency to see relatively authoritarian states and assume very centralized decision-making. Yet, when it comes to China’s external economic relationships (the security dimension is different), bottom-up forces remain the determinant of whether China invests a lot or a little. For Iran, what is important should not have been attempting to focus on trying to change decision-making dynamics in Beijing. If Iran wanted a healthier economic relationship with China, it needed to adjust domestic dynamics, make its market more attractive.

This is where you can understand the difference with Iraq, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. None of these countries are particularly effective at going to Beijing and dictating the terms of their bilateral relationship at. If anything, Iran arguably carries more geopolitical weight given its centrality to the national security calculations of Russia, the U.S., and China. What Iraq, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia did accomplish, unlike Iran, was to enhance the attractiveness of their domestic markets over the relevant period, through deliberate policy efforts.

In Iran’s case, this was always going to be difficult because of the sanctions. Nevertheless, there remained there were low-hanging fruit in terms of improving the Iranian market’s attractiveness. The failure of authorities in Tehran, across the political spectrum, to make these improvements is the fundamental reason why Iran lags behind its regional peers in its relationship with China. In a way, Iranians are debating over the wrong things because they are focused too much on ascribing blame for government policy that is externally facing when the reason for Iran’s inability to reap the benefits of its economic relationship with China is, as in many developing countries, is actually a reflection of internal policy that have yet to be adequately addressed.

TN: My last question concerns the reforms that “should” be undertaken in Iran. You have long advocated structural economic reforms, and I’m currently seeing many Iranian economic actors strongly asking for them, given the gravity of the situation. Do you think the current Iranian system is reformable?

EB: Given everything that has transpired since the major multilateral sanctions in 2012 altered the trajectory of Iran’s economy, we are no longer dealing with a simple question of reform. When we look at the economy of Iran, we’re talking about something closer to “reconstruction.”

What’s at stake is not just policy adjustment. Iran was once a large, industrialized, and productive economy. But due to insufficient investment, especially over the past decade, and a lack of access to technology, it now faces a deterioration of its capital stock: machinery, equipment, vehicles, and infrastructure have all degraded.

Relative to other countries, Iran is falling behind. Take power generation as an example, power demand has continued to rise because the economy has not collapsed, but Iran has not been able to build more power plants. As a result, plants are operating at full capacity. When disruptions occur, blackouts affect parts of the country, harming industrial production as well as households and urban services.

This illustrates why Iran is soon approaching a pivotal moment. If a diplomatic agreement with the U.S. leads to sanctions relief, the fundamental question is no longer economic reform. It will be whether Iran can attract the investment necessary to rebuild its economy. That requires substantial new capital formation and the import of advanced technology and equipment to modernize industry across different sectors.

For most countries, a key partner in infrastructure development today is China. There is therefore urgency in determining how to engage more effectively with China. I think at some point, if the conditions are right, the market will address part of the problem: Iranian companies will seek partners in China and will acquire technology where possible.

However, if the Iranian government – whether the current one or a new one – wants to put the country back on track, it needs to think about how its industrial policy aligns with China’s. This requires moving beyond the comprehensive strategic partnership, which remains largely an MOU with vague commitments. Iran needs a clear model of economic development, and China is central to that model. There is, in practical terms, no alternative partner capable of, for example, supporting Iran decarbonize its economy

These issues are more urgent than ever. The only Iran that gets out of the hole involves some degree of Chinese support. Over the past decade, China has neither been willing nor able to provide the level of assistance required. The task now is to understand why that has been the case and to try and change the conditions so that Iran can secure the help it needs.

Theo NENCINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Lecturer in International Relations and a PhD Candidate at Sciences Po Grenoble and the Catholic University of Paris. His research focuses mainly on Iran-China relations, approached from a long-term systemic perspective and through a multilevel analysis, both with regard to Iran’s strategic thinking, political complexity and regional integration dynamics, and China’s foreign policy toward the Middle East.

By Andrea Ghiselli

More than a hundred children at a girls’ primary school in Minab, in southern Iran, are reported dead. Missiles and drones are striking targets across Israel as well as the Gulf, from Kuwait to Oman, with the barrage not limited to military assets – such as U.S. bases and, allegedly, the USS Abraham Lincoln – but also civilian landmarks, including Dubai’s Burj Al Arab. And by the close of February 28, 2026, the first day of this sudden “Iran-United States war,” news broke that Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, was dead.

China’s official response was swift. Foreign Minister Wang Yi condemned U.S. and Israeli strikes, denouncing the decision to “blatantly assassinate a leader of a sovereign country and instigate regime change.”^[1] Yet, even as China called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to diplomacy, it found itself struggling to square an increasingly fraught circle. China must denounce the attack on Iran without, however, appearing indifferent to Iranian missiles falling on its major economic partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Toeing this ever-thinner line, Fu Cong, China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, declared that “China stresses that the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Iran and other regional countries must be respected.”^[2]

Against this background, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer surveys the first wave of reactions from Chinese academic and private-sector experts. Although the situation remains fluid and opaque, one point of consensus stands out: for many Chinese analysts, this conflict is an inflection point, one that may mark the end of the Islamic Republic itself.

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Operational Logic: Coordination, Timing, and Strategic Signaling

For Chinese commentators, the strike was, first and foremost, a tightly coordinated and deliberate military operation. In an article published by Xinhua, Bao Chengzhang of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) and Wu Bingbing, Director of the Middle East Research Center at Peking University, converge on this assessment while emphasizing different dimensions of the campaign.^[3]

Bao emphasizes the depth of U.S.–Israeli coordination. The two “fully coordinated” their actions, maximizing intelligence sharing, air defense integration, and missile interception capabilities. He situates the strike in the context of stalled U.S.–Iran negotiations (though Oman, which was mediating, claims that the two sides were on the verge of a diplomatic “breakthrough”) and the completion of a dual-carrier U.S. deployment to the region. To him, the sequence indicates meticulous planning, rather than impulsive escalation.

Wu, instead, zeroes in on timing. He notes how the decision to strike during daylight hours served three purposes: breaking the established pattern of nighttime attacks to achieve tactical surprise; meeting the technological requirements for precision-guided systems that perform better in daylight; and projecting a powerful deterrent signal by openly demonstrating force – “showing their cards” (亮出明牌) rather than operating covertly. In this reading, the operation was as much strategic communication as kinetic action.

Strategic Intent: Regime Change or Coercive Diplomacy?

Liu Chang of the China Institute of International Studies, the official think tank of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, characterizes the operation as strongly “preemptive” – a label Israel has also applied to its attack, though one that many legal scholars and legal experts vigorously contest. He also suggests the strike could mark the opening phase of a longer campaign designed to paralyze Iran’s senior command structure and erode domestic resistance.^[4] At the same time, he acknowledges a different reading: that this may represent an attempt at “using force to promote negotiations” (以打促谈) coercing Iran into concessions.^[5]

In an interview with Shanghai Observer, Zhou Yiqi of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies suggests that the scale and declared objectives push the episode far closer to war than to a limited strike.^[6] For Iran, he argues, the missile issue is existential; any concessions on missile capabilities would effectively equate to regime overthrow. Under these conditions, even negotiations framed as coercive diplomacy are likely to blur into the logic of structural regime change.

Escalation Dynamics: Asymmetric Retaliation and Regional Spillover

Chen Long, a research assistant at Renmin University, argues that Iran’s retaliation is likely to remain asymmetric, relying on waves of ballistic missiles and drones.^[7] Such a posture, he suggests, could produce a dual, uneven confrontation: indirect U.S.–Iran clashes alongside direct Iranian–Israeli exchanges, with spillover risks stretching from the Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean and even the Red Sea.

Zhou Yiqi notes that Iran’s counterattack has already been more rapid and multi-pronged than during previous crises, striking not only Israel but also U.S.-linked regional bases, a sign of Tehran’s preparedness for a wider confrontation.^[8] In an interview with The Observer, SISU’s Ding Long similarly describes the initial U.S.-Israeli strikes as a textbook “decapitation” operation aimed at leadership infrastructure rather than nuclear facilities alone. He anticipates a conflict that could exceed last year’s “Twelve-Day War” in both duration and scale.^[9]

That said, Chen Long also points out an opening, however narrow, for de-escalation:

“Against the backdrop of a U.S. national security strategy under Trump in which ‘retrenchment’ is the key word, if the United States becomes deeply entangled in a prolonged war of attrition in the Middle East, it will inevitably weaken the strategic resources it can devote to other regions. This, too, is where the hope lies that Iran–U.S. negotiations may still see a turning point.”

Regime Stability: Institutional Resilience or Systemic Fragility?

A key fault line among Chinese analysts concerns Iran’s internal stability. In an article published by Shanghai Observer, three experts debate the extent to which the Islamic Republic can weather such an unprecedented shock.^[10]

Li Shaoxian of the China–Arab States Research Institute underscores how Iran’s political system has institutionalized succession mechanisms. In his view, contingency planning and structured power-transfer procedures mitigate systemic vulnerabilities. Absent a ground invasion, he argues, airstrikes alone are unlikely to topple the regime. According to Li:

“Iran and Venezuela have vastly different national circumstances. This operation will not be able to overthrow the Iranian regime; on the contrary, it will instead stimulate even stronger impulses of revenge and retaliation within Iran’s political system.”

SISU’s Liu Zhongmin contends that while the assassination of the Supreme Leader constitutes a severe symbolic and institutional shock, it does not automatically imply regime collapse. He points to the absence of a strong organized opposition and the limited domestic traction of diaspora-based alternatives.

However, Liu adds that Khamenei’s assassination, along with the elimination of Hamas leaders in Iran and several high-ranking Iranian military officials and scientists, reflects the extremely serious extent of U.S. and Israeli infiltration of Iran. This raises the prospect that Washington and Tel Aviv have cultivated potential power-seizing forces within the country. The existence of this “political black hole” (政治黑洞), he warns, further exacerbates Iran’s domestic situation.

By contrast, Ding Long raises the possibility that sustained decapitation pressure could induce command paralysis or a cascading breakdown within Iran’s political–military leadership. Under prolonged stress, he suggests, regime collapse could become conceivable. As he stated:

“Regardless of who succeeds, Iran lacks the military resources to wage a protracted war against the United States and Israel, and its ability to survive is questionable.”

Energy Security and the Strait of Hormuz: The Systemic Risk Variable

Across the sources surveyed, the Strait of Hormuz is treated as the central systemic risk.

Wan Zhe of Beijing Normal University argues that short-term oil pricing is now driven less by supply–demand fundamentals and more by geopolitical risk premiums.^[11] She stresses the strait’s role as a critical global energy artery and highlights its broader implications for the energy transition and supply-chain resilience.

In the same article, Wang Lei of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences notes that while Iran could, in theory, wield significant leverage through a sustained blockade of Hormuz, such a move would also be highly self-destructive and would almost certainly trigger countermeasures, suggesting practical limits to on Tehran’s escalation choices.

Interviewed by the 21st Century Business Herald, He Ning of Kaiyuan Securities emphasizes that Iran’s strategic influence over the strait gives it disproportionate impact relative to its modest production share, particularly given Asia’s heavy reliance on energy flows through Hormuz.^[12]

Financial Markets: Risk Aversion and Commodity Strength

Due to the war, Chinese financial analysts anticipate heightened volatility and a classic risk-off pattern across global markets.

Speaking to China News Service, Tian Lihui of Nankai University identifies three main transmission mechanisms: the repricing of risk premiums, energy cost pressures on corporate profits, and constraints on monetary easing as higher oil prices complicate rate cuts.^[13] Wang Lei further highlights Asia’s vulnerability through imported inflation and shipping disruptions that amplify the energy shock.

In the aforementioned 21st Century Business Herald article, three other experts discussed longer-term economic implications.^[14] Tao Chuan of Guolian Minsheng Bank predicts that gold and oil prices will climb in tandem while risk assets face downward pressure, reflecting historical patterns during Middle East crises. Xu Chi of Zhongtai Securities argues that this episode differs structurally from last year’s confrontation and may sustain commodity strength, while also shaping expectations regarding the accelerated weaponization and informatization of AI in defense. Liao Bo of the China Chief Economist Forum contends that deep structural differences between U.S. and Iranian negotiating positions make compromise unlikely and increase the probability that escalation becomes recurrent rather than episodic.

Conclusion: Where is China?

Unsurprisingly, none of the experts cited here directly addressed the implications for China. Like everyone else, Chinese diplomats and policymakers are surely monitoring the evolving situation closely, but they have so far avoided public commentary. One of the few exceptions is a former Chinese diplomat who argued, in an anonymous comment to the South China Morning Post, that the China-Iran economic relationship is resilient enough to withstand ongoing political upheaval.[15]

In the same article, Wen Shaobiao of SISU’s Middle East Studies Institute similarly suggests that Khamenei’s death will not significantly disrupt bilateral economic ties. On the contrary, he argues that:

“if a pro‑Western government is established [in Iran] and the U.S. sanctions are subsequently lifted, it would actually boost Chinese investment in the country.”

Previous ChinaMed Project analyses have already brought to light a certain pessimism among Chinese observers regarding the trajectory of Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and domestic situation. Beijing has likely already made some kind of preparation for the possibility of regime change in Tehran – one that would probably produce a military‑led, rather than clerical‑led, government.

As written elsewhere, this war presents some problems for Chinese diplomacy. However, at the overall strategic level, it may also offer Beijing notable advantages: complicating U.S. planning for contingencies in East Asia and creating new openings for China to promote its initiatives and to shape the global discourse and norms on international security.

Dr. Andrea GHISELLI is Head of Research of the ChinaMed Project. He is also Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology of the University of Exeter. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy making and China’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.

[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs – People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Has a Phone Call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” March 1, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbzhd/202603/t20260301_11866751.html.

[2] Xinhua, “China deeply concerned about U.S.-Israel strikes against Iran: envoy,” March 1, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260301/b0e2af6198534cd7a9877b2f17eff4f5/c.html.

[3] Xinhua, “Guójì guānchá gǔn zhànzhēng chéng yǐn huòduān wújìn——sì wèn měi yǐ xíjí yīlǎng” 国际观察丨战争成瘾　祸端无尽——四问美以袭击伊朗 [International Observer | War Addiction: Endless Calamities – Four Questions about the US-Israeli Attack on Iran], February, 28, 2026, https://www.news.cn/world/20260228/1b1f52a02f034e0aa3efac9131dbd11e/c.html.

[4] Xinhua, “Měi yǐ liánshǒu kōngxí yīlǎng yīlǎng shìyán ‘huǐmiè shì bàofù’” 美以联手空袭伊朗 伊朗誓言“毁灭式报复” [The US and Israel launched joint airstrikes against Iran; Iran vowed “devastating retaliation”], March 1, 2026, https://www.news.cn/20260301/0c832b91135d4da3b74bcdbb61f0a02a/c.html.

