Bulgaria is entering a new political phase following Iliana Iotova’s victory, a result that strengthens Rumen Radev’s position. In an interview with *Adevărul*, Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev explains what is changing in Sofia, whether relations with Moscow might become closer, and what impact the new political landscape will have on Romania.

Melissa Dobrea, Adevărul, 3 November 2026

Adevărul: What led to Iliana Yotova’s victory? To what extent did support for her political programme matter, and to what extent did voters’ dissatisfaction with the current political class play a part?

Vladimir Mitev: In my view, the most revealing factor is, first and foremost, the voter turnout. Iliana Yotova won with 57.6 per cent, compared to 39.5 per cent for Andrei Gyurov. However, voter turnout was just 29.1 per cent, and in the first round it reached a historic low – below 23 per cent. This means that neither of the two candidates managed to inspire much enthusiasm beyond the core supporters of the parties backing them. The campaign lacked vision, plans and other proposals – and these were never discussed in the media. It was only a few days before the second round that a debate took place between the two.

Perhaps people knew that the outcome of these elections was a foregone conclusion. Perhaps elections are increasingly becoming a mere formality with very little substance, and Bulgarian society no longer engages in any discussion about the world or the future, but merely argues over whether its leader is weak or strong in relation to Russia. Be that as it may, the result of these elections is that Rumen Radev is taking full power in Bulgaria. So far everything suggests that his term of office will be a long one and will continue into the future. From now on, anyone with dealings with Bulgaria will have to acknowledge the reality that Rumen Radev is at the helm of the country.

Iliana Yotova supports maintaining Bulgaria’s European orientation, but also promotes closer relations with Russia. How do these two approaches fit together, and what stance do you think she will adopt regarding the European sanctions imposed on Moscow?

Until 2022, Western Europe had extensive economic cooperation with Russia, exemplified by the ‘Nord Stream’ gas pipeline and investments by German, French, Austrian and other European companies in Russia, and Bulgaria was part of these processes in which Western Europe and Russia collaborated. Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine has destroyed this economic order.

Now, Iliana Yotova argues that the conflict in the Black Sea – which has turned its waters into the most dangerous in the world for civilian vessels and their crews – must be de-escalated.

She expresses her desire to be part of a peace coalition that would engage in dialogue with Russia. She has not explained exactly how she intends to set in motion these processes that will reconcile Western Europe and Russia. But, at least in my view, as far as Russia is concerned, she will do only what Bulgaria’s Western European partners want and approve of. In other words, through her, Bulgaria is banking on a future scenario in which part of Western Europe will once again seek dialogue with Russia.

There are already some signs pointing in this direction. However, I do not see Bulgaria taking any arrogant or unjustified steps in this process. Bulgaria could only participate in this process as part of a broader trend towards the restoration of relations. I do not know whether it is known at this stage whether the conditions will be favourable for this, when they will arise, or how this reconciliation will be achieved. For the time being, we are seeing rather the opposite trend – the conflict in the Black Sea is intensifying, and Bulgaria (like Romania) is suffering significant economic losses. And it seems that it is not very clear what else could be done apart from the measures that the presidents of the two countries, their defence ministers, foreign ministers and chiefs of the general staff have already taken in October 2026.

Bulgaria’s support for Ukraine: what is changing

What changes might the new presidency bring to Bulgaria’s relationship with Ukraine? Can we expect a reduction in military and diplomatic support for Kyiv, or are there institutional and political constraints that would prevent such a change?

In my view, on the whole, Bulgaria continues to follow the European line on Ukraine. Military supplies from Bulgarian army depots have ceased, but commercial arms supplies continue unabated. In October 2026, however, there was indeed a noticeable weakening of Bulgaria’s commitment to Ukraine. Bulgaria and Hungary toned down the wording regarding Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, removing from the conclusions of the European Council summit of 15–16 October 2026 the phrase stating that this must take place ‘as soon as possible’. Furthermore, on 20 October 2026, Radev was quoted by the BTA news agency as saying that Bulgaria refuses to contribute financially to the additional €70 billion that the EU is considering sending to Ukraine.

So far, it appears that Bulgaria is abandoning or scaling back activities from which it derives no visible benefit. However, in its bilateral relations with Ukraine, there are various possibilities – for example, regarding cooperation in the energy sector (Rumen Radev discussed these issues with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara during the NATO summit on 8 July 2026).

Certain diplomatic activities are also taking place, in connection with which Bulgaria – and, specifically, Rumen Radev – have been consulted. One example of this is the visit to Sofia this autumn by the highly influential Ukrainian figure Kirilo Budanov, who, following his meeting with Radev, joined Zelensky’s delegation to the US for peace negotiations. In my view, Bulgaria is pursuing a pragmatic, rather than an ideologically driven, approach towards Ukraine, even though some of Rumen Radev’s and Iliana Iotova’s voters are sovereigntists. For the time being, Bulgaria is signing all joint documents on Ukraine at EU and UN level, although there have been some peculiar controversies in which Bulgarian politicians have verbally distanced themselves from the approval they gave to some of these documents. I expect – or at least hope – that where Sofia considers there to be a common interest, cooperation and support will continue, and it would be logical for this to be the case.

Relations with Romania and security in the Black Sea region

What does Iliana Yotova’s victory mean for Bulgaria’s relationship with Romania and for security in the Black Sea region? Could the new leadership change the priorities for regional cooperation within the EU and NATO?

Iliana Yotova has already been invited to Bucharest by the Romanian President, Nicușor Dan, who has expressed an interest in working with her.

An important consequence of Iliana Yotova’s victory for Romanian-Bulgarian relations is that Rumen Radev becomes Bulgaria’s undisputed leader for a period that may well be far from short. On the eve of the second round, a scandal erupted in the Romanian media in which a speech by Rumen Radev at the Sofia Economic Forum was interpreted as a display of hostility and an accusation against Romania, which undermined confidence in Romanian-Bulgarian relations. However, if we read or listen to this speech, we will see that Radev does not utter a single hostile remark towards Romanians. On the contrary, he displays a positive attitude towards his institutional partners in the Romanian state. The misinterpretation or incorrect translation of his words was probably linked to the presidential elections in Bulgaria.

I note that a section of the Romanian political elite does not accept Radev and views him as a new Orban. I hope that the hostility towards him will not lead to a mild form of cold war between the two countries. Personally, I believe that Romanians and Bulgarians have much to achieve together, and it is becoming increasingly necessary for us to learn to cooperate and trust one another. The common threat in the Black Sea also unites our two nations. In these circumstances, mistrust and hostility between us only play into the hands of our enemies.

However, I realise that, alongside my message that the political reality in Bulgaria must be acknowledged, this statement is equally valid the other way round. The reality in Romania must also be acknowledged to allow for a new approach to our relations. In the current climate, Bulgaria is all too often – and, in my view, not always justifiably – reduced solely to its pro-Russian current. The impression is created that the country is not part of NATO, the EU or the Schengen Area, and that it will not soon join the OECD either. But in fact, Bulgaria is a country firmly anchored in the West. And it can probably be understood not only through its ties with the other Slavic nations, but also through many other ties in which Bulgaria’s partners are also Romania’s partners.

As regards NATO’s and the EU’s priorities, I believe these are shaped by the partners to a far greater extent than Bulgaria and Romania could influence them on their own or together. It is important to me that Romanians bear in mind that, as both countries are members of NATO and the EU, no threat can arise from Bulgaria towards Romania. Our partners and the rules of these integrationist organisations ensure that no malicious plan can be carried out against another member. It is up to us to make the most of the opportunities offered by these organisations and to learn to work together, rather than spending our time fearing or suspecting one another.

This article appeared originally in Adevărul under the title Iliana Iotova’s victory shifts the balance of power in Sofia. A Bulgarian journalist’s warning to Romania. The Bridge of Friendship has republished under its own title.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Interview with Vladimir Mitev regarding the meeting in Sofia of the defense ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye; a comparison of the Bulgarian and Romanian reactions to the attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea; Rumen Radev’s speech at the Sofia Economic Forum, which sparked sharp reactions in Romania; and discussions among defense and security experts in the Romanian public sphere regarding

Bulgarian National Radio, October 29, 2026

Summary of the Interview

Spas Krainin’s interview with BNR journalist Vladimir Mitev (October 29, 2026) examines the reactions in Romania following the meeting of the defense ministers of Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye in Sofia, as well as the context surrounding the attacks on civilian and commercial ships in the Black Sea.

Key points:

• Romanian media focus on Türkiye: In Romania, Türkiye’s key role in Black Sea security is highlighted. Türkiye’s warning to Russia and Ukraine to cease attacks on commercial vessels underscores Ankara’s neutral stance, as it does not allow military ships from countries outside the Black Sea region to operate in the Black Sea.

• A Comparison of the Bulgarian and Romanian Positions: Although Romanian authorities more often point to the Russian Federation as the perpetrator of the attacks, the positions of the two countries are similar in their shared concern over the escalation of the conflict, and there have been statements by Romanian President Nicușor Dan that echo those of Rumen Radev regarding the difficulty of “technically” determining who is carrying out the attacks, even though logic allows for a reasonable assumption to be made in this regard. It is also noted that NATO currently has no policy for direct escalation or invoking Article 4, with the priority remaining on deterring new attacks rather than expanding the conflict.

• Rumen Radev’s Statement: The Bulgarian prime minister’s remarks regarding the premature identification of a culprit prior to an official investigation created false impressions and tension in the Romanian public sphere.

• According to Mitev, the full transcript of the statement reveals a positive tone toward Romanian institutions, a desire for bilateral cooperation, and the argument that escalating rhetoric alone does not prevent actual incidents near the coast. Radev’s policy of “ambiguity” regarding who the perpetrator is also does not prevent these incidents. So he is right about one thing—the issue of attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea is complex and has no easy solution.

• Regional Cooperation and NATO’s Limitations: Threats to maritime transport and the economy are driving closer cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye (building on the existing mine-clearing group). However, experts note the limitations on NATO’s ability to deploy large-scale forces to the Black Sea for an extended period due to specific conventional and political constraints.

Introduction

On October 26, 2026, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev delivered a speech to participants at the Sofia Economic Forum, in which he outlined his government’s position on key issues such as regional security, infrastructure development, and others. His remarks from that speech were presented in Bulgarian and Romanian media as accusations against Romania, suggesting that because it had named Russia as the culprit behind the attacks on civilian shipping earlier in October, it had suffered new strikes and had only itself to blame. Two days later, a ship was attacked in Bulgaria’s special economic zone in the Black Sea, demonstrating that Radev’s ambiguous stance on identifying the perpetrator of the attacks does not help his country achieve greater security.

However, the Romanian media’s interpretation of Radev’s words sparked intense anger, which was compounded by traditional Romanian suspicions that he is pro-Russian, if not something worse. Thus, over a period of perhaps two days, a certain unease arose in the attitudes of some Romanian elites and citizens toward the Bulgarian state. Once again, people recalled the famous phrase by the national poet Mihai Eminescu, that Bulgarians have “thick necks” and are “bulgaroi,” not “bulgari”—which suggests that there is something wild and boorish about them.

I, Vlad Mitev, initially also misreported that Radev had said something rude. However, Radev’s speech is available on YouTube, and upon listening to it, his message to Romania sounds very different—friendly and well-intentioned toward Romanian President Nicușor Dan, the new Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu, and Romanian Ambassador Brândușa Predescu in Sofia. Radev expressed a desire to cooperate with them and outlined what he has already done together with his Romanian partners in response to the attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea. Radev’s remarks regarding Romania’s “identification of the culprit” (Russia) sound different in his speech than reported, as they were intended to convey that there is no easy solution to the security problem that has arisen regarding civilian shipping in the Black Sea. Radev points out that Romania has done what the Bulgarian opposition wants him to do, yet has not achieved greater security. However, his conclusion contains no accusation against Romania. He simply notes that the issue of the threat to ships in the western Black Sea has no easy solution.

Radev’s statement came after two intense weeks during which he, together with Romanian President Nicușor Dan, sought greater support in Brussels from the European Council and NATO. It also comes a day after the first round of the presidential election, in which the candidate and incumbent President Iliana Yotova—backed by Rumen Radev’s ruling party, “Progressive Bulgaria”—received just 3% more of the vote than her opponent, Andrey Gyurov, a former caretaker prime minister supported by the anti-corruption parties “Change Continues” and “Democratic Bulgaria”.

Two days later—on October 28, 2026—the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staffs of Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye gathered in Sofia. From Sofia, they expressed a shared commitment to increasing coordination and the exchange of intelligence among themselves. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler issued a warning to Ukraine and Russia to stop their attacks on ships in the Black Sea. A day later—on October 29, 2026—at 6:45 a.m., the founder of “The Bridge of Friendship” gave the interview published below as a transcript. Preceding this is the transcript of Rumen Radev’s speech, which sparked such heated debate.

Full Transcript of Rumen Radev’s Speech at the Sofia Economic Forum (2026)

Interview

Introduction

Spas Krainin: Continuing on the topic of the attacks in the Black Sea, we turn to our colleague, journalist Vladimir Mitev, who is monitoring the reactions from the Romanian authorities. Good morning!

Vladimir Mitev: Good morning!

Reactions in Romania to the meeting of the defense ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye in Sofia on October 28, 2026

In fact, since yesterday, you’ve had the opportunity to follow the news coverage in Romania following the high-level meeting that was organized here in Bulgaria. What are the reactions of the Romanian authorities following yesterday’s strikes in the Black Sea, and what are analysts saying on the subject?

This meeting received quite a lot of attention in the Romanian media. It’s perhaps important, of course, that they’re following the activities of their minister, Ștefan-Radu Oprea, but I find it more interesting that there’s a strong focus on the actions of Türkiye and Turkish Minister ‌Yașar Güler, since Romania is well aware that Türkiye is currently key to security in the Black Sea.

Yes, he warned yesterday… Türkiye warned Russia and Ukraine to cease attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea. But what follows such a warning? What does this mean?

First, it means there is reciprocity, there is mutuality. Usually, since we focus only on the western part of the Black Sea, criticism flows in one direction—toward Russia—but Türkiye takes a more holistic view. Türkiye has a policy of not allowing military ships other than those of Black Sea countries into the region, yet it remains open to various forms of support. In any case, Türkiye is the key NATO country that will likely drive greater cooperation at the NATO level.

The Official Positions of Bulgaria and Romania Regarding the Attacks on Civilian Ships in the Black Sea

Do you see any distinction, however slight, between the positions of the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities on this issue? Because the Romanians were unequivocal in their statement that these were, in fact, attacks carried out by the Russian Federation. Or am I mistaken?

My impression is that the positions are similar. Perhaps I’m mistaken, but in any case, I noticed that Nicușor Dan, the Romanian president, also made a similar statement—namely, that technically it isn’t entirely easy to determine who is responsible for these attacks.

So, in my view, there’s simply a moment in our political struggle surrounding the elections when this rhetoric—whether you’re tough or soft on Russia—might score some points with certain voters.

But it seems to me that Romania, too—even though it has, of course, traditionally maintained a firm and unequivocal Euro-Atlantic or anti-Russian stance—is in fact also very concerned about the threats and risks posed by the escalation of the conflict. Last but not least, I should perhaps point out that Romania has a new government. The current foreign minister, for example, is very familiar with relations with NATO, as he was the one who handled precisely these issues at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And here, too, it seems to me that I can once again cite some of my informal contacts. Attention is being drawn to the fact that NATO apparently has no policy of escalation, and this is actually evident from some interviews published in the Romanian media.

At the same time, from what I’ve read, I understand that our allies would rather not invoke Article 4 or escalate tensions by adopting a more confrontational stance toward Russia. Rather, the idea is to deter Russia from attacking. Yes, I know there is perhaps a slight difference here in rhetoric or terminology, but NATO is a defensive alliance, and it seems to me that this is also recognized in Romania. If the issue were to escalate or to attack Russia, that would be a different situation. The goal, in fact, is to deter conflict.

Rumen Radev’s remarks at the Sofia Economic Forum, which sparked widespread outrage in Romania

And how do you interpret the Bulgarian prime minister’s remarks—that, in fact, naming the culprit before an official investigation has determined who owns the drones further escalates the already high tensions in the Black Sea? He criticized the behavior of the Romanian authorities—at least that’s how I interpreted his words.

Well, it created the impression—and I think some people may have been misled to some extent—that these were hostile remarks toward Romania. In Romania, there’s generally a certain sensitivity toward Radev. There’s, you know, a sort of distrust toward him, just as in our country there are theories that he’s far too open toward the East. But the point is that you can look at the statement—it’s available on YouTube; anyone can listen to it or read it…

For example, I took the trouble to transcribe it and shared it with some Romanian acquaintances who, before hearing it for themselves, were also convinced before reading the transcript that Radev was somehow saying offensive things about Romania. In fact, the tone of this speech is quite positive toward Romanian institutions. For example, he mentions the Romanian ambassador by name, says he’s working with Nicușor Dan, and that he’s also been in contact with Romania’s new prime minister; in fact, he emphasizes that he wants cooperation with Romania and that there’s no other way.

As for his specific words, of course, there are statements such as his remark that “Romania has named the enemy, yet the attacks have not stopped,” but he says this more to illustrate how difficult the situation is and that there is no easy solution. What justifies his not naming Russia so categorically, according to his arguments, is that even if he were to name it—as Romania, for example, has done—the attacks would still not stop, and we see that even if he does not name it, the attacks still do not stop. Yesterday we had such an example near the Bulgarian coast. So perhaps he is right, at least in this respect, that there is no obvious or easy solution.

I, for example, recall a talk show I appeared on—if I’m not mistaken, about 10 days ago—on one of the Romanian television stations. Some of the leading experts on defense and security were there. And in fact, this was also on Romanian television—once again, this was the focus of the discussion: that there doesn’t seem to be much clarity on what can be done in this situation. Of course, various measures are being taken—defense capabilities are being strengthened, surveillance is being stepped up, and cooperation among the three NATO countries in the Black Sea is being enhanced. In other words, the steps that can be taken are obviously being taken. But it’s not very clear what more can be done beyond that.

Cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye on defense in the Black Sea

“Through sensitive and careful diplomacy, we must avoid approaches that would increase tension and danger in the region. It is essential to make rational decisions at both the tactical and strategic levels”—I am quoting Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler. What would these rational decisions look like? Have the Romanian authorities commented on this to the Romanian media, and do you have the opportunity to compare this with the behavior of the Bulgarian authorities? What would these rational decisions look like in the search for a solution to the problem?

I’m not exactly a defense expert; I’m more of a person who reads or occasionally talks with such experts, so perhaps what I’m about to say isn’t the most comprehensive answer. It seems to me that, traditionally, cooperation between these three countries—Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye—has been limited so far, in the sense that there was this group clearing mines in the Black Sea, but that was perhaps the only format in which they did anything together. It seems to me that this emerging threat is serious for economic dynamics and maritime transport, and in a way, it’s bringing these countries together. It may take some time to simply get used to it—to share information more often, to discuss things together more frequently—but I think things are moving in that direction.

Petitions, memorandums, signatures, statements—is this the right path toward a final solution?

The Romanian media also notes that there are expectations regarding NATO, but simply, as far as I understand at this stage, NATO cannot, for example, send warships to the Black Sea, since policy dictates that these ships cannot remain there for very long, so such decisions cannot be implemented at the moment.

Thank you, colleague Vladimir Mitev.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Introduction

On October 26, 2026, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev delivered a speech to participants at the Sofia Economic Forum, in which he presented his government’s position on key issues such as regional security, infrastructure development, and others. His statements in this speech were presented in the Bulgarian and Romanian media as accusations against Romania, suggesting that because it named the culprit behind the attacks on civilian shipping in early October—Russia—Romania has suffered further blows and is solely to blame. Two days later, a ship was attacked in Bulgaria’s special economic zone in the Black Sea, which shows that even Radev’s ambiguous stance regarding the identification of the perpetrator of the attacks does not help his country achieve greater security. But something else is more important.

The Romanian media’s interpretation of Radev’s words sparked intense outrage, which intertwined with Romanians’ long-standing suspicions toward him—namely, that he harbors a pro-Russian stance, if not something even more serious. Thus, over the next few days, a certain agitation emerged among some Romanian elites and citizens. The famous phrase by the national poet Mihai Eminescu was once again brought to mind, according to which Bulgarians have “thick necks” and are “Bulgaroi,” not “Bulgarians”—which suggests that there is something wild and crude about them.

I, Vlad Mitev, initially believed—as did many people in Romania and Bulgaria—that Radev had said something crude, and I played a part in spreading that message. Radev’s speech, however, is available on YouTube, and upon listening to it, his message to Romania sounds entirely different—friendly and well-disposed toward Romanian President Nicușor Dan, the new Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu, and Romania’s ambassador to Sofia, Brândușa Predescu. Radev expresses his desire to collaborate with them and mentions what he has already undertaken together with his Romanian partners in response to the attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea. His remarks, which refer to Romania’s “identification of the culprit” (Russia), take on a different tone in the speech, as they are phrased to suggest that there is no easy solution to the problem that has arisen regarding the security of civilian navigation in the Black Sea. Radev emphasizes that Romania has done what the Bulgarian opposition demanded of him and has not achieved greater security. But his conclusion contains no accusation against Romania. He simply draws attention to the fact that the problem of the threat to ships in the western part of the Black Sea has no easy solution.

Radev’s statement came after two intense weeks during which he, together with Romanian President Nicușor Dan, had sought greater support in Brussels from the European Council and NATO. It also came one day after the first round of the presidential election, in which the candidate and incumbent president, Iliana Yotova—backed by Rumen Radev’s ruling “Progressive Bulgaria” party—received just 3% more of the vote than her opponent, financier and former interim Prime Minister Andrei Gyurov, who was supported by the anti-corruption parties “We Continue the Change” and “Democratic Bulgaria.”

Two days later—on October 28, 2026—the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff of Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey met in Sofia. From Sofia, they expressed their shared commitment to intensifying coordination and the exchange of intelligence among themselves. Turkish Defense Minister Yașar Güler issued a warning to Ukraine and Russia to cease attacks on ships in the Black Sea.

On November 1, Iliana Yotova was elected president of Bulgaria, securing a lead of about 20% over her opponent, Andrey Gyurov. Below is the transcript of Rumen Radev’s speech, which sparked so much controversy. I invite everyone who was angry or felt shame at Radev’s supposed statements to find at least one hostile statement directed at Romania in the Bulgarian prime minister’s words.

Full video of Rumen Radev’s speech (with auto-generated subtitles in English)

Rumen Radev’s Speech

Dear Mr. Tzomokos, dear Mr. Kremdes, distinguished organizers of this timely event, distinguished high-ranking guests, ladies and gentlemen,

I find myself once again on this distinguished podium. We’ll wait a moment for you to put on your headphones...

Your Excellencies, as your presence here is of the utmost importance. I find myself once again on this distinguished podium, and it is an honor for me that we can speak openly about the challenges we face. And addressing these challenges requires an open and dynamic dialogue, for these are dynamic times. These times present us not only with challenges but also with opportunities—opportunities to jointly set the strategic goals for Bulgaria and the region, and to work together to find solutions to them.

I do not think it is necessary to dwell on the extremely dynamic geopolitical situation, especially in the field of security. We all see what is happening around us—to the north, to the south. We all bear the consequences of the deepening crises and the global conflict—military, economic, and technological.

Starting with the war in Ukraine, which has long since ceased to be a war between two countries. It has turned into a global conflict and a war of attrition. And we must not allow it to turn into a war of destruction.

To the south of us—the conflicts in the Middle East—we see what is happening with prices, especially fuel prices. This is of crucial importance to us. Therefore, I will not go into such analyses.

I know my time is extremely limited, as a very relevant debate will take place here shortly, one that will contribute to achieving the objective of this forum. That is why I will be concise and move directly to the issues and questions that concern us all—us, the Bulgarian business community, as well as our foreign partners.

And the questions are complex. How will we adapt more quickly and effectively to these dynamic geopolitical changes, and how will we seek strategic opportunities for our country and for the entire region? How will we ensure our security? Because that is the foundation of all other activities. Without security, there is no social development, no economy, and no investment in human capital.

How will we manage to be more resilient and stronger together? This is an extremely important question. And here, regional cooperation and regional alliances will become increasingly important. As for us specifically—how will we more quickly overcome this heavy economic and financial legacy? Let me remind you: we are still experiencing a downward trend in investment—I’m referring to foreign direct investment, exports, and industrial production.

What we inherited—an empty treasury, burdened by debt, without a budget, with a neglected Recovery and Resilience Plan, with social spending rising explosively, and, precisely, a lack of capital investment. How will we address these challenges in the 2027 Budget, which we will present next week? Namely: on the one hand, to secure revenue, ensure demographic policy, and guarantee support for investment in order to achieve economic growth; and on the other hand—to reduce the deficit significantly and lower the debt burden.

These are extremely contradictory objectives—very difficult, very challenging—but we will strive to achieve them. That is why, in the 2027 Budget, we are setting clear priorities. First and foremost, this involves the recovery of public finances. Increased social and family support. More funding for defense. For critical sectors such as health, education, culture, sports, and others.