[5] See note 3, Xinhua, February, 28, 2026, https://www.news.cn/world/20260228/1b1f52a02f034e0aa3efac9131dbd11e/c.html.

[6] Wang Ruoxian, “Měi yǐ yào ‘yí píng’ yīlǎng dǎodàn gōngyè, yīlǎng fǎnjí ‘méiyǒu hóngxiàn’! Zhōngdōng yòu yīcì zhàn zài shízìlù kǒu” 美以要“夷平”伊朗导弹工业，伊朗反击“没有红线”！中东又一次站在十字路口 [The US and Israel want to “raze” Iran’s missile industry; Iran retaliates with “no red lines”! The Middle East once again stands at a crossroads], Shanghai Observer, February 28, 2026, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1073994.

[7] Chen Long, “Yīlǎng tuìle yībù, pàohuǒ jìnle yībù” 伊朗退了一步，炮火进了一步 [Iran took a step back, but its artillery fire advanced], Renmin University News, March 3, 2026, https://news.ruc.edu.cn/2027925388097986561.html.

[8] See note 6, Wang Ruoxian, Shanghai Observer, February 28, 2026, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1073994.

[9] Observer, “Dīng lóng: Měi yǐ xíjí shì wéi zhèngquán gēngdié, yīlǎng de chéngbài qǔjué yú liǎng gè yīnsù” 丁隆：美以袭击是为政权更迭，伊朗的成败取决于两个因素 [Ding Long: The US-Israeli attacks are for regime change; Iran’s success or failure depends on two factors.], February 28, 2026, https://news.ifeng.com/c/8r7JyNlvW8N.

[10] Liao Qin and Zhang Quan, “Shēndù | zuìgāo lǐngxiù shēnwáng, měi yǐ jiàoxiāo jìxù dǎ, yīlǎng néng fǒu tǐngguò 47 niánlái zuì zhìmìng wéijī?” 深度 | 最高领袖身亡，美以叫嚣继续打，伊朗能否挺过47年来最致命危机？[In-depth analysis | With the death of its Supreme Leader, the US and Israel are clamoring to continue the war. Can Iran survive its deadliest crisis in 47 years?], Shanghai Observer, March 1, 2026, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/web/newsDetail.html?id=1074266&v=2.2&sid=11.

[11] China News Service, “Měi yǐ xíjí yīlǎng quánqiú néngyuán zhuǎnxíng yíng fùzá biànjú” 美以袭击伊朗 全球能源转型迎复杂变局 [US-Israeli attacks on Iran: Global energy transition faces complex changes], March 1, 2026, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2026/03-01/10578936.shtml.

[12] 21st Century Business Herald, “Yīlǎng, shǐyòng xīn wǔqì! Zhōumò huǒsù jiědú! Rúhé yǐngxiǎng dà lèi zīchǎn?” 伊朗，使用新武器！周末火速解读！如何影响大类资产？[Iran uses new weapons! Quick analysis over the weekend! How will this affect major asset classes?], March 1, 2026, https://www.21jingji.com/article/20260301/herald/97f3767873cd52fceffa248f7811ac01.html.

[13] See note 11, China News Service, March 1, 2026, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cj/2026/03-01/10578936.shtml.

[14] See note 12, 21st Century Business Herald, March 1, 2026, https://www.21jingji.com/article/20260301/herald/97f3767873cd52fceffa248f7811ac01.html.

[15] Zhao Ziwen, “Khamenei is dead. But China’s ties with Iran will endure. Here’s why,” South China Morning Post, March 1, 2026, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3345051/khamenei-dead-chinas-ties-iran-will-endure-heres-why.

In other news, we want to highlight insights from our research team on how China may be perceiving and reacting to the ongoing protests in Iran. For instance, Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli and ChinaMed Research Fellow Theo Nencini have shared their views with the Washington Post:

The Washington Post - China senses opportunity as U.S. targets Iran and Venezuela by Simon Elegant and Huiyee Chiew

If you read French, you can also find further analyses by Theo Nencini for Les Echos, RFI, and Mediapart.

By Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni^[1]

On November 12, 2025, the Chinese embassy in Tripoli officially reopened after more than a decade. However, the return of Chinese diplomatic staff to the Libyan capital passed largely unnoticed, attracting scant media interest both domestically and abroad.^[2] Most of the international coverage came from Italy,^[3] where the news outlet Formiche^[4] interviewed ChinaMed’s Head of Research Andrea Ghiselli on the matter.

According to Ghiselli, the reopening of the embassy in Tripoli may be linked to Beijing’s plans to restore its diplomatic mission in Syria later this year. Taken together, he argued, these moves suggest an effort by China to reintroduce a degree of “normalcy” into two long-standing Mediterranean dossiers. From this perspective, the unshuttering of the Chinese embassy in Tripoli may signal an attempt by Beijing to expand its diplomatic room for maneuver across the region.^[5]

Ghiselli is careful, however, to draw a distinction. While Syria has succeeded in achieving a measure of territorial consolidation, international recognition and investment commitments under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Libya, by contrast, remains deeply fragmented. The country is divided between the United Nations-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli in the west, and the de facto authority of military strongman Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east.

Still, the Syrian comparison is useful. As in Syria, China’s role in Libya has often been overstated, swinging between inflated expectations and undue suspicion. This edition of the ChinaMed Observer therefore revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing’s evolving relations with the country’s factions and situating them within a regional context. We explore whether dynamics reminiscent of the end of the Syrian civil war are beginning to emerge in Libya, and whether such parallels can shed light on Beijing’s future approach to the Libyan crisis.

Our assessment aligns with Ghiselli’s argument: the reopening of the Chinese embassy signals normalization, but little beyond that. As the Syrian case shows, diplomatic engagement does not imply political commitment, let alone a readiness for direct involvement. China is thus unlikely to engage deeply in Libya’s power struggles. If anything, recent developments in Syria appear to be shaping Beijing’s approach to Libya, reinforcing a preference for caution, balance and neutrality. This posture is all the more likely given that Libya today is not only unresolved but far more crowded with external actors than Syria ever was. In such an environment, Beijing will likely opt to keep its options open – present, but uncommitted.

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China and the Beginning of the Libyan Crisis

The Libyan crisis erupted in early 2011, when the Arab Spring swept in from neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, igniting mass protests against the long-entrenched rule of Muammar Gaddafi. What began as popular unrest quickly descended into a violent civil war, one that also upended foreign economic interests rooted in the country, notably those of China.

Before the conflict, Beijing was a major importer of Libyan oil (see graph 1), and Chinese state-owned enterprises were deeply involved in construction, energy, and infrastructure projects nationwide (see graph 2). However, an unintended risk of this mutually profitable partnership was that tens of thousands of Chinese nationals were on Libyan soil when war broke out (see graph 3). Their safety was an immediate concern for Beijing, which mounted an unprecedented response: in March 2011, China carried out its largest overseas evacuation, extracting more than 35,000 citizens from Libya, an active war zone thousands of kilometers from its borders.

China’s unprecedented response and ability to operate in the Mediterranean caught many European observers off guard (this episode spurred the creation of the ChinaMed Project later that same year). At the same time, the operation’s reliance on chartered civilian ships and aircraft laid bare the limits of China’s power-projection capabilities. As such, experts regard the Libya evacuation as having catalyzed Beijing’s subsequent push to modernize its military, establish its first overseas base in Djibouti, and refine its doctrine for “military operations other than war.”^[6]

Analysts like Jesse Marks also see Libya as the watershed moment in China’s approach to conflict resolution in the region. In March 2011, as violence spiraled out of control, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 that sanctioned the NATO-led intervention by authorizing a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Despite its veto power and commitment to non-interference, China chose to abstain to avoid alienating the Arab League and the African Union which supported the resolution.^[7]

By ultimately toppling Gaddafi’s regime, however, the intervention contributed to plunging the country into prolonged political instability and a severe humanitarian crisis. In the aftermath, Beijing adopted a more skeptical posture toward Western-led interventions, doubling down on the primacy of state sovereignty and negotiated settlements.

This shift was most evident regarding Syria, where China repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council resolutions it believed could open the door to regime change. At the same time, China further prioritized cultivating ties with key regional actors and expanding its multilateral frameworks in the region not merely to insulate its relationships from future diplomatic divergences, but also to shape the contours of the regional debate itself.^[8]

China’s Stance on Libya’s Factions: Cautious and Calculated Neutrality

Although China abstained from Resolution 1973, it was quick to criticize NATO airstrikes. This somewhat discongruous posture allowed Beijing to pursue what Sandy Alkoutami and Frederic Wehrey described as a strategy of “cautious” and “calculated” neutrality during the 2011 Libya war. In practice, China hedged its bets: preserving ties with Gaddafi’s collapsing regime while opening channels to the opposition National Transitional Council (NTC), which Beijing formally recognized as Libya’s sole legitimate authority in September 2011, following the fall of the capital Tripoli.^[9]

This ambiguity initially led to mistrust. At first, the NTC viewed Beijing warily amid accusations that China had sought to skirt the arms embargo to supply Gaddafi. However, through sustained diplomatic outreach after the war, China managed to repair relations with Libya’s post-Gaddafi leadership. As Alkoutami and Wehrey note, these efforts not only helped restore China’s prewar economic footprint but also left Beijing in relatively good standing with successive UN-recognized, Tripoli-based governments.^[10]

Those governments, for their part, proved incapable of unifying the anti-Gaddafi camp. Rival factions hardened, Islamist groups expanded their reach, and state authority steadily fragmented. Against this backdrop, Khalifa Haftar and his LNA launched Operation Dignity in eastern Libya in May 2014, ostensibly to eliminate Islamist militias, but widely perceived as a bid for dominance. In response, opposing Islamist militants and armed groups coalesced into the Libya Dawn coalition, leading to fighting erupting around Tripoli and across the east, plunging Libya into its second civil war.

Heavy foreign intervention quickly followed, unsurprising given the strategic prize of Libya’s vast oil reserves. Broadly speaking, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, and Russia supported the LNA, while Türkiye, Qatar, and Italy backed the UN-recognized authorities in Tripoli. These states did not merely act through proxies; several intervened directly, deploying airpower, military advisers, and mercenaries. Türkiye’s role was especially consequential, tipping the balance against Haftar’s 2019 surprise offensive on Tripoli.

A UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 briefly raised hopes for national reconciliation and elections. Those hopes have since faded, with any progress stalling amid disputes over electoral rules and candidate eligibility. The east-west divide between the GNU and LNA has only become more entrenched, with periodic and often intense clashes continuing to punctuate this uneasy stalemate.

Throughout this second civil war and its unresolved aftermath, Beijing has largely maintained its posture of neutrality and balancing. As in conflicts such as Yemen, China has consistently called for a political solution that preserves Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while condemning foreign interference.

Yet, for much of the past decade, many analysts have questioned if this neutrality has ever been truly even-handed. Samuel Ramani has argued that China tilted toward Tripoli-based governments over Haftar-aligned authorities in the east. This tendency is consistent with Beijing’s longstanding preference for UN-recognized governments and is reflected in its sustained (though not exclusive) diplomatic engagement with the GNU and its predecessors.^[11]

Jalel Harchaoui argued that this preference is also motivated by economic concerns, (this reflects a broader tendency to view China’s Libya policy as “economy first” by default). Tripoli-based authorities control the highly contested Central Bank of Libya, the sole legal repository of the country’s oil revenues, granting the GNU the unique ability to disburse funds, sign contracts, and allocate capital. When Chinese state-owned PetroChina signed an annual contract with Libya’s National Oil Corporation in May 2018, it necessarily relied on, and reinforced, the financial primacy of Tripoli.^[12]

Nor has the relationship been one-sided. Tripoli, for its part, has actively courted Chinese investments by joining the BRI in 2018.^[13] Since then, successive Tripoli-based governments have sought to market Libya as a destination for Chinese capital, not only in hydrocarbons, but also in infrastructure and telecommunications, pointing to firms such as Huawei and ZTE as possible partners. This outreach has continued under the current government. In June 2024, at the inaugural Chinese-Libyan Economic Forum in Beijing, GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah urged Chinese companies to restart suspended projects, explicitly casting Beijing as a central actor in Libya’s reconstruction.

China’s response has been cautious but noteworthy. Bilateral trade has grown over the last few years and Chinese firms have signed on to restart frozen infrastructure projects (see graphs 4 and 5). The November 2023 memorandum of understanding between the Misrata Free Zone and China Harbour exemplifies growing Chinese interest in investing in GNU-controlled territory.

However, this deepening economic and diplomatic relationship has clear limits. Even as Beijing elevated ties with Tripoli to a “strategic partnership” during the visit to China of the (GNU-linked) Libyan Presidency Council head Mohammad al-Manfi, it has stopped short of translating the relationship into tangible security support – something Tripoli has sought. As Harchaoui noted, Beijing has declined Tripoli’s requests to help lift the UN arms embargo or to assist it in accessing Libya’s frozen sovereign wealth fund.^[14]

This restraint speaks to both China’s reluctance to become entangled in Libya’s security quagmire and its determination not to foreclose options in the east. Beijing has consistently kept open channels with Haftar, hedging against the uncertain trajectory of the Libyan conflict and likely mindful that much of Libya’s oil infrastructure lies in LNA-controlled territory. At the same time, recent developments have led to speculation that China may be leaning toward a more active role in Libya’s security landscape, and perhaps even beginning to tilt, cautiously, toward the LNA.

Recent Developments: Planes, Trains and UAVs

For years, analysts have argued that, from Beijing’s perspective, it mattered little who ultimately “won” in Libya. China’s priority, the argument went, was to keep open channels to all plausible power centers, ensuring a seat at the table when postwar reconstruction began.^[15]

China’s hedge, however, may no longer be evenly balanced. A growing body of reporting suggests that China’s interest in Libya may be drifting eastward, away from the GNU and toward Haftar. Where Chinese firms once avoided acknowledging interest in the east, now the picture looks markedly different. Reports of Chinese interest in the Haftar-controlled Benghazi airport, the ports of Tobruk and Sirte, and long-discussed railway links connecting Cyrenaica to the Sahel now circulate with increasing frequency, often framed within the BRI.^[16]

However, these projects’ feasibility and the depth of Chinese financial commitment remain an open question. Much of the apparent uptick may simply reflect improving operating conditions in the east, particularly following the establishment of the Energy and Mining Bank, intended to provide eastern authorities greater financial autonomy and contracting capacity. Even if the headline projects remain aspirational, Chinese firms appear sufficiently active in the east to have provoked a reaction from Tripoli: the GNU has suspended Huawei’s operations in western Libya, citing the company’s role in developing telecommunications infrastructure in LNA-controlled areas.