Stimulating production and providing tax incentives so that we can rely on economic growth, because only increased production, higher productivity, and greater competitiveness can truly solve budgetary problems. We want to achieve something very important—at least to reverse the trend. To change the model of economic development. From a model based on consumption, redistribution, and cheap labor, we must shift to a model of accelerated economic development—through increased productivity, competitiveness, and innovation; through greater investment.

The part that deals with Romania

These are the main and most important tasks we have set out in this budget. But let me return to the most important condition—security. Especially recently, with the attacks against our ships in the Black Sea, this issue has become extremely important. And we must find a solution as quickly as possible.

I can say that, to date, the actions of Bulgarian institutions—our sailors, our rescuers, and our teams—have been extremely swift, professional, and well-coordinated. From the very first minutes of the tragedies that occurred in our exclusive economic zone, our rescue teams were on the scene, even though the rescue operations took place at night and under difficult weather conditions. We have demonstrated that Bulgaria, as a civilized nation, is capable of fulfilling its international obligations regarding emergency search and rescue within its exclusive economic zone.

We immediately took all necessary diplomatic measures at the executive level: discussions with NATO, videoconferences with the European Commission, and with the President of Romania. I see that Brândușa (Brândușa Predescu is Romania’s ambassador to Sofia—Ed.) is here. Together with Nicușor Dan, we immediately met with the NATO Secretary General. We analyzed all the options available to us as guarantees for our security.

Together with the Romanian president, we brought to the attention of the European Council and European leaders the issue of a memorandum that would finally prohibit or limit attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea.

We held discussions with the new Romanian prime minister, as well as with Turkish President Erdogan. We are acting with great dynamism and the utmost responsibility. We have mobilized all the resources of the Bulgarian armed forces—our entire air, maritime, and land defense capabilities—wherever we have surveillance systems, in order to ensure the most thorough possible understanding of the situation in our maritime space.

Our allies have responded. As you know, an allied aircraft arrived immediately and is conducting patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions over the Black Sea coast. We are expecting even more support. The most important thing—and this is where we must pay attention—is that we did everything possible, under difficult weather conditions, to bring the ship Chelsea 3 into the port of Burgas to ensure a thorough and detailed investigation. Our allies have arrived here with high-tech equipment, and we are awaiting the findings.

Now, regarding the question that has been raised—perhaps more of a political, pre-election, or ideological nature: “But name the aggressor immediately, so that we can point him out together.” I have no objection. I was the only prime minister who summoned the Russian ambassador over the incident involving our three state customs vessels in the Black Sea. And I made my position and views very clear from the very beginning.

But I have principles: when I make an accusation, before doing so, I must have clear evidence on the table—not just rely on slogans. Now there has been another viewpoint: many people believe that when we point the finger at the aggressor and threaten them, the attacks will stop, and thus we will protect our territorial waters from potential attacks.

I just want to mention the case of Romania. They did exactly that. Indeed, the Romanian political leadership stepped forward and said: “It doesn’t matter that there is no evidence; we know that Russia is responsible for these attacks, and we categorically condemn them.”

And what happened? Two ships—one of them just a few days ago—were struck and sunk with the utmost audacity in Romanian territorial waters. So, I want to tell you—the issue is very complex. Sometimes, even in this situation, it is beyond our capabilities to retaliate on our own.

That is why we have taken a clear stance: together with our allies, we will do everything possible—both through military means and, above all, through diplomatic means—to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. This is vital for our economy.

And I want to assure you that Bulgarian ports and our territorial waters are safe for navigation. I have requested statistics for the same period—from September to the present, up to the same date—as well as from the beginning of October, when the attacks began, until now: traffic to and from the ports of Varna and Burgas has remained unchanged.

Compared to last year, we are recording much higher volumes. Therefore, we will continue to do everything in our power, using all available means, to guarantee this safety. The anchor of our security lies in the European Union and NATO, as well as in a strong transatlantic partnership with our strategic ally, the United States, especially when it comes to security.

We have a duty to continue developing our own defense capabilities. That is why, in the budget, we are inevitably allocating more funds for the modernization of the Bulgarian armed forces and for cooperation with other European Union member states under the SAFE joint procurement program. This is the path we have charted and are following.

Regional and EU dimensions of government’s policy

We cannot have a growing economy without connectivity. And this announcement made by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her report just one month ago—that Bulgaria will host the summit on connectivity along the Central Corridor—is by no means coincidental. This is the active—I might even say proactive—work of our government. Because we have an important problem to solve: how will we finally transform our strategic geographic position into a strategic economic advantage? And we are finally, after decades, on the verge of beginning to solve this important problem together with you, of course.

And it’s not just the Central Corridor. We are also actively working on the corridor connecting the Gulf countries, passing through Bulgaria, to our European partners. This is extremely important, especially given what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz. And this is linked to another issue, which I raised, among other things, at the European Council, in front of all our partners. And this concerns fuel production in Europe. Because, in recent decades, numerous refineries have closed in Europe. And Europe is facing a shortfall in aviation fuel production. Only 60% of our needs are met. There is a diesel shortage. And we import it mainly from this region—I’m referring to Europe.

But we have a strategic asset that is not merely of regional importance. I am referring to our refinery in Burgas. I am referring to the Bulgarian refinery in Burgas, which is currently still owned by “Lukoil.”

However, decisions regarding this refinery are made outside of Bulgaria, outside the European Union. That is why I believe that this refinery, which is certainly one of the largest and most modern in Europe, is not merely a national asset of ours. It is a European asset, especially in times of crisis. That is why I expect us to be more active here as allies, seeking solutions to guarantee our energy security and independence.

Recently, at the end of last month, I signed an extremely important agreement together with the transportation ministers of Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. It aims to connect the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Danube. Here lies the immense potential and extraordinary opportunity to expand these connections together.

All these corridors passing through Bulgaria represent a huge opportunity for us to strengthen our transportation and freight forwarding companies, as well as to build and invest here in logistics centers and warehouses. This represents an even greater opportunity for our goods to find new markets. So this is where we will definitely focus our attention. But this global and regional connectivity, which we have through these corridors, also requires internal national connectivity.

And this is precisely what is reflected in our strategy: our internal transportation corridors should be part of these global corridors. Only in this way will we achieve accelerated development. And here we are finally determined to change the model for building strategic domestic transportation and energy infrastructure.

We’ve done the math: if we continue to build this way—exclusively with public funds, as has been the case so far—it will take at least 50 years. While connections are showing some progress—albeit limited—along the east-west axis within Bulgaria, those along the north-south axis in Bulgaria remain in an extremely unsatisfactory state. That is why we have drafted the new Public-Private Partnership Act, so that the model we will apply aims to mobilize private capital for the rapid construction of our strategic transportation infrastructure.

On Friday, we had a very encouraging meeting—with nearly the entire government, the Bulgarian pension funds, the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, and the Financial Supervision Commission. I am extremely optimistic, as everyone enthusiastically welcomed this idea. We are set to establish a National Investment Company. We are set to begin mobilizing capital very quickly through various means.

Next, we will implement what is already provided for in the budget of the Ministry of Regional Development and Spatial Planning, so that we can extremely rapidly accelerate the preparation of urban planning schemes, expropriation procedures, and environmental impact studies, enabling us to very quickly launch, through public-private partnerships, the concession-based highways.

And Petrohan with the tunnel—that section is ready. Ruse–Makaza, to connect with Alexandroupolis, which I’ve mentioned at other conferences as a strategic hub for us—for Bulgaria and for the region. To connect this port, via Bulgaria, further north toward Romania. The “Black Sea” highway, the “Rila” highway. We must also consider the Vidin–Botevgrad section, to finally complete it. The “Hemus” highway must be completed as soon as possible. The “Thrace” Highway—the absolutely essential third lane from Sofia to Plovdiv.

And all of this we must—and we have the ambition, and we must—achieve within two terms. We can no longer wait, because this represents a huge obstacle to our economy.

Energy

Let’s move on to another sector vital to the economy—the energy sector. We know that energy is the foundation of all economic activity. Bulgaria has very quickly, almost imperceptibly, become the leader in the Balkans in terms of installed energy storage battery capacity. Just yesterday, an interesting article appeared in Reuters—if you noticed—which clearly states:

If we consider the figures regarding the ratio of power generation and battery energy storage capacity to the capacity of the entire energy system and on a per-capita basis, I can say that, from Australia through Europe to California, Bulgaria is the leader in terms of these ratios. And this has already changed the situation. I know that the business community is extremely interested—and not just the business community—in lower prices, because they guarantee greater competitiveness.

Batteries offer the possibility of extremely dynamic development in the renewable energy sector, enabling us to achieve these lower prices. And it was precisely with the help of batteries that, this summer, during the major crisis, we also helped our neighbors—both Romania and Greece—because it was precisely at night, during peak hours, that electricity from the batteries installed in Bulgaria was used. Not to mention the pumped-storage hydroelectric plants—I’ll say it again, but this time we have a genuine ambition to build these three plants.

The waters in mountainous areas represent an immense resource that we possess. We already have dams in place—we just need to be faster and more flexible in putting them into operation, because this is the most efficient and environmentally friendly “battery.” And when they do come online—the green energy corridors—the “Gregi” project in North Africa, which crosses Greece to deliver green energy; when the green energy corridor from Azerbaijan comes online, right here in Bulgaria could be the storage site that ensures the daily cycle of this green energy as it is distributed to the rest of Europe. We, too, must capitalize on this potential and ensure an advantage for the region and for Europe.

Foreign direct investment

Furthermore, it is very important for us to revitalize the economy—specifically through foreign direct investment. We are working in an extremely dynamic and comprehensive manner with key strategic partners. I will not mention their names before signing the relevant binding memorandums of understanding. I do hope, however, that things are at a fairly advanced stage.

One of the areas where we want to attract foreign investment—specifically strategic investment—is artificial intelligence factories and large data centers. We have all the necessary basic commercial regulations in place. We already have, as they say, the “game-changing” elements. We have the most important element of what we offer: political will, predictability, and speed.

Recently, I was in France for the space summit organized by President Macron. And there I visited such a center—a 50-megawatt artificial intelligence facility. I can say that we must use these examples to combat prejudices. Because certain circles are trying to stir up a fuss, saying, “Look, this is terrible, this is scary; these centers would use up all our water, make a lot of noise, consume all our electricity, take up all our land,” and so on. Absolute lies!

At the center we visited—the water circulates in a closed loop; there are probably just three hydrants inside, and that’s it. These doors are equipped with an internal cooling system. No noise at all. A compact footprint, enormous potential. And we need to put this project into practice as soon as possible, because it will propel Bulgaria into an entirely different orbit. We’re moving on to the industries of the future—high-tech manufacturing.

By the way, when I spoke with these investors, who are already at an extremely advanced stage here in Bulgaria—this is a serious Euro-American consortium—they told me: “We want to build the largest artificial intelligence factory. We’re going to build it right here in Bulgaria.”

I asked them, “Why in Bulgaria? If there’s serious European involvement, build it in…” I couldn’t believe it. I asked them, “Why not build it in Germany or France?” They replied, “The problem is huge—we’d have to wait five years for permits and to get connected to the grid.”

And here—and they’ve realized this—we offer what matters most: speed. Speed in decision-making. Speed in execution. Speed in getting connected and support at the highest political level.

So, we will focus our efforts in this direction. Robotics is another very important strategic field—especially for Europe, not to mention Bulgaria.

We are facing serious demographic imbalances. We are facing an aging population. We are facing a labor shortage.

Currently, this problem is being addressed through increasingly heavy reliance on imports, as Europe’s ethnic, religious, and cultural landscape shifts. We are seeing that this is already beginning to create problems. The way to solve this problem is through automation at all levels.

And I believe that in Bulgaria, thanks to the investments accumulated over the years in INSAIT, in the development of a strong IT ecosystem, thanks to our solid educational system—especially in this field, as demonstrated at international competitions—and thanks to our existing traditions in mechatronics and robotics, we can truly be a country capable of attracting strategic investments in this field. Not to mention the defense industry—serious negotiations are already underway there, and we expect to see progress in this area soon as well.

But the most important thing for us is the support provided to the Bulgarian business community, Bulgarian entrepreneurs, and Bulgarian manufacturers. That is why we are including a series of measures in the budget to provide this support: tax incentives for scientific research and technology transfer; raising the VAT registration threshold; a reduction in the administrative burden; a one-stop shop for services; and a European digital wallet, so that everything can be done much more quickly, with far less bureaucracy for the business community.

Support for investments: we are determined to lower the threshold for priority projects from 25 to 15 million, so that medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria can participate immediately. Assistance for expropriations. Assistance, particularly in industrial zones, for their development and for access infrastructure.

Our goal is for Bulgarians, with their entrepreneurial spirit, to increasingly withdraw their money from banks—where over 100 billion lies idle—and invest it in the real economy. This is the path we see for the future.

Of course, we are also talking here about investments in human capital. Despite the extremely difficult and challenging budgetary situation, we are allocating substantial funds. We are increasing funding for both education and health care—particularly for the National Children’s Hospital and for the salaries of young doctors.

However, we plan to exercise much stricter control over the spending of funds from the Health Insurance Fund, and to this end, we are already developing robust digital systems to put an end to all the scandalous leaks and thefts in the healthcare system serving Bulgarian citizens.

As you can see, inspections will continue with the full force of law enforcement. We have also set out to increase incomes: tax breaks for families with children and for children with disabilities; new preferential tax breaks to support our children’s development—for anyone involved in sports, the arts, etc.; and tax breaks for a range of activities. We will not leave pensioners without a pension increase, even if it is minimal; we have also planned an increase for public sector employees.

So, these are, in fact, the most important investments. We will also invest in greater safety, as befits a civilized European country. And we want to be a developed and dignified European country.

Human and natural resources

How can we do this when our people are dying on the roads and we hold a record—which we share with Romania, alternating from time to time in terms of the number of traffic fatalities per capita? We are establishing a very serious Road Safety Center. We will allocate funds for the purchase of aviation equipment—firefighting aircraft; a new search-and-rescue vessel for the Black Sea; and digital systems for monitoring dam water levels. You know what used to happen… we must ensure this doesn’t happen again.

Many, many other things, but I repeat—for us, human capital is the most important. Support for schoolchildren—school scholarships have not been adjusted in over a decade. Support for college students is also planned.

So, I hope that through all these comprehensive measures… These are just a part of the policies, priorities, and reforms we’re implementing—and, believe me, there are reforms. Even indirectly, everything we’ve undertaken—such as reducing taxes on products—falls under our support for citizens and the business community. And at this point there is opposition; someone has lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (CAS – ed.), because there will be those who stand to lose out. But we want this issue to be diversified; we are drastically reducing these taxes and we want there to be freedom—so that this matter isn’t reserved solely for an elite. It won’t be that way, regardless of the resistance that arises.

The law on mineral resources will be adopted soon.

I believe it must be a fair and objective law, so that Bulgaria can gain more from its mineral resources and, at the same time, give serious entrepreneurs the opportunity to conduct environmental studies that comply with all standards, so that we can finally have a digitized geological map of Bulgaria.

This is extremely important for us and for Europe, because Europe must return to the extraction of raw materials—particularly those of critical importance—and to their processing. We, thank God, have not shut it down—on the contrary, we have developed it; we have not shut down our extractive industry; we are developing it and intend to continue doing so in the future.

And finally: I know there will be resistance, but we are seeing a number of changes with the Gambling Law. Because, I repeat, the most important thing for us is to ensure the development of the most important factor in any country—our people. Therefore, we will move resolutely in this direction.

I believe we will achieve this through joint efforts, together with all of you. We can promise you transparency, openness, and cooperation, and I hope that, in these challenging times, our efforts will be crowned with success.

Thank you for your attention!

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Ștefan Lică, Adevărul, 25 October 2026, before the end of the eletion day

Interview

Foreword

The first round of the presidential election in Bulgaria was marked by a historically low turnout of just over 22 per cent. Proceeding to the second round on 1 November are the incumbent president, Iliana Yotova, backed by ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the former caretaker prime minister, Andrey Gyurov, backed by the anti-corruption groups ‘We Continue the Change’ and ‘Democratic Bulgaria’. With 100 per cent of the ballot papers counted, Iliana Yotova and her vice-presidential candidate Kiril Valchev have secured 34.76 per cent, whilst Andrei Gyurov and his vice-presidential candidate Georgi Kandev have received 31.95 per cent. The presidential ticket of the Sovereignist Party has 12.54 per cent, whilst 4.43 per cent of voters chose the ‘I do not support anyone’ option.

The interview with Vladimir Mitev conducted by Ștefan Lică took place on election day, 25 October 2026, and was published on the Adevărul website before the end of the working day.

Intro

The Black Sea has become an area of intense geopolitical tension, and Bulgaria is going through an extremely turbulent election period. As polling day on Sunday, 25 October 2026, draws to a close, polling stations south of the Danube are tallying the votes following a turnout closely monitored by the entire region. Throughout the campaign, the labels applied to Bulgarian leaders risk obscuring a far more nuanced reality. In a comprehensive analysis, Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev unravels the intricacies of his country’s political scene and explains, in an interview with ‘Adevărul’, what Rumen Radev’s political stance really means, what the candidates’ vulnerabilities are, and how these developments mirror the situation in Romania.

The main contenders

Bulgarians are heading to the polls today for the first round of the presidential election. Who are the main favourites in the race for the Bulgarian presidency, and what do the polls show ahead of the first round?

The main intrigue of these elections centres on the pair of candidates for president and vice-president, comprising, on the one hand, the current president, Iliana Yotova, and the director of the Bulgarian News Agency (the equivalent of the Agerpres Agency), Kiril Valchev, on the one hand, and the pair comprising former interim Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov and the Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior in his cabinet, Georgi Kandev, on the other. Polls on the eve of today’s round indicated support of over 40 per cent for Yotova-Valchev, whilst support for Gyurov-Kandev stood at around 26–27 per cent.

In third place, the polls placed the candidates of the sovereignist “Revival” party – its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, and MEP Petar Volgin. The polls attributed results of around 10–11 per cent to them. Far behind them was a group of candidate pairs with openly pro-Russian messages, as well as others, such as, for example, a pair targeting the environmentalist and anti-corruption vote.

Protocol gaffes, incidents with journalists and social media strategies

How would you assess the quality of this campaign, and how did the candidates fare in the debates and in the exchange of ideas? How did the main frontrunners stand out?

In my view, there was no campaign in the true sense of the word – that is, a competition of visions, strategies and concepts regarding the governance of the country. No debate took place between Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov. Iliana Yotova, a former MEP from the Party of European Socialists, entered the campaign as the clear favourite, but her conduct, in many respects, was not convincing. She is backed by Rumen Radev’s ruling party – Progressive Bulgaria – and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Consequently, she has targeted a segment of the sovereignist electorate – she has demonstrated closeness to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, whilst her candidate for vice-president, Kiril Valchev, is very close to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Yotova holds conferences and events praising the Cyrillic alphabet as a civilisational contribution by Bulgaria to the world, and so on. However, she appeared unconvincing when explaining how, on the one hand, she endorsed joint documents in support of Ukraine and against Russia, for example at the UN, as happened in September 2026, yet, at the same time, she consistently offered various explanations through which she distanced herself from the line taken by her country and her institution within international forums. Of course, Yotova had announced a vision for de-escalating the conflict in the Black Sea, even before the attacks on commercial vessels in October 2026.

For his part, Andrey Gyurov trailed Yotova significantly in the polls at the start of the campaign, but over time he increased his support by probably 10–11 per cent, whilst Iliana Yotova’s standing in the polls appears to have fallen slightly. He did not say much in the way of concrete details, such as promises or visions. He described his role as president as that of a sort of ombudsman, someone who would listen to what people want and incorporate this into the country’s agenda. However, Gyurov ran a strong campaign on social media, including through videos showing him interacting with ordinary people in markets across the country. Last but not least, Gyurov accused Rumen Radev of failing to name Russia as the culprit behind the escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea, which took place in October. Radev began to mention Russia more openly as the possible or logical perpetrator of the drone attacks on commercial vessels near, or even within, Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters, only after the second wave of attacks on 13 October 2026, when the general threat to shipping to Romanian and Bulgarian ports prompted Sofia and Bucharest to jointly seek support from the European Council and within NATO.

Gyurov has not presented a concrete vision of what he proposes as an alternative to the government of Radev and Yotova, but it seems he is gaining some additional support from their mistakes. Here I would like to draw attention to the incident on 22 October 2026, in which a journalist, seeking to provoke a reaction, sneaked past the security guards of the Speaker of Parliament from the Progressive Bulgaria party – Mihaela Dotsova, opened the door of the car in which the politician had just taken her seat and, immediately afterwards, was pushed by the security guards, falling onto her back and sustaining, in her own words, injuries. The behaviour of the guards from the National Service of Protection in the first few seconds after the incident was widely criticised on social media as insensitive, and led Gyurov’s supporters to claim that Bulgarians must decide whether they want people with such an insensitive attitude towards the people to lead them for another presidential term.

The powers of the president in Bulgaria

Following recent constitutional reforms, what powers does the Bulgarian president actually retain, and how does this weakening of the institution compare with the profile and influence of the Romanian president?

The powers of the Bulgarian President were significantly curtailed following a constitutional reform a few years ago. This removed his ability to exert direct influence over the secret services, with the exception of the National Service of Protection, which we have already discussed. At that time, the President’s right to form interim governments when parliament is unable to form a cabinet was also significantly curtailed. The Bulgarian President plays a role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. He, and in particular the Vice-President, also have responsibilities towards Bulgarians living abroad. In short, the Bulgarian president is currently, without a doubt, a weaker figure than the Romanian president, who over the years has played an active role in political life during Traian Băsescu’s time and even now exerts influence over the formation of the government and over state processes at various levels. Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic.

The enigma of the second round. How will the GERB and DPS electorates split their votes

An extremely close second round is on the cards for 1 November 2026. How will the electorates of key parties, such as Boiko Borisov’s GERB or Delian Peevski’s DPS, align themselves, and where will the sovereignist and pro-Russian vote go?

It is predicted that, in the first round, none of the candidates will secure the required majority of over 50 per cent.

This means that there will certainly be a second round of the presidential election, to be held on 1 November 2026. The decisive factor then will be how the voters of Boiko Borisov’s GERB party – which has not nominated a candidate – those of Delian Peevski’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party, which has also not nominated a candidate, as well as how the pro-Russian vote – which went to the candidates with weaker results in the first round – will be distributed.

Members of GERB were part of the initiative committees for both Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov. In certain respects – for example, at the meeting of the Consultative Council for National Security concerning the attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea – GERB supports the line taken by Progressive Bulgaria and Iliana Yotova. In other instances, such as the recent vote in the European Parliament on the EU’s position regarding the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea, GERB MEPs voted in favour of the resolution which, amongst other things, criticises Radev for his weak response to Russia. For the time being, at least as far as I am concerned, it is unclear who GERB voters will vote for, or whether they might prefer to stay at home on election day.

There has been much talk recently about DPS voters; some of them have moved into Rumen Radev’s sphere of influence. Be that as it may, it is anticipated that the ongoing conflict between the government and the influential businessman Delian Peevski, who is the DPS party’s president, as well as the arrests of several prominent mayors from within this party, will lead a large section of the DPS electorate not to support Iotova.

As regards the pro-Russian vote, the most significant trend within this group is that the Revival Party’s rhetoric is directed against both Progressive Bulgaria and the anti-corruption parties supporting Gyurov. In particular, with regard to Yotova, comments have appeared on social media from supporters of the Renaissance Party claiming that she is, in their view, linked to Soros, which is likely to be seen as a negative factor by them. So, in this respect too, we are dealing with a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’, to borrow the phrase attributed to Churchill, with which he described Russia, but which, in this case, is being used in relation to the preferences of the pro-Russian electorate.

Rumen Radev: a pro-Russian leader or a pragmatist caught between East and West?

In Romania, Rumen Radev is frequently labelled a pro-Moscow leader. How accurate is this oversimplification, and how would you actually describe him – as a ‘pro-everyone’ politician, a pragmatist caught between East and West, or a leader tempted to follow in Viktor Orbán’s footsteps?

I believe Radev is part of a trend amongst high-ranking Bulgarian politicians to be ‘pro-everyone’. Another contemporary representative of this trend is Borisov, about whom the renowned political scientist Ivan Krastev, who received the ‘European of the Year’ award this week, said years ago that he is ‘more pro-American, more pro-European and more pro-Russian’ than anyone else. Of course, in Radev’s case, we are talking about a politician who made his mark during Donald Trump’s first term in office, and who now – during Trump’s second term – has even come to represent the dominant political trend in the country.

Both Borisov and Radev were praised by Viktor Orbán during his visit to Sofia in December 2024, on the eve of Bulgaria and Romania’s full accession to the Schengen Area, as politicians who defend Hungary against its enemies both within and outside Bulgaria.

However, not only I, but also people who understand Hungarian politics far better than I do – such as Stefano Bottoni and Sergiu Mișcoiu – are of the opinion that a new Orbán in the region is not possible, as no one possesses the resources of Hungary and of Viktor Orbán himself to pursue the policies he has pursued. What Radev is doing bears a resemblance to Orban’s approach – as Bulgaria is currently opening up more actively to American and Chinese capital. Furthermore, Radev graduated with distinction from an American military university and gives the impression of being pro-Trump – an orientation that is also reflected in specific actions – for example, in the fields of energy or technology. Radev’s support for the diesel agreement between Trump and Putin has sparked much debate in Brussels, while even politicians with sovereigntist leanings, such as the Czech Prime Minister Babiš, have spoken in this context of “betrayal of Europe” committed by Trump.

At the same time, however, Rumen Radev was the only EU politician mentioned by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union address this year, in the context of the summit on infrastructure connectivity between Europe and Asia, which they will co-host in Sofia in early 2027. In other words, Radev can be compared to Orbán not only in a negative sense, but also in a ‘positive’ sense, in that, as Stefano Bottoni puts it, Orbán was a rebel with the authorities’ permission.

Radev, however, is still a long way from rebellion and may never reach that point, as Bulgaria lacks the American and Chinese investment that Hungary benefits from and which allows the latter to develop its own, sovereign economic dynamism. Bulgaria remains heavily dependent on its economic ties with Western Europe. This probably also explains why Radev faces strong resistance at a national level in Bulgaria.

I do not wish to act as Radev’s advocate, nor do I feel that I am one. I do not support his policies in favour of the business community and against the trade unions, or to the detriment of Bulgarians’ social rights. There is no conclusive evidence that he has defeated the oligarchy, as he claims; on the contrary, we are seeing businesspeople from this oligarchy and supporters of ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ being killed, including on the day before the elections.

Bulgaria and the Black Sea crisis

Against the backdrop of the recent escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea and tensions surrounding attacks on commercial vessels, how do you view the need for closer coordination between Sofia, Bucharest and Turkey, as well as the role played by Radev in this security equation?

Against the backdrop of the renewed escalation of the Black Sea conflict in October 2026, I observe a growing realisation in both Sofia and Bucharest that the common threat to the economic interests and security of the two countries requires them to coordinate and cooperate more closely – both with each other and with Turkey. And here, I believe, Radev plays a positive role.

Furthermore, from what I have observed and from media reports, our own NATO allies do not wish to escalate the conflict with Russia, but rather to deter its spread. And, once again, our partners do not want us to invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty following another attack, because if Article 4 were invoked for every such attack, it would be triggered every week. And the outcome of invoking it would probably not be very different from that without it.

In other words, Radev is genuinely trying to be loyal, whilst sticking to his own line. In this case, Russia is seeking an escalation, and perhaps it makes sense that it should not get what it wants. And given that there are differences between the centre and the periphery of the EU, as well as between Trump and Western Europe, Radev’s task of striking a balance to some extent between all sides is difficult to achieve; he faces a lack of understanding, and even he himself struggles to explain it, and time will tell to what extent this gamble – including on the part of Bulgarian voters and the Bulgarian state – was justified.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Analysis by Alexandru Drăgulin for The Bridge of Friendship, 18 October 2026

Article

The prospect of accession to the European Union is shaping two distinct debates on the future of the Republic of Moldova. Unification with Romania is cited by some political actors as a fallback solution should the European path become blocked. The reintegration of Transnistria concerns the restoration of constitutional authority over a territory internationally recognised as part of the Republic of Moldova. In this second case, closer ties with the EU can provide the economic and administrative resources needed to overcome the division. These two themes converge in the same question: how compelling can the European offer become for Moldovan society, including for those living on the left bank of the Dniester?

The thesis of this analysis is that credible accession can consolidate the Republic of Moldova as a European state and create more favourable conditions for its territorial reintegration. Conversely, prolonged uncertainty may fuel the search for alternatives to accession as an independent state, without these alternatives automatically becoming easier to achieve. The relationship between these developments depends on political decisions, domestic reforms and the security environment.

What does the 2028 deadline represent?

The discussion about an emergency unionist solution must begin with a distinction regarding the timeline. In June 2026, Euronews Romania reported, based on an Euractiv interview with Eugen Osmochescu, then Deputy Prime Minister, that unification with Romania could become a ‘Plan B’ if the European path were to stall after 2028. The stated objective was to sign the accession treaty by the end of that year. Signing the treaty and actually acquiring membership are different stages. [1]

The year 2028 must therefore be treated as a political objective for Chișinău, not as a deadline guaranteed by the EU, nor as an expiry date for the European option. A procedural delay is not equivalent to the closure of the prospect of accession. Any assessment of a potential deadlock should take into account its causes: insufficient reforms, disagreements amongst Member States, or a shift in domestic political orientation.

Furthermore, the state of negotiations has evolved since the ‘Plan B’ statement was made. On 13 October 2026, the EU and the Republic of Moldova opened negotiations on the clusters concerning the internal market and competitiveness and inclusive growth. These are in addition to the clusters on fundamental issues and external relations, which were opened in June and July. There has, therefore, been verifiable institutional progress, even if this alone does not guarantee the conclusion of negotiations within a predetermined timeframe. [2]

Unification with Romania: political currents and the Presidency’s position

The debate on unification spans several political camps and does not entirely coincide with the divide between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations. To understand it, a distinction must be made between a preference for the unification of the two states, the acceptance of unification as a potential security solution, and support for EU accession whilst preserving Moldovan statehood. These are analytical positions that may overlap; they are not factions organised within a stable system of alliances.

One strand is unionism, embraced as a political and identity-based project. For its proponents, reunification is an end in itself, justified by a shared language and culture and by redressing the consequences of historical separation. The programme of the National Liberal Party of the Republic of Moldova explicitly links Euro-Atlantic integration with union with Romania. In this view, unification is not merely a fallback option in the event of a failure to join the EU, but also the preferred route to the European area. [9]

However, supporters of unification differ on the timing and the means. In January 2026, Vasile Costiuc, leader of the party Democracy at Home (Democrația Acasă), announced on TV8 his intention to propose a referendum. Igor Grosu, Speaker of Parliament and leader of PAS, criticised the initiative as ill-timed in the absence of a favourable majority, although he stated that he would personally vote in favour of unification. The dispute shows that a pro-unification preference does not automatically lead to support for an immediate referendum. For the pro-unification opposition, such a move could test the government’s consistency; for the PAS leadership, the risk cited was that the project would be compromised by a failed vote. [10a–10b]

A second strand concerns unification as a response to strategic vulnerability. Alexandru Tănase, former Minister of Justice and former President of the Constitutional Court, presented it in January as a protective measure in the event of a major escalation of the Russian military threat. Eugen Osmochescu’s statement regarding a possible ‘Plan B’ in the event of the European path being blocked forms part of a related debate, but concerns a different trigger. A diplomatic deadlock and an immediate military threat are not equivalent situations and do not justify the assumption of a single contingency plan. [11; 1]

Within pro-European society, a distinct place must be reserved for the statist preference: the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU as an independent state, with its own institutions and representation. The label ‘pro-European Moldovanism’ may describe part of this discourse, but it is too broad if it equates Moldovan identity with the denial of Romanian identity and the rejection of unification. A citizen may recognise the Romanian language and historical ties with Romania, may support bilateral cooperation, and yet may prefer to preserve the Moldovan state. Geopolitical orientation, cultural identity and the choice of statehood must be analysed separately.

For pro-European statists, the EU can provide the framework within which independence becomes more secure and more functional. Consequently, non-accession by a certain deadline does not automatically transform this preference into a pro-union one. Analytically speaking, this is where an important limitation of the discourse on ‘Plan B’ lies: commitment to European integration is not a mandate that can be transferred to unification. Nor can votes for the PAS or Maia Sandu be counted en masse as votes for reunification.

This position must be distinguished from pro-Russian anti-unionism. The PSRM reacted in January 2026 to Maia Sandu’s statements by calling for her resignation and an investigation into alleged treason. The accusation comes from the party and does not constitute a legal finding. In this confrontation, the defence of statehood was used against the head of state and the government’s policy direction. The fact that even a pro-European figure may reject reunification does not place them in the same political camp: the same stance on borders may stem from very different external and institutional agendas. [12]

Maia Sandu’s position carries particular weight because it combines the expression of a personal preference in favour of unification with the exercise of a mandate to consolidate the Republic of Moldova and pursue EU accession. In an interview with the British podcast The Rest Is Politics, reported in the press in January 2026, she stated that she would vote in favour of unification in a referendum, whilst also pointing out that the European project enjoys majority support and is the objective pursued by the authorities. At the press conference on 22 January 2026, she reiterated the lack of a pro-unification majority and stated that she had not discussed this issue with European leaders. [13a–13b]

This distinction is confirmed by the institutional agenda: the Presidency’s priorities for 2026 aim to advance accession negotiations, mobilise institutions for reforms and strengthen security and resilience. They do not amount to a programme for preparing for unification. At the Moldova Security Forum on 9 October 2026, Sandu reiterated the argument that the Republic of Moldova would be safer as part of Romania, whilst maintaining the condition of a popular majority and the priority of European integration. Her position cannot be reduced either to a rejection of union or to an announcement that the state is shifting towards a unionist project. [14; 15]

From a political perspective, the President’s statements legitimise the discussion of unification within the context of security, extending beyond traditional unionist circles. At the same time, they may create tension within the pro-European majority: citizens who support accession as a means of strengthening the state may perceive unification as a shift in the project’s ultimate goal. This is an implication of the difference between the two options, not evidence that the pro-European electorate has split to any measurable extent as a result of the statements. The reactions of Costiuc, Grosu and the PSRM, however, show that the presidential message has become a focal point of domestic political competition.

The Presidency must therefore manage the balance between openness to a unionist option and maintaining a broader social coalition in favour of accession. Clarity of the mandate is crucial: citizens must be able to support the European project without being implicitly expected to accept the disappearance of the Moldovan state. Any potential unification project would require its own democratic agreement and arrangements negotiated with Romania, in coordination with European partners. Romania’s EU membership and the German analogy do not predetermine these conditions.

This diversity explains why unification remains a contested possibility, whilst the reintegration of Transnistria is an objective for which the authorities are already implementing policies. A credible European perspective can bring together citizens with different identity-based and state-related preferences. Turning the year 2028 into a unionist ultimatum would risk narrowing this base of support before the alternative has secured its own mandate.

European instruments and the reintegration of Transnistria

In the Transnistrian issue, European integration can gradually alter the costs of separation and the benefits of participating in a common economic and administrative area. There is already a concrete precedent: the rules of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and the Republic of Moldova were extended to the Transnistrian region from 1 January 2016. Economic access to Europe can, therefore, proceed even in the absence of a political settlement. [3]

Experience also highlights the limitations of this mechanism. Economic actors can benefit from trade with Europe without the de facto administration renouncing its separation. To contribute to reintegration, economic benefits must be linked to the convergence of rules and to the expansion of the capacity of constitutional institutions to provide services and protect rights.

European funding can support this transformation. The Reform and Growth Facility for the period 2025–2027 provides for approximately 1.9 billion euros, predominantly in the form of loans, with disbursements contingent upon the implementation of agreed reforms. This is a programme for the Republic of Moldova, not a budget earmarked for the reintegration of Transnistria. Targeting interventions to bring the two banks closer together would require eligible projects, financial oversight and appropriate implementation conditions. [4]

One important area is energy. Reducing the right bank’s vulnerability to Russian supplies and to electricity produced in the Transnistrian region can strengthen Chișinău’s freedom of decision-making. At the same time, the European offer of 60 million euros for the population on the left bank of the Dniester is conditional on measures relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and excludes support for energy-intensive activities. The offer illustrates a mechanism for incentivising change; it should not be confused with a sum that has already been transferred. [5]

These conditions must be accompanied by a social package that is clear to residents. Access to healthcare, the recognition of qualifications and support for business adaptation could make closer ties with Chișinău more attractive. These are policy areas that deserve to be developed through projects and negotiations, rather than results already achieved simply by opening accession chapters.

The Convergence Fund offers an example of an internal initiative that could be coordinated with external support. The Moldovan authorities link the harmonisation of tax regimes to funding aimed at reducing the disparities between the two banks of the Dniester. At the end of September, the Government announced the collection of duties on certain goods and the provision for allocations to the fund in the 2027 budget. In October, the drafting of its operational framework was still undergoing consultation. Consequently, it should be presented as a mechanism under development, not as a European programme that is already operational. [6]

The challenge is to transform fiscal convergence into a credible exchange between contributions and benefits. If the population perceives only additional costs, the de facto administration may exploit this discontent. If the new obligations are accompanied by accessible services and transparent investments, the Chisinau authorities can gain legitimacy in everyday life.

Reintegration and accession can proceed in parallel

Economic resources alone do not solve the problem of Russian troops, separatist security structures and guarantees for a sustainable settlement. On 5 October 2026, Kaja Kallas emphasised the importance of socio-economic reintegration efforts and reiterated that Transnistria would not become an obstacle to the Republic of Moldova’s European path. The political message is important, but does not in itself constitute a legal framework for accession. [7]

The Cyprus precedent shows that European law can accommodate the accession of a state that does not exercise effective control over its entire territory. Protocol No. 10 suspended the application of the acquis in areas not controlled by the Cypriot government. The possible use of a tailored formula for the Republic of Moldova would require separate negotiations. The precedent demonstrates the existence of a legal possibility, without guaranteeing its replication or the resolution of the conflict. [8]

Chișinău has reasons to pursue both accession and reintegration simultaneously, whilst ensuring that the Transnistrian settlement does not become a veto over its European choice. At the same time, a negotiated reintegration should protect the rights of residents and allow democratic institutions to function. An arrangement that would grant separatist structures the ability to block external or internal reforms could actually undermine the very objective it purports to serve.

The stakes for Romania and the region

These two challenges illustrate why the credibility of enlargement has implications that go beyond the technical timetable of the negotiations. For Romania, supporting reforms and interconnections contributes to the stability of a close neighbour. For Bulgaria and the other European partners, a more resilient Republic of Moldova means reducing a vulnerability in the Black Sea neighbourhood. This shared stake can underpin a European approach that goes beyond the bilateral relationship between Bucharest and Chișinău.

A successful accession would provide the Republic of Moldova with greater resources to consolidate its state and make reintegration an attractive prospect. A prolonged deadlock could give credence to calls for emergency solutions, but it would not eliminate the difficulties of unification with Romania, nor the Transnistrian issue. Therefore, the most sound policy is to build a verifiable European perspective, in which institutional progress is accompanied by visible benefits on both banks of the Dniester.

Sources

[1] Euronews Romania, 3 June 2026, report on the Euractiv interview with Eugen Osmochescu. The statements are attributed to the position held at the time of the interview.

[2] Council of the EU, Fourth Accession Conference with the Republic of Moldova, 13 October 2026; Moldova summary page for the sequence of cluster openings.

[3] European Commission and High Representative, Report on the implementation of the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2017) 18 final, p. 20.

[4] Council of the EU, Approval of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, 18 March 2025.

[5] European Commission, DG ENER, EU–Republic of Moldova energy cooperation, page on energy cooperation and the conditional offer for the Transnistrian region.

[6a] Government of the Republic of Moldova, ‘In Context’ with Valeriu Chiveri, 28 September 2026.

[6b] Reintegration Policy Office, announcement regarding the drafting of the decision on the Convergence Fund, consultation 8–18 October 2026.

[7] EEAS, statements by Kaja Kallas following the EU–Republic of Moldova Association Council, 5 October 2026.

[8] The 2003 Act of Accession, Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, in particular Articles 1–3.

[9] National Liberal Party of the Republic of Moldova, PNL Programme, section on identity and Euro-Atlantic integration.

[10a] TV8, statements by Vasile Costiuc on the programme ‘Cutia Neagră’, 15 January 2026.

[10b] NewsMaker, Igor Grosu’s position on the referendum initiative, 23 January 2026, based on the programme ‘În profunzime’ broadcast on 22 January.

[11] Euronews Romania, interview with Alexandru Tănase on the scenario of unification in the context of the Russian threat, 13 January 2026.

[12] AGERPRES, the PSRM’s reaction to Maia Sandu’s statement on unification, 13 January 2026.

[13a] AGERPRES, report on Maia Sandu’s interview for *The Rest Is Politics*, 12 January 2026.

[13b] AGERPRES, Maia Sandu’s statements at the press conference on 22 January 2026 regarding the majority required for unification and the priority of accession.

[14] Presidency of the Republic of Moldova, President Maia Sandu’s address at the New Year’s press conference, 22 January 2026.

[15] AGERPRES, Maia Sandu’s remarks at the Moldova Security Forum, 9 October 2026, reported on the basis of Deschide.md.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

B1 TV, 18 October 2026

Summary

The programme, hosted by Răzvan Munteanu on Check Media, analysed the deteriorating security situation in the Black Sea, marked by the interception of Russian Geran-4 drones by the Romanian Army’s F-16s and the attacks on commercial vessels in the exclusive economic zones and territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria.

Here are the main points and ideas discussed by the guests:

• Statement by the Minister of Defence, Radu Miruță: He confirmed the recent shooting down of two jet-powered drones flying at 450 km/h towards Tulcea and Ukraine, noting that the F-16s acted on the basis of pre-calculated predictive models. He highlighted efforts to promote a NATO command with a physical presence in the Black Sea (CTF) and to acquire four new vessels through the SAFE mechanism, reaffirming the need for firm diplomatic action, as peacetime resources cannot permanently cope with the frequency of such incidents.

• Political scientist Radu Carp’s perspective: He argued that the Russian Federation is deliberately testing the reaction of Romania and Bulgaria, taking advantage of the decline in public vigilance caused by disinformation. He pointed out that the intensity of attacks in the Black Sea has doubled compared to that in the Baltic Sea, warning that the next targets could be the critical infrastructure at gas deposit Neptun Deep and the port of Giurgiulești (Republic of Moldova), given that the joint Romanian-Bulgarian intervention mechanisms are still in their infancy.

• Security expert Iulian Fota’s perspective: He criticised the lack of firmness on the part of NATO and Romania in the Black Sea, pointing out that no allied (non-littoral) has entered the region since November 2021. He pointed out that Russia is waging an aggressive, widespread hybrid/political war against the entire Alliance and that Romania has failed since 2014 to modernise its naval capabilities (opting only for patrol vessels), leaving institutional responsibility for the security of maritime and energy platforms unclear.

• The perspective of Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev: He stated that the media and society in Bulgaria are following these events with growing concern, particularly due to the significant economic risks to grain exports and industrial supply chains. In Bulgaria, a package of measures is awaited from NATO regarding the strengthening of air defence and anti-drone capabilities, with general sentiment being pessimistic – further escalations are expected.

• Analyst Ștefan Popescu’s perspective: He emphasised that the national territory and the exclusive economic zone are increasingly becoming part of the immediate theatre of war, jeopardising freedom of navigation and future energy investments. He called for much firmer diplomatic action on Romania’s part to secure military support and concrete equipment from allies, not just declarations of solidarity .

Video with auto-generated English subtitles

Programme

Introduction

Răzvan Munteanu, presenter:

Good evening, dear friends! I’m Răzvan Munteanu on Check Media. In the first part of our programme, we will be discussing the Black Sea. The Black Sea is becoming an increasingly unsafe region, as today the Romanian Armed Forces’ F-16s shot down two more drones that had entered our country’s airspace. Furthermore, commercial vessels have been struck by drones, both in Romania and in Bulgaria.

We even had a meeting between the President of Romania, Nicușor Dan, and Mark Rutte, the head of NATO. What lies ahead for our country and how do we respond to these security threats? We are about to discuss and debate this with my guests.

Professor Radu Carp, good evening!

Radu Carp, political scientist:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Professor Iulia Fota, good evening, Professor Fota!

Iulia Fota, security expert:

Good evening!

Interview with the Romanian Minister of Defence, Radu Miruță

Răzvan Munteanu:

To begin with, we’d like to welcome the Minister of National Defence, Mr Radu Miruță, who is joining us by telephone. Good evening, Minister!

Radu Miruță, Minister of Defence:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, regarding today’s incidents, in which F-16s shot down two drones, do we know anything about the origin of the drones? What targets were they intended to strike? What specific information do we have about these events?

Radu Miruță:

Firstly, the events took place last night at 6.00 pm, not today.

Răzvan Munteanu:

OK.

Radu Miruță:

We know that these drones – the first of their kind to be shot down by the Romanian Armed Forces – were the new jet-powered drones, which were flying at much higher speeds than those shot down previously, at 450 km per hour. They descended from 3,000 metres, entering Romanian airspace.

They were intercepted and shot down by fighter jets, which had been dispatched to that area to intercept them. Imagine that the first drone entered at 17:59 and by 18:01 it had already been shot down. The second entered at 18:00, that is, one minute later, and was shot down at 18:05. We are moving forward, trying to learn as much as possible from all the characteristics and types we observe every time a drone enters Romanian airspace. And bear in mind that this time it turned out that the predictions we had calculated at the Ministry of National Defence turned out to be correct, because in the two minutes since the drones entered, it would not have been possible to take off and reach the interception point in that area; therefore, the aircraft had already been dispatched there, and it was demonstrated that the model we had calculated was correct. Congratulations to my colleagues who are constantly working on such improvements to the models we use! Given that the drone was flying at 450 km per hour, based on radar data and the pilots’ accounts, it was a Geran-4 model drone.

This leads us to believe that it was of Russian origin, as that is where this type of drone comes from. Furthermore, the area from which it came and to which it was heading was in Tulcea; it was due to enter Ukraine. These characteristics indicate, with a fairly high degree of probability, that it does not belong to the Ukrainian drone fleet.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, President Nicușor Dan, as we mentioned in the introduction, had a meeting with the NATO Secretary-General, Mr Mark Rutte. What specific measures to enhance security in the Black Sea might Romania request from its NATO allies from a military perspective?

Radu Miruță:

First of all, one thing must be understood in relation to reality: the surface area of the Black Sea is twice that of Romania. Not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility.

We, at national level, have a huge interest in ensuring that the Black Sea is a safe area for navigation. Several things are happening. Firstly, there is, at the level… .and Turkey, alongside Romania, a memorandum of understanding regarding the assurance of free navigation routes, to which the provision of protection for critical infrastructure in the area has also been added. Secondly, following a discussion I had with him last week, I asked the Bulgarian minister I sent him a letter, which he confirmed he would sign, so that there might be a NATO command in the Black Sea with a physical presence in Romania as well. Turkey wishes for this command to have a physical presence on the Turkish Black Sea coast and to operate with officers also hosted by Romania, but there. We want this rotation to take place not only in terms of personnel, but also in terms of location. No such CTF currently exists within NATO.

We want it to be put into operation, because that would mean a NATO command with resources provided by all countries or by any NATO member state – in other words, more than we have had so far.

Romania has considered these matters, taking into account the SAFE mechanisms through which we have commissioned four new capabilities – four ships – because it is not enough for us simply to want, to ask for and to say that we need them; we must also put some resources on the table. These four ships, for which contracts have now been finalised, are a further element of credibility for Romania when it makes such requests.

Things are happening, given that Romania is shooting down drones over the Black Sea. It is not as though no measures whatsoever are being taken. I would remind you of a decision that is somewhat historic in the context of recent decades, taken a month ago, when the Romanian Army decided to dispatch a fighter jet with a shoot-down order to a depth of 160 kilometres over the Black Sea — a situation that had never before occurred at such an altitude, with an aircraft dispatched with orders to fire and which actually did so. I am referring to the incident involving that drone which had come within 150 metres of the critical infrastructure at Neptun Deep and which was ultimately destroyed by fire from fighter jets.

Such things do happen, but on the other side too, the frequency is very high. And yet, the situation is viewed from a different perspective. The war between Russia and Ukraine involves a different scale of resources.

Romania is not a country at war, and in peacetime Romania’s defence plans involve a certain type of resources. We cannot expect to respond to situations of such magnitude and frequency with the resources available or made available in peacetime. There must be a very firm protest at diplomatic level, because Romania, not being a country at war, is not in a situation where it is normal – and we must not get used to the situation – where we scramble fighter jets several times a week, sometimes to counter drones that illegally enter Romanian airspace.

This is a rule of international law that Russia must respect.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, you have said – and made a very good point – that not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility. Beyond these issues which you listed earlier during your telephone interview, there are, however, two other NATO member states here in the Black Sea region: Bulgaria and Turkey. Are you considering developing joint mechanisms, at least with these two other coastal states, Bulgaria and Turkey, so that we have a jointly operated system for detecting and intercepting drones?

After all, it could be carried out under the auspices of NATO – why not?

Radu Miruță:

Not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility, but absolutely everything that happens in the Black Sea is of interest to Romania.

We are a NATO member state; we are a European Union member state with extensive access to the Black Sea; we have the largest shipyard amongst the European NATO member states; we are interested in absolutely everything that moves in the Black Sea. Yes, not only do we take this into account, but we are also taking action.

Mine-clearing operations to ensure clear shipping lanes or to protect critical infrastructure are carried out using both ships and military personnel — from both Bulgaria and Turkey. This is a joint operation.

This command, this CTF, the Black Sea Task Force, is an initiative that we are promoting at both the military and diplomatic levels, putting forward proportionate arguments, which entails joint action by NATO, not just by the three NATO member states bordering the Black Sea. There are also discussions within the European Union regarding joint action in the Black Sea, but Romania cannot decide on behalf of other countries. Romania is perfectly capable of defining its interests clearly and can fight diplomatically and politically to ensure that these interests are achieved.

Romania’s relevance in the Black Sea region is essential, and there is a need to increase NATO’s presence in the Black Sea region; this is achieved through joint action under the NATO umbrella, such as this CTF, which does not currently exist even in Turkey.