Economic engagement with multiple sides is hardly unusual for China, and, on its own, would not signal a strategic realignment. What has truly fueled speculation are several high-profile, security-related episodes that hint, however ambiguously, at a more direct role.

In June 2024, Italian customs authorities intercepted two Chinese-made military drones at the port of Gioia Tauro. Shipped from Yantian and bound for Haftar-controlled Benghazi, the cargo was concealed as wind turbine components, an apparent attempt to circumvent the UN arms embargo on Libya.

More troubling still was an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which alleged that China-linked firms had plotted to supply the LNA with up to US$1 billion worth of drones, disguised as COVID-19 humanitarian assistance. Shell companies were allegedly used to mask state involvement, with the investigation suggesting the possible deliberate involvement of Chinese state-owned defense firms and even elements of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[17]

Investigators went further, suggesting that Beijing’s underlying logic may have been “using war to end war quickly” by tipping the balance in Haftar’s favor.^[18] That conclusion, however, remains contested. Ghiselli, for example, has cautioned against reading the episode as evidence of a centrally directed Chinese strategy, noting that even large Chinese state-owned enterprises have at times acted with considerable autonomy, often to Beijing’s irritation.^[19]

Moreover, Chinese-made drones have been present in Libya for more than a decade, most prominently the Wing Loong systems deployed by the LNA as early as 2016. Those drones were procured and operated by the UAE, not China, with Beijing insisting that such sales were purely commercial transactions unrelated to its political stance on Libya. Even Western officials have largely concurred. In 2020, Wolfgang Pusztai, former Austrian defense attaché to Libya and chairman of the advisory board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations, noted that there was no evidence China had directly supplied weapons to either side.^[20] Chinese drones, after all, are ubiquitous across the region and can just as easily be found trained on one another in the arsenals of rival states such as Algeria and Morocco.

More recent developments, however, have further muddied the waters. Last month, Pakistan reportedly finalized a US$4 billion deal to supply the LNA with military equipment over the next two and a half years, including sixteen JF-17 “Thunder” fighter jets. The fourth-generation fighter is jointly developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, a fact that has drawn attention to Beijing’s possible role. However, the driving force behind this deal appears to be Pakistani, not Chinese.^[21]

Islamabad has aggressively marketed the JF-17 as a cost-effective, combat-tested alternative to Western aircraft following its reportedly successful deployment during recent clashes with India.^[22] This push is both recent and potentially overextended, and may amount more to marketing than sustainable export capacity. Libya remains subject to a UN arms embargo – frequently violated, but still consequential – and analysts have questioned if Pakistan has the industrial and logistical capacity to honor a growing slate of large, long-term, and in some cases unconfirmed defense agreements, most notably an alleged deal with Saudi Arabia.^[23] These uncertainties cast doubt on whether fulfilling a contract with the non-UN-recognized authorities in eastern Libya would rank as a strategic priority for Pakistan, let alone for China.

Amid this landscape of ambiguous commercial ties and third-party arms transfers, Beijing’s clearest move has come not on the battlefield or in the boardroom, but in the diplomatic sphere. After much delay, China has relocated its embassy staff from Tunis back to Tripoli. Far from signaling support for the LNA, a rival authority that has repeatedly sought to seize the Libyan capital by force, this move points to a measure of confidence in the GNU and a desire to further strengthen ties with the UN-recognized government. More plausibly still, it reflects a pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground, as Libya, and the wider region, enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and an emerging rift pitting the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.

Has Libya Become the New Syria?

In the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse in Syria to rebel forces, a wave of reporting suggested that Russia was rapidly redeploying military and naval assets from the Syrian port of Latakia to LNA-controlled territory in Libya.^[24] Since then, Tobruk and the base in Maaten al-Sarra have been cast by analysts as the new logistical gateways for the Africa Corps – the rebranded successor to the Wagner Group – supporting Russian operations across sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Sahel.

Beyond Russian maneuvers, another decisive dynamic reshaping Libya is the widening rift between the once close partners of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and its continued engagement with Tel Aviv amid the Gaza war, has increasingly set it apart from Riyadh and other Gulf capitals, particularly after Israel’s escalatory military actions against Syria’s new regime, Iran and Qatar.

Simmering tensions over Sudan, Somalia and Yemen finally boiled over in December 2025. In Yemen, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council launched an offensive against the Saudi-backed internationally-recognized government. Riyadh responded with a direct military intervention, decisively routing the southern forces and laying bare the depth of the Gulf rupture.

Libya is deeply enmeshed in this broader fracture. The UAE remains one of the LNA’s main external backers, with Haftar serving as a critical nexus in a wider Emirati-backed network that includes Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, now locked in a brutal civil war against the Sudanese Armed Forces, who in turn, are backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. As Emirati assertiveness grows, Cairo, Riyadh and Ankara have increasingly coordinated their stances on regional files. Should this alignment deepen, the once-cohesive external coalition supporting the LNA could begin to unravel if Egypt and Saudi Arabia draw closer to Türkiye, Tripoli’s most influential military patron.

Recent developments in Syria and Yemen have also delivered a hard lesson for Haftar: his key backers, Russia and the UAE, are far from infallible guarantors. Still, this does not necessarily spell the end of the LNA. While Haftar is now eighty-two, he has already cultivated a successor in his son Saddam Haftar, who has embarked on an international tour stopping in Paris and Cairo. Moreover, the LNA’s firm grip over eastern Libya, both territorially and militarily, sharply contrasts with the west, where the GNU remains hollowed out by corruption and fragmented authority, hostage to militias and local power brokers.

Adding further complexity is the Mediterranean dimension. Amid concerns over migration flows and volatile energy prices, Libya retains strategic importance for Italy, France, and Greece. However, European involvement has been anything but straightforward. The rival ambitions of Rome and Paris, each backing opposing factions or trying to outmaneuver the other as peace broker, have undermined any hope of a unified EU strategy on Libya.

China and Russia’s entrenched presence in the country has only heightened Italian and European unease. Though the Syrian case cautions against assuming seamless Sino-Russian alignment in Libya, the revival of power-politics thinking in Europe has fueled skepticism toward China’s role. This skepticism is especially pronounced in Italy, where commentators, policymakers and military voices view the former Italian colony as within Rome’s “natural” sphere of influence, vital to energy security, migration management, and national security.^[25] This is despite Chinese diplomats having in the past indicated openness to cooperate with Italy on Libya, likely motivated by a shared preference for Tripoli over Benghazi.^[26]

In such a crowded and complex environment, which recently saw the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) extend its mandate in hopes of advancing the UN roadmap, it is unsurprising that Chinese officials have sought a more visible on-the-ground presence by reopening their embassy – a move which, however, should not be mistaken for deep commitment.

Conclusion

As Libya and the wider region enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and the emerging rift between the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye, the return of Chinese diplomats to Tripoli reflects Beijing’s pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground while maintaining a position of cautious and calculated neutrality between the Libyan factions.

While Chinese defense companies have seemingly participated in Libya’s security landscape through third parties, it remains highly unlikely that China would seek a direct role in the conflict. The most plausible explanation is that Beijing tolerated some security-related engagement with the LNA as a way to maintain relations with the most significant stakeholder in eastern Libya. The LNA’s relative cohesion, compared to the fractured and internally weak GNU, might also position Haftar as a key player should a long-anticipated power-sharing agreement materialize.

The Syrian experience likely informs this cautious approach. China’s steadfast support for the UN-recognized government of Bashar al-Assad ultimately left it exposed when his regime collapsed, temporarily locking Beijing out of engagement with the new Syrian authorities and undermining Chinese interests, particularly regarding Uyghur fighters operating in the country.

Any Chinese engagement with the LNA, then, is best understood not as a pivot but as insurance: a way to remain relevant without becoming entangled. As Libya remains only more crowded with external actors as Syria ever was, Beijing’s most rational course is to remain present, visible, and determined above all to keep its options open.

Bianca PASQUIER is a Project Officer and Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Sciences at the University of Turin and holds a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include the foreign policies of MENA countries and the media coverage of China in North Africa.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute, a Junior Research Fellow at the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai), and a graduate of the Sciences Po–Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.

^[1] The authors would like to thank Davide Donald for his help and clarifications.

^[2] Sami Zapitia, “Chinese Embassy officially resumes its operations from Tripoli today – after a 10-year closure due to security situation,” Libya Herald, November 12, 2025, https://libyaherald.com/2025/11/chinese-embassy-officially-resumes-its-operations-from-tripoli-today-after-a-10-year-closure-due-to-security-situation/;
The Libya Observer, “Chinese Embassy returns to Tripoli” November 14, 2025, https://libyaobserver.ly/index.php/inbrief/chinese-embassy-returns-tripoli.

^[3] Agenzia Nova, “China to reopen its embassy in Tripoli in November,” October 31, 2025, https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/la-cina-riaprira-la-propria-ambasciata-a-tripoli-a-novembre/.

^[4] Formiche is an Italian political and strategic affairs magazine. Rather than a mass-circulation news outlet, it is more a platform for analytical commentary and agenda-setting aimed at policymakers, civil servants, diplomats, and business leaders. It has an Atlantist editorial line.

^[5] Emmanuele Rossi, “Cosa racconta il ritorno della Cina in Libia” [What China’s Return to Libya Tells us], Formiche, December 13, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/12/cosa-racconta-il-ritorno-della-cina-in-libia/ (a partial translation in English is also available on Decode39, a spin-off project of Formiche).

^[6] See Andrea Ghiselli, “Diverse Threats, Diverse Responses,” Protecting China’s Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy (Oxford, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867395.003.0007;
Carine Pina, “La Chine et les opérations militaires autres que la guerre (军队非战争军事行动) à l’étranger : quelles conséquences sur le dilemme de sécurité ?” IRSEM n°115, March 2025, https://www.irsem.fr/actualites/etude-de-l-irsem-n-115-2024.html

^[7] Jesse Marks, “The Legacy of Libya in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Coffee in the Desert [Substack], December 29, 2024, https://jessemarks.substack.com/p/the-legacy-of-libya-in-chinese-foreign.

^[8] Jesse Marks, “China’s evolving conflict mediation in the Middle East,” Middle East Institute, March 25, 2022, https://mei.edu/publication/chinas-evolving-conflict-mediation-middle-east/.

^[9] Sandy Alkoutami and Frederic Wehrey, “China’s Balancing Act in Libya,” Lawfare, May 10, 2020, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/chinas-balancing-act-libya.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Samuel Ramani, “Where Does China Stand on the Libya Conflict?,” The Diplomat, June 18, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/where-does-china-stand-on-the-libya-conflict/.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] Later that same year, in December 2018, Libya also joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. https://libyaobserver.ly/index.php/inbrief/libya-joins-china-based-aaib.

^[14] Guy Burton, “Will China Become More Active in Libya?,” The Diplomat, February 19, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/will-china-become-more-active-in-libya/.

^[15] Giorgio Cafiero, “The Geopolitics of China’s Libya Foreign Policy,” ChinaMed Project, August 4, 2020, https://www.chinamed.it/publications/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-libya-foreign-policy.

^[16] Al-Estiklal, “China Leverages Economic Ties to Win Over Both Sides in Libya: How?,” September 9, 2025, https://alestiklal.net/en/article/china-leverages-economic-ties-to-win-over-both-sides-in-libya-how;
Sage, “China’s Expanding Strategic Footprint in Libya: Energy, Infrastructure, and a New Gateway to Europe,” SinoSage [Substack], July 3, 2025, https://sinosage.substack.com/p/chinas-expanding-strategic-footprint.

^[17] Sophia Yan, “Inside China’s secret plan to send weapons disguised as Covid aid to warlord,” The Telegraph, December 26, 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/12/26/chinas-secret-plan-to-send-armed-drones-to-libyan-warlord/.

^[18] Tom Kington, “Chinese COVID aid talks with Libyans called a plot to smuggle drones,” Defense News, September 27, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/09/27/chinese-covid-aid-to-libya-is-labeled-a-plot-for-smuggling-war-drones/.

^[19] Emanuele Rossi, “Cina in Libia? Che cosa raccontano i droni in cambio di petrolio” [China in Libya? What do the drones exchanged for oil deal tell us], Formiche, December 31, 2024, https://formiche.net/2024/12/cina-in-libia-che-cosa-raccontano-i-droni-in-cambio-di-petrolio/.

^[20] See note 15, Giorgio Cafiero, ChinaMed Project, August 4, 2020, https://www.chinamed.it/publications/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-libya-foreign-policy.

^[21] MEE staff, Pakistan seals $4bn arms deal to sell Chinese warplanes to Libya’s Khalifa Haftar: Report,” Middle East Eye, December 22, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/pakistan-seals-4bn-arms-deal-sell-chinese-warplanes-libyas-khalifa-haftar-report.

^[22] Zia Ur Rehman, “Why Pakistan’s war with India led to a boom in arms sales and defence ties,” Middle East Eye, January 16, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-pakistans-war-india-led-boon-arms-sales-and-defence-ties.

^[23] Snehesh Alex Philip, “The curious case of Pakistan’s JF-17 ‘orders,’” The Print, January 15, 2026, https://theprint.in/the-fineprint/the-curious-case-of-pakistans-jf-17-orders/2827270/.

^[24] Leela Jacinto, “Fallout of Assad’s ouster in Syria ripples down the Mediterranean to Libya,” France24, December 20, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20241220-fallout-assad-ouster-syria-ripples-down-mediterranean-libya.

^[25] Jacopo Marzano, “La forza della penetrazione tecnologica cinese nel dietrofront su Huawei in Libia” [The strength of Chinese technological penetration in the about-face on Huawei in Libya], Formiche, August 28, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/08/la-forza-della-penetrazione-tecnologica-cinese-nel-dietrofront-su-huawei-in-libia/;
Federico Di Bisceglie, “L’Italia oggi conta di più in Europa, ora una proiezione mediterranea. La versione di Quagliariello” [Italy today counts more in Europe, now to project in the Mediterranean. Quagliariello’s view], Formiche, December 27, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/12/litalia-oggi-conta-di-piu-in-europa-ora-una-proiezione-mediterranea-guidata-dal-piano-mattei-parla-quagliariello/;
Fabio Caffio, “La Cina nel Mediterraneo, uno scenario possibile raccontato dall’amm. Caffio” [China in the Mediterranean: A Possible Scenario, as Told by Admiral Caffio], Formiche, December 9, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/12/la-cina-nel-mediterraneo-uno-scenario-possibile-raccontato-dallamm-caffio/.

^[26] Guido Santevecchi, «Cina e Italia insieme in Libia per fermare i profughi e battere il terrorismo» [“China and Italt together in Libya to stop the refugees and to defeat terrorism”], Corriere della Sera, January 22, 2008, https://www.corriere.it/esteri/22_gennaio_08/cina-italia-insieme-libia-fermare-profughi-battere-terrorismo-189c9bfc-70ae-11ec-bed9-868e21cce827.shtml.

The Path of Affection

Giving and Belonging: Patterns of Chinese Diaspora Philanthropy from Italy

By Amanda Chen…

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By Chen

On October 28, Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te (賴清德) made headlines when he publicly referred to Israel as a “valuable model” for Taiwan’s defence.^[1] He delivered the remark during a dinner in Taiwan organised by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a Washington-based pro-Israel lobby. Reiterating his earlier proposal for the construction of an air-defense network for Taiwan – a “T-Dome” – modelled on Israel’s Iron Dome,^[2] Lai urged for closer bilateral security cooperation, invoking biblical history:

“Israel’s determination and ability to defend its territory is a valuable model for Taiwan. I have always believed that Taiwan should adopt the spirit of David versus Goliath in standing up to authoritarian coercion.”^[3]

Israeli experts largely welcomed Lai’s statement, viewing it as a further expression of goodwill, solidarity and support from Taipei, which – since the outset of the Gaza War on October 7, 2023 – has rhetorically and materially supported Israeli society and economy. Tel Aviv’s warming ties with Taipei unfold amid a perceived chill in Sino–Israeli relations, due in large part to Beijing’s pro-Palestine rhetoric.^[4]

This ChinaMed Observer examines the Israeli debate surrounding Tel Aviv’s relations with Taipei, which has drawn heightened scrutiny following recent reports on strategic cooperation circumventing Beijing.

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Taipei’s Strategic Engagement During Israel’s Wars

Although the Israel–Taiwan relationship has a long, contentious, and oft overlooked history,^[5] Israeli observers interpreted Lai Ching-te’s announcement of the proposed “T-Dome” as the culmination of more recent trends, namely, Taipei’s visible, consistent and increasingly proactive diplomatic outreach over the two years of war in Gaza. From the beginning of the conflict, Taipei strongly condemned Hamas’ “terrorist attack on Israeli civilians” and expressed its determination to continue supporting Tel Aviv:

“[We] will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries to jointly resist all forms of terrorist attacks.”^[6]

Taipei’s rhetorical solidarity was followed by immediate material assistance, notably a USD 70,000 donation to the IDF and Israeli families from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Israel, led by Representative Ya-Ping Abby Lee (李雅萍).^[7] Similarly, during the Israel–Iran War in June 2025, the Taiwanese mission delivered generous donations to Israeli charities supporting Bat Yam residents whose homes were damaged by Iranian missile attacks, accompanied by Lee’s message: “you are not alone.”^[8]

Taiwan’s engagement extended beyond donations. Its outreach adopted a strategic approach aimed at cultivating ties with the Israeli public through civil society diplomacy, including university exchanges, liaising with NGOs, and reaching out to members of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.^[9] For instance, in contrast to China’s University of International Business and Economics’ decision to permanently close its campus in Israel in September 2024,^[10] the Taipei Office in Tel Aviv has actively engaged with Israeli youth at Reichman University, the Hebrew University, and even with Druze communities.^[11]

Lee’s pro-Israel activism stood in stark contrast to Beijing’s limited presence and declining popularity among both Israeli officials and the wider public. Tuvia Gering, a researcher at the Israel–China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), described Lee as having been “extremely active at using this window of opportunity where the fissure between Israel and China is at its widest and mutual trust at its lowest point […] while the Chinese were nowhere to be seen.”^[12]

In 2025 alone, Taiwan invited and paid for the visits of multiple unofficial Knesset delegations,^[13] as part of its diplomatic effort to strengthen ties with Tel Aviv. The most recent delegation was headed by Member of Knesset Boaz Toporovsky in his capacity as chairman of the Israel–Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Association. On September 17, the delegation met with Lai Ching-te and presented a statement signed by 72 Israeli legislators affirming their support for Taiwan’s participation in international forums.^[14]

Following these visits, several Members of the Knesset reportedly started referring to Taiwan as a “country,” drawing criticism from China’s Ambassador to Israel Xiao Junzheng. Xiao not only publicly condemned Taiwan’s initiative, but also singled out Toporovsky for “interfering in China’s internal affairs” by addressing Lai as “president” and claiming to speak “on behalf of the Israeli people.”^[15] Even though Knesset members are not government officials, this kind of behaviour “violated Israel’s own commitment to the One-China principle” according to Xiao.^[16] Israel’s official response dismissed the criticism, stating that “parliamentary delegations are unofficial and do not represent the Knesset.”^[17]

Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy also attracted attention from Chinese experts. Xin Qiang, director of the Taiwan Studies Center at Fudan University, described the exchange as “political theater,” while Ding Long, Vice Director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, labelled it as a “provocative” vehicle for Israeli politicians interested in finding a diplomatic “breakthrough” amid Israel’s international isolation.^[18]

Taiwan’s proactive outreach, coupled with the support shown by Israeli lawmakers, has invigorated the enthusiasm for deepening practical cooperation across trade and technology sectors among Israelis, who have come to perceive Taipei as an actor sharing similar “values of freedom, equality, human rights, and the rule of law, all in a challenging geopolitical environment.”^[19]

During the 15^th Taiwan–Israel Economic and Technological Cooperation Conference, held online on November 17, 2025, both sides pledged to continue expanding trade and industry partnerships.^[20] In an interview with Israeli online newspaper Walla, Abby Lee underscored the complementarities between the Israeli and Taiwanese economies, describing the two as “irreplaceable international partners” in the technology sector:

“We enjoy the status of major players in the world of technology. Taiwan is a leader in the field of hardware and Israel is one of the world leaders in the field of software.”^[21]

Israeli experts echoed this assessment, recognizing the synergy between Israel’s start-up innovation ecosystem and Taiwan’s scale-up economy. They perceive access to, and support from, a friendly and capable partner as increasingly crucial amid shifting global trade dynamics. Ynet tech reporter Raphael Kahan suggested that “Taiwan is approaching Israel in an attempt to establish a technological alliance” in the face of a perceived “growing threat from China,” potentially by integrating Israeli industries into TSMC’s partnerships with the United States in a trilateral technological alliance.^[22]

Dean Shmuel Elmas, Chief Geopolitics Analyst at Globes, highlighted the strategic importance of Taiwan’s industrial capacity (something Israel lacks) in the scenario of supply chain disruptions if not arm embargos amid the global trade war and Israel’s deepening diplomatic isolation.^[23] This assessment also reflects growing anxiety in Israel over its international standing in the aftermath of the Gaza War, which prompted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to call for the country to “adapt to an economy with autarkic characteristics.”^[24]

Criticism and the Emotional Dimension of Taiwan-Israel Relations

Taipei’s unequivocal support for Tel Aviv has not gone unnoticed in the global reckoning with the war in Gaza and its humanitarian consequences. It has likewise drawn attention – albeit limited – within Taiwan itself. Taiwanese-American journalist Brian Hioe (丘琦欣), writing for the radical magazine New Bloom, explains Lai Ching-te’s outreach to Tel Aviv as an attempt to play “the Israel card” in order to appeal to U.S. conservatives and MAGA Republicans, whose support for Taiwan has appeared increasingly uncertain.^[25]

The Israel–Taiwan rapprochement has also raised concerns about secret agreements. Among these were allegations – denied by the Taiwanese pager company Gold Apollo – of involvement in the boobytrapping and detonation of the thousands of pagers destined for Hezbollah, which killed 32 people and wounded thousands more in Lebanon, including children and civilians, between September 17 and 18, 2024. In this context, Amnesty International Taiwan urged the government to strengthen oversight to prevent Taiwanese products from being diverted for Israeli military use.^[26]

Another controversy was sparked after reports that Abby Lee had pledged to donate approximately half a million USD dollars to the Nanasi Medical Centre in Sha’ar Binyamin, an illegal Israeli settlement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.^[27] Facing internal and international criticism, the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that the donation had not been finalized but was “currently under review.”^[28] Chiu E-Ling, head of Amnesty International Taiwan, warned that the reported involvement could make Taipei complicit in Israel’s settler movement, which violates international law.^[29]

Human rights activists within Taiwan have increasingly contested the government’s Israel policy, linking it to what Amnesty International Taiwan also defined as a plausible “genocide” in Gaza,^[30] in line with the ruling of the International Court of Justice. In its defence, Taipei has attempted to deflect the criticism by characterizing itself as a “peace-loving actor” that, despite lacking official ties with either party of the conflict, has provided aid to both Israelis and Palestinians, including a one-off donation of USD 500,000 to Mercy Corps U.S. in May 2024 and a recent USD 500,000 pledge to International Medical Corps, another US-based organization, for humanitarian relief efforts.^[31] While Taipei operates a representative mission in Tel Aviv, its engagement with Palestine is mediated through the Economic and Cultural Office based in Jordan (Taiwan has no plans to recognize a Palestinian state, with which Beijing has formal diplomatic ties since 1988).^[32]

Kerim Friedman, a Jewish anthropologist and a Professor in the Department of Ethnic Relations and Cultures at National Dong Hwa University in Taiwan, described Taipei’s Israel policy as an instance of schismogenesis, a process whereby “groups seek to differentiate themselves from rivals by taking up contrary […] political alignments.”^[33]

“I think something like this has hurt support for Palestinians in Taiwan. If the Chinese are for it, the logic goes, then Taiwan must be against it.”^[34]

This dynamic appears to operate in reverse as well, shaping Israeli perceptions toward Beijing and Taipei. Demonstrations of Palestine solidarity in Taiwan went mostly unreported in Israeli media. Instead, Israeli commentators underscored Taipei’s diplomatic goodwill in contrast to Beijing’s pro-Palestine rhetoric and its ties with states considered hostile to Israel, such as Iran. Galia Lavi, Director of the Israel-China Center at the INSS, argued that even though Knesset members’ sympathies for Taiwan are unofficial, they nevertheless “reflect Israeli public opinion, which has been influenced by China’s response to October 7.”^[35]

“In such an atmosphere, it is difficult to accuse MKs of promoting ties with Taiwan, whose support for Israel has been consistent and open since the beginning of the fighting.”^[36]

While not all Taiwanese are fully comfortable with deepening ties with Israel, Israeli sources perceive the emotional dimension of the relationship as reciprocal, rooted in shared democratic values and a similar security environment. For instance, the Israeli press has given considerable attention to parallels drawn by Taipei officials, discussing how just as Israel is surrounded by nations hostile to it, Taiwan’s own situation is marked by “challenges to [its] international status and threats to [its] sovereignty.”^[37] They shared how Lai Ching-te contended that the idea of ​​“peace through strength” – a term used by U.S. President Donald Trump – is a principle shared by Israeli, American and Taiwanese societies.^[38]

Ofir Dayan, an associate researcher at INSS’ Israel-China Policy Center, observed that only a few days after October 7, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense had sent a civil delegation to study Israel’s response to the war, visiting communities and touring emergency operation centers.^[39] In the process, Taipei formalized partnerships with Israeli rescue, emergency, and civil aid organizations to promote exchanges in emergency response.^[40] Beyond technical learning, these gestures underscore how deeply Taipei interprets Israel’s wartime experience as a mirror to its own existential concerns, which culminated in Lai’s above-mentioned announcement to construct a “T-Dome” for island defence. According to the Israeli Daily Maariv, former Taiwanese Deputy Defense Minister Fu Hong-hui (柏鴻輝) visited Israel in September 2025 to promote the project and discuss the transfer of advanced military technology, in complete secrecy and far away from the eyes of the media and the public.^[41]

Interestingly, according to Israeli media, just as Taipei is seeking to learn from the wars in the Middle East and Israeli societal resilience, Beijing has likewise drawn its own lessons. They contend that China viewed the June 2025 war against Iran as a test case, closely monitoring U.S. capabilities and, more importantly, the extent of Washington’s willingness to intervene on behalf of an ally, Israel.^[42]

Concluding Thoughts on the Impact of Taiwan’s Outreach on Sino-Israeli Relations

Israeli experts have debated the rapprochement between Tel Aviv and Taipei in the context of Israel’s China policy. Israel has largely welcomed and responded positively to Taiwan’s outreach. Yet, while agreeing on the emotional dimension of the “shift” – motivated by shared values and geopolitical similitarities – they caution that careful balancing is required to maintain relations with Beijing. After all, Galia Lavi explained that despite the low media profile, Chinese trade with Israel did not stop during the war in Gaza (as shown in the graph below), and Chinese workers remained in the country even “under the threat of missiles.”^[43]

Listing these examples as evidence of China’s practical support, Lavi stressed that given Beijing’s strategic importance, Tel Aviv does not intend to change its commitment to the One China policy. Notwithstanding, “elected officials are required to exercise discretion” in managing relations with China, given Beijing’s stance on the Palestinian issue, which many in Israel view as hostile in the international arena.^[44]

Compared to China’s pro-Palestine stance, Taiwan differentiated itself with open support for Israel since the beginning of the Gaza War. Constant engagement and diplomatic outreach created positive momentum for strengthening relations – despite domestic and international criticism directed at Taipei for supporting Tel Aviv. Israeli commentators warmly welcomed solidarity coming from a “like-minded” actor with shared values and facing similar “security challenges.” While both sides recognize clear economic incentives for deepening cooperation, Israeli experts emphasized a scenario in which Taiwan’s manufacturing capacity could mitigate Israel’s vulnerability to supply-chain pressure if defence-related export controls tighten.

While Israel may not change its One-China policy anytime soon, Taipei’s strategic civil-society diplomacy has generated measurable sympathy amid Israeli public opinion, particularly against the backdrop of China’s perceived hostility. In this context, and amid growing expert calls for a reassessment of Israel’s China policy,^[45] the future of Sino-Israeli relations remains uncertain.

At the end of the day, Israel is recovering from war and preoccupied with managing its domestic political fallout while the international community is focusing on the implementation of Trump’s Gaza Peace plan. Neither Beijing nor Taipei are a priority, but both Israelis and Palestinians will remember how each responded to the war.

Amanda CHEN is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is a graduate of SOAS University of London, Sciences Po Paris, and Peking University. Her research interests include China–Middle East relations, conflict mediation practices, and global philanthropy, with a focus on the role of civil society in these processes.

^[1] The Jerusalem Post, “Taiwan unveils ‘’T-Dome’ missile shield modeled on Israel’s Iron Dome,” November 26, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/defense-and-tech/article-876274.

^[2] The T-Dome project was announced during Lai’s National Day address on October 10, 2025. See Joseph Yeh, “Lai pledges to build ‘T-Dome’ air defense system in national address,” Focus Taiwan, October 10, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202510100006.