Analysis of the current situation from a Romanian perspective

Răzvan Munteanu:

Very well, Minister! Thank you very much for joining us by telephone. That was Radu Miruță, Minister of National Defence. Mr Fota, Mr Carp, I’d like us to continue our analysis, and I’d like to ask you both – starting with you, Professor Carp – do you believe that the Russian Federation is deliberately testing NATO at the moment?

Radu Carp, political scientist:

Obviously, the Russian Federation is deliberately testing, but I wouldn’t necessarily say NATO; rather, Romania and Bulgaria in recent times. Why? Because it has become apparent that these countries, well, sometimes retaliate, sometimes less so, depending on their technical capabilities, but it has become clear that the intensity of the reaction amongst the public has diminished considerably.

In other words, whilst at the start, when the first such incursions by Russian drones took place, there was a more widespread outcry. Today, if we ask ordinary people who are behind these drones, half will tell you that it is actually the Ukrainians. This is where we have ended up, unfortunately, due to disinformation. And this is what the Russian Federation is testing: trying to erode public support for Ukraine.

Because things aren’t being explained, and there is a communication gap here. Why does the Russian Federation want to strike in this area specifically? I saw a map in the French press today – which, unfortunately, hasn’t appeared in our own media – showing Russian drone attacks on NATO territory since July.

And I noticed something very interesting: the number of attacks in the Black Sea is double that in the Baltic region, which effectively means a reversal of the Russian Federation’s priorities. This has happened over the last three months.

This must be highlighted, and Romania must also make this point in Brussels, before NATO: namely, that at present, the entire eastern flank is under threat from Russia and, moreover, the Black Sea has become a focal point of the conflict. And there is another aspect which, once again, I believe we are deliberately ignoring, namely the fact that the Russian Federation is attacking any vessel attempting to enter Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, as well as any vessel leaving these ports — which has somehow managed to enter and then succeed in leaving. Regardless of where it is — whether in Ukrainian territorial waters, in Romanian territorial waters, in the exclusive economic zone, or in Bulgarian territorial waters — Russia deliberately attacks these vessels.

And the final point I wish to make is that, well, Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation is lacking. We are only just beginning to consider how we might interconnect these mechanisms. And I’ll give a very simple example: the rules for intercepting these drones, for engagement, differ between Romania and Bulgaria. So it will take time.

The Russian Federation is exploiting the fact that, as Mr Miruță also said, these Romania–Bulgaria–Turkey cooperation mechanisms are still in their infancy in the Black Sea. It is the fault of all these countries that, for five years now, they have practically failed to take this scenario into account.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, what is your view?

Iulia Fota:

Well, my view is that we’re deluding ourselves into thinking that something will be resolved regarding NATO. Nothing will be resolved, because NATO has certain limits to its action, and we’re well aware of those limits and can see them. Or at least some of us are aware of them and can see them.

Let me give an example: in an article in Foreign Affairs a few months ago, Julie Smith recounted something very interesting. In 2024, the issue of a strategy towards Russia was raised within NATO — a matter which I, too, when I was at the Foreign Ministry, raised,

and it was also raised by the Poles and the Balts. Because, following Russia’s second aggression against Ukraine, we wanted to know: ‘Sir, where do we stand in our relationship with NATO?’ I’d like to make a side note here: when I left the Foreign Ministry in early 2024, there were still some NATO countries that weren’t convinced that the NATO–Russia Founding Act was no longer valid, even though it had been signed during a more favourable period, when there was still a modicum of cooperation with the Russians.

And, finally, I don’t want to go into matters here that are too sensitive. But this shows you that there is still confusion within NATO regarding how the issue with Russia should be addressed, due to certain member states.

And what does Julie Smith say? Although it was discussed in 2024 and the strategy was proposed in 2025, so a year later, Russia isn’t even mentioned in the summit’s final communiqué. So it’s clear there was resistance there. One or more states didn’t want to make Russia an issue for NATO in this way. Obviously, to put it bluntly.

So, why am I emphasising this point? Because we have a situation that we won’t resolve any time soon, as some NATO countries are unwilling to do so and are therefore blocking the decision. The last NATO vessel in the Black Sea was in November 2021. A ship – I believe it was a French frigate or corvette – left the Black Sea via the Bosphorus.

And since then, no NATO country – we’re not talking about the coastal states: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – has sent a warship into the Black Sea. And the Russians are well aware of this. For them, this is a signal that NATO will not have the courage to confront them at sea in the Black Sea and, obviously, it is a constant source of encouragement for them, especially now. Two points to note here:

1. They are determined and have already waged all-out war against Ukraine; that much is clear.

2. They have stepped up their efforts… and here I disagree with Professor Carp: the Russians’ war is not solely against Ukraine. The conventional military aggression is directed against Ukraine. But Russia is waging a political war – we could also call it ‘hybrid warfare’ if you like, although there is a difference between the two.

They’ve stepped it up again in recent months, which is why we have drones in Leipzig. OK, the Black Sea is the Black Sea: the Ukrainians export grain and the Russians want to cripple their grain exports first and foremost, because that’s where a great deal of money comes from. But what are Russian drones doing in Leipzig? And that’s just one example amongst many.

So Russia has also stepped up its war against the Alliance as a whole, and the Alliance is lagging behind in its response. And now, given that we’re seeing these developments in America – so ugly, so unpleasant and so surprising… and here I’d like to share a piece of information with you and the viewers.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Please go ahead!

Iulia Fota:

I posted it on Facebook this morning as well. I’ve learnt from an article or a press analysis that Witkoff and Jared Kushner asked the Ukrainians to give in completely to the Russians, without Russia making any concessions.

So we had this impression that negotiations were taking place, that a compromise was being reached, which meant that each side was giving something. No! The two American envoys and negotiators recently asked the Ukrainians to give in completely to Russian demands — in other words, to hand over the Donbas entirely to the Russians — without the Russians making any concessions whatsoever in this whole conflict over their aggression against Ukraine.

Just imagine how bleak the picture is! So, if we expect NATO to deter the Russians, I think we’re deluding ourselves. What can be done?

1. Capabilities. I’d like to praise Minister Miruță for one good thing he did, which I appreciated: he had the courage to engage Russian targets with live fire. That’s commendable, and it’s good that he did it, because the next minister to succeed him won’t have quite so much courage, and then we’ll always have a contrast that we can draw on:

Răzvan Munteanu:

Let’s wait and see, let’s not jump to conclusions...

Iulia Fota:

Ah, I have my suspicions… Anyway.

2. Where would I criticise Minister Miruță? I praised him at first, but now I’d criticise him: he didn’t have enough courage to stand up to the generals when the issue of shipbuilding came up, to be more ambitious and more resolute in pursuing what we want. Because what’s going to be built in Mangalia? Two patrol vessels. A patrol vessel isn’t a warship.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Hold on a moment, Mr Fota! So you’re saying that the generals who imposed their vision on…

Iulian Fota:

Well, I don’t think it comes from the minister.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Right, those generals…

Iulia Fota:

I have my own theory, but it’s not a very pleasant one.

Răzvan Munteanu:

That those generals weren’t acting in the national interest?

Iulia Fota:

They don’t have the courage to confront Russia’s navy in the Black Sea, to tell you what I think.

Răzvan Munteanu:

And even if the Romanian generals don’t have the courage to confront Russia’s navy in the Black Sea, are they still undermining the national interest?

Iulia Fota:

No, no. It’s a different way of looking at protecting the national interest. Well, it’s actually a discussion about the policy of balance; anyway, it’s complicated. I mean, we can discuss it – I’ve no problem with that.

So I don’t understand… Don’t tell me it’s a coincidence that, ever since Cioloș’s story about the three or four — I can’t even remember how many there were — frigates… I think they were frigates or corvettes, in any case they were superior vessels… Those are warships! There’s a marked difference between frigates, corvettes and these patrol vessels. Those can wage war; they can withstand hits.

They’re built differently; they have what’s called an internal stronghold – a metal cage that ensures their survival even when the ships are hit. These patrol vessels don’t have anything like that.

And that’s why they’re patrol vessels. If they’ve got some armament on board, fine, but they’re not warships.

So, since 2014, when the Russian aggression began, and especially since 2022, we haven’t been able to carry out any significant modernisation of our warships. Pusher tugs, tugboats, patrol vessels… Yes, mate, but you can’t keep the Russians at bay with those! No, you can’t keep the Russians at bay.

Radu Carp:

If I may follow on from what Ion Fota was saying: it’s true, these NATO ships haven’t entered the area since before the war in Ukraine began.

Iulia Fota:

November 2021.

Radu Carp:

This is a crucial point. Because Romania, as you may have noticed, hasn’t asked NATO for something extremely simple: namely, the escort of these ships into the Black Sea.

An escort cannot be carried out as a deterrent by Romanian ships — of which we have few anyway — or Bulgarian ones, right? But it can be done with NATO’s involvement.

Yet Romania hasn’t even asked for this.

Iulia Fota:

We’re going too far here. By providing an escort, we would already be becoming a party to the conflict.

Radu Carp:

No, I was talking about civilian ships carrying grain.

Iulia Fota:

There’s no such thing. I don’t agree. The Ukrainians have asked us for all sorts of things; something like that cannot be accepted.

Because, I repeat, at that point the Russians would have grounds to strike you too. And what did you do?

Radu Carp:

If ships registered in Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria are escorting Ukrainian vessels, it is clear that this is not an act of war directed against the Russian Federation. It is, however, a powerful act of deterrence. Yet we didn’t even consider this possibility.

Iulia Fota:

Russia doesn’t see things that way. And if it strikes you, NATO will tell you: ‘Don’t get upset, you’re unprofessional, you don’t know what you’re doing and you’ve got yourself into this – sort it out yourself!’ And we’ll find ourselves in a very serious situation.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We all agree, and I think we understand that even in…

Iulia Fota:

So those NATO ships shouldn’t come to act as escorts.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Both Romania and other countries have held much more extensive discussions than what has actually taken place.

Iulia Fota:

It’s an international body, so the Russians aren’t allowed to impose their own rules. And NATO, in my view, has shown weakness by accepting the Russian viewpoint.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We’ve been discussing Bulgaria here in the studio, and we’ve been joined by an expert from Bulgaria, Vladimir Mitev, a Bulgarian journalist and expert who speaks Romanian. Mr Mitev, good evening!

Yes, I think we’re having a problem with the internet connection. We’ll come back to Vladimir Mitev.

Radu Carp:

I’d like to add to what Ms Iulia Fota was saying: regarding the actions of these so-called negotiators. Today, reports appeared in the press suggesting that they had called for the resumption of Nord Stream, that is, the resumption of Russian gas transit to Europe.

And they have officially requested this of European leaders. It appears that Germany has strongly opposed this. But the mere fact that the issue of resuming Russian gas supplies is once again being raised directly by the United States means that developments are, indeed, very worrying.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes. Mr Fota, do you know what’s interesting? Why has the security architecture in the Baltic Sea region been strengthened since the start of the war in Ukraine, whilst here, in the wider Black Sea region, it hasn’t been strengthened to the same extent?

Iulia Fota:

For several reasons. Firstly, the Baltic Sea is a NATO sea. With Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Baltic Sea has become a NATO lake.

Although the Russians know this, they’ll still carry on causing trouble in the Baltics. Another factor… although they didn’t create these themselves – others did – but never mind. So they’ll find all sorts of hybrid warfare tactics to test the Balts and the others – the Swedes, the Nordics – and to rile them up. But the strategic stakes are different for the Russians.

Because, firstly: Ukraine doesn’t export via the Baltic states. They do transport goods via Poland by train, yes, and Poland exports – how shall I put it – to this part of the West. And as such, the Russians don’t have the nerve to go that far.

Secondly: Ukraine exports via the Black Sea. These exports — and we’re talking here of several tens of billions a year when it comes to Ukraine’s agricultural exports, as the country is a major player in agriculture — mean the Russians are doing everything they can to prevent Ukraine from accessing that money.

That’s one thing.

Two: furthermore, the issue of Novorossiya remains unresolved. Because the Russians know that, if they do manage to take the South and find a way to seize southern Ukraine, Ukraine as a state will eventually cease to exist; it won’t be viable.

And thirdly: the opportunities. Because up there, the northerners are, how shall I put it, cohesive; they’re a homogeneous group; they cooperate. Well, now, before the second invasion, around 2020 or 2021, the Nordic countries had integrated their air forces. And I thought: ‘Goodness me, two integrated NATO countries – why do they need a regional framework as well?’. Because they — and then I realised — thought that, if NATO isn’t capable or isn’t interested, if we have problems with the Americans and the Americans block us, they should be able to operate and help one another. Which is something you don’t have here, in this region! I don’t think we and the Bulgarians have integrated air forces – let alone Turkey – based on the Nordic model.

So the Russians have no opportunities for action there, nor do they have much interest in the region, because the route to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is via the Black Sea, not via the Baltic, which is a much longer route. So the stakes for the Russians are much higher here and, as Gorchakov said after they were defeated in the First Crimean War, the Black Sea is, for them, the gateway to world domination. So, as long as they control the Black Sea and impose their viewpoint, they will continue to harbour such ambitions.

Secondly: they are keeping Ukraine in check, Romania in check, Bulgaria in check, and Turkey to a certain extent as well. From this, you can see that the Russians are careful not to step on the Turks’ toes, and Turkey is getting off lightly, because their routes to the Caucasus do not intersect with this war zone.

The Black Sea is a paradoxical place: the northern part is a war zone, with the Ukrainians fighting the Russians, and the Russians are bombing and attacking these ships. But the southern part of the Black Sea – that is, from the Bosphorus straight to the Caucasus – is calm and peaceful, because that’s where the Russians export their oil under… well, via the ‘ghost fleet’ they have.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Professor Carp, do you think that President Dan’s meeting with Mark Rutte changes anything in this context?

Radu Carp:

To me, this actually seems to show that Romania has not broken free from a certain paradigm and a certain routine. I mean, we’ve once again asked for enhanced capabilities, anti-drone systems and so on, but we haven’t gone any further. Because it’s clear that the Russian Federation will continue to escalate, and it’s clear that at the moment there are only local solutions.

Of course, this mechanism, which Minister Miruță has also initiated, is running on autopilot. So there are procedures in place; the procedures have been set in motion. Some are successful, others are not. But the intensity of these Russian attacks, you should know, gives me a great deal of cause for concern. Because, you see, it began with the Danube sector, then spread to Romania’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, then moved into Romania’s territorial waters, and, subsequently, here we are, Bulgaria’s territorial waters.

So, practically speaking, all the areas bordering Ukraine on the part of the two NATO states, Romania and Bulgaria, are currently under attack. What’s more: this vessel, which was somehow saved by the timely intervention of the Romanian Armed Forces, had set sail from the port of Giurgiulești – in other words, effectively from the Republic of Moldova. This is because the Republic of Moldova also has access to the sea and can contribute to the navigation system in the Black Sea.

What can Romania do in the current situation?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, here’s a question for both of you: what should Romania do to break out of this stereotype of how we handle the situation? What should we demand?

Iulia Fota:

We put up with it, we suffer, we grumble, we swear… Nothing happens.

Răzvan Munteanu:

So we can never do anything?

Iulia Fota:

I’m talking about national security. They say it’s like air: you only realise how important it is when you’re without it.

I always teach this lesson to my students and tell them: ‘Listen, when it comes to national security, if you don’t sort things out in good time, you’re done for!’ Because that’s when you’re left gasping for air!

And if you don’t have a gas cylinder, or something like that to sort out the problem, you’re dead. So we should have, from 2014 – which is what the Poles did, but our responsible politicians were unable to do – taken some major decisions in light of the situation. Because the Poles classified the motorway linked to the annexation of Crimea as an existential threat, whereas our own… Well, just look at Iohannis’s strategy from 2015: a disaster, a shambles! Why are we surprised now that we’re powerless?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Iohannis tried to set up that NATO fleet in the Black Sea.

Iulia Fota:

We don’t need a fleet; that’s just a fairy tale.

Răzvan Munteanu:

No, I was just giving you an example.

Iulia Fota:

You do need a fleet! You need some ships with powerful capabilities which, when the Russians come out, can keep an eye on them and keep them in check. Did you know that at the start, after the second Russian aggression in 2022, they sent two ships out to sea?

And when they… My suspicion is that the Russians used certain methods, like firing signal flares at that helicopter… I mean, sending out signals of dissatisfaction, like ‘get out of here or you’ll get it’… Right. And we immediately put our foot in it, because we realised: well, with what, those frigates?

Radu Carp:

Look at what Romania promised and didn’t deliver! For example, regarding the protection of critical infrastructure: when this project called Neptun Deep was launched, of course the economic, political and strategic aspects were highlighted, but the idea that this infrastructure needed to be protected came very late. What’s more: when… as I told you, there is still no solution. The scenario of an invasion of Serpent Island in the event of an armed conflict has never been taken into account by Romania since 2014. And this happened, I repeat, on the very first day of the war.

So we are still unprepared to deal with such a situation.

Iulia Fota:

In 2016, Cioloș wanted to set up – and had created with Damen – a ‘super shipyard’ and a ‘super company’ to build – I can’t quite remember – three or four frigates or corvettes; I don’t recall the details. Right, okay, but the deal was done and dusted. Then the PSD came along and ruined the whole thing. Just imagine, we’d have had them all out at sea by now, and we’d have kept the Russians at bay in a different way!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Now, with all due respect, I don’t think the PSD is to blame for absolutely everything that isn’t working in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Iulia Fota:

Dragnea stopped it, didn’t he? So the deal that Cioloș had signed with Damen was blocked by the next government, after Cioloș was ousted. The elections took place and the whole lot were replaced.

Well, these are decisions that are costing us now – that’s a fact!

Intervention by Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, gentlemen, I’m afraid I must interrupt you. Vladimir Mitev has managed to join us again. Hello, Vladimir!

I hope your internet connection is working well now. Welcome back to Check Media!

Vladimir Mitev:

Yes, good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Vladimir, we’re well aware — we were discussing this here before you joined us — of the incidents involving drones that have struck commercial vessels in both Romanian and Bulgarian waters. The first thing I’d like to ask you is how the media in Sofia is reporting on these security incidents and what the public mood is like. Because here in Romania, we’re discussing these issues a great deal, and the public is becoming increasingly anxious. What’s the situation like in Bulgaria?

Vladimir Mitev:

In my view, there is a great deal of media attention. I can even use myself as an example: this week I gave three interviews to various television and radio stations, because they were looking for people who could offer a certain perspective that also encompasses Romania. It is clear that a period is approaching in which Romania and Bulgaria will probably cooperate much more closely in these areas of defence and security.

Furthermore, there is concern — I would say considerable concern — in the economic sphere, because this commercial shipping in the Black Sea is linked to Bulgaria’s wheat exports. Bulgaria is a major wheat producer, just like Romania. Last but not least, there are industries which, for example, receive materials from Ukraine. So there is also a problem at an industrial level, I would say. There have been interviews on this subject.

And, likewise, last but not least, I believe that all those with expertise in these areas of security and defence have been invited onto Bulgarian television and radio programmes over the last few days. And, of course, I can say very briefly — before you ask me any further questions — that the discussions you have had in the studio are very similar to those taking place in Bulgaria.

For example, the idea that Bulgaria and Romania should cooperate — this was highlighted by Mr Carp. On the other hand, the fact that, well, NATO supports us, but I have also heard views on what else can be done given that ships not belonging to Black Sea littoral states cannot remain in the Black Sea for very long.

So, of course, this is just an introduction. Perhaps we can discuss this in more detail if there are any further questions.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We’ll explore this topic further after the advert break. I’d ask you to stay with us, Vladimir Mitev. I have one more question before we reach that break we were talking about: Bulgaria has requested additional support from NATO, in particular defence systems against drones. I’d like to know what Bulgaria has managed to secure, especially given that, of course, your leader also had a meeting with Mark Rutte.

Vladimir Mitev:

I might add here that the meeting was, as far as I understand, with Nicușor Dan in Brussels. So, for the time being, it has been stated in general terms that air defence will be strengthened, including through NATO aircraft coming to our country. On the other hand, as you said, Bulgaria will join the NATO anti-drone programme and such support will be provided.

But I can say that we actually expect it to become clearer next week exactly what NATO members will offer Bulgaria. We do not yet have a definitive answer, but such support will certainly be provided. Bulgaria reacted very quickly following this escalation, and I believe there is a political will to support it.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes, these questions are relevant in Bucharest too, but we’ll take a short advertising break and be back shortly. Perhaps we’ll get a glimpse of what the answers to these questions will be.

[After the advertising break]

Răzvan Munteanu:

Iulia Fota, Professor Radu Carp and Vladimir Mitev, a journalist from Bulgaria, remain with us.

Vladimir, I have one final question for you: at the start of the discussion, we were talking about the incidents in the Black Sea and how Bulgarian society and the political class perceive these threats. How is the overall situation viewed there? Is there talk in Bulgaria of an escalation of these situations in the Black Sea region in the near future, or are the scenarios more optimistic?

Vladimir Mitev:

I’ve also had some informal discussions with people who are more knowledgeable about the topics discussed in the studio, and the sentiment among those I spoke to is rather pessimistic, in the sense that they perhaps expect an even greater escalation. For Bulgaria, this escalation is something relatively new. Until now, Romania had been much more exposed to these effects of the war. Now Bulgaria, perhaps somewhat in shock, is also coming to realise that it is in the immediate vicinity.

So I haven’t noticed a very optimistic attitude. I might even say that we have a Prime Minister who has spoken with Mark Rutte and visited Brussels. He, of course, is conveying positive messages; he has no other option — that is probably how it must be for any leader — but it seems to me that, beyond the optimistic or positive messages that we have support and that we are not alone, there remains a sense of concern even at the highest levels of government.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Vladimir Mitev, thank you very much for joining us on Check Media!

Expectations regarding the situation in the Black Sea

Gentlemen, let’s continue our analysis, and I’d like to know what we can expect, Professor Carp, in the coming period.

Radu Carp:

It depends very much on how events unfold.

Răzvan Munteanu:

The question is simple: will such incidents escalate? Will we remain in a stalemate where we see the occasional drone? Or might things de-escalate?

Radu Carp:

On the contrary, they will escalate, because, I repeat, at present, practically all areas in the vicinity of Romania have been targeted by the Russian Federation. What’s more, as Minister Miruță pointed out, the Russians are using far more advanced drones. These Geran drones have been in use since this summer – to be more precise, in Ukraine – and now they have already targeted areas within Romanian territory.

So the Russian Federation has a specific objective, namely to intensify the attacks and to create the impression in Romania that this is, in fact, a common occurrence; that we must understand that we, too, are part of a war; that, in fact, we are on Ukraine’s side and that is why this is happening to us. So this is what the Russian Federation is aiming for, and so, obviously, these attacks will be a daily occurrence. But you have seen that they are also pursuing something else: there was an attack in September on a border crossing between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

I fear that the attacks on precisely these border crossings – Moldova-Ukraine, Romania–Moldova, and even Romania–Ukraine. Because the Russians have identified a weak spot, namely the fact that the Republic of Moldova does not enjoy the same air defence as Romania, and they will almost certainly step up their attacks across the entire Black Sea region.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, is Romania’s national defence industry prepared — we did have the SAFE programme, didn’t we? — to rapidly develop military defensive responses to such incidents in the Black Sea region?

Iulia Fota:

I don’t think so, because that sort of preparation takes time. Honestly, I’m still not convinced that we’ve even started building the munitions and gunpowder factory from scratch… Anyway, this is an absolutely grotesque situation, because the basis of any war is being able to produce at least the gunpowder for bullets and some TNT — because, after all, anyone who’s done military service can still fight a tank with a sock and some TNT, if they know how to use it.

Yet we don’t even have these things anymore; we’ve imported them from all over the place: from the Serbs, from the Brazilians… Well, all sorts of stopgap solutions like that. So there’s no special focus on the defence industry. I’ve been saying this for a few years now: it doesn’t work the way our leaders think it does!

A clear government official needs to be appointed, reporting either to the Prime Minister or to the President, with certain powers, holding at least the rank of Secretary of State, and who knows exactly what needs to be done and can really get on their backs and push them all forward. Because I still see chaos, I see private interests and corruption in the defence industry, I see — how shall I put it — a lack of clear strategic direction and a lack of ambition. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: if we let the bureaucracy decide our fate, we deserve it!

Because bureaucracy has no interest in being ambitious; it’s just going round in circles. So ambition must come from the political sphere, yet the political sphere remains uninterested in defence. Can we say… that with Ilie Bolojan we’ve seen the country’s defence treated as a priority? We’re now discussing pensions, all sorts of things…

Răzvan Munteanu:

You know how it is, Mr Fota: Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan is currently focusing on issues that are more of an electoral nature for the general public. Romania’s defence and national security is a more sensitive issue.

Iulia Fota:

In which seven sailors died…

Răzvan Munteanu:

Sir, it is a rather sensitive issue which the political class has failed to address properly for public opinion over the last few decades.

Iulia Fota:

We have been at war for four and a half years, almost five years. In this acute phase, or even worse, the aggression…

Comment by geopolitical analyst Ștefan Popescu

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, we should also consider another point of view. Ștefan Popescu, a foreign policy analyst, is with us on the phone. Good evening, Ștefan!

Ștefan Popescu:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Ștefan, what is your analysis of these security incidents in the Black Sea region which, as we can see, no longer concern only Romania, but increasingly Bulgaria as well?