^[3] Yuval Peso, “Nasi Taiwan: ‘Israel Hi Model LeHaganat Yi’” נשיא טייוואן: ״ישראל היא מודל להגנת אי״ [Taiwan President: “Israel is a model for island defense”], Globes, October 28, 2025, https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001524797.

^[4] Itamar Eichner, “Paragon LeTaiwan, Akitza LeSin: Kakh Hishpia HaMilkhama Al Yakhasei Israel Mul Shtei HaYerivot” פרגון לטייוואן, עקיצה לסין: כך השפיעה המלחמה על יחסי ישראל מול שתי היריבות [A paragon for Taiwan, a sting for China: This is how the war affected Israel’s relations with the two rivals], Ynet, October 11, 2024, https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/r1yb0vlkkg.

^[5] See Nathan Greppi, “Israel and Taiwan: A common history of survival,” Ynet, May 9, 2025, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjyshrun0. Also see Evan Stubbs, “Students of Survival: Israel and Taiwan as Partners in Geopolitical Exile,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, May 23, 2024, https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/students-of-survival.

^[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, “MOFA condemns terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians by Palestinian military group Hamas,” October 7, 2023, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&sms=273&s=115635.

^[7] Caroline Haïat, “Taiwan Embassy donates $70,000 to Israeli soldiers and families,” i24News, October 23, 2023, https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/1698071583-taiwan-embassy-donates-70-000-for-israeli-soldiers-and-families.

^[8] Itamar Eichmer, “Taiwan Tarma 1,2 Milion Shekel LeNifgayim Bat Yam VeLeZaka, Beit Kholim MeLos Angeles He’evir 100 Elef Dolar LeSoroka” טייוואן תרמה 1.2 מיליון שקל לנפגעי בת ים ולזק”א, בית חולים מלוס אנג’לס העביר 100 אלף דולר לסורוקה [Taiwan donated 1.2 million shekels to the Bat Yam victims and to ZAKA, a Los Angeles hospital transferred $100,000 to Soroka], Ynet, June 25, 2025, https://www.ynet.co.il/activism/article/sy80nvoele.

^[9] Ofir Dayan, “Friendship in Times of Trouble: Israel–Taiwan Relations During the Swords of Iron War,” INSS Insight No. 2019, July 24, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-taiwan-2025/.

^[10] Navit Sommer, “HaUniversita HaSinit HaRishona BeIsrael – Ozevet Et HaAretz” האוניברסיטה הסינית הראשונה בישראל - עוזבת את הארץ [The first Chinese university in Israel - leaving the country], Ynet, September 18, 2024, https://www.ynet.co.il/economy/article/rjp7thp6c.

^[11] See note 9, Ofir Dayan, July 24, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-taiwan-2025/.

^[12] James Baron, “Navigating Taiwan’s Complex Relationship with Israel,” Global Taiwan Institute, January 8, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/01/navigating-taiwans-complex-relationship-with-israel/.

^[13] Knesset delegations arrived in Taiwan in February, May, July and September. Taipei’s sponsorship of the visits was made evident in a Haaretz inquiry by Nir Gontarz, “Lama Kol Kach Harbe Khavrei Knesset Nosyim LeTaiwan, Veod BeZman HaMilkhama? ‘Lehakir Et HaMurkavut Shel HaMedina’” למה כל כך הרבה ח״כים נוסעים לטייוואן, ועוד בזמן מלחמה? ״להכיר את המורכבות של המדינה״ [Why do so many MKs travel to Taiwan, especially during a time of war? “To learn about the complexity of the country”], Haaretz, September 4, 2025, https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/on-the-line/2025-09-04/ty-article/.highlight/00000199-0f65-dd6c-afdb-6fe742c00000.

^[14] Itamar Eichmer, “China issues threat to Israeli lawmaker over Taiwan visit: ‘Will fall and shatter into pieces,’” Ynet Global, September 22, 2025, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hk6eshcsee.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Galia Lavi, “Hayim Israel Noteshet Et Mediniyut Sin Akhat?” ?האם ישראל נוטשת את מדיניות ״סין אחת״ [Is Israel abandoning the ‘One China’ policy?], Calcalist, August 11, 2025, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/rjaremdoeg.

^[18] Global Times, “Israeli lawmaker’s Taiwan visit political stunt, won’t shake one-China principle,” September 22, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202›509/1344199.shtml.

^[19] AP and TOI Staff, “Taiwan’s foreign minister: Closer ties with Israel align with the island’s interest,” The Times of Israel, November 12, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/taiwans-foreign-minister-closer-ties-with-israel-align-with-the-islands-interests/.

^[20] Taiwan Today, “Taiwan, Israel stage economic, technological conference,” November 19, 2025, https://www.taiwantoday.tw/Economics/Top-News/277917/Taiwan%252C-Israel-stage-economic%252C-technological-conference.

^[21] Yoav Shuster, “Khadshanut, Demokratia VehaKhayim BeTzilo Shel Iyum Kiyumi: Sipur HaYedidut HaMufla’a Ben Israel LeTaiwan” חדשנות, דמוקרטיה והחיים בצילו של איום קיומי: סיפור הידידות המופלאה בין ישראל לטייוואן [Innovation, Democracy, and Living in the Shadow of an Existential Threat: The Story of the Wonderful Friendship Between Israel and Taiwan], Walla, September 17, 2025, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3732568.

^[22] Raphael Kahan, “Taiwan Mekhazeret Akharei Israel VeArtzot Habrit VeZo Hizdamnut SheAlula Leatzben Et Sin” טאיוואן מחזרת אחרי ישראל וארה״ב וזו הזדמנות שעלולה לעצבן את סין [Taiwan is following Israel and the US, and this is an opportunity that could irritate China], Ynet, March 7, 2025, https://www.ynet.co.il/digital/technews/article/bysq11n00o1e.

^[23] Dean Shmuel Elmas, “BeZman SheBeEuropa Medabrim Al Embargo, BaTa’asiyot HaBitkhoniyot Khosheshim MeTarkhish Khamur Yoter” בזמן שבאירופה מדברים על אמברגו, בתעשיות הביטחוניות חוששים מתרחיש חמור יותר [While Europe is talking about an embargo, the defense industries fear a more serious scenario], Globes, September 16, 2025, https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001521952.

^[24] Yuval Einhorn, “Netanyahu Kara Lehistage LeAutarkia. Ma Ze Omer?” נתניהו קרא להסתגל לאוטרקיה. מה זה אומר [Netanyahu called for adapting to autarky. What does that mean?], Globes, September 16, 2025, https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001521730.

^[25] Brian Hioe, “Lai Tries to Play Israel Card to Appeal to MAGA Republicans,” New Bloom, November 1, 2025, https://newbloommag.net/2025/11/01/lai-israel-maga/.

^[26] See note 12, James Baron, January 8, 2025, https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/01/navigating-taiwans-complex-relationship-with-israel/.

^[27] E-Ling Chiu, “Why Is Taiwan Supporting an Illegal Israeli Settlement in the Occupied West Bank?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/why-is-taiwan-supporting-an-illegal-israeli-settlement-in-the-occupied-west-bank/.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Amnesty International Taiwan, “Táiwān wù chéngwéi bālèsītǎn zhǒngzú mièjué bāngxiōng, qiǎnzé wàijiāo bù juānzhù yǐ guó túnkěn qū jì huà” 台灣勿成為巴勒斯坦種族滅絕幫凶，譴責外交部捐助以國屯墾區計畫 [Taiwan should not become an accomplice to Palestinian genocide; condemnation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ donation to Israel’s settlement project], August 6, 2025, https://www.amnesty.tw/node/22877.

^[31] Kelvin Chen, “Taiwan donates NT$15.5 million to support medical aid in Palestine,” Taiwan News, November 5, 2025, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/6236539.

^[32] Joseph Yeh, “Taiwan has no immediate plan to recognize a Palestinian state: MOFA,” Focus Taiwan, September 22, 2025, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202509220017.

^[33] Kerim Friedman, “Yes ‘Taiwan Can Help,’ but not if it continues to ignore Palestinian voices,” Positions Politics, July 29, 2025, https://positionspolitics.org/p-kerim-friedman-yes-taiwan-can-help-but-not-if-it-continues-to-ignore-palestinian-voices/.

^[34] Ibid.

^[35] See note 17, Galia Lavi, August 11, 2025, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/rjaremdoeg.

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] Guy Ulster, “Nasi Taiwan Hitzdia LaAm HaYehudi: ‘Nekhushim Lehagen Al Shitkhenu Kmo Israel’” נשיא טייוואן הצדיע לעם היהודי: ״נחושים להגן על שטחנו כמו ישראל״ [Taiwan’s president salutes Jewish people: “We are determined to defend our territory like Israel”], Walla, October 28, 2025, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3790265.

^[38] Ibid.

^[39] See note 9, Ofir Dayan, July 24, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-taiwan-2025/.

^[40] Ibid.

^[41] Maariv, “Sin BeHelem: Israel Mefatachat LaOyevet HaGedola Kipat Barzel | Divuach” סין בהלם: ישראל מפתחת לאויבת הגדולה כיפת ברזל | דיווח [China in shock: Israel develops Iron Dome for its greatest enemy | Report], October 22, 2025, https://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/article-1244016.

^[42] Roni Yacobi, “Ma Meshutaf LeIsrael, Iran VeTaiwan? Yoter Mima SheNidme” מה משותף לישראל, איראן וטייוואן? יותר ממה שנדמה [What do Israel, Iran, and Taiwan have in common? More than you think], Walla, June 23, 2025, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3759815;
Adir Ben Ami, “Eikh Mashpi’a HaTkifa HaAmerikanit BeIran Al Taiwan?” איך משפיעה התקיפה האמריקאית באיראן על טיוואן [How does the American attack on Iran affect Taiwan?], Bizportal, June 26, 2025, https://www.bizportal.co.il/globalmarkets/news/article/20018677;
Yishai Halper, “Sin Hishkifa AlMilkhemet Iran MeHaTzad, VeNitzla Et HaHizdamnut Lilmod” סין השקיפה על מלחמת איראן מהצד, וניצלה את ההזדמנות ללמוד [China watched the Iran war from the sidelines, and took the opportunity to learn], Haaretz, June 26, 2025, https://www.haaretz.co.il/ty-WRITER/0000017f-da36-d938-a17f-fe3ed1890000.

^[43] See note 17, Galia Lavi, August 11, 2025, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/rjaremdoeg.

^[44] Ibid.

^[45] Eyal Propper, “The future of Israel – China Relations,” The Times of Israel, December 3, 2025, https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-future-of-israel-china-relations/.

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Engelsberg Ideas - How Europe can harness its economic power
by Michael Pettis and Enrico Fardella

In this piece, ChinaMed Director Enrico Fardella and Michael Pettis (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) argue that, squeezed between the mercantilist policies of the United States and China, European governments must confront an economic paradox that threatens the very foundations of the European project.
[Available on Engelsberg Ideas, click here to read]

For our Italophone audience, we are pleased to share that several brief summaries of lectures from our ChinaMed webinar series written by members of our research team, as well as another analysis by ChinaMed Director Enrico Fardella, have been published in Formiche:

• Formiche - Cina-Iran, cosa c’è dietro la freddezza di Pechino. Report ChinaMed by Veronica Turrini

• Formiche - La strategia digitale di Pechino in Nord Africa. El Kadi analizza rischi e opportunità by Miriam Verzellino

• Formiche - Xi e il fantasma di Hu Yaobang. Come il Partito riscrive la propria coscienza by Enrico Fardella

• Formiche - La Cina come mediatore in Medio Oriente. L’analisi di Jesse Marks by Giorgia Facchini

Our final webinar of the term will take place next week with Omar Al-Ubaydli (Bahrain Center for Strategic, International, and Energy Studies) on July 11:
“Why China is so compatible economically with the Gulf countries.”

There’s still time to join us! To sign up, please visit https://forms.gle/XZM9ireHq1a16izf6 or contact us at chinamed@tochina.it.

By Ádám Koi and Giorgia Facchini

On October 9, after indirect talks in Egypt between Israel and Hamas, the two sides reached an agreement on the “first phase” of Trump’s 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan. During this initial phase, a ceasefire came into effect with both sides agreeing to halt hostilities.^[1] Israeli troops were expected to withdraw to a temporary “Yellow Line” inside the enclave while Hamas was required to release all living hostages and return the bodies of deceased hostages in exchange for almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.^[2] On November 25, Qatari and Egyptian mediators met in Cairo to discuss the second phase of the agreement, despite accusations of ceasefire violation by both Israel and Hamas.^[3]

This issue of the ChinaMed Observer analyzes Beijing’s official position and the Chinese expert debate on the ratification of the ceasefire agreement. While official statements endorsed the “two-state solution” as the only viable solution to the conflict, both Chinese officials and scholars remain highly skeptical of the sustainability of the deal, which faces significant challenges ranging from the complete lack of trust between Israel and Hamas to the mercurial nature of the Trump administration, which has assumed the responsibility to safeguard the agreement.

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Beijing’s Official Position

On October 10, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi stated Beijing’s official response to the first-phase of the Gaza ceasefire during his official visit to Switzerland:

“China welcomes all efforts aimed at restoring peace and saving lives. The humanitarian disaster in Gaza is a stain on the 21st century, and humanity’s conscience must be awakened.”^[4]

In the speech that followed, Wang underscored Beijing’s principles of inclusivity and national ownership of the peace process in three appeals. Firstly, that all parties should work together toward regional stability. Secondly, that future arrangements for Gaza should respect the will of the Palestinian people according to the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” (Bā rénzhì Bā, 巴人治巴). Lastly, he emphasized China’s endorsement of the Two-state Solution (Liǎng guó fāng’àn, 两国方案) as the only viable framework to resolve the conflict. As per Beijing’s role in the peace process, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared China’s willingness to work with the international community to achieve “a comprehensive, just, and lasting resolution to the Palestinian question and to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.”^[5]

However, several officials have voiced concern regarding the practical implementation of the next phase of the ceasefire agreement. At an open debate of the UN Security Council on October 24, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong warned that recurrent violations of the ceasefire risk undermining any prospect of lasting peace.^[6] He urged Israel to fulfill its obligations under international humanitarian law as the occupying power by lifting remaining “restrictions on aid operations conducted by humanitarian agencies.”^[7] Previously, Fu had also criticized the United States for complicity, it using its veto power in the Security Council role to enable Israel’s actions and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza:

“If it were not for the United States’ repeated abuse of the veto, the Security Council’s response to the Gaza crisis would not have been so inadequate. If it were not for the United States’ shielding of Israel, Council resolutions and international law would not have been so flagrantly violated.”^[8]

These statements are not that dissimilar from those made by Chinese officials in the past. Domestically, however, Chinese media have conveyed a far less nuanced opinion on the topic. In particular, state broadcaster CCTV struck a sharp tone in its coverage of the Sharm El Sheikh Summit by labelling it a “shallow and hollow political PR stunt (zhèngzhì zǒuxiù, 政治走秀)” rather than a solemn conference, and pointing out the absence of representatives from both Israel and Hamas:

“What was most surprising was that the ceasefire agreement, which common sense suggested should have been signed between Israel and Hamas, ultimately turned into a document […] jointly signed by the four mediators: the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye.”^[9]

Israel and Hamas’ Motivations for Accepting the Ceasefire

Chinese scholars discussed the motivations that led both parties to reach an agreement on the ceasefire, acknowledging both internal factors and external pressure. Internally, both sides were showing clear signs of war fatigue, and their leaders faced rising domestic pressure to halt the fighting, at least temporarily. This, according to Chinese analysts, played a key role in creating a shared incentive to advance toward compromise.^[10] On this foundation, there is broad consensus that it was external pressure from the international community that played the decisive role – especially for Israel – which has faced growing diplomatic isolation due to its actions in Gaza, even from the United States and European partners.

Li Shaoxian, President of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, argued that with no major shift in Israeli policy toward the war, the current ceasefire can be largely attributed to President Donald Trump’s pressure.^[11] Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, however, doubted Trump’s genuine concern by characterizing his efforts as primarily driven by his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize.^[12] With regards to European countries, Su Xiaohui, Associate Researcher at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), posited that widespread anti-Israeli sentiment drove governments and enterprises to weigh more seriously the reputational risks associated with dealing with Israel.^[13]

That said,Chinese experts believe there is a dual nature to American pressure on Israel. For instance, Li Yanan, Deputy Director of Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argued that while Trump was behind Netanyahu accepting the ceasefire, the U.S. remains a significant supporter of Israel, providing it with continued political leeway despite its unprecedented diplomatic isolation.^[14]

As for Hamas, it was also facing significant pressure, both to accept and reject the deal. On the one hand, as noted by Liu Zhongmin, Director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), accepting the terms risked alienating Islamist organizations and the wider “Axis of Resistance.”^[15] On the other, Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye, in coordination with the U.S., were actively mediating the conflict and were forcefully pushing Hamas to accept the agreement, especially after the Israeli strike on Doha aimed at killing Hamas negotiators on September 9, 2025.^[16] For Li Yanan, regional states, alarmed by the Israeli strike and determined not to be dragged into military escalation, pressed Hamas to moderate while the U.S. constrained Israeli actions.^[17] Even so, she argued, regional mediators’ priority remains that to “create a favorable environment to implement their own development plans.” ^[18]

Since Hamas’ negotiating position was remarkably weaker than Israel’s, rejecting the plan would have placed moral and political responsibility for the continued conflict entirely on itself – it “had no cards left.” ^[19] According to this understanding, Fudan Professor Sun Degang considered the U.S. commitment to act as guarantor of the agreement as the critical assurance that ultimately persuaded Hamas’ leadership to accept the deal.

The Ceasefire: Short-Term Success with Ambiguous Prospects

As discussed, Chinese experts see significant factors that have pushed Hamas and Israel toward an agreement. Many noticed that the large-scale hostage exchange and the withdrawal of Israeli forces are “more thorough” and “significant” than in previous agreements,^[20] providing a crucial window for meaningful humanitarian relief and crisis management in Gaza. While Zhu Yongbiao, Executive Director at the Research Center for the Belt and Road in Lanzhou University, expressed that, if implemented thoroughly, this settlement could mean a major breakthrough in the conflict,^[21] other observers stressed that the first phase’s swiftness was due to its “transactional character,” as the parties were essentially picking low-hanging fruits.^[22]

Given the short-term nature of this convergence, the Chinese debate remains largely pessimistic about the long-term prospects for peace, fearing the accord is unlikely to mark a fundamental shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the transition to the second phase still pending, many scholars foresee procedural and political issues that could likely derail the entire process. Niu Xinchun, Professor at the China-Arab Research Institute in Ningxia University, captured this general sentiment by assessing that the now-completed first phase of negotiations is but the “first step towards ending the conflict.”^[23]

Qin Tian from CICIR’s Institute of Middle East Studies concurred, noting the similarities between current negotiations and the January 2025 ceasefire, which ultimately stalled despite promising initial outcomes.^[24] Stressing the importance of maintaining momentum, he stated that:

“If the second phase cannot be initiated quickly and early, it may result in a loss of mutual trust between the two sides and could also bring about the risk of renewed conflict.”^[25]

Experts also unequivocally pointed out that key issues such as Hamas’ disarmament were delegated to the second phase of the negotiations, making it “crucial and challenging.”^[26] According to Dong Manyuan, a senior research fellow specialized in Middle East studies and ethnic issues at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Hamas’ disarmament is a core issue whose procedural details remain highly ambiguous:

“Does it mean they disarm on their own, or are they forced to disarm by external forces? Should an international stabilization force be established first to supervise and implement Hamas’s disarmament, or should the Israel Defense Forces [...] take action themselves if Hamas refuses to disarm?”^[27]

Dong warned that this ambiguity could even work in Tel Aviv’s favor, “if Hamas refuses to disarm, the U.S. and Israel will blame Hamas, and Israel will be able to restart the fight.”^[28] Similarly, the destruction of Hamas’ tunnels is another issue that could bring the truce to a quick end. Both locating the small tunnels and deciding who and how to destroy them remains a time-consuming problem complicated by the looming danger of clashes re-erupting at any moment.^[29]

After all, according to Chinese experts, extremist actors on both sides are still capable of deliberately provoking violence to advance their own agendas.^[30] On the Israeli side, the “two-state solution” endorsed by the international community and accepted by Hamas is far from a mainstream stance in Israeli domestic politics, where disruptive and intransigent actors benefit from positioning themselves as hardliners on the Palestinian question.^[31] Sun Degang warned that this divisive rhetoric may push Prime Minister Netanyahu to adopt a tougher line to win the next general elections by complying with the demands of far-right officials known for their uncompromising stance against Hamas, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.^[32]

“Against this backdrop, the Israeli government may be forced to resume military operations to win over right-wing voters [...] even promising to ‘completely eradicate’ [Hamas].”^[33]

Regarding Hamas, Professor Ding Long of the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU argued that the group may be unable or unwilling to satisfy Israel’s conditions for hostage exchanges, as some bodies may simply be unrecoverable for the time given, thus contributing to a perceived lack of good faith.^[34] Moreover, Niu Xinchun underscored the suspicion that Hamas may intend to use the remains of hostages as leverage in the negotiations.^[35]

In general, all these risks stem from the fact that the two sides’ bottom lines are irreconcilable.^[36] Hamas, as a resistance movement, insists it will only disarm once Israeli military occupation in Palestine ends. Israel, viewing Hamas as a terrorist organization, is unwilling to end the war until Hamas is eliminated. Accordingly, Niu maintained that Hamas’ very existence may continue to serve as a pretext for Israel’s right to claim that negotiations are impossible, stall any peace process and undermine Palestinian moderates.^[37] Though they appear to be mortal enemies, extremists on both sides ultimately sustain one another.^[38] As such, Chinese experts seriously doubt the ceasefire can develop into a long-term peace settlement, because “the core demands of the two sides are fundamentally different.”^[39]

The Future of Israel and Hamas after the Ceasefire

Trump’s Peace Plan was not nearly as consequential as the war it sought to end, which has profoundly reshaped both Israel and Hamas’ standing, as well as regional power dynamics over the past two years. Chinese experts discussed possible scenarios that could emerge from Israel and Hamas’ decisions, and by extension, the role that the United States and Iran may play in sustaining or undermining the ceasefire.

According to Niu Song, an associate professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU, both parties find themselves in a “lose–lose” situation worse than at the start of the war.^[40] On the one hand, Hamas’ monopoly over Gaza has been shaken while the group and its Iran-backed allies in the region suffered significant military setbacks. On the other hand, Israel has neither retrieved all hostages nor eradicated Hamas as a security threat.^[41] Israeli actions in Gaza have also severely damaged its moral standing and international image, leading numerous countries to recognize the State of Palestine. Li Yanan linked Tel Aviv’s diminishing diplomatic standing to Washington’s loss of credibility and its contested hegemonic influence, ultimately undermined by its unrestrained support for Israel’s military operations in Gaza.^[42]

Chinese observers expect the Trump administration to prioritize upholding the agreement by fulfilling its responsibility as the guarantor state, leaving Israel with fewer legitimate grounds to resume hostilities.^[43] Nevertheless, they worry this may not alter Washington’s unwavering and unrestrained support to Tel Aviv.^[44] In this context, Su Xiaohui, Director of the Department for American Studies at CIIS, observed that moral pressure on the U.S. has already decreased because of the Summit and its short-term results.^[45] This is why it was labelled as a mere “political stunt” (政治表演) by CCTV.^[46] For Niu Xinchun, the core problem is that Trump and Netanyahu interpret the agreement in fundamentally different ways. For Trump, its primary value lies in the ability to make a sweeping claim of diplomatic success and celebrate a foreign policy achievement. For Netanyahu, however, this is just a temporary situation.^[47]

Equally temporary, however, may be Israel’s enhanced security environment following its military actions against the Axis of Resistance.^[48] Liu Zhongming, argued that Tel Aviv’s reliance on “expansion through military power” has set a dangerous precedent that is likely to push Arab states toward deeper security cooperation with other regional actors such as Iran and Türkiye.^[49] This potential “wave of reconciliation” may coalesce into a regional mechanism aimed at containing Israel’s hegemonic aspirations. Pointing to the Israeli strike on Qatar as a watershed moment in regional security, Niu Xinchun commented:

“Before the conflict, both Israel and the Gulf Arab states considered Iran to be their greatest security threat. Now, almost all countries, including Iran, Türkiye, and Arab nations, view Israel as their greatest security threat.”^[50]

Hamas’ position, by contrast, is generally characterized as fighting for survival. Israel’s clearly defined bottom line is the complete removal of Hamas from Gaza’s governance, a stance understood by both Western and Arab states and endorsed by Trump’s Peace Plan, which, if carried out fully, would result in Hamas’ political demise.^[51] However, Hamas’ operations eliminating the Doghmush clan, a Palestinian group suspected of collaborating with Israel, and other alleged collaborators, suggest to some Chinese analysts that it may be premature to declare the organization dead. ^[52] Hamas’ apparent struggle to maintain control within the Strip indicates its determination to remain and participate in Gaza’s post-war governance. As both Niu Xinchun and Liu Zhongmin observed:

“Recent developments show Hamas has restored governance in Gaza after Israeli withdrawals, demonstrating that both its combat and administrative capacities remain intact.”^[53]

As such, both Niu and Liu raised doubt on the difficulty of determining at what point Hamas can be considered disbanded. As mentioned earlier, this cannot but risk giving a pretext to Netanyahu to resume the war.^[54] After all, estimating Hamas’ fighting force has always been problematic, especially after the slowing down of Israeli military operations provided it with breathing room to rebuild its forces.^[55]

Unsurprisingly, the lack of Palestinian national ownership over the ceasefire deal, including Hamas’ exclusion from it, was widely interpreted as a setback for Palestinian self-governance. Sun Degang observed that the current settlement merely acknowledges the Palestinian people’s “wish” for statehood, without any reference to a “two-state solution.”^[56] Liu Zhongmin warned that the marginalization of the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah (a secular nationalist movement opposed to Hamas) in the drafting of the agreement risks further dividing the Gaza Strip from the West Bank by placing the former under an externally appointed administration – something he likens to a form of colonial governance.^[57] After all, Netanyahu has repeatedly shown he is more interested in “creating more divisions within Palestinian society,” substantiating the suspicion that “the Israeli leadership will not allow an independent Palestine” to exist.^[58] In this vein, Israel’s control of the territory behind the “Yellow Line” in Gaza could become permanent and further its aim to completely remake the security and organizational model in the Strip.^[59] Qin Tian contends that this is ultimately a counter-productive move, because Israel will inevitably undermine the prospects of long-term peace if it insists on completely excluding Hamas from Palestinian politics.^[60]

Among these scenarios, Iran, the principal supporter of Hamas, appears to be the least concerning actor. Severely weakened by the Twelve-Day War against Israel, Chinese experts agree that Tehran is now primarily interested in de-escalation.^[61] Even if Liu Yanting, Middle East observer at Guancha,^[62] defined the relationship between Hamas and Israel and, by extension, between Iran and the United States, as one of “symbiotic hostility,”^[63] she argued that having reached a rare convergence with regard to the conflict in Gaza, all sides, and especially Iran, are intent on preventing escalation into a full regional war.^[64]

Conclusion

The Chinese official position on the issue reiterated the importance of collaborating with the Palestinian people as the ultimate solution to the conflict. Principles such as “Palestinians governing Palestine” and the two-state solution, in Beijing’s view, must be taken into consideration for a just resolution of the conflict. Unsurprisingly, some officials grasped the opportunity to criticize both the United States and Israel’s behavior, stating that Washington’s use of its veto to shield Tel Aviv in the Security Council and Israeli attacks on civilians compromised the already complex situation and worsened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

As for the expert perspective, there is widespread criticism of the same actors and concern over the sustainability of the ceasefire. Chinese commentators have widely denounced the transactional nature of Trump’s deal. The lack of a detailed timeline for the implementation of the plan’s next steps and the frequent ceasefire violations further complicate the seemingly irreconcilable demands of the warring parties, Israel and Hamas. According to Chinese experts, the biggest issue in Trump’s Peace Plan is the lack of consideration for the root causes of the Gaza War, itself part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given Israel’s ultimate objective being to disarm and eliminate Hamas, as prescribed in the deal, and Hamas being unlikely to accept its exclusion from Gaza’s future governance, Chinese experts expressed concern regarding the durability of an agreement that marginalized, if not excluded, Palestinian agency in both its formulation and implementation.

Ádám KOI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is a PhD candidate in Sinology at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. His primary areas of research are China’s governance and administrative system, and China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.

Giorgia FACCHINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include Sino–Middle Eastern relations, with a focus on China’s role in key maritime chokepoints and strategic corridors, and its economic interests and foreign policy behavior in the region.

[1] Mariel Ferragamo, “A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal,” Council of Foreign Relations, October 29, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/guide-trumps-twenty-point-gaza-peace-deal.

[2] Jason Burke, “Israel and Hamas hand over bodies as part of Gaza ceasefire deal,” The Guardian, November 3, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/03/israel-remains-hostages-gaza-hamas.