Ștefan Popescu:

I have no other point of view; I agree entirely. It is worrying that Romania’s national territory is becoming part of the theatre of war. Until now, it was the neighbouring areas – that is, the security zone (you’ll be familiar with Gheorghe Brătianu’s concept of the security zone, which is somewhat broader) – that is, the exclusive economic zone of Romania and Bulgaria. The problem is that we risk losing our freedom of action in this area, which formally remains under our control. We have investment projects there; we have major interests in the Black Sea.

I would remind you that from 2027, Romania’s energy hub will move to the Black Sea region.

And there is something else: maintaining the logistics flow to Ukraine is not solely Romania’s responsibility. Indeed, there are many issues — and Professor Fota, whom I listened to earlier, pointed out that not much groundwork has been done — but it is also an allied responsibility. In other words, I see this as a moment of truth, because the logistical flow to Ukraine is an issue for the entire coalition of the willing, for the European Union, and I therefore hope that Romania will have the diplomatic capacity to secure more than just declarative solidarity. We need equipment.

Equipment, of course, to make up for our own shortcomings, but at the same time this is also a matter of a political commitment from our Black Sea allies, because we will not be able to cope on our own. I have seen that… you know, I do not wish to look for extenuating circumstances; in many instances the gunpowder factory has been mentioned – I fully agree – but in the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia, there are countries that possessed ultra-sophisticated weaponry and yet failed to defend their critical infrastructure.

As for us… we’re not even stopping to gauge the economic shockwaves should, God forbid, something strike that would have a major economic impact on Romania. Because nobody invests in vulnerable areas. We haven’t had — I hope it never comes to that — a government vessel that could become the target, I don’t want to dwell on worst-case scenarios, but of hostile actions. I also believe that would be very serious.

Security in the Neptun Deep area

Răzvan Munteanu:

Thank you very much, Ștefan Popescu! Professor Radu Carp, is Neptun Deep at risk? Could we see critical infrastructure in the Neptun Deep area come under attack?

Radu Carp:

At present, there is no solution for protecting critical infrastructure in the Black Sea in the event of a drone attack. The Russian Federation is aware of this. The fact that it has not targeted this infrastructure is due to its strategy of advancing gradually in this type of warfare. The Russian Federation’s next targets will likely be the Port of Giurgiulești and Neptun Deep.

We do not know when this will happen, but logically I believe these will be the next targets.

Iulia Fota:

Who is responsible for Neptun Deep? We have a question to which there is still no answer: which Romanian state institution is responsible for the security of the Neptun Deep platform and project?

We saw this at the port, when we were at a loss and things were unclear: the Ministry of Transport came forward with a draft bill to at least clarify who is responsible for the port’s security. It’s a step forward, but who is responsible for the platform’s security?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Do you think that after the incident…

Iulia Fota:

…that it’s a private entity! Fair enough, but the Romanian state has a major stake here.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Following the incident at the Port of Constanța, do you think the Romanian state has put the necessary legislative and operational framework in place? I saw in the press that the Ministry of Transport — it strikes me as a bit odd that they were the ones to take the initiative, but anyway, at least that’s something...

Iulia Fota:

It’s still good that we’re taking a step forward. There’s a draft bill regarding the security of the Port of Constanța, but it will need to be properly organised.

Macron held a meeting about three weeks ago with the prefects, and the prefects were assigned special responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure across France, including in the context of Russian actions, whether sabotage or other types. However, the Romanian state should at least follow others’ example, and we too should follow in their footsteps, unless we have the creativity to come up with our own solutions. But we need to get a move on!

We are far too stagnant, we are slow and we are lagging behind events.

Radu Carp:

Today I read a report by a journalist who was on site at this new thermal power station we’re always boasting about, and he reported from the scene that there is absolutely no protection against drones. And this is at a thermal power station that is essential to the energy system!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes, there are a great many questions to which we must eventually find answers. But, Professor, we are in this critical situation; we must acknowledge it...

Iulia Fota:

And Zaharova has already threatened Giurgiulești.

Răzvan Munteanu:

It is only natural to consider the worst-case scenario. What should we be preparing for in the worst-case scenario? Very briefly, Professor.

Radu Carp:

It all depends on how relations between the Russian Federation and the United States develop and what the outcome of these mid-term elections will be. Because we can see that, at the moment, the United States is attempting an overt rapprochement with the Russian Federation, despite all the warnings from European leaders. We do not know how long this policy will last, nor do we know what influence the mid-term elections will have on this policy.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, looking beyond what lies ahead in the United States and the mid-term elections, what specific steps must Romania take today to prepare for the worst-case scenario in the future?

Iulia Fota:

This strategy, from this ‘pot’ we’ve had since 2025, contains a few good ideas. One of the ideas was to make Romania strong — well, phrased as ‘a regional power, second only to Poland’, anyway… Sir, you’ve got no other option! Everyone has their own problems; everything is dysfunctional in the West at the moment.

We’ve also got the EU, by the way — I’d meant to mention something earlier, when our Bulgarian colleague was here: we’ve got the European Union’s security hub; does anyone even talk about it anymore?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, can you hear the music in the background… Unfortunately, the first part… Mr Fota, you’re an exceptional discussant, but you never let me finish my point!

Thank you very much for joining us on Check Media! Professor, we haven’t had time to speak, but I’d like to present this book to you. You’re a co-author of The Republic of Moldova: Elections and Political Choices During Hybrid War, published by the Romanian Academy Press.

It’s a book that might bring us back together in the same format on set – all three of us – to discuss the situation in the Republic of Moldova, which is very, very tense. And when we talk about the Republic of Moldova, we’re talking about Romania. A short commercial break, and we’ll be back with other conflicts and wars that are already emerging in the Middle East.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Radio Varna, 15 October 2026

Summary

Vladimir Mitev’s interview with Radio Varna (15 October 2026) concerns Bulgaria and Romania’s responses to the escalation in the Black Sea

• Escalation and cooperation: The second wave of attacks on civilian vessels in the Black Sea (13 October 2026) is putting commercial shipping and insurance premiums at risk. This has intensified political dialogue and coordination between Bulgaria and Romania.

• Diplomatic initiatives: The two countries are seeking support from the EU, NATO and Turkey for a moratorium on hostilities and the use of drones in the Black Sea — a de-escalation initiative launched by Iliyana Yotova and backed by France and Germany, according to Bulgarian media.

• Drone defence: Romania has the US-made mobile Merops system (with F-16s deployed in the event of incidents) and is negotiating for Slovakian radars and maritime systems, but does not yet have comprehensive coverage. Bulgaria is also planning new airspace control capabilities.

• Regional connectivity: The blog ‘The Bridge of Friendship’ examines the concept of the ‘Balkan Banana’ (linking Thessaloniki, Sofia, Plovdiv, Ruse, Bucharest and Timișoara) and the ‘Three Seas Initiative’. The focus is on the Romanian perspective, according to which Bulgaria is an indispensable partner in regional infrastructure.

Introduction

On 15 October 2026, Radio Varna presenter Valeria Vassileva interviewed Vladimir Mitev regarding the escalation of the war in the Black Sea, during which ships were attacked near Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters and within the special economic zones of both countries. Vladimir Mitev explained that this threat to commercial shipping in the region is bringing Bulgaria and Romania together in the defence sphere and prompting them to seek support at EU and NATO level. Vladimir Mitev also explained what steps Romania is taking to ensure anti-drone defence and what the latest article on his website will be about – the regional infrastructure projects that are turning Romania into a geopolitical hub.

Interview

Valeria Vassileva:

We continue with a topic that directly affects security in our region — the tensions in the Black Sea and the way in which institutions in Bulgaria and neighbouring Romania are responding to the growing geopolitical challenges. Do Sofia and Bucharest share a common approach to security in the region, or do they continue to operate at different speeds? What are your observations?

We will now hear from our fellow journalist Vladimir Mitev — editor at the Romanian desk of ‘Radio Bulgaria’ and founder of the online platform ‘The Bridge of Friendship’. You follow developments in both countries closely. Thank you for agreeing to comment for Radio Varna.

Security in the Black Sea and the response from Sofia and Bucharest — that is the first focus.

Vladimir Mitev:

What we have been observing in recent days — following the second wave of attacks on civilian vessels in the Black Sea on 13 October — is that Bulgaria and Romania are drawing closer politically in the sphere of security and defence. There is clearly a common threat. There is a risk that civilian shipping in the Black Sea could come to a complete standstill, as it may become too dangerous for crews and too costly for shipowners due to rising insurance premiums.

In my view, this is leading to a situation where it appears that the traditional reserve which Romania had shown towards the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Rumen Radev, in recent months seems to be fading. We can see that the outgoing Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan has held talks with him, whilst, on the other hand, Romanian President Nicușor Dan has also held talks with Iliyana Yotova.

The result of these discussions is that today, at the European Council summit, there will be a special agenda item on the Black Sea and the situation there. Bulgaria and Romania’s interest in securing European support for the initiative to impose a moratorium on hostilities and the use of drones in the Black Sea will also be discussed. [It has been reported in our media that] she enjoys the support of both France and Germany, whilst it is important to seek Turkey’s support in this regard as well.

This is a vision for de-escalation in the Black Sea, which, in my view, Iliyana Yotova herself has been promoting recently. Of course, there are no signs of such de-escalation as yet — rather, there are signs to the contrary.

In any case, Europe must demonstrate coordination and unity — both between Bulgaria and Romania and at the European level in general — in order to safeguard the economic interests and security of both countries and of the entire European Union in the Black Sea.

Valeria Vassileva:

In fact, both Bulgaria and Romania are — as the military terminology puts it — a flank of the European Union; on its external and maritime borders. This should, after all, imply a strong commitment from the European institutions. In your view, is this a matter of diplomacy, or has it now reached a practical stage where these measures require better coordination between military institutions – greater alignment of actions, surveillance and defence?

Bulgaria plans to deploy new forces and capabilities to control the skies over the Black Sea as far as possible. Is there a similar response in Romania? Should military and defence relations be better coordinated, rather than just diplomatic ones?

Vladimir Mitev:

I approach these topics as a journalist, not as a defence or security expert, but of course I interview such experts and liaise with them as far as possible in both countries. From what they share, I get the impression that Romania seems to be slightly more advanced in terms of drone defence, as it has an operational system — called Merops — which has been provided by the US as part of their strategic partnership. At present, it has been provided free of charge, whilst the costs of its operation are covered by the Romanian side. There are discussions about NATO taking control of it. It should be noted that the system is mobile and can be mounted on a pick-up truck. However, it does not cover the entire territory of the country; many more systems are needed, and at this stage Romania still does not have a comprehensive solution.

We see that when drones enter Romanian territory, F-16 fighter jets are scrambled. Romania is negotiating with various countries to acquire radars and other anti-drone systems. For example, as far as we understand, the supply of more sophisticated radars from Slovakia is under discussion. I believe work is also underway on a system to counter drones at sea — that is, to counter underwater drones.

Valeria Vassileva:

A coastal defence system, yes.

Vladimir Mitev:

So work is being done on this issue in both Romania and Bulgaria.

It seems to me that Romania is slightly ahead, but in my view that is not all that important. What matters is the direction. Given that such a threat exists, I assume that measures will be taken swiftly and that the risk and vulnerability will not be allowed to become too great.

Another thing I’ve learnt from my interviews and informal conversations is that Turkey’s role will be significant for what lies ahead — for this attempt at de-escalation in the Black Sea. Turkey has a more complex relationship with Russia.

Valeria Vassileva:

Slightly different from the European Union’s position.

Vladimir Mitev:

Turkey is maintaining its economic relations with Russia. Some time ago, it also acted as a mediator in the war in Ukraine. So it remains to be seen how these matters will develop at NATO level, not just within the European Union.

Turkey is a member of NATO, and I suppose that what lies ahead today within the European institutions – and, in principle, at NATO level – is closer coordination and consultation. As far as I am aware, the European Union has a Black Sea strategy, drawn up in 2025. On the other hand, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has indicated that, if necessary, there will be changes to NATO’s approach to the Black Sea region.

Clearly, the situation is such that both NATO and the European Union are facing a heightened level of threat in the Black Sea region, and we await their response.

Valeria Vassileva:

What is the final topic on ‘The Bridge of Friendship’? Let’s end on a positive note regarding the border between Bulgaria and Romania.

Vladimir Mitev:

Today I’ll be publishing an article on regional cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. The point is that, in recent weeks, the idea of the so-called ‘Balkan banana’ has appeared in the Greek media. Perhaps our listeners are aware that there is a theory according to which the EU is a community of industrially and infrastructurally linked regions that form the shape of a banana. The core of the EU is also such a ‘banana’, encompassing the Ruhr Valley, part of France and northern Italy.

Valeria Vassileva:

An interesting metaphor.

Vladimir Mitev:

What’s interesting is that the idea is now being put forward that there is also a ‘Balkan banana’, which starts in Thessaloniki, passes through Sofia and Plovdiv, and encompasses Bucharest, Ruse, Giurgiu, Ploiești and Timișoara. Of course, this is a rather loose interpretation of the geography. I asked an acquaintance of mine — a Romanian foreign policy expert — to comment on this idea, so that we could gain an insight into the Romanian perspective on infrastructure connectivity in our region.

There are, in fact, at least two such infrastructure connectivity initiatives. One is between Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, whilst the other is the so-called ‘Three Seas’ initiative, which is more closely linked to Poland and Central Europe as a whole. Very soon — probably today — I will publish the text of his speech. I think it will be interesting to see how, increasingly, Bulgaria is viewed in Romania as an indispensable country. I believe he uses precisely this expression when discussing the development of infrastructure links in the region.

It is significant that the Romanians are saying this, because here in Bulgaria the prevailing view for a long time seemed to be that we are not sufficiently connected to Romania and that this desire for infrastructure links is being ignored.

Valeria Vassileva:

Thank you very much for the conversation. An interesting topic. We look forward to reading about it on the ‘Bridge of Friendship’ blog, which our colleague – the journalist Vladimir Mitev – maintains. It is an accessible, open source of information featuring original articles on various aspects of the situation in the Balkans.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Bulgarian National Radio, 15 October 2026

Summary

On 15 October 2026, on the programme “Before Noon” on the “Horizon” channel (BNR), presenter Irina Nedeva spoke with journalist Vladimir Mitev about the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea following a series of drone attacks on merchant ships off the coasts of Bulgaria and Romania.

Key points from the conversation:

• Joint diplomatic initiative: The growing threat to shipping and the exclusive economic zones of both countries has prompted Sofia and Bucharest to coordinate swiftly. Bulgarian and Romanian government leaders discussed joint action and a proposal for a moratorium on attacks against merchant ships, which was raised at the EU Summit in Brussels and with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

• Economic and regional risks: Romania is directly affected by the incidents due to the key importance of the port of Constanța and the Danube routes for the transit of goods and grain. The escalation threatens regional trade and the insurance sector, necessitating the adoption of de-escalation measures.

• Warming of relations between Sofia and Bucharest: The common threat is helping to overcome the initial cooling of relations and scepticism associated with Prime Minister Rumen Radev. Bulgaria’s foreign policy moves (including high-level meetings and publicly identifying Russia as a source of risk) are seen as a sign of closer cooperation.

• The domestic political situation in Romania: Although the country is going through a period of political transition, the forthcoming formation of a regular technocratic government led by Luca Nicolescu is expected to make Bucharest’s response more dynamic and decisive.

• The broader regional context: Turkey’s role also remains crucial to ensuring security in the Black Sea and on NATO’s eastern flank.

Introduction (to the Bridge of Friendship)

On 15 October 2026, presenter Irina Nedeva from the programme ‘Horizon’ on Bulgarian National Radio interviewed Vladimir Mitev regarding the dynamic regional and international situation following the two successive waves of attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea on 6 and 13 October 2026, which are believed to have been carried out by Russia. The overall threat to shipping in the territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of Bulgaria and Romania prompted urgent action from the governments in Sofia and Bucharest. The prime ministers of the two countries – Rumen Radev and Ilie Bolojan – as well as their presidents – Iliana Yotova and Nicușor Dan – held this week phone talks on joint initiatives at the European Council Summit in Brussels (15–16 October 2026). Whilst in the Belgian capital, Rumen Radev and Nicușor Dan also discussed the situation with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte during this period, which led to the forthcoming convening of the North Atlantic Council.

In this context, Vladimir Mitev commented on the growing coordination at EU and NATO level, as well as the closer ties between Bulgaria and Romania in response to the threat they both face.

Video (with auto-generated English-language subtitles)

Interview (on Bulgarian National Radio)

Irina Nedeva:

The issue of the Black Sea is also on the agenda for the Summit. As we heard on the news, Prime Minister Radev spoke about the joint initiative with Romania for a moratorium on attacks in the Black Sea. This follows drone attacks on merchant ships off the coast of Bulgaria last night, whilst Romania woke up to similar reports – in this case involving tankers. Bulgaria and Romania are already discussing joint action at the level of European forces within NATO. But what does this mean in practice, and how does Bucharest perceive the threat whilst it is itself in the midst of a political crisis?

I say ‘Good afternoon’ to the journalist Vladimir Mitev. Can you hear me? He is a colleague from Radio Bulgaria, founder of the blog ‘The Bridge of Friendship’, which tracks relations between Bulgaria and Romania, as well as reactions in Romania at the political level and the tone in the media.

Firstly – in brief: what do we know about the tankers and what is the current mood in Romania?

Vladimir Mitev:

Last night, the Romanian authorities reported receiving a report of a fire on board the tanker ‘Yara J’, which was carrying chemicals and petroleum products.

The crew has been evacuated and the seafarers are safe. Today, however, there has been another incident involving a ship on which a fire also broke out. In this case, there were 12 people on board – 8 of them are still missing, whilst 4 have been rescued.

These incidents are part of an escalation that has been ongoing for about ten days now and, in my view, is leading to changes in our region and in our relations. We can see that Bulgaria and Romania will cooperate more closely on a moratorium on attacks against merchant ships in the Black Sea, for which we also have European support. Perhaps we will discuss this in the next set of questions.

Irina Nedeva:

Vladimir, I would like to ask: how are the Romanian media reporting on the incidents involving these merchant ships in the immediate vicinity of Bulgarian territorial waters? Has this been covered in the media? Is a connection being drawn between Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters? And above all – how are the events being portrayed: as a direct threat to Romania’s national security, as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, or as yet another instance in which the war is drawing closer to NATO?

Vladimir Mitev:

I think Romania has a strong interest in maintaining commercial shipping in the Black Sea and at the mouth of the Danube, so these incidents are quite alarming and are attracting attention. Even if they seem to take a back seat against the backdrop of other events, this is due to the political crisis, which we nevertheless expect to be resolved soon.

In fact, Romania takes pride in the fact that Constanța is a major Black Sea port and that Ukraine has exported around 60 per cent of its grain harvest via Romanian ports – both Constanța and those on the Danube. Romania also makes active use of shipping on the Danube. All these reasons show that it has a much greater interest than other countries in the region in ensuring that there is peace here and that international law is respected with regard to commercial shipping.

Irina Nedeva:

Has there been a shift in the political tone in Bucharest in response to the signals coming from Bulgaria? It seemed there was a difference in the reaction to the drone threat between our northern neighbour and our country until the most recent incident. For the first time, Radev began to mention Russia by name after 13 October – that is, two days ago.

Vladimir Mitev:

Yes, I think there has been such a change. During the first few months of Radev’s presidency, there was a certain coolness in the Romanian media – it was clear that he was more interested in relations with Turkey in the region than with Romania.

The labels that were being pinned on him did not exactly inspire much sympathy in Bucharest either.

Irina Nedeva:

Which labels do you mean?

Vladimir Mitev:

That he has an eastern orientation – not only towards Russia, but also that he is making attempts to develop relations with China. In my view, however, there has been a shift here too. The new level of escalation, triggered by the conflict in the Black Sea, has led to a situation where the threat is shared – by Bulgaria, Romania and the countries whose ships sail the waters. This calls for a reassessment of relations.

Last but not least, we see that both France and Germany support the idea of a moratorium on attacks against merchant ships. Our Foreign Minister met with his German counterpart this week and received such support. Of course, he added that concessions only embolden Putin and that a firm stance is needed, but clearly, in addition to firmness, a way to reduce tensions is also required. As economic interests are severely affected, there is a risk that shipping could come to a complete standstill, which in turn would lead to a rise in insurance premiums.

Irina Nedeva:

Yes, of course – and food supply chains would be disrupted too. You say there has been a change in attitudes towards Bulgaria and towards the Bulgarian Prime Minister Radev since 13 October, after Bulgaria...

Vladimir Mitev:

Yes, I’d like to give another example, if there’s time. The visit to Sofia by the senior Ukrainian representative Kirilo Budanov also provoked interesting reactions amongst foreign policy experts in Romania with whom I’m in contact. I asked them how this was viewed from Bucharest – their comment was that consultations were taking place with Sofia. In other words, the role that Radev appears to be playing was viewed positively, and the nature of that role will likely become clearer in the future.

Irina Nedeva:

Yes, because in fact we do not have much information about the meeting between Kirilo Budanov and the Bulgarian authorities. In conclusion: Romania finds itself in a rather complex political situation – there is an acting Prime Minister, with whom Radev is holding talks, and the next one is due to take office literally in the next few days, is that not so? Is there a risk that this political crisis in Romania might weaken the response and, above all, the joint position of Bulgaria and Romania, which is to be presented in Brussels?

Vladimir Mitev:

Personally, I expect the formation of a regular government in Romania to make Bucharest’s response more dynamic and even more decisive. In recent months, there has been a sense of a certain interregnum and a divergence in views regarding the direction the country should take. We expect the prime ministerial nominee, Luca Niculescu, to secure a majority in parliament, as he has secured the support of both the Social Democratic Party (which will have 11 ministers in his cabinet) and the National Liberal Party and The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, which have stated they will back him without joining the government.

This will be a technocratic government – the key ministries will not be filled by party appointees. It appears that a formula is being sought to accommodate the various centres of power in Romania, including the presidency. In my view, Romania can no longer afford to procrastinate, as this very escalation shows that the period of indecision is coming to an end.

And let me reiterate – cooperation is not limited solely to talks between Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey’s role in what lies ahead is also extremely important, as it is also a member of NATO.

Irina Nedeva:

Let us leave room to understand what its role will be. Thank you to Vladimir Mitev. Merchant ships in the Black Sea are an important part not only of the region’s economy but also of its security – a real test for NATO’s eastern flank.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Nova News, 16 October 2026

Introduction (on the Bridge of Friendship)

On 16 October 2026 Lora Indzhova from the programme ‘Your Day’ on Nova News interviewed Vladimir Mitev regarding the latest escalation of the war between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, which led to attacks on merchant ships near Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters. These attacks, which caused fires, the sinking of vessels and loss of life, prompted Bulgaria and Romania to request the inclusion of a special agenda item on Black Sea security during the European Council on 15 and 16 October 2026. Meanwhile, the presidents of both countries — Rumen Radev and Nicușor Dan — raised the issue of the security of commercial shipping and the escalation in the region with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, following which a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council is due to take place.

Video (with auto-generated English-language subtitles)

Interview (on Nova News)

Lora Indzhova:

We are joined on our live line by Vladimir Mitev – a journalist and founder of the Bulgarian-Romanian website ‘The Bridge of Friendship’. Mr Mitev, hello!

Vladimir Mitev:

Hello!

Lora Indzhova:

I won’t draw you into a political discussion, but I’d like you to tell me what the current mood is in Romania regarding yesterday’s events and the European Council meeting – the talks that took place between the leaders of Bulgaria and Romania and Mark Rutte. This joint defence headquarters on a rotational basis

Vladimir Mitev:

It seems to me that we are witnessing something that has already happened, when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. At that time, this common threat to Bulgaria and Romania led to a situation where the two countries began to grow closer politically. In 2023, they signed a joint declaration on strategic partnership. This rapprochement continues to this day.

But here I should perhaps add a little context. When Rumen Radev was president, he invited Nicușor Dan to visit Sofia, immediately after his election as president in May 2025. But I have never noticed any public response to this invitation. That is precisely what is interesting. For some time, there was a certain reserve or hostility towards Rumen Radev in the Romanian media or amongst Romanian experts.

Lora Indzhova:

Why?

Vladimir Mitev:

He’s been labelled as being very open towards the East.

Lora Indzhova:

Is that what people are saying in Romania? I wasn’t expecting the conversation to take this turn.

Vladimir Mitev:

I have come across such claims. For example, when the drone crashed near Kardam earlier this year, there seemed to be a certain hostility towards him. At the moment, this is not noticeable at all in the Romanian media. In fact, even people with anti-Russian views are speaking positively about his initiatives. Perhaps it is important to put this into context, as both Germany and France are currently supporting the initiative for a moratorium on attacks against civilian vessels in the Black Sea.

In fact, what is interesting is that things are falling into place in such a way that the growing overall threat in the Black Sea is leading Bulgaria, Romania, and indeed European countries and NATO member states in general to coordinate more closely. You actually highlighted this in the news round-up before our interview.

Lora Indzhova:

Tell me, the people in Romania – the Romanians – how are they living, how are they feeling at the moment? Romania fell victim to similar attacks much earlier than Bulgaria. Are the authorities managing to reassure the people? Are they managing to convince them that there are sensible leaders who are looking after their security?

Vladimir Mitev:

Romania has been in a political crisis since the spring – the government is in a caretaker capacity. Over the summer there was also an energy crisis, which is still ongoing, as the Cernavodă nuclear power station remains out of operation and, consequently, the country is importing large amounts of electricity, whilst lacking significant battery storage capacity. There is also a fiscal or financial crisis to some extent, as Romania’s credit rating is close to the point where it will be downgraded to ‘junk’ status, meaning that bankruptcy could be imminent. In this respect, there really is a sense of crisis in Romania this year.

And perhaps it is interesting… I would mention two things very briefly. The first is that next Tuesday, the motion on the ‘Niculescu’ cabinet will be put to a vote. It is expected to be passed, as there are key parties supporting it. This may well mark the beginning of the end of the political crisis.

The other thing that might be of interest to our viewers: unexpectedly, whilst in Romania there has long been a view that they are very successful economically and in other respects, this year there have been many positive articles about Bulgaria. In fact, as far as our country is concerned – with our entry into the eurozone, the fact that the energy crisis did not affect Bulgaria and that Bulgaria was an exporter of electricity; even with Bulgaria’s victory in the Eurovision music contest, if you like – that Bulgaria somehow came out on top. It seems that Bulgaria is currently doing things better.

This matters at a time when the Romanians themselves are really struggling. I have acquaintances who have so far managed to get by in one way or another – for example, through services, tourism or something else. The decline in consumption, the fall in incomes and the spending cuts introduced by the ‘Bolojan’ cabinet are leading to a situation where these people are now looking for jobs as employees, whilst the business model they relied on is collapsing. To me, these are signs that things aren’t quite as good as they used to be.

Lora Indzhova:

Thank you for this conversation and for what you mentioned at the end. That’s why I fell silent and listened to you with such great interest – because I’d like our viewers to... It’s a bit like… We were recently joking with political observers about ‘therapeutic talk’. We need to believe in each other a little more; we need to be more united.

At the moment, Bulgaria is once again torn apart by divisions – both ideologically and in the context of the election campaign. We see all sorts of things, such as comments and extreme, polarised positions on social media. But it’s nice to have someone from the outside, a fellow countryman, tell us how Bulgaria is increasingly being mentioned in a positive light for the progress it’s making – despite all the difficulties here, despite all the doubts, despite the manipulative political rhetoric during the election campaign and despite the lack of honesty, which voters sometimes need most of all.

But in any case, we’re moving forward. Quite often over the years, Romania has been seen as the frontrunner in the Bulgaria–Romania pairing. This time, you say that things seem to be different this year. You also spoke about the crises Romania is currently facing.

We’ll be keeping an eye on what happens next Tuesday with the vote on the ‘Niculescu’ cabinet, which you mentioned. Thank you once again for this conversation, Mr Mitev.

Our compatriot Vladimir Mitev – a journalist and founder of the Bulgarian-Romanian website ‘The Bridge of Friendship’ – appeared on ‘Your Day’ following yesterday’s European Council meeting. It is a two-day meeting, so the session continues today. Let us see, following the inspection of the vessel Chelsea 3, whether we will have a clear answer to the question of who owns the drones that attacked Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone and, regrettably, led to the loss of life on the two civilian merchant ships that were attacked.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Alexandru Drăgulin, 14 October 2026

Article

Regional cooperation initiatives are becoming increasingly complex as economic infrastructure and security become harder to separate. Russia’s war against Ukraine has reinforced this connection and the need for secure supply routes.[1] A railway can carry both freight and military reinforcements; an energy interconnection can support industry and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. For Romania, the overlap between these functions raises the question of whether the country is beginning to emerge as a geopolitical hub in Central and Eastern Europe. The answer proposed here is conditional: Romania has the foundations and some of the capabilities of such a hub, but regional influence is built through functional connections and political initiative; it does not automatically follow from a country’s position on the map.

Two Different Levels of Cooperation

A comparison between the “Balkan Banana” and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) first requires a clarification. In an analysis published by The Opinion on 6 October 2026, the “Balkan Banana” denotes a potential economic arc linking Thessaloniki, Sofia, the Ruse–Giurgiu area, Bucharest–Ploiești and Timișoara, with connections to Plovdiv. The author envisages a network of industrial, logistics and technology centers connected to Central Europe. This is a proposal for an economic geography, put forward in the Greek press, that seeks to capitalize on Thessaloniki’s role as a maritime gateway. The article presents neither an intergovernmental agreement nor a joint budget or organization bearing that name. The identifiable intellectual initiative should not automatically be attributed to the Greek government.[2]

The 3SI has a more established political framework. Launched in 2015 at the initiative of Croatia and Poland, it is a platform for cooperation among EU member states on north–south connectivity in transport, energy and digital infrastructure.[3] Greece became its thirteenth participating state at the Bucharest summit in 2023.[4] Its Polish–Croatian origins do not, however, imply a monopoly over the agenda. Romania helped institutionalize its investment dimension: EximBank and the Polish bank BGK jointly established the initiative’s investment fund in 2019.[5]

US support gives the 3SI a transatlantic dimension, while the Dubrovnik Declaration of April 2026 places it within the wider effort to strengthen European resilience and cohesion.[1] This support should not, however, be confused with authorship of the initiative or unified political control. The agenda emerges from negotiations among participants, the priorities of successive presidencies and the availability of financing. Romania, therefore, has room to take the initiative within an established framework, whereas the “Balkan Banana” primarily offers a vision for potential subregional integration.

There is nevertheless an official basis for trilateral cooperation. The memorandum signed by Greece, Bulgaria and Romania in December 2025 established a Black Sea–Aegean Sea corridor platform, under the political coordination of the transport ministers and with European support.[6] On 9 October 2026, the European Commission announced a joint action plan that includes upgrading the Giurgiu–Ruse railway bridge and preparing a new road and railway bridge.[7] The official platform exists in its own right and predates the formulation in the Greek press. The “Banana” may express an economic ambition for this cooperation without retrospectively becoming its official name.

Although they do not use the term “Balkan Banana”, contributions by researchers associated with ELIAMEP place this vision within a longer-standing debate about Greece’s regional role. In 2023, Panagiota Manoli argued that opening the Three Seas Initiative to Greece would add a Mediterranean dimension to cooperation. Connections with Central and South-Eastern Europe would support the development of northern Greece while also serving a security function. The extension of Via Carpathia towards Thessaloniki and the importance of the port of Alexandroupolis to NATO illustrate this convergence between the economy and defense. [8]

Katerina Sokou interprets Greece’s growing regional role through its contribution to South-Eastern European energy security and support for NATO’s eastern flank within the Greek–American partnership. Access to the Aegean through Alexandroupolis thus emerges as a natural complement to the 3SI’s north–south axis. Maria Gavouneli, in turn, highlights the role of Greece and Thessaloniki in regional cooperation through the 3SI and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. These two perspectives explain Athens’ interest in turning port and energy infrastructure into a source of regional influence. [9] [10]

The practical requirement for this ambition emerges from the discussion moderated by Elena Lazarou at the 3SI forum in April 2026: national projects need to be connected into interoperable networks by coordinating investment and removing cross-border bottlenecks. For Romania, these contributions suggest an opportunity for complementarity with Greece and Bulgaria: connecting the Aegean axis to the Danube, the Black Sea and the eastern neighborhood through joint projects. This is an interpretation of the convergence between these analyses, rather than an explicit ELIAMEP position on the “Balkan Banana”. [11]

What Romania Stands to Gain

Romania can pursue this complementarity at two levels: within the 3SI, by promoting connections with Central Europe, and in cooperation with Sofia and Athens, by completing cross-border links to the south. The 2026 3SI declaration explicitly includes Rail2Sea and Via Carpathia among the projects relevant to connectivity and mobility for both civilian and military use.[1] Bucharest’s objective is to align these projects with access to the port of Constanța and the country’s economic and security needs.

For Romania, the benefits extend beyond transit revenues. The aim is for infrastructure to attract production, logistics services, research and local suppliers. Better connections between ports and industrial centers can make investment in production more attractive; traffic merely passing through the country does not guarantee this outcome. Promoting the corridor must therefore be accompanied by projects for intermodal terminals, rail access to industrial sites and cooperation among businesses. Competition between ports and cities will not disappear, but it can coexist with complementary services and alternative routes.

Bulgaria is an indispensable partner in this equation. Uninterrupted connections between Romania and the Aegean ports depend on infrastructure and decisions on Bulgarian territory. The removal of checks on persons at internal land borders, effective 1 January 2025, improved conditions for movement.[12] Schengen, however, does not increase a bridge’s capacity or modernize a railway. For communities in Giurgiu and Ruse, geopolitical success must also mean more predictable journeys and access to jobs and services. An agenda devised solely in the capitals would risk overlooking the very places where regional integration is tested every day.

Within the 3SI, Romania can use its financial participation to support well-prepared projects and regional partnerships. On 24 September 2026, the European Investment Fund and institutions from six countries, including Romania’s Investment and Development Bank, launched a new infrastructure fund platform, with total commitments of €360 million and the aim of mobilizing at least €2 billion in investment.[13] Commitments and mobilization targets are not money already invested in Romania. The ability to benefit depends on project feasibility, co-financing and delivery. A strategic label can open a discussion, but it cannot replace the necessary documentation and economic viability.

Where Energy and Security Meet in Infrastructure

Energy cooperation shows that regional initiative is shared among governments and operators. The Vertical Corridor links gas transmission networks in South-Eastern Europe and can diversify access to supply sources. In the September 2026 announcement concerning its expansion, Transgaz’s management stated that Romania and the company had promoted the concept since 2016.[14] This is an explicit claim of Romanian initiative, distinct from the Greek origins of the “Banana” metaphor. The corridor’s operation nevertheless depends on cooperation among operators, available capacity, tariffs and actual demand, rather than a single political center.

Romania can combine its transit role with that of a regional producer and supplier. In their announcement of 28 September 2026, OMV Petrom and Romgaz expected the first gas from Neptun Deep to enter the system in the first half of 2027.[15] This prospect can support supply security and relations with neighboring countries, but future production should not be treated as currently available. To turn the resource into lasting influence, Romania needs connections, credible contracts and infrastructure protection. Diversification should also be pursued through electricity, efficiency, and renewable sources, so that a new role in gas trading does not lead to dependence on a single sector.

The direct link to defense emerges in cooperation on military mobility. On 10 July 2024, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece signed a letter of intent for a corridor to facilitate the cross-border movement of forces and equipment. The stated objectives include adapting road and rail routes and reducing bureaucracy, in line with NATO priorities and EU initiatives.[16] This is a mechanism distinct from the 3SI and the economic proposal represented by the “Banana”, even where the infrastructure overlaps. The intended strategic advantage is to reduce the time needed to reinforce the south-eastern flank and provide more supply options.

Infrastructure intended for civilian and military use must be designed for both functions. Bridge load-bearing capacity, terminals, rail interoperability and crossing procedures deliver benefits when addressed together. Concentrating flows at a single point can create vulnerability; alternative routes and repair capabilities increase resilience. At the same time, military compatibility does not justify every economic project. Romania should prioritize investments that meet demonstrable civilian needs and specific defense requirements, rather than promising that every motorway will automatically deliver security.

A Regional Role Supported by Alliances

The security architecture within which these projects operate remains Euro-Atlantic. NATO provides the framework for collective defense, planning and military structures; European cooperation supports infrastructure and resilience. The 3SI is not a military alliance and provides no defense guarantees of its own. Romania already performs specific regional functions: it hosts the allied battlegroup with France as the framework nation, as well as the multinational headquarters in Sibiu and Bucharest, which have responsibilities for the battlegroups in Romania and Bulgaria.[17] These support the idea of a military hub, without in themselves demonstrating the existence of a center of influence across all fields.

In diplomacy, the Bucharest Nine format, established at the initiative of Romania and Poland in 2015, provides a channel for consultations among allies on the eastern flank.[18] Bucharest can use this position to advocate sustained attention to the Black Sea in allied discussions. Cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria adds a southern dimension, while cooperation with Türkiye is essential in the maritime domain. The MCM Black Sea Task Group, established by Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye and operational since 2024, shows how a specific need—countering the threat from naval mines—can generate practical cooperation. An expansion of its missions was announced in July 2026.[19]

Romania’s relevance therefore stems from its participation in arrangements with different functions and its ability to coordinate them. Partners’ interests do not coincide on every issue, and a credible regional strategy must accept this reality. Bucharest stands to gain by proposing projects that also benefit its neighbors, including the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. An active role entails providing solutions and bearing costs, such as preparing projects or maintaining logistics capabilities, alongside requesting allied support.

When Geographical Position Becomes a Security Asset

The hypothesis that Romania is a geopolitical hub can be tested against the results. What matters is whether transport times become shorter and more predictable, whether cross-border bottlenecks are removed and whether backup routes emerge. It also matters how much economic value remains in the communities being connected and whether Romania can sustain energy and logistics flows during a crisis. Equally relevant is whether Bucharest’s proposals become joint decisions and projects. The number of summits hosted or memorandums signed is insufficient to measure this capacity.

A realistic priority would be a joint agenda with Bulgaria and Greece focused on a few cross-border links, with publicly identified responsibilities, financing and deadlines. Romania could promote eligible components through European instruments and mechanisms associated with the 3SI, aligning them with military mobility requirements. In parallel, links to Constanța, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine should ensure continuity between the southern projects and Romania’s role as a security provider in the Black Sea region. Domestic coordination among transport, energy, defense and local authorities is a prerequisite for such a foreign policy.

Romania is thus moving towards becoming a geopolitical hub, but the process is uneven and remains conditional. Its military functions are already visible; economic integration and the ability to shape the regional agenda need further strengthening. The 3SI offers a platform for negotiation and investment, while the “Balkan Banana” idea encourages the development of a more closely connected regional economy. Their value to Romania will depend on its ability to turn cooperation with its neighbors into lasting results. For Bucharest, the test of regional influence begins at the bridges across the Danube, too.

Sources

[1] Three Seas Initiative. Dubrovnik Declaration: The Three Seas in Its Second Decade: Powering Europe’s Strategic North–South Axis. Dubrovnik, 28–29 April 2026.

[2] Ουγγρίνης, Φάνης. “Βαλκανική «Μπανάνα»: Οικονομικό τόξο με πύλη τη Θεσσαλονίκη”. The Opinion, 6 October 2026.

[3] Croatian Parliament. Parliamentary Summit of the Three Seas Initiative: Advancing the Three Seas Initiative: Vision, Responsibility, Partnership. Media advisory. Zagreb, 24 March 2026.

[4] President of the Republic of Poland. “The 8th Summit and Business Forum of the Three Seas Initiative in Bucharest”. 6 September 2023.

[5] EximBank. “Fondul de Investiții al Inițiativei celor Trei Mări, vehicul de investiții pentru finanțarea proiectelor de infrastructură”. 28 November 2019.

[6] European Commission, Representation in Romania. “România, Grecia și Bulgaria își consolidează cooperarea în domeniul infrastructurii de transport”. 4 December 2025.

[7] European Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. “Bulgaria, Greece and Romania Step Up Delivery of Strategic Transport Links”. 9 October 2026.

[8] Manoli, Panagiota. “Turning the 3SI into a 4SI: A View from Athens”. In Anticipating the 2023 Three Seas Initiative Bucharest Summit: Advancing the Common Agenda, edited by Ana-Maria Andreea Anghelescu and Iulian Oneașcă, 43–44. Working Paper 46. Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, 2023.

[9] Sokou, Katerina. Greece-US Relations: Capitalizing on a Generational High. ELIAMEP, 26 September 2023.

[10] ELIAMEP. “The Role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)”. Summary of an interview with Maria Gavouneli on ERT3, 13 September 2024.

[11] ELIAMEP. “Dr Elena Lazarou, Director General of ELIAMEP, at the Three Seas Business Forum 2026 in Croatia”. Event report, 30 April 2026.

[12] Council of the European Union. “Schengen: Council Decides to Lift Land Border Controls with Bulgaria and Romania”. 12 December 2024.

[13] European Investment Fund. “EIF Joins Forces with Six EU Countries to Spur at Least €2 Billion for Infrastructure between Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas”. 24 September 2026.

[14] Transgaz. “Signing of the MoU on the Expansion of the Vertical Corridor”. Press release published via the Bucharest Stock Exchange, 4 September 2026.

[15] OMV Petrom. “Neptun Deep avansează către prima producție de gaze, preconizată pentru prima jumătate a anului 2027”. 28 September 2026.

[16] Romanian Ministry of National Defense. “Letter of Intent Signed Romania, Bulgaria and Greece for the Creation of a Military Mobility Corridor”. 11 July 2024.

[17] NATO. “Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank”. Accessed 14 October 2026.

[18] Szymański, Piotr, and Jacek Tarociński. Security Cooperation Formats in the Baltic Sea Region: Recommendations for the Council of the Baltic Sea States. OSW, 29 May 2026.

[19] Romanian Ministry of National Defense. “România, Bulgaria și Turcia extind misiunile grupului MCM Black Sea”. 8 July 2026.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Ivan Vasilchin, 5 October 2026

Summary

After a hiatus of several years, the ‘Homeland at the Crossroads’ art festival returns for its 13th edition in the Banat village of Dudeștii Veci (Romania). The event, which began in 2006, has overcome the lack of accommodation thanks to a partnership with restored houses (Dudesco).

Key highlights from the programme:

• Dates and opening: The programme began on 25 September 2026, and the official opening of the exhibition took place on 3 October 2026 with a ceremonial address by the writer Robert Șerban, who emphasised the event’s significance for preserving and affirming the cultural identity of the Banat Bulgarians.

• Participants: Nine artists from Bulgaria and Romania took part in the art festival (Nikolina Dzhanovska, Valentina Lapcheva, Rumyana Zhivkova, Gergana Bogdanova, Rumen Atanasov, Stanislava Zapryanova, Volodya Kazakov, Ivan Vasilchin and Radu Kotishel), as well as children from the local art club.

• Theme: The theme of this edition is ‘Return’ – a symbol of the festival’s revival and a return to roots and traditions.

• Upcoming events: From 23 to 25 October 2026, an exhibition under the same theme will also be presented in Sofia during the Conference on Banat and Bessarabian Bulgarians, serving as a bridge between the diaspora and Bulgaria.

The event is organised by the artist Ivan Vasilchin with the support of Mica Vasilchin.

Press release

Dudeștii Vechi, Romania – Following a break of several years due to the pandemic, the ‘Homeland at the Crossroads’ art festival is resuming with great hope and renewed vigour. The event, which began exactly 20 years ago – in 2006 – started as a small open-air workshop for local artists, before developing over the years into a large-scale fusion art festival.

The main obstacle to holding the festival until now – a lack of accommodation – has now been overcome. Thanks to a partnership with a number of restored houses provided by the company Dudesco, the 13th edition has new facilities to welcome participants and guests.

The event programme began on 25 September, and an Open Day was held on 2 October. The official opening of the exhibition took place on 3 October 2026 at 4.00 pm in the municipal gallery.

The opening address will be delivered by the renowned writer and poet Robert Șerban, who is also well known as a prominent figure in the presentation and opening of cultural events related to the arts.

“Communities that respect themselves forge their identity not only by preserving the past, but also through their ability to create culture in the present. An art symposium held for the thirteenth time is no longer a coincidence, but has become a tradition. That is why what is happening here has a dimension that goes beyond the narrow circle of contemporary art. At a time when cultural tourism is increasingly seeking local experiences, recognisable identities and destinations that offer something different from the well-trodden paths, such projects can become genuine centres of attraction.

A village or a municipality does not need to be a capital city or a metropolitan centre to acquire cultural significance. Sometimes it is precisely the geographical periphery that creates symbolic centrality. The unusual can be more powerful than fame. The distinctive can be more memorable than the standard. And the Bulgarian community in Banat, with its resilience and cultural distinctiveness, is given yet another opportunity here to assert its identity not through words, but through a concrete cultural manifestation. Thus, the exhibition becomes both an artistic event and an act of representing the community.”

This year’s edition features 9 artists from Bulgaria and Romania:

• Nikolina Dzhanovska (Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria)

• Valentina Lapcheva (Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria)

• Rumyana Zhivkova (Pleven, Bulgaria)

• Gergana Bogdanova (Pleven, Bulgaria)

• Rumen Atanasov (Sofia, Bulgaria)

• Stanislava Zapryanova (Sofia, Bulgaria)

• Volodya Kazakov (Botevgrad, Bulgaria)

• Ivan Vasilchin (Star Beshenov / Dudeshti Veki, Romania)

• Rado Kotishel (Turda, Romania)

The theme of the 13th edition is ‘Return’. It symbolises both a return to the series of events following the long hiatus and a return to one’s roots, to the beginning, to tradition and to a look back at the past.

During the event, alongside the artists, children from the art club also came to paint – a fact noted and even praised by the writer Robert Șerban. In this way, the children’s participation ensured continuity and a future and, as he said, “I look forward to seeing you all at the 33rd edition.”

As a continuation of this concept, from 23 to 25 October 2026, an exhibition will also open in Sofia under the same theme, as part of the Conference on Banat and Bessarabian Bulgarians. This demonstrates that ‘The Return’ is not merely a return to the past and one’s roots, but also a bridge connecting the Banat and Bessarabian Bulgarians, as well as the diaspora and Bulgaria.

The main message from the organisers of ‘Homeland at the Crossroads’ is that wherever two or three Bulgarians gather, they create a small homeland.

The event is led by the artist Ivan Vasilchin, with the support and co-organisation of Mița Vasilchin.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

The “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Over 45 scholars from six countries attend a conference on the Bessarabian and Banat Bulgarians in Sofia

From 23 to 25 October 2026, Hall 1 at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski” will host the First International Academic Conference “Bessarabian and Banat Bulgarians in a Historical and Contemporary Context: Language, Cultural Memory, Identity”. The event is organised by the “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Department of Cyril and Methodius Studies at Sofia University, as part of a project funded by the Scientific Research Fund. The project is led by Senior Assistant Professor Dr Tatiana Braga, and the team includes Dr Svetlana Karadjova (Institute of Literature – BAS) and Dr Olga Kolot.

The programme features 37 papers by 46 scholars from Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Hungary and Italy. The topics cover history, language, onomastics, folklore, religious memory and the contemporary challenges facing the identity of the two communities.

Accompanying events:

On 23 October 2026:

• At 4.30 pm, there will be a presentation of the monograph *The Names of the Bulgarians in the Bolhrad Region (Southern Bessarabia). Part I. The Identity of the Bessarabian Bulgarians between Language, History and Migration* by Tatyana Braga.

• At 6.00 pm, the exhibition ‘Return’, curated by Ivan Vasilchin, will open. It is dedicated to the idea of a return to one’s roots and to the connections between Bulgarians from Banat and Bessarabia. Artists from Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova are taking part: Ivan Vasilchin (Star Beshenov, Romania), Miki Velchev (Timișoara, Romania), Kiril and Milkana Meskin (Pleven), Nina Radovanova (Sofia), Galina Sintsova (Sofia, Moldova) and Natalia Darmancheva (Sofia).

The conference is being held with the financial support of the Scientific Research Fund (contract No. KP-06-M 100/1).

Appendix: the conference programme

International Scientific Conference „Bessarabian and Banat Bulgarians in Historical and Contemporary Context: Language, Cultural Memory, Identity“

Sofia, 23 – 25 October 2026,

Hall 1, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”

Programme

With the financial support of the Scientific Research Fund under contract No. KP-06-M 100/1 of 10 December 2025.