[3] Sky News, “Talks begin on the next phase of Gaza ceasefire deal as Hamas and Israel hand over remains,” November 26, 2025, https://news.sky.com/story/talks-begin-on-the-next-phase-of-gaza-ceasefire-deal-as-hamas-and-israel-hand-over-remains-13475639.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Wang Yi States China’s Position on First-Phase Agreement Regarding the Gaza Conflict,” October 11, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202510/t20251013_11731389.html.

[5] Global Times, “China hopes for a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza, advocates ‘Palestinians governing Palestine:’ FM,” October 9, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1345228.shtml

[6] Global Times, “Chinese envoy calls for durable ceasefire in Gaza,” October 24, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1346415.shtml

[7] Ibid.

[8] People’s Daily, “China expresses disappointment over U.S. veto of UN Gaza draft resolution: envoy,” October 3, 2025, https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1003/c90000-20373779.html

[9] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Yàzhōu》20251014” 《今日亚洲》20251014 [Asia Today, 20251014], October 14, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/14/VIDEIvf9vOaLpigyBZ6VWFhx251014.shtml?spm=C45305.PiIkmPvmwrBJ.E3GBGR5JxwmC.29.

[10] Wenhui News, “Bā rén zhì Bā” cái shì Jiāshā chōngtú jiějué zhī dào“ 巴人治巴”才是加沙冲突解决之道 [“Palestinians governing Palestinians” is the true solution to the Gaza conflict], October 16, 2025 https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=whb&date=2025-10-16&id=468283&page=4

[11] CCTV Chinese,”《Huánqiú Shìxiàn》 20251013 Bā Yǐ Hù Shì Bèi Kòu Rényuán Měi Zài Zhōngdōng Shàngyǎn ‘Hépíng Xiù’” 《环球视线》20251013巴以互释被扣人员 美在中东上演“和平秀” [Global View 20251013: Palestine and Israel Mutually Release Detained Persons; US Stages “Peace Show” in the Middle East], October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.

[12] Nanfang+, “Jiāshā tínghuǒ tánpàn yíng zhòngdà jìnzhǎn, Yǐ méi chēng ‘zhànzhēng yǐjīng jiéshù’? Yī wén dúdǒng →” 加沙停火谈判迎重大进展，以媒称“战争已经结束”？一文读懂→ [Gaza ceasefire negotiations see major progress, Israeli media claims “the war is already over”? Understand it in one article →], October 9, 2025, https://static.nfnews.com/content/202510/09/c11798578.html.

[13] Nie Shuyi, “Jiědú｜Yǐ Hā Dáchéng Běn Lún Chōngtū Yǐlái ‘Dì Sān Fèn’ Tínghuǒ Xiéyì, Zhànzhēng Néng Yínglái Zhōngjú Ma?” 解读｜以哈达成本轮冲突以来“第三份”停火协议，战争能迎来终局吗？ [Analysis | Israel and Hamas Reach ‘Third’ Ceasefire Agreement Since Start of Conflict - Can This War Finally End?], The Paper, October 9, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_31746319

[14] CCTV Chinese “《Shēndù Guójì》20251011 Jiāshā: Hépíng shǔguāng chū xiàn?” 《深度国际》20251011加沙： 和平曙光初现？ [In-Depth Word, 20251011: Gaza: a Dawn of Peace?], October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml

[15] Liu Zhongmin, “Liú Zhōngmín: Ràng Jiāshā tuōlí Bālèsītǎn, yóu Měi Yǐ Yīng gòngguǎn, zhè huò shì Tèlǎngpǔ de zhēnshí mùdì” 刘中民：让加沙脱离巴勒斯坦、由美以英共管，这或是特朗普的真实目的, [Liu Zhongmin: Having Gaza separate from Palestine and placed under joint US-Israel-UK administration—this might be Trump’s true objective], Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.

[16] Nandu, Jiāshā kùnjú yuánzhuō duìhuà: Xiéyì shuāngfāng sùqiú gè yì xià de hù xìn nántí yǔ fùzá zǒushì加沙困局圆桌对话：协议双方诉求各异下的互信难题与复杂走势 [Roundtable on the Gaza Dilemma: Challenges of Mutual Trust and Complex Trends Amid Differing Demands from Both Sides of the Agreement], October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[17] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.

[18] Ibid.

[19] See note 13, Nie Shuyi, The Paper, October 9, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_31746319.

[20] See note 15, Liu Zhongmin, Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.

[21] Fan Anqi, “Israel and Hamas agree to first phase of Gaza peace plan but questions remain,” Global Times, October 9, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1345189.shtml

[22] Ibid.

[23] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.

[24] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.

[25] Ibid.

[26] CCTV Chinese, ”《Jīnrì Guānzhù》20251023 Měi gāoguān mìjí fǎng Yǐ bǎo tínghuǒ? Yǐsèliè yào tūnbìng Yuēdànhé Xī’àn?” 《今日关注》20251023 美高官密集访以保停火 以色列要吞并约旦河西岸？[Today’s Focus: U.S. Senior Officials Visit Israel in succession to Safeguard Cease-fire Settlement; Does Israel Intend to Annex the West Bank?] October 23, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/23/VIDE0z6uvh7aaLQQKnCgPmXz251023.shtml.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Guānzhù》20251026 Měi: “Guójì bùduì” bùjiǔ jìn Jiāshā Yǐ: Jiāshā dìdào 60% shàngwèi cuīhuǐ?”《今日关注》20251026 美：“国际部队”不久进加沙 以：加沙地道60%尚未摧毁？[US: “International forces are to enter Gaza soon, Israel: 60% of Gaza tunnels not yet destroyed?] October 26, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/26/VIDEutM0WtzWSCn6MmNEWOp9251026.shtml.

[30] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[31] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.

[32] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Jiefang Daily, “Tínghuǒ xiéyì lái le, yìng gǔ tou zài hòu miàn? Hāmǎsī jiě chú wǔ zhuāng, Yǐsèliè quán miàn chè jūn, Jiāshā zhàn hòu zhì lǐ děng nántí dài jiě” 停火协议来了，硬骨头在后面？哈马斯解除武装、以色列全面撤军、加沙战后治理等难题待解 [The ceasefire agreement has arrived, but the tough part is yet to come? Issues such as Hamas disarming, Israel’s complete withdrawal of troops, and post-war governance in Gaza remain to be resolved], October 10, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2025-10-10&id=466989&page=07.

[35] CCTV Chinese, “20251016 Yǐfāng fǒurèn dì èr jiēduàn tánpàn kāishǐ. Hāmǎsī chēng yǐjūn wéifǎn tínghuǒ xiéyì” 20251015以方否认第二阶段谈判开始 哈马斯称以军违反停火协议 [U.S. Israel denies that the second-phase negotiations have begun; Hamas claims the Israeli military violated the ceasefire agreement], October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.

[36] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[37] CCTV Chinese, “《Shēndù Guójì》20251025 Jiāshā tínghuǒ kùnjú yǔ chūlù”《|深度国际》20251025 加沙停火 困局与出路 [In-Depth World, 20251025. Gaza Ceasefire: Dilemmas and Solutions], October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.

[38] Ibid.

[39] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[40] See note 10, Wenhui News, October 16, 2025, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=whb&date=2025-10-16&id=468283&page=4.

[41] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.

[42] Ibid.

[43] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.

[44] Xinhua, “Explainer: 2 years into conflict, is peace in Gaza on the horizon?,” October 8, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251008/ed4766c104dd427baef5f84f3b6196ab/c.html.

[45] See note 35, CCTV Chinese, October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.

[46] See note 9, CCTV Chinese, October 14, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/14/VIDEIvf9vOaLpigyBZ6VWFhx251014.shtml.

[47] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Yàzhōu》20251013 Yǐ fāng bèi kòuyā rényuán yǐ shìfàng, yǐ zǒnglǐ: zhànzhēng réng wèi jiéshù; fèixū zhī shàng, Jiāshā chóngjiàn huò xū shí nián,” 《今日亚洲》以方被扣押人员已释放，以总理：战争仍未结束；废墟之上，加沙重建或需10年 [Asia Today: Detainees held by Israel have been released; Israeli Prime Minister: The war is not over yet; Amid the ruins, Gaza’s reconstruction may take a decade],October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEPQGZPQqwozwd2cynzK5y251013.shtml.

[48] Jiefang Daily, “Chōngtū liǎng zhōunián zài tán tínghuǒ, Hāmǎsī tí liǎng dà yāoqiú, Hā Yǐ jiāohuàn dài shì rényuán míngdān; Xīn yī lún tánpàn néng fǒu xīmiè Jiāshā zhànhuǒ?” 冲突两周年再谈停火，哈马斯提两大要求，哈以交换待释人员名单：新一轮谈判能否熄灭加沙战火 [Ceasefire Talks Resume on Second Anniversary of Conflict: Hamas Puts Forward Two Major Demands, Parties Exchange Lists of Detainees to Be Released. Can the New Round of Negotiations Extinguish the Flames of War in Gaza?], October 9, 2025, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2025-10-09&id=464861&page=08

[49] Ibid.

[50] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.

[51] Ibid.

[52] See note 35, CCTV Chinese, October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] See note 37, CCTV Chinese, October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.

[56] See note 12, Nanfang+, October 9, 2025, https://static.nfnews.com/content/202510/09/c11798578.html.

[57] See note 15, Liu Zhongmin, Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.

[58] See note 37, CCTV Chinese, October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.

[59] See note 29, CCTV Chinese, October 26, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/26/VIDEutM0WtzWSCn6MmNEWOp9251026.shtml.

[60] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.

[61] Yanting Liu, “Zhè liǎng gè guānjiàn wèntí dōu méi líqīng, āijí qiāntóu ‘zhōngdōng běiyuē’ shì xiǎng duōle” 这两个关键问题都没厘清，埃及牵头“中东北约”是想多了 [Without clarifying these two key issues, Egypt’s idea of ​​leading a “Middle East NATO” is wishful thinking], Guancha, September 28, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuYanTing/2025_09_28_791658.shtml.

[62] Guancha.cn is a Chinese-language online political news platform developed by the Shanghai Chunqiu Development Strategy Research Institute.

[63] Yanting Liu, “Zhǒngzú mièjué jiūchán jiànguó huànmèng, liùfāng bóyì juédìng jiāshā jiéjú” 刘燕婷：种族灭绝纠缠建国幻梦，六方博弈决定加沙结局 [Genocide Intertwined with the Dream of Nation-Building, Six-Party Game Determines the Outcome of Gaza], Guancha, August 25, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuYanTing/2025_08_25_787661.shtml

[64] Ibid.

Disclaimer: The terminology and analysis presented here does not necessarily reflect the personal views of the author or official stance of the ChinaMed Project, T.wai. For the sake of consistency and clarity, this piece employs the commonly recognized term “Western Sahara.”

By Imane Ezzehouany

On October 31, 2025, China abstained from the United Nations Security Council vote on Resolution 2797, which endorses Morocco’s 2007 Autonomy Proposal for the Western Sahara as a framework to resolve the long-standing conflict between Rabat and the Polisario Front, a political and military organization supported by Algeria.^[1] While China’s UN Representative Fu Cong justified the abstention pointing to perceived imbalances in the U.S.-drafted resolution, Morocco interpreted Beijing’s position as a diplomatic victory.^[2] In an interview with the Moroccan television channel 2M, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita explained that China’s decision “in no way calls into question the substance of the resolution or the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative.”^[3]

This development may mark a turning point for Beijing’s approach to the region, as China has long avoided taking explicit positions on the Western Sahara, consistently refusing to recognize either side’s claim over the disputed territory (for the most part controlled by Morocco). Against this backdrop, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer analyzes the Moroccan media coverage and expert debate surrounding the Security Council vote and the events leading up to it, particularly Bourita’s September 19 visit to Beijing at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi.

Overall, the shift in China’s stance did not come as a surprise to many Moroccan journalists and analysts, who increasingly view the Sino-Moroccan economic partnership as acquiring a more overt diplomatic dimension (an evolution also noted by observers in France, Algeria, and Tunisia, as discussed in the previous ChinaMed Observer). Several Moroccan commentators argue that signs of Chinese support for Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory were already evident during Bourita’s trip to Beijing.^[4] Indeed, while Moroccan official statements highlighted the establishment of a new mechanism for strategic dialogue as a significant diplomatic achievement, the Moroccan press interpreted the visit in explicitly political terms, questioning whether it signals greater Chinese receptiveness to Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara – even if Beijing’s official stance remains cautious.

Bourita’s Visit to Beijing: a Diplomatic Shift over the Western Sahara?

In recent years, public debate and expert analysis on Sino-Moroccan relations have largely focused on economic aspects, including investment, trade, and infrastructure development. A clear milestone in this relationship’s development was King Mohammed VI’s state visit to China in 2016, during which Rabat and Beijing elevated their cooperation to a strategic partnership. The following year, Morocco became the first African country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The latest figures available on ChinaMed Data reveal that the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in Morocco has tripled between 2016 and 2023, surpassing USD 500 million.

According to L’Opinion, the official newspaper of the conservative and monarchist Istiqlal Party, Rabat’s strategic position in the global EV battery ecosystem makes it an extremely attractive market destination for Chinese battery manufacturers.^[5] Dr. Rachid Yazami, the Moroccan scientist who invented the graphite anode for lithium batteries, echoed this assessment, noting Morocco’s potential to establish itself as a global player in the industry.^[6] Phosphate in particular, of which Morocco holds more than 70% of global reserves, represents a key component in the production of lithium-iron-phosphate batteries, which are increasingly sought after due to their safety features and extended life span.

Over time, the Moroccan media debate on Sino-Moroccan economic cooperation has broadened to include political and diplomatic dimensions. This discourse shift became evident after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s unexpected stopover in Casablanca in November 2024. Both Moroccan and international observers interpreted the unofficial visit as a political rapprochement, highlighting Beijing’s role in Rabat’s foreign policy diversification strategy.

Speculation intensified after the Spanish media outlet Espiral 21 reported, citing Chinese sources, that Beijing was allegedly preparing to open a consulate general in Laayoune, the largest city in the Western Sahara, and invest in a land bridge connecting the disputed territory to the Canary Islands.^[7] Although neither Beijing nor Rabat confirmed the claims, Jawad Kerdoudi, President of the Moroccan Institute of International Relations (IMRI), affirmed that “there is no smoke without fire” during an interview on Atlantic Radio, an apolitical Moroccan broadcaster covering economic and financial topics.^[8]

This debate became only more prominent after Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita’s meeting with Wang Yi in Beijing on September 19, 2025. During this two-day visit, the ministers signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a Strategic Dialogue mechanism between Morocco’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Chinese counterpart. The framework aims to institutionalize political consultation and strengthen coordination on bilateral, regional, and global issues.