Let us bring back the colour of the past

Bessarabian and Banat Bulgarians, early 20th century

23 OCTOBER 2026 (Friday)

Hall 1, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”

8:30 – 9:00 Registration of participants

9:00 – 10:00 Official opening of the conference. Welcome addresses

SECTION „BULGARIAN HISTORICAL COMMUNITIES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT“

10:00 – 11:00

Moderator: Assist. Prof. Dr. Tatyana Braga

10:00 – 10:15 MARGARET DIMITROVA (Sofia University ‘St Clement of Ohrid’) – Baskoy Copy of “Istoriya slavenobolgarskaya”

10:15 – 10:30 KRISTINA MENHART (L. Jótvös University of Budapest, Hungary) – The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Community in Hungary – Historical Role and Contemporary Perspectives

10:30 – 10:45 MARIA BRUS (Vasyl Stefanyk Carpathian National University, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine)– Bulgarian-Ukrainian Language Contacts: From the Emergence of Literacy to the First Translated Works

10:45 – 11:00 NICOLAE MARKOV (Timiș County Library, Romania)– The Fate of the Bulgarians of Modoș: From Migration to Integration

11:00 – 11:15 Discussion

11:15 – 11:45 Coffee break

SECTION „BESSARABIA AND BANAT: MIGRATION AND COMMUNITY IDENTITY“

11:45 – 12:45

Moderator: Dr. Svetlana Karadzhova

11:45 – 12:00 IANCU-CONSTANTIN BERCEANU (The Association for Banat Culture, Romania) – Topophilia and Identity Preservation - Case Study of Catholic Bulgarians from Banat

12:00 – 12:15 KENTA SUGAI (Hokkaido University, Japan) – Bulgarian as a Minority Language in Public Space: Analysis of the Linguistic Landscape in the Republic of Moldova

12:15 – 12:30 ALLA ROMANCHENKO, DARINA STOYANOVA (I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine)– Language as a Marker of Ethnic Identity: Linguodidactic Mechanisms for Preserving Continuity in the Conditions of Diaspora

12:30 – 12:45 BONO CUCALAN (Mayor of Dudestii Vechi, Romania) – Sustainable Development and Identity Preservation in a Globalized World: Economic Innovations and European Projects in Dudeștii Vechi (Romanian Banat)

12:45 – 13:00 Discussion

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch break

SECTION „HISTORY, WRITTEN HERITAGE AND POPULAR MEMORY OF THE BULGARIANS“

14:00 – 14:45

Moderator: Prof. Andrey Boyadzhiev

14:00 – 14:15 NICOLETA CIOCANI (Radio Timișoara, Romania) – The Bulgarian Section of Radio Timișoara – Guardian of Community Memory

14:15 – 14:30 ELENA VODINCHAR (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – The Menaion from the ‘Otets Paisiy – 1876’ Community Cultural Center (Chitalishte) in the Town of Brezovo: Cultural Value and Memory of the Bulgarians in Bessarabia

14:30 – 14:45 MARIYANA TSIBRANSKA-KOSTOVA, KALINA MICHEVA-PEICHEVA, MARCO SCARPA (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; University of Messina, Italy)– Catholic Missionaries as Healers in the Bulgarian Lands under Ottoman Rule in the First Half of the 19th Century

14:45 – 15:00 Discussion

15:00 – 15:20 Coffee break

SECTION „BESSARABIA: IDENTITY, DEMOGRAPHY AND HISTORICAL MEMORY“

15:20 – 16:05

Moderator: Dr. Nikolay Markov

15:20 – 15:35 SVETLANA KOCH, YULIA UZUN (Odesa National University, Ukraine)– The Identity of the Bessarabian Bulgarian Diaspora in the Context of Security Challenges and the Securitization of Border Space

15:35 – 15:50 ALEXANDER GANCHEV (State University of Intellectual Technologies and Communications, Odessa, Ukraine) – Average Marriage Age Among the Bulgarians in Bessarabia from the 19th to the Early 21st Century: Stability and Change

15:50 – 16:05 KALINA KUNEVA, BOZHIDARA DIMOVA, ANDREY BOYADZIEV (Sofia University ‘St Clement of Ohrid’)– Glasnik: A Website with Research Data on Banat and Bessarabia

16:05 – 16:20 Discussion

16:30 – 17:30

Book Presentation. Tatyana Braga, The Names of the Bulgarians in the Bolgrad Region (Southern Bessarabia). Part I. The Identity of the Bessarabian Bulgarians Between Language, History, and Migration. The book is supported by the Publishing Activities Council under the Governing Board of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and funded under the Programme for the Study of the Bulgarian Diaspora Abroad

18:00 – 18:30 Opening of the Exhibition “Zavrashtane” (Return)

The theme of the event “Zavrashtane” (Return) aims to emphasize the idea of returning to one’s roots, as well as rediscovering and strengthening the ties between the Bulgarians of Banat and the Bulgarians of Bessarabia

Ivan Vasilchin – Dudeștii Vechi, Romania

Miki Velchov – Timișoara, Romania

Kiril Meskin – Pleven, Bulgaria

Milkana Meskin – Pleven, Bulgaria

Nina Radovanova – Sofia, Bulgaria

Galina Sintsova – Sofia – Moldova

Natalia Darmancheva – Sofia, Bulgaria

24 OCTOBER 2026 (SATURDAY)

Hall 1, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”

SECTION „LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND MEDIA OF THE CATHOLIC BULGARIANS“

9:30 – 10:30

Moderator: Prof. Margaret Dimitrova

9:30 – 9:45 MAGDALENA ABADJIEVA, LUCA BARBIERI (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; Opera del Vocabolario Italiano) – The Bulgarian-Italian Grammar of Father Stefan Bragalya: Hypotheses and Preliminary Observations

9:45 – 10:00 YAVOR IVANOV (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; St Cyril and St Methodius National Library) – Names of Professions and Positions in the Banat Stories of Yaku Ronkov

10:00 – 10:15 EVGENIA TARLEVA (Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldova)– The Banat Bulgarians and the Bulgarians of Moldova

10:15 – 10:30 SVETLANA KARADZHOVA (Institute of Literature – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

– Gabriel Cociuba (Boris Groškva) and His Diaries: Memory in the Interstices of Meaning

10:30 – 10:45 Discussion

10:45 – 11:15 Coffee break

SECTION „TRADITIONS, RELIGION AND CULTURAL MEMORY“

11:15 – 12:15

Moderator: Assoc. Prof. Krisztina Menyhart

11:15 – 11:30 GALIN GEORGIEV, MILENA MARINOVA (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – Manifestations of the ‘Old Matchmaker’ (starosvatstvo) Custom among the Bessarabian and Banat Bulgarians

11:30 – 11:45 GALINA STOYANOVA (I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine) - Archaic Elements of Birth and Funeral Rites among the Bessarabian Bulgarians in the Context of Diaspora Cultural Memory

11:45 – 12:00 PAVEL VELCIOV (‘Yaku Ronkov’ Community Centre, Star Beshenov, Romania) – Communication through Culinary Traditions – The Bulgarians in Banat (Based on the Experience of the Community Center in Dudeștii Vechi)

12:00 – 12:15 VLADISLAVA SPASOVA (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – The ‘Bessarabian Amalgam’ of National-Revival Spirit and Religious Affiliation: A Vital Code for the Survival of the Bulgarian Diaspora in Moldova

12:15 – 12:30 Discussion

12:30 – 13:45 Lunch break

SECTION „EDUCATION, LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL POLICIES“

13:45 – 14:30

Moderator: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Svetlana Georgieva

13:45 – 14:00 NATALIA MOSKOVCHUK (State University of Intellectual Technologies and Communications, Odessa, Ukraine) – - The Formation of Communicative Competence among Primary School Students Taught in the Languages of National Minorities

14:00 – 14:15 VALENTINA KOVALZHIU (University of National and World Economy, Sofia) – Comparative Analysis of the Policies of Ukraine and Moldova towards the Bulgarian Ethnic Minorities in the Field of Culture

14:15 – 14:30 YOVKA TISHEVA, MARINA JONOVA (Sofia University ‘St Clement of Ohrid’)– Bulgarian Language Island in Serbian Banat – Sustainability and Linguistic Innovations

14:30 – 14:45 Discussion

14:45 – 15:20 Coffee break

SECTION „ONOMASTICS, TOPONYMY AND LEXIS“

15:20 – 16:20

Moderator: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Galin Georgiev

15:20 – 15:35 SVETLANA GEORGIEVA (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine)– Male Personal Names in the Anthroponymicon of the Village of Kamchik (Ukraine) in the Light of Linguistic Archaeology

15:35 – 15:50 OLGA KOLOT (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – Vocabulary of the Female Ritual Costume in the Bulgarian Dialect of the Village of Ternivka, Mykolaiv Region (Ukraine)

15:50 – 16:05 TATYANA BRAGA (Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – Names and Identity of the Bessarabian Bulgarians in Bolgrad in the 19th Century (Based on Archival Documents)

16:05 – 16:20 Discussion

25 OCTOBER 2026 (SUNDAY)

10:00 – 10:15 Connection test with online participants

SECTION „THE MEMORY OF THE CATHOLIC BULGARIANS IN ROMANIA: DOCUMENTS, SONGS AND DRESS“

10:15 – 11:15

Moderator:

10:15 – 10:30 GABRIELA MITU BULAREANU (independent researcher, Romania) – Linguistic Borrowing in Banat Bulgarian Festive Attire: A Socio-Historical Perspective

10:30 – 10:45 MARIUS OANȚĂ (independent researcher, Romania) – The Bulgarian Catholic Community in Cioplea in the Memorials of Archbishop Raymund Netzhammer (19th–20th Centuries)

10:45 – 11:00 CĂTĂLIN GRIGORE (University of Bucharest, Romania) – Preserving the Pavlikean Voice: A Comparative Linguistic and Literary Analysis of Folklore across Two Eras

11:00 – 11:15 VENETA YANKOVA (University of Bucharest; Cyril and Methodius Research Centre – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) - ‘Who Are Strangers in Their Home’ (Hungarian Testimony from 1884 on the Re-emigration of the Banat Bulgarians)

11:15 – 11:30 Discussion

SECTION „BESSARABIA AND TAVRIA: LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND CULTURAL MEMORY“

11:30 – 13:00

Moderator: Assist. Prof. Dr. Olga Kolot

11:30 – 11:45 NADEZDA GAIDARJI (Angel Kanchev University of Ruse – Taraclia Branch, Republic of Moldova) – Voices from the Past, Messages for the Future: Grandmothers’ Songs from Bessarabia in Dialogue with Bulgarian Literary Classics

11:45 – 12:00 MARIA SMIRNOVA (Doctoral School, State University of Moldova)– School Education in the Bulgarian Settlements of Bessarabia in the Second Half of the 19th Century (Based on Materials from the ‘Kishinev Diocesan Gazette’)

12:00 – 12:15 OLGA NOVAK (I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine)– The Bilingual Linguistic Personality in Cognitive Perspective (Based on Field Observations of the Linguistic Behavior of Bessarabian Bulgarians)

12:15 – 12:30 IRINA GANCHEVA-CHURSA (Zaporizhzhia Regional Society for Bulgarian Culture, Ukraine) – The Ukrainian-Bulgarian ‘Lichtarik’ Radiance

12:30 – 12:45 KRASIMIRA KOLEVA (Bogdan Khmelnitsky Melitopol State Pedagogical University – Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine)– The Culture of Bulgarians in Bessarabia as a National Treasure of Ukraine

12:45 – 13:00 SERGEY PACHEV (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) – The Toponymy of Bulgarian Villages in Bessarabia and Tavria as a Marker of Genetic Ties

13:00 – 13:15 Discussion

Financially supported by the Bulgarian National Science Fund under contract No. КП-06-М 100/1 dated 10.12.2025. The Fund is not responsible for the content of the papers presented at the scientific forum, nor for the content of the advertising and other materials for the event.

List of Participants

Prof. Alexander Ganchev, PhD in Economics. State University of Intellectual Technologies and Communications, Odessa, Ukraine, Alexander_Ganchev@yahoo.com

Prof. Alla Romanchenko, PhD in Philosophy. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, apromanchenko@ukr.net

Prof. Dr Andrey Boyadzhiev. Sofia University ‘St Kliment Ohridski’, aboy@uni-sofia.bg

Student Bozhidara Dimova. Sofia University ‘St Kliment Ohridski’, majoring in ‘Bulgarian Philology’, bozidaradimova180@gmail.com

PhD student Valentina Kovaljiu. University of National and World Economy, Sofia, valentina.kovalzhiu@abv.bg

Associate Professor Veneta Yankova, PhD. University of Bucharest; Cyril and Methodius Research Centre – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, veneta_yankova@abv.bg

Dr Vladislava Spasova. Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, semiramissia@yahoo.com

Associate Professor Galin Georgiev, PhD. Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, etnologia@mail.bg

Associate Professor Galina Stoyanova, PhD candidate in History. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, gzstoyanova@gmail.com

Dr Darina Stoyanova. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, d.stoianova@onu.edu.ua

Evgenia Tarleva, MA. Bulgarian Community in the Republic of Moldova, evgheniatt@gmail.com

Senior Assistant Professor Dr Elena Vodinchar. Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, elena.vodinchar@iefem.bas.bg

Irina Gancheva-Chursa, MA. Zaporizhzhia Regional Society for Bulgarian Culture, Ukraine, 71irina19@gmail.com

Prof. Dr Yovka Tisheva. Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”, tisheva@uni-sofia.bg

Kalinia Kuneva, student. Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, majoring in “Bulgarian Philology”, kalinakuneva8@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof. Dr Kalina Micheva-Peicheva. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; k.micheva@gmail.com

Dr Krasimira Koleva. Lecturer in Bulgarian Language, Literature and Culture at the Melitopol State Pedagogical University “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” – Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine k.koleva@shu.bg

Associate Professor Kristina Menhart. Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary, menyhart.krisztina@btk.elte.hu

Associate Professor Dr Magdalena Abadzhieva. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, msabadzhieva@gmail.com

Prof. Dr Margaret Dimitrova. Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”, marg@slav.unisofia.bg

Assoc. Prof. Dr Marina Dzhonova. Sofia University “St Kliment Ohridski”, djonova@slav.uni-sofia.bg

Prof. Dr Maria Brus. Carpathian National University “V. Stefanik”, Ukraine, mariia.brus@cnu.edu.ua

Maria Smirnova, MA, PhD. Doctoral School, State University of Moldova, smirnova.maria@taraclia.edu.md

Prof. Mariana Tsibranska-Kostova, PhD. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, tzibran@ibl.bas.bg

Senior Lecturer Dr Milena Marinova. Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, etnologia@mail.bg

Senior Lecturer Dr Nadezhda Gaydarji. Angel Kanchev University of Ruse – Taraclia Branch, Republic of Moldova, ngaydarzhi@uni-ruse.bg

Associate Professor Natalia Moskovchuk, PhD candidate in Pedagogical Sciences. State University of Intellectual Technologies and Communications, Odessa, Ukraine, moskovchuknata85@gmail.com

Ms Nikolet Ciocani. Radio Timișoara, Romania, eticiocani@yahoo.com

Senior Lecturer Dr Olga Kolot. ‘Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin’ Institute of the Bulgarian Language – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Kolotol2811@gmail.com

Associate Professor Olga Novak, PhD candidate in Philology. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, olga.novak@onu.edu.ua

Senior Lecturer Dr / Associate Professor Dr Svetlana Georgieva. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – BAS; “I. I. Mechnikov” Odessa National University, sgeorgijevamititel@gmail.com

Dr Svetlana Karadjova. Institute of Literature – BAS, svetlana.karadzhova@gmail.com

Prof. Dr Svetlana Koch. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, svetlana.v.koch@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof. Dr Sergei Pachev. Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the Ethnographic Museum – BAS, psergej69@abv.bg

Senior Assistant Professor Dr Tatyana Braga. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – BAS, bragakarakash@gmail.com

Prof. Dr Yulia Uzun. I. I. Mechnikov Odessa National University, Ukraine, uv_uzun@onu.edu.ua

Dr Yavor Ivanov. “Prof. Lyubomir Andreychin” Institute of the Bulgarian Language – BAS / “Sts Cyril and Methodius” National Library, ivanov.popa@gmail.com

Eng. Bono Cucalan. Mayor of the municipality of Dudești Veci, Romania, bcucalan@gmail.com

PhD Cătălin Grigore. University of Bucharest, Romania, grigorecatalin@yahoo.com

Gabriela Mitu Bulareanu. Independent researcher, Romania, mitu_gabriela@yahoo.com

PhD Iancu-Constantin Berceanu. The Association for Banat Culture, Romania, meteaic@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof., PhD Kenta Sugai. Hokkaido University, Japan, ksugai1227@hotmail.com

Prof. Luca Barbieri. Opera del Vocabolario Italiano, luca.barbieri@cnr.it

PhD Marius Oanță. Independent researcher, Romania, mariusu1981@gmail.com

PhD Nicolae Markov. ‘Sorin Titel’ Timiș County Library, Romania, nickmarkov@gmail.com

Pavel Velciov. ‘Yaku Ronkov’ Community Centre, Star Beșenov, Romania, velciovpavel.dv@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof. Marco Scarpa. University of Messina, Italy, marscarpa@unime.it

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Radu Magdin, Financial Intelligence, 1 October 2026

Summary

Romania has entered an economic phase in which passively attracting Western capital is no longer sufficient. Western capital has become selective and is reallocating its assets, opening up space for regional competitors. Six neighbouring economies are already on the offensive (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece, Turkey and Israel), actively expanding into the Romanian market, whilst Ukraine is set to become a major player after the war.

Although there are already a few Romanian champions making overseas acquisitions (Banca Transilvania, TeraPlast, Aquila, Pavăl Holding), these remain the exception. For Romania to make the transition from a mere destination to a regional investor, the future government must take on three major economic priorities:

1. Restoring competitiveness – through infrastructure, a predictable tax system and the reduction of red tape.

2. Attracting foreign investment – retaining Western capital and attracting investment from Asia and the Global South.

3. The internationalisation of Romanian businesses – supporting exports and financing the cross-border expansion of local companies.

Article

Romania has prospered over the last two decades largely on capital from the West. The next phase calls for something different. We will still need to attract capital, but we will also have to learn to generate Romanian capital capable of playing a role in the region. Around us, six economies have already gone on the offensive. The seventh, Ukraine, will change the game the day the guns fall silent.

Capital doesn’t leave. It circulates

For twenty years, the economic story of Central and Eastern Europe has been almost linear. Capital flowed in from the West, and the region’s countries vied to welcome it: factories, banks, hypermarkets, energy networks, service centres. The winners were those offering land, cheap labour and a favourable tax regime.

Western capital remains essential. However, the major groups have become far more selective. They are reviewing their portfolios, withdrawing from markets where they are no longer number one or two, and concentrating their resources where returns and strategic stakes justify the effort. The returns that the region offered 15 or 20 years ago no longer come automatically.

Carrefour is the most recent and telling example. The French group sold its Romanian operations to Pavăl Holding in a deal worth 823 million euros, and from 30 June 2026, Carrefour Romania no longer featured in the group’s results, a decision linked to its focus on core markets. One detail is worth noting: the Polish group Żabka was also among the potential buyers mentioned in the international press. This time, the asset remained with a Romanian group. There is no guarantee that the same will be true next time.

The shake-up is not coming solely from the West. OTP, the Hungarian bank which for years was the symbol of Budapest’s regional ambition, has withdrawn from Romania by selling its subsidiary to Banca Transilvania. Regional capital is also reassessing its bets.

We are not witnessing an exodus. Romania continues to attract investment. We are witnessing a maturing of capital, and in such a phase only one thing matters: who is prepared to buy when someone else is selling. This leads to the question that truly interests me. Who is occupying the vacated ground? The answer compels us to look much more closely at Romania’s 6+1 competitive neighbours.

The northern flank: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary

Poland is a textbook example of an economy that has transitioned from being a destination for Western capital to becoming an exporter of its own capital. Polish companies no longer come to Romania merely with products. They come to buy, to build networks and to gain market share.

Żabka has done so methodically. The group entered Romania in February 2024, acquiring a majority stake in DRIM Daniel Distribuție, and within two years the Froo network had grown to 204 shops. Its stated ambition is much greater: the group is talking about 4,000 shops in Romania. In the pharmaceutical sector, the trend has been even more pronounced. Polpharma, Poland’s largest pharmaceutical manufacturer, acquired Biofarm in a deal worth approximately 270 million euros – one of the most significant takeovers on the Romanian capital market in recent years. We are talking about a company that has been on the market since 1921, with brands such as Carmol, Triferment and Colebil.

I have no criticism of the seller. Every exit has its own logic, and Polish money is welcome. However, these transactions tell us something about who currently has liquidity, appetite and a regional strategy.

The Czech Republic is following the same playbook, albeit with less fanfare. EMMA Capital, through Premier Energy, has built a robust energy platform in Romania and the Republic of Moldova and continues to grow through acquisitions. Czech capital realised long ago that the region is its natural market.

Hungary is deliberately pursuing the creation of regional champions in banking, energy, telecommunications and industry. Some attempts succeed, others do not, and OTP’s exit shows that even Budapest does not win every battle. The direction, however, remains clear: Hungarian capital is seeking a regional footprint, with a state that supports it without reservation.

Warsaw, Prague and Budapest no longer view us merely as neighbours or as an export market. They view us as a territory for expansion. This is precisely what I have termed, in other writings, ‘coopetition’: we are allies in NATO, partners in the European Union, standing shoulder to shoulder on the eastern flank, and uncompromising competitors in the market. These two realities are not mutually exclusive. Problems arise only when one side overlooks the other.

The southern flank: Greece, Turkey, Israel

Competitive pressure is also coming from the south.

Following the 2010 crisis, Greek banks withdrew almost entirely from Romania. Greek capital, however, returned through a different channel: energy, infrastructure and property. PPC, which took over Enel’s assets, has become one of the key players in the Romanian energy sector, and for many Greek companies, Romania has once again become the natural market for expansion.

Turkish capital has become more sophisticated. It no longer means just trade, construction or traditional manufacturing, but increasingly energy, industry, logistics and acquisitions with strategic implications. For Ankara, Romania is both an important market and a platform within the European Union.

Israeli capital has a long history in Romania, in property, agriculture, technology and energy, and continues to view the Romanian market as one of the natural gateways to Central and Eastern Europe.

Greece, Turkey and Israel are not all neighbours on the map. However, they are, ever more clearly, neighbours in the market.

+1: Ukraine

The factor that could rewrite the regional equation is Ukraine.

Today it operates as a war economy. Tomorrow, reconstruction will attract capital, international financial institutions and companies specialising in infrastructure, energy, technology, logistics and industry from all over the world. The Odessa–Galați–Constanța corridor could become one of Europe’s economic arteries.

Geography gives us our position. It does not give us the dividends.

There is an asymmetry that we should recognise now, not in five years’ time: Ukrainian firms could gain ground in Romania and the European Union more quickly than Romanian firms are gaining ground in Ukraine. Nova Post has expanded internationally in the midst of the war, and Romania is one of the markets where this is evident. After the war, this trend will accelerate.

The reconstruction of Ukraine cannot be viewed from Bucharest solely in terms of transit, ports and motorways. It is a competition for economic standing. If Polish, German, French, American or Turkish firms penetrate the Ukrainian economy more quickly and more deeply, whilst Ukrainian firms enter Romania in the meantime, we risk a paradox: being one of the main gateways to reconstruction without being amongst its main corporate beneficiaries.

We have a few champions. We need a generation.

The good news is that we are not starting from scratch.

Banca Transilvania has acquired OTP Bank Romania and, through Victoriabank, holds a significant position in the Republic of Moldova. TeraPlast has gone even further than we might have expected a few years ago: following the Republic of Moldova, Hungary, Austria and Croatia, Spain has become the group’s fifth foreign market. Aquila has completed the takeover of KITAX, one of the top five distributors in its sector in Hungary, a move which the company’s management has described as its entry into a second foreign market, following the Republic of Moldova. Pavăl Holding has moved on from Praktiker Hellas to a transaction of a different magnitude: Carrefour Romania.

The issue is one of scale. Four or five names that anyone following the market can rattle off do not constitute a national strategy. These cases must cease to be exceptions and become the start of a pattern.

I have argued on several occasions that Romanian statecraft will never be complete without Romanian businesscraft. We deliberately need a larger cohort of companies capable of buying, investing, producing and selling across borders. Not through protectionism. Nor through the administrative selection of so-called ‘winners’. But by building an ecosystem in which high-performing Romanian firms can become regional players, and some of them, global players.

Three priorities for the next government

Romania must bounce back, not just in terms of economic growth statistics, but in its ability to compete. In a region where others are playing an offensive game, the next government should put three major economic priorities on the table.

The first is a return to competitiveness. The figures are stark. Romania has dropped 12 places to 61st out of 70 economies in the IMD 2026 ranking, trailing behind Poland (41), Hungary (51) and Bulgaria (56). The details are even more worrying: we have slipped to 69th place in business environment efficiency, down from 50th, and to 61st in government efficiency, down from 44th. Being second-to-last in business environment efficiency is not merely a statistic. It is the message received by every board that compares us with Warsaw or Budapest. The problem cannot be reduced to a budget deficit or an unfavourable economic cycle. Competitiveness means infrastructure, competitively priced energy, a predictable tax system, a government that makes decisions swiftly, human capital, digitalisation, innovation and, above all, a state that does not hold back companies seeking to grow. You cannot aspire to be a leading regional economy with second-rate tools.

The second priority is attractiveness to foreign investment. Western capital remains fundamental, but competition for it is far fiercer than it was ten or twenty years ago. Romania must once again become an obvious choice when a board in the United States, Germany, France or the United Kingdom decides where to locate its next factory, energy investment, logistics hub or technology operation. At the same time, we must prepare for another wave: that of capital from Asia and the Global South. As the EU’s trade relations with India, Mercosur, the Gulf states and Asian economies deepen, Romania can become one of the European hubs for this capital. Foreign investment is not just about jobs. It means a country’s capitalisation, technology, know-how and connection to the decision-making centres of the global economy.

The third priority is the internationalisation of Romanian capital and the growth of exports, elevated to the status of a national economic objective. This requires dedicated funding, guarantee schemes, trade intelligence, support for overseas acquisitions and genuine coordination between the state, banks, investment funds and entrepreneurs. We already have proof that these instruments work when they are in place: Exim Banca Românească provided €14.7 million in financing for TeraPlast’s acquisitions in Hungary and Spain. What is lacking is scale and consistency. We have very capable people in economic diplomacy. They need a clear political mandate and commensurate institutional support. Romania must not only know how to invite investors to Bucharest, but also to accompany its companies to Warsaw, Prague, Istanbul, Dubai, Delhi or São Paulo.

These three priorities are mutually reinforcing. Competitiveness attracts investment. Investment capitalises and modernises the economy. A more competitive and better-capitalised economy, in turn, produces companies capable of exporting and purchasing beyond its borders.

From an attractive Romania to a proactive Romania

This is the paradigm shift we need.