While a few articles in Moroccan media on the visit discussed Chinese investments, most reporting focused on the potential prospect of securing China’s support for the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

Ya Bilady, an independent online newspaper, observed that even though Morocco’s official communiqué did not explicitly mention the Western Sahara issue, Bourita and Wang’s discussion of “regional and international issues of common interest” (emphasis added) may suggest a convergence on matters such as respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the fight against separatism and extremism.^[9]

Similarly, Abdelnabi Sabri, Professor of International Relations at Mohammed V University in Rabat, noted that deepening Sino-Moroccan ties may hold “significant surprises for the Moroccan Sahara issue,” as the UN Security Council was preparing for its October 31 vote on the matter.^[10]

Moroccan experts’ interpretation of deepening Sino-Moroccan ties can be explained by the growing international recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara – now officially endorsed by France, the United Kingdom and the U.S. Assured of their support within the Security Council, Moroccan media was hoping that Beijing, alongside Moscow, would maintain a moderate stance by refraining from exercising its veto power.

China’s Stance at the UN: Neutrality or Pragmatism?

As mentioned earlier, Beijing has historically had a cautious approach on the Western Sahara, refraining from explicitly taking sides between Rabat and Algiers/Polisario Front, consistently declining to recognize either claim for decades.^[11] However, expanding Sino-Moroccan economic cooperation and political dialogue have led Moroccan observers to suggest that China may be reassessing its traditional stance, with several analysts interpreting Beijing’s October 31 abstention on Resolution 2797 as a pragmatic shift, if not an outright diplomatic win for Rabat.

Hicham Ismaili, Ph.D. student at the University of Fes’ Laboratory of Political Studies and Public Law, observed that although “ideological consistency and relationships with other African nations may prevent a full-throated endorsement,” China’s vote can be considered a “tacit acceptance” of the plan.^[12]

Similarly, the Moroccan online media outlet Hespress reported the findings of Observatorio de la Política China, a foreign policy research group of the Spanish cultural institution Casa Asia, stating that:

“Although China’s principles have clearly favored a solution through self-determination, in practice, its actions have become more ambiguous and pragmatic over time.”^[13]

In a report for the Moroccan think tank Policy Center for the New South (PCNS), Fadoua Ammari, a Lecturer in International Relations at Hassan II University in Casablanca, and Rida Lyammouri, a Senior Researcher at the PCNS,^[14] argued that China is “gradually moving toward a convergence of strategic interests regarding the Moroccan Sahara.”^[15] They highlight the exclusion of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (a partially recognized state proclaimed by the Polisario Front), from the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), despite its status as a full member of the African Union, as evidence of Beijing’s “implicit refusal to recognize the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the Sahara.”^[16]

While Ammari and Lyammouri interpret China’s earlier support for Security Council Resolution 2440 (2018) and Resolution 2602 (2021), both considered highly “favorable” to Morocco’s Autonomy Plan, as Beijing attempting to align with the prevailing consensus within the Security Council, they regard the People’s Republic’s most recent posture as instead the result of geoeconomic considerations and the consolidation of Sino-Moroccan ties on the ground. “Morocco is a key partner for its strategy in Africa and the Western Mediterranean,” the report notes, pointing to flagship projects, such as the Gotion High-Tech gigafactory in Kenitra and the active presence of Chinese companies in the Tanger Med port, as evidence.^[17] As such, Ammari and Lyammouri maintain that China, to secure regional stability and the security of its investments, should support Rabat’s integration of the Western Sahara.

“A pacified Sahara, well integrated into Morocco, could instead become a space of opportunity: exploitation of mineral resources (the Sahara holds reserves of phosphates, of which Morocco is the world’s leading exporter), development of renewable energies (wind and solar power in the desert), and infrastructure projects linking Morocco to the rest of Africa (trans-Saharan highways, energy links, and a future gas pipeline).”^[18]

In a similar vein, Lahoucine Bekkar Sbaai, a Moroccan lawyer specializing in migration, human rights, and the Sahara conflict, holds that Morocco’s accession to the BRI, its role as a reliable investment and trade partner, and its expanding economic cooperation with Beijing are all indicators that “suggest a possible shift in China’s position on the Western Sahara issue, moving towards support for the autonomy initiative and recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over its Sahara.”^[19] This leads him to remark, with notable confidence, that:

“Yes, ladies and gentlemen, if this trend continues on its current trajectory, China’s recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara may only be a matter of time.”^[20]

It is noteworthy that, alongside this economic dimension, Bekkar Sbaai also links Beijing’s apparent shift on the Western Sahara to how Rabat “consistently supports China’s territorial integrity in international forums,” particularly on “sensitive issues such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.”^[21] A similar observation is also made by Ammari and Lyammouri, who posit that:

“[China’s] conciliatory attitude towards the Moroccan proposal may be part of a broader balancing act: Morocco has supported the “One China” policy (regarding Taiwan) and Beijing’s priorities in international forums, and, in return, China is demonstrating an understanding of Morocco’s sovereignty concerns.”^[22]

That said, these optimistic interpretations of Beijing’s position are not shared by all Moroccan commentators. For instance, Souad Mekkaoui, co-founder of the pro-government magazine Maroc Diplomatique, criticizes China’s abstention by comparing its cautious stance against what she defines a “clear-sighted choice” by major Western powers – Spain, France, the UK, the U.S., and Germany. While she previously criticized both Russia and China for their ambiguous positions,^[23] Russia’s recent more direct support for Morocco has led Mekkaoui to redirect her criticism primarily toward China.^[24]

Confident in Rabat’s global standing, Mekkaoui contends that China must clearly side with Morocco on the Sahara issue: “Beijing can no longer remain hidden behind the curtains of strategic caution […] China must choose […] to decide whether it wants to belong to the camp of History… or to the camp of those who watch it pass by.” To make her point, she also draws a parallel between the Sahara and Taiwan, suggesting that a lack of Chinese clarity on the former would be a “double standard”:

“Beijing, so quick to reiterate its commitment to the principle of territorial integrity, rightly demands that no one challenge its sovereignty over Hong Kong, Tibet, or Taiwan. But how, in the same breath, could it deny Morocco what it claims for itself? […] Morocco has never resorted to interference, never contested the sovereignty of another state, not even that of China. It has always chosen the path of respect, steadfastness, and loyalty. But respect, in relations between nations, is never unilateral; today, it demands reciprocity.”^[25]

Noting how “the Sino-Moroccan axis is already strategic and fruitful” economically and that Morocco has become the essential African link for the BRI, she argues that China’s historic partnership with Algeria should not be an obstacle:

“Between the inertia of a bygone ally and the vitality of a partner for the future, the choice should not be difficult. For diplomacy, ultimately, is not measured by rigid loyalties, but by the capacity to embrace the future. […] In this awakening Africa, Morocco stands out as a beacon: stable, bold, and visionary. Therefore, if China truly wants to engage with the Global South, it must recognize this beacon, not bypass it.”^[26]

For international observers, however, Beijing’s balanced stance was unsurprising. Jonathan Fulton, Associate professor of Political Science at Zayed University, pointed out in his China-MENA Newsletter that despite China’s comprehensive strategic partnership with Algeria and growing economic ties with Morocco, Beijing’s reluctance to “tip the scales” in disputes such as the Western Sahara reflects its limited ambitions beyond commercial engagement in the Middle East and North Africa.^[27]

Conclusion

As Sino-Moroccan economic cooperation has deepened, the Moroccan expert debate has increasingly turned to the potential of greater political convergence between Beijing and Rabat on the Western Sahara issue. As a result, Moroccan media coverage of Bourita’s visit to Beijing moved beyond discussions of Morocco’s growing strategic importance for Chinese economic expansion in Africa, focusing instead on the possibility that China might eventually follow much of the Western world in recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.

China’s abstention in the UN Security Council vote on the resolution endorsing Rabat’s Autonomy Plan was widely interpreted as confirming this perspective. Many Moroccan commentators (though not all) presented Beijing’s decision not to oppose the resolution as a positive step, potentially signalling incremental progress toward eventual full recognition. Though some analysts maintain that China should do more, discarding its ambiguous position on the issue and historic partnership with Algeria, a broad consensus has emerged among Moroccan analysts that “realism,” a clear assessment of mutual interests, and perceived parallels with Taiwan could encourage Chinese foreign policy to move beyond its traditionally noncommittal stance and toward endorsing Morocco’s proposed solution to the Western Sahara issue.

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Imane EZZEHOUANY is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in History, Cultural Heritage, and International Studies at the University of Cagliari. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a second Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Cagliari, where she was subsequently involved in various academic projects as a researcher. Her research focuses on the implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for North Africa.

[1] DW, “Western Sahara: Polisario Front leader arrives in Algeria,” June 3, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/western-sahara-polisario-front-leader-arrives-in-algeria/a-57764852.

[2] Xinhua, “Zhōngguó dàibiǎo duì ānlǐhuì xī sǎhālā wèntí juéyì bù pínghéng biǎoshì yíhàn” 中国代表对安理会西撒哈拉问题决议不平衡表示遗憾 [China’s envoy to UN Council expresses regret over imbalance of Western Sahara resolution], November 1, 2025, http://www.xinhuanet.com/20251101/d2c5ce6481e5426fb7343f50f5234fa5/c.html.

[3] 2MTV, “حوار حصري مع ناصر بوريطة، وزير الشؤون الخارجية والتعاون الأفريقي والمغاربة المقيمين بالخارج” [Exclusive interview with Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs & African Cooperation and Moroccans Abroad], Youtube, November 1, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWD3Y1V4KDo.

[4] Elmehdi El Azhary, “Sahara : Pékin et Moscou — une convergence pragmatique ?” [Sahara: Beijing and Moscow — a pragmatic convergence?], TelQuel, July 23, 2025, https://telquel.ma/2025/07/23/sahara-beijing-and-moscow-a-pragmatic-convergence_1938969.

[5] L’Opinion, “Batteries pour véhicules électriques: BTR New Material s’apprête à investir 4,9 milliards de dirhams dans une nouvelle usine au Maroc” [Batteries for Electric Vehicles: BTR New Material Prepares to Invest 4.9 billion Dirhams in a New Factory in Morocco], April 25, 2024, https://www.lopinion.ma/Batteries-pour-vehicules-electriques-BTR-New-Material-s-apprete-a-investir-49-milliards-de-dirhams-dans-une-nouvelle_a48324.html.

[6] Hiba Chaker, “La trajectoire inspirante de Rachid Yazami” [The inspiring journey of Rachid Yazami], Maroc Hebdo, July 14, 2023, https://www.maroc-hebdo.com/article/trajectoire-rachid-yazami.

[7] Espiral 21, “China ofrece un puente con Canarias entre España y Marruecos” [China offers a bridge with the Canary Islands between Spain and Morocco], November 13, 2024, https://espiral21.com/china-ofrece-un-puente-con-canarias-entre-espana-y-marruecos/.

[8] Atlantic Radio, “Sahara : vers une reconnaissance de la Chine ?” [Sahara: Towards Chinese recognition?], November 20, 2024, https://atlanticradio.ma/podcast/sahara-vers-une-reconnaissance-de-la-chine.

[9] Mohammed Jaabouk, Sahara: China reassures Morocco ahead of October UN deadline, Yabiladi, September 20, 2025, https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/176879/sahara-china-reassures-morocco-ahead.html.

[10] Khadija Alimousa, “بوريطة يزور الصين لتعزيز التعاون.. صبري: محطة أساسية لإنهاء النزاع المفتعل حول الصحراء” [Bourita visits China to strengthen cooperation… Sabri: a key stage to end the contrived Western Sahara dispute], TelQuel, September 18, 2025, https://ar.telquel.ma/بوريطة-يزور-الصين-لتعزيز-التعاون-مع-ب/.

[11] Jamal Laadam, “The Chinese stance on the Moroccan Sahara shifts from neutrality to subtle backing of sovereignty”, Modern Diplomacy, July 18, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/18/the-chinese-stance-on-the-moroccan-sahara-shifts-from-neutrality-to-subtle-backing-of-sovereignty/.

[12] Hicham Ismaili, “China’s Delicate Balance: Predicting Beijing’s Position on Morocco’s Autonomy Plan at UNSC” Morocco World News, October 30, 2025, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2025/10/265914/chinas-delicate-balance-predicting-beijings-position-on-moroccos-autonomy-plan-at-unsc/.

[13] Tawfiq Boufertih, “مرصد السياسة الصينية : بكين تميل إلى الحكم الذاتي في الصحراء المغربية” [Chinese Policy Observatory: Beijing tends toward autonomy in the Moroccan Sahara], Hespress, November 7, 2025, https://www.hespress.com/مرصد-السياسة-الصينية-بكين-تميل-إلى-الح-1650995.html.

[14] The PCNS is affiliated with the OCP Group, a state-owned company controlling the biggest phosphate mines in Morocco and the Western Sahara.

[15] Fadoua Ammari & Rida Lyammouri, “La Chine et la Russie face à la question du Sahara marocain : vers une convergence des intérêts stratégiques” [China and Russia on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara: towards a convergence of strategic interests], Policy Center for the New South, June 13, 2025, https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-chine-et-la-russie-face-la-question-du-sahara-marocain-vers-une-convergence-des.

[16] Ibid, p. 8.

[17] Ibid, p. 11.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Lahoucine Bekkar Sbaai, “Le Maroc et la Chine : la diplomatie économique au service de la souveraineté sur le Sahara” [Morocco and China: Economic diplomacy in service of sovereignty over the Sahara], Atalayar, November 5, 2025, https://www.atalayar.com/fr/opinion/lahoucine-bekkar-sbaai/maroc-et-chine-diplomatie-economique-au-service-souverainete-sur-sahara/20250609110500215700.html.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See note 15 Fadoua Ammari & Rida Lyammouri, Policy Center for the New South, p.5.

[23] Souad Mekkaoui, “Sahara marocain : Chine et Russie, il est temps de choisir le camp de la légitimité” [Moroccan Sahara: China and Russia, it is time to choose the camp of legitimacy], Maroc Diplomatique, June 6, 2025, https://maroc-diplomatique.net/sahara-marocain-chine-et-russie-il-est-temps-de-choisir-le-camp-de-la-legitimite/.

[24] Souad Mekkaoui, “Sahara : La Russie a choisi, à quand le courage de la Chine ?” [Sahara: Russia has made its choice, when will China show the courage?], Maroc Diplomatique, October 19, 2025, https://maroc-diplomatique.net/sahara-la-russie-a-choisi-a-quand-le-courage-de-la-chine/.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Jonathan Fulton, “China-Iran: more sodium perchlorate deliveries, more discounts for oil. China-Western Sahara: more fence-sitting,” The China-MENA Newsletter [Substack], November 1, 2025, https://chinamenanewsletter.substack.com/p/china-iran-more-sodium-perchlorate.