The first wave that transformed Romania was Western capital. It remains vital, but has become selective, and every major investment must once again be earned. The second wave is regional capital: Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Greek, Turkish and Israeli. It is welcome, provided we understand that the economies producing it are simultaneously our partners and competitors. The third wave will increasingly come from Asia and the Global South, seeking platforms for access to the European market.

Romania must attract all these waves. But it must also learn to generate its own wave.

In the coming decade, Romania’s economic success will no longer be measured solely by how many foreign companies have factories or service centres here. It will also be measured by how many Romanian companies have factories, subsidiaries, networks and customers in Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Athens, Istanbul, Chișinău or Kyiv, and further afield, in the major hubs of the global economy.

Our 6+1 competitive neighbours are not a threat. They are a sign that the region has matured and that the others have already gone on the offensive.

Our journey has three stages: from Romania as a destination to Romania as a platform and, increasingly, to Romania as an investor. The others have already climbed the first two. It is up to us to keep pace – and to do so quickly.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Sofia, 1 October 2026 — Taraclia, home to the largest Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldova, will become a municipality with its own second-tier administrative status under the local government reform presented today by Prime Minister Vasile Tofan.

The reform replaces the country’s 32 districts or raions with three large regions — North, Centre and South — while Taraclia is transformed from a raion into a municipality, alongside the two existing municipalities: the capital Chișinău and Bălți, Moldova’s second largest city. The Gagauz autonomy retains its autonomous status. Parliament is expected to adopt the legislative package this autumn.

The decision takes account of the ethnocultural and linguistic particularities of the area and of Moldova’s commitments to the protection of national minorities. In practice, Taraclia keeps a directly elected administration of its own, rather than being part of the new South region.
“The Bulgarian community is part of who we are as a country. Taraclia has preserved its language, its traditions and its ties with Bulgaria for two centuries, and Moldova is stronger for it. The Government wants the people of Taraclia to build their future at home, in a thriving community, as citizens of a European Moldova. This reform gives Taraclia the status, the resources and the tools to do that,” Prime Minister Tofan said.

Some 38,000 citizens of Moldova declared Bulgarian ethnicity in the 2024 census. Bulgarians make up about 64% of the population of Taraclia district and form the majority in the town of Taraclia, Tvardița, Corten and Valea Perjei, with further communities across the south of the country. The new status builds on a decade of growing cooperation between Moldova and Bulgaria aimed at strengthening the identity and culture of the Bulgarian community in Moldova. Under an agreement between the two governments, the former Taraclia State University became a branch of the “Angel Kanchev” University of Ruse in 2024, giving students in southern Moldova access to a European Union degree at home; the branch enrolled more than 200 students within weeks of opening, and Ruse University took ownership of the campus in July 2025. Bulgarian is taught in schools across the area, and Bulgaria has been a consistent supporter of Moldova’s European Union membership bid.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

The three countries are progressively implementing the memorandum of understanding signed in December 2025, which set out the path towards the construction of transport corridors between them and on to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine

Mediapool, 29 September 2026

Summary

At a high-level meeting in Brussels, the transport ministers of Bulgaria (Georgi Peev) and Greece (Christos), together with Romania’s State Secretary for Transport (Ionel Scrioșteanu), European Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas, coordinators of European transport corridors and the Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, Robert de Groot, signed an action plan for cross-border connectivity.

Key highlights of the plan and the project:

• Scope and funding: Twenty-five key projects with a high level of readiness, totalling nearly 22.8 billion euros, have been approved for routes between the Aegean Sea, the Danube and the Black Sea.

• Priorities: The focus is on rail connectivity (higher speeds, capacity, electrification and links to ports), as well as the modernisation of connections between Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.

• Specific projects:

  • Modernisation of the Burgas–Varna–Ruse railway line and design of new bridges over the Danube at Silistra and Nikopol (by 2034).

  • Deepening of the Danube (FAST2 Danube) by 2028.

  • Rapid modernisation and electrification of the Ruse–Giurgiu–Bucharest rail link (2028–2030).

  • Construction of a new combined rail and road bridge between Ruse and Giurgiu, with bypass routes, by 2032.

• Synchronisation and military mobility: Bulgarian Transport Minister Georgi Peev emphasised the need for synchronised infrastructure development on both sides of the borders, support for increased European funding (2028–2034) and ensuring that new projects comply with requirements for military mobility and crisis preparedness.

Video – ‘Connected Europe’ Days 2026: The ‘Friends of South-East Europe’ High-Level Group bridging the gaps between them

Opening address by Apostolos Tsitsikostas, European Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism

Signing of the ‘Political Commitment to Ensure Cross-Border Connectivity in South-East Europe’

Article

Bulgaria, Greece and Romania have drawn up an action plan for the implementation of 25 key transport projects worth nearly 23 billion euros along the routes between the Aegean Sea, the Danube and the Black Sea. This took place during a high-level meeting in Brussels on the theme “Friends of South-Eastern Europe: Bridging the gaps together”, according to the press office of the Ministry of Transport.

The action plan was signed by Bulgaria’s Minister of Transport, Georgi Peev; Greece’s Minister of Transport, Christos; and Romania’s State Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure, Ionel Scrioșteanu. The document was also signed by Apostolos Tzitzikostas, European Commissioner for Sustainable Transport and Tourism; Mario Mauro, coordinator of the “Baltic Sea–Black Sea–Aegean Sea” European Transport Corridor; the coordinator of the ‘Rhine–Danube’ European Transport Corridor, Margarida Marques, and the Vice-President of the European Investment Bank, Robert de Groot.

The action plan implements the memorandum of understanding between the governments of the three countries on enhanced cross-border cooperation within the framework of the Black Sea–Aegean Sea Corridor platform, signed on 3 December 2025.

Key projects

Twenty-five of a total of 53 projects have been identified as initiatives of key importance and with a high degree of readiness. These are major cross-border links, bridges, and rail and road corridors. Their total value is approximately €22.8 billion, with funding partially secured. The aim is to build a continuous transport network along the North–South and East–West axes, according to the Ministry of Transport.

Rail connectivity forms the dominant part of the project portfolio in the signed action plan. The objectives are higher speeds, greater freight capacity, electrification, European safety systems, the doubling of certain sections, better connections to ports, and more reliable links between Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.

The modernisation of sections along one of the busiest rail routes – between Burgas, Varna and Ruse – as well as the design of two new bridges over the Danube – at Silistra and Nikopol – are also earmarked for funding up to 2034.

Among the projects set to be implemented most quickly is the modernisation of the existing Ruse–Giurgiu–Bucharest rail link, including the electrification of the existing bridge. The project will apply for funding under the ‘Reflow call’ of the Connecting Europe Facility within the current programming period. The implementation period is 2028–2030.

The deepening of the waterway border between Bulgaria and Romania, FAST2 Danube, is one of the projects with secured funding, and its completion is scheduled for 2028.

The construction of a new combined rail and road bridge between Giurgiu and Ruse, with bypass routes around both cities, is expected to be completed by 2032.

More funding for cross-border cooperation

“Cross-border projects for which there is political commitment, technical readiness and a realistic prospect of funding must be simultaneously included in national investment programmes, so that the construction of infrastructure on both sides of the border takes place in a synchronised manner,” said the Minister of Transport and Communications, Georgi Peev, during the forum. He added that a strategic priority for Bulgaria is to link the Aegean Sea, via Bulgaria, with the Danube, Romania and the European transport network.

The Bulgarian transport minister expressed Bulgaria’s support for substantial European funding for cross-border transport infrastructure in the EU’s next financial framework for 2028–2034, as well as for an increase in resources under the Connecting Europe Facility.

“When planning new infrastructure, the transport and defence sectors must work together from the very outset, so that investments meet both economic needs and the requirements for sustainability, crisis preparedness and military mobility,” said Georgi Peev.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

An interview with Dan Pîrșan from the Association of Prosumers and Energy Communities in Romania on the problems facing the Romanian energy sector, the boom in prosumers north of the Danube, and some comparisons with the Bulgarian energy sector

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 27 September 2026

Summary

• Main cause of the crisis: The summer energy crisis in Romania in 2026 was triggered by the drought and low water levels in the Danube, the shutdown of units at the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Station, and the acute shortage of energy storage capacity (batteries and pumped-storage hydroelectric plants).

• Investment roadblock: Transelectrica and the regulator ANRE have awarded grid connection points to ‘paper’ projects without financial guarantees, thereby blocking new investors from connecting batteries to the grid.

• State interests and windfall profits: The state uses the energy companies (Hidroelectrica, Nuclearelectrica, Transelectrica) as a ‘cash cow’ for dividends. The hydroelectric giant Hidroelectrica earns huge sums on the balancing market by selling evening electricity at 10–20 times the normal price, which is why it has no interest in the entry of competing battery storage systems.

• A blow to the industry: Expensive electricity (18 euro cents/kWh) and red tape scuppered the construction of a solar farm for the car factory in Mioveni, prompting Renault to relocate production of the Dacia Spring to Slovenia and make 1,500 redundancies.

• Comparison with Bulgaria: Bulgaria is far ahead in energy storage (8.6 GW of capacity, which is used to balance the Romanian market in the evenings as well), whilst Romania leads convincingly in the number of prosumers.

• A boom in prosumers: There are over 370,000 prosumers in Romania. Around half of them are already installing their own batteries to ensure their energy self-sufficiency.

Interview

Introduction

Dan Pîrșan, Chairman of the Association of Prosumers and Energy Communities in Romania, comments on the setbacks and the recent crisis in the country’s energy sector, caused by low water levels in the Danube and the shutdown of the nuclear power station.

Romania and the development of new electricity storage capacity

Mr Pîrșan, this summer Romania faced a severe energy crisis. Part of this was due to a lack of sufficient electricity storage capacity. However, reports are already appearing in the press that Romania is working on building new storage capacity. What do you know about these developments?

Here, journalists, ministers and officials from the Ministry of Energy, in their official communications – including ANRE (the National Energy Regulatory Authority) – seem to imagine that Bulgaria will remain stagnant, whilst Romania will grow like a girl in a fairy tale. I have always said that this is simply not possible. And I have arguments to back this up.

Even if we assume that you stop investing in storage and private capital in Bulgaria stops investing in this, Romania will not be able to reach the 8.6 GW of capacity that your country has, as there is nowhere to connect this installed capacity. In other words, to put it simply, Transelectrica – the operator that manages the grid connection points – has no spare capacity. Technical permits for connection have been issued but have not materialised and will not materialise; there is simply nowhere to connect the connection points for tens, hundreds or thousands of batteries and pumped-storage hydroelectric power stations.

In other words, if 10 billion euros were to flow into Romania tomorrow from investors and banks for energy storage, they would be unable to put it into practice: they would bring in the batteries, but there would be nowhere to connect them to the National Energy System. And this is, in practice, the main reason why Romania will not be able to develop this sector significantly.

Yes, I agree, ‘the sharks have smelled blood in the water’ and every week there are reports of new storage capacities – enough to make your head spin – hundreds of megawatts every week. But these are merely projects on paper that have not materialised. There are very few available connection points for these batteries — such as those you have in Southern Bulgaria — because most are, so to speak, already reserved, yet the projects themselves remain unfinished.

There may be willingness, there may be optimism, there may be unlimited funds, but we have nowhere to connect them because mistakes were made in allocating the connection points without any guarantees. And here, the regulator ANRE and Transelectrica are both to blame, hand in hand.

The causes of the energy crisis in Romania in the summer of 2026

Romania has far greater energy resources than Bulgaria and, accordingly, far greater ambitions. I can give examples such as its desire to be the leading producer of natural gas in the European Union, the development of wind energy, and so on.

How is it possible for a country with such significant strategic interests, such grand ambitions and resources to have fallen into this energy crisis this summer and to find itself in the situation you have just described — with difficulties in installing batteries?

It is entirely possible, despite the country’s natural resources. Indeed, it is only this autumn that a gas-fired power station will be commissioned, and even that is not funded by the Romanian state — the investment comes from Saudi Arabia, for a plant with a capacity of just over a thousand megawatts; in practice, this is a conversion of an old thermal power station, which the Saudi Arabian investors have managed to carry out, rather than the Romanian state.

The Neptun Deep project for gas from the Black Sea is, after all, a concrete plan. But instead of using gas, instead of investing in storage… we have a fairly significant daily surplus of electricity for six to seven months of the year, generated by photovoltaic panels. Romania has the opportunity to build a pumped-storage hydroelectric power station near Tarnița, but over the past 10 years, six feasability studies have been commissioned and they have still not been able to get the project off the ground.

As for Romania, we could say that it has the resources, but unfortunately it seems that certain interests have led to energy becoming a convenient means for the Romanian state to tax its citizens. Because what you and your fellow citizens need to know is this: 70–80 per cent of the energy is produced by companies in which the Romanian state is the majority shareholder. In this way, these companies have made huge profits, which have been channelled as dividends to the Romanian state.

To put it simply: Hidroelectrica, Nuclearelectrica and Transelectrica were, and continue to be, run politically, without specialists. And the surplus – the money they received from the sale and production of energy – goes mainly towards dividends for the state. The Romanian state uses energy producers as a piggy bank — whenever it needed money, it took dividends.

It is true that, as the majority owner, it did not even allow them to make major investments, but they themselves did not bother to ask for them either. Consequently, even if there were very large investments in storage, energy prices would not fall in either 2027 or 2028, as these investments would be quite limited — in other words, we should not expect a deluge of batteries, as I told you. On the other hand, those who do invest are private companies that will want to sell their stored energy in the mornings and evenings at good prices in order to recoup their investments.

Renault and its interests in the Romanian energy sector

How do you explain the fact that the Romanian energy sector is developing so slowly and, consequently, prices are high, whilst money is made through dividends and through taxation on electricity — a topic you touched upon in your previous interview with Mediapool?

The Renault Group operates in Romania – in Pitești and Mioveni – where they stated that in Romania they pay 18 eurocents per kilowatt-hour of electricity, whilst in Spain they pay between 6 and 7. They issued a warning to the Romanian government that there is a lack of dialogue on this issue and that there is a risk that Dacia – the Romanian brand – could be lost precisely because of the high cost of energy.

This is because someone who was present at the table when the president of Renault Romania made the statement in Paris remarked that, in practical terms, a car manufacturer needs three basic ingredients: people, metal and energy. These are the key elements required for a car company to operate in a given country. They have the workforce, and they’re paid what they’re paid — even the head of Mercedes recently cited Romania as an example, where wages in the car industry are much lower than in Germany. In other words, he held this up as a financial scare tactic. Metal: they have a procurement department that knows where to buy it from. But they have to get their energy from the Romanian state!

Here’s another revelation for you: I was in the Romanian Parliament and sitting to my left was a delegation from Renault – there were senators and MPs all around… The people from Renault Romania took the floor and explained to the politicians in Romanian (they spoke neither English nor French) that the senior management of the Renault Group had granted them the sum of 1.5 million euros to build a solar park to help the plant in Mioveni pay less for energy, at least during the day. They did not give us any specific figures. The project fell through because the distribution operator in the Pitești area – which, just like in your country, has a regional monopoly – demanded almost double the amount just to connect this park to the National Grid. Moreover, the park was to be situated on land that Renault already owned, meaning there was no need to purchase any land. They demanded over 2 million euros just for the connection!

In light of this, the chairman of the Renault Group stated that he was not prepared to pay such a sum simply to connect a single plant. And this is how greed, stupidity or ulterior motives mean that politicians… we received absolutely no response from them! That is what I am trying to tell you. The politicians failed to grasp the consequences of this event. And following it, the Dacia Spring — the electric car that was supposed to be produced in Pitești — went to Slovenia, and 1,500 people were made redundant in Mioveni because the production line was simply relocated.

And so, here we have politicians and certain companies in Romania acting against the national interest. This is an example I witnessed with my own eyes – it hasn’t been recounted or read about. It’s simply that these people showed no reaction whatsoever when Dacia Pitești told them: “We’re going to lose a production line with 1,500 jobs.”

As for the ‘smooth operators’ (the so-called ‘smart boys’ in Romanian socio-political rhetoric – author’s note)… They operate in the energy trading sector and are active in several areas. These individuals, who have embedded themselves in the National Energy System, are so deeply entrenched in politics, in energy companies and in business dealings with them that serious reform is needed. Such a reform, which the – in my view – irreplaceable former Minister of Energy Sebastian Burduja was unable to carry out. Nor has a single Minister of Energy in Romania over the last 10–15–20 years managed to implement it. So the reform of the energy system never actually happened.

Romania has no chance of building data centres

At the moment, there is a global craze for building data centres, which consume a great deal of water and energy, with a preference for cheap energy. What are Romania’s chances, in this situation, of attracting such centres — American, European or any others?

Zero. From my point of view — zero. Because the summer of 2026 proved that we have neither water for cooling nor enough energy. Data centres must operate 24/7 and are extremely energy-intensive, which is why they need cheap energy. No, Romania has no chance of attracting such investments, because energy here is expensive even compared to Western European countries, as well as compared to Bulgaria. So we have no competitive advantages for such investments.

Energy links between Bulgaria and Romania

Large-scale plans for investment in energy infrastructure were recently announced, including plans to increase the capacity of the Bulgaria–Romania electricity interconnector. What can we expect in terms of regional connections and the mutual importance of the two countries in the energy sector?

Bulgaria is very important to Romania — it has been and continues to be so, given that in the evenings it used to supplement Romania’s energy needs with Greek electricity via Bulgarian transmission lines. This is because the shortfall of 2,000–2,200–2,500 MW in the evenings, when there was insufficient water in the Danube and no nuclear power, was extremely costly to compensate for. So Bulgaria put this idea into practice, exploiting vulnerabilities to the south and north, and in this way managed to cover a range that would otherwise have created enormous difficulties. Without Bulgaria playing this role, evening and morning prices in Romania would have skyrocketed. I congratulate the Bulgarian investors who had this vision.

Who were the main beneficiaries in the balancing market and the evening electricity market? Hidroelectrica! Hidroelectrica operates cascades of small hydroelectric power stations on certain rivers in Romania, which it only operates when balancing consumption is required. And they sold it at 10, 15 or 20 times the price they would have charged had they sold the energy during the day. In this way, Hidroelectrica profited significantly from the lack of batteries.

For this reason — so that Hidroelectrica could monetise and make a lot of money alongside Transelectrica (Note: two state-owned companies which the state regards as cash cows) — these two entities (Transelectrica, which determines who participates in balancing, and Hidroelectrica, which was the favourite for this) acted in this way. You know just as well that coal-fired power stations take up to two days to come online, whilst gas-fired ones have even longer lead times. So the balancing was carried out precisely by hydroelectric power stations!

If we had batteries, they would have created huge competition for Hidroelectrica. Then electricity would have been cheap in the evenings, and in a normal country Hidroelectrica wouldn’t have generated those windfall profits. So the simple and straightforward answer as to why Romania doesn’t have batteries — without getting into political wrangling, as I’m not involved in politics — is that there was simply no desire to do so. Because that’s how both Transelectrica and, above all, Hidroelectrica made a mountain of money on the balancing market, which they extracted from hydropower, rather than it going to battery operators.

Prosumers in Romania

What are the latest developments in the prosumer sector and within your organisation?

I have some good news: we’re approaching 370,000 people. We’re growing by over 10,000 prosumers a month. And our association now has over 2,300 members, each paying an annual membership fee of 100 lei (around 20 euros). So the number of prosumers is growing rapidly. By the end of the year, we will have reached over 400,000, and by the end of 2027 — over 500,000.

There is more good news: by the end of the year, of those 400,000, 200,000 will most likely already have storage systems in place, and for at least eight months of the year, many of them will be completely energy-independent. So, prosumers in Romania have realised the importance of storage before the state has, and the time-shifting (chemical/energy) of solar energy from midday to the evening, night and morning provides them with a high degree of autonomy.

How do you explain the fact that the Romanian state — which you criticised for acting against industrial and public interests — has allowed such a large number of prosumers to emerge and become established? Why is Bulgaria, which has done so well with batteries, lagging significantly behind when it comes to prosumers?

European directives have supported prosumerism and led to the adoption of the relevant legislation. We have laws – some clear, others less so, but generally favourable to the rights of prosumers, which I defend. Our association entered the fray relatively late, in 2024, but it came just in time. Before that, there were senators and MPs who supported the European requirements. So we had seeds that sprouted and bore fruit. Once a law has been passed, it is difficult to pretend it does not exist.

The Association of Prosumers and Energy Communities made a major contribution through its knowledge of the regulatory framework, by proposing draft legislation and, above all, through its cooperation with the European Commission. This is recognised at a political level, and the fact that our voice is growing ever stronger makes it impossible for us to be ignored. With 400,000 businesses and households, that amounts to nearly one million voters — politicians cannot afford to take such a large number of people lightly.

For this reason, regarding your question as to why Bulgaria has not followed the same path, I cannot give a precise answer. Indeed, the situation with prosumers in Bulgaria — in terms of their numbers and how they connect to the grid — is utterly discouraging. We’ve done the maths and, unfortunately, for a prosumer in Bulgaria, taking into account all the charges and the feed-in tariff (not to mention the transformers they have to replace at their own expense), the investment would only pay for itself after 18 years! Whereas in Romania, a 6 kW system pays for itself in between 4 and 6 years. That is a significant difference which citizens are taking note of.

And the solution to the problem starts in Sofia — that is my view. It all comes down to the lack of legislation or the fact that, in your country too, the energy sector appears to be strictly regulated. Because we must acknowledge the following: every prosumer in Bulgaria, Romania, Germany or the Netherlands who invests in energy generation on their roof or in their garden, especially if they also have a battery, is lost as a customer to the energy companies. It seems that your companies have realised this and have put the issue on the back burner.

The struggles surrounding the Prosumer Act

You fought for the adoption of the Prosumer Act, which comes into force this autumn. What can be said about its implementation?

We fought and continue to fight, because the battle is not over. Unfortunately, the regulator ANRE attempted to water down the impact of a law that was just one A4 page long by initially drafting a full 61 pages of regulations — as if it were laying down the rules for the migration of humanity to another planet. We strongly criticised the initial draft, which was put out for public consultation. Today (21 September 2026), the new proposals for regulations were published… I say ‘proposals’ in the plural, as two versions have been put forward instead of one, totalling 86 pages compared to the original 61. Unfortunately, I do not believe we will be able to change the regulator’s and the providers’ intentions in any way other than through the courts. This is a battle that prosumers will have to fight, however long it may take.

So the fight continues. The Prosumer Act will introduce European standards, particularly regarding payment methods. In Romania, prosumers were paid for their surplus energy only two years after the billing date — I don’t think there was any other country in the world like that! There were supply companies that didn’t issue invoices for three years, so people had to wait five years for their money. However, we taught them how to switch suppliers and claim what was due to them by law. We beat them at their own game.

Things will return to normal. But let’s see what surprises the regulator ANRE has in store for us in the meantime.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Mihai Isac, Cotidianul, 20 September 2026

Summary

The article ‘Ukraine is outpacing us in the Carpathians, or how Romania remains in the wake of others’ geopolitics’, published by Mihai Isac in Cotidianul on 20 September 2026, analyses Bucharest’s lack of diplomatic initiative regarding the regional potential of the Carpathian region.

The main points and analyses in the text include:

• Kiev’s political and geopolitical initiative: Although Romania accounts for over half of the European Carpathians’ area, Ukraine has taken the lead and organised the first summit of the Carpathian Integration Initiative on 18 September 2026 in Ivano-Frankivsk, as well as the Carpathian Economic Forum. President Volodymyr Zelensky has brought the countries of the region together around a new architecture linking energy, transport, security, investment and European integration.

• The scale of the Ukrainian project: Kyiv presented an investment portfolio comprising 95 projects worth over 42.5 billion euros, attracting nearly 1,400 participants from 25 countries and 400 companies. The joint statement provides for annual meetings, coordination between governments and local authorities, as well as the examination of a future EU macro-regional strategy for the Carpathians. Ukraine is placing energy sustainability, infrastructure and logistics at the heart of its future reconstruction, whilst waging a war against Russia.

• The contrast with Bucharest’s position: Romania is attending the meeting at Ukraine’s invitation. Bucharest’s foreign policy message remains a familiar and standard one – the need for new roads, border crossing points, energy connections and the development of tourism. According to the author, there is a clear contrast between Romania’s immense potential (its membership of the EU and NATO, its Black Sea port infrastructure, and access to European funds) and its lack of leadership initiative.

• Bilateral projects versus regional architecture: Although there are concrete bilateral initiatives between Romania and Ukraine (such as joint drone production, the use of the European SAFE instrument and security in the Black Sea, discussed during the meeting between Zelensky and Nicușor Dan), the author draws a distinction between bilateral cooperation and the construction of a comprehensive regional framework.

• Conclusion and challenge for Romania: Geographical position, the size of the territory and membership of unions do not automatically guarantee influence. Influence is built through concrete projects, funding and the ability to attract partners. For Bucharest, the main challenge is to transform its geographical and political advantages into a coherent regional strategy, rather than remaining merely a transit territory for foreign capital, goods and energy resources.

Video: Press conference by Ukrainian President Zelensky, held during the summit of the Initiative for Practical Integration (C8 – the Carpathian Eight)

Opinion

Romania accounts for over half of the European Carpathian range, yet it was Ukraine that took the political initiative to bring the region’s states together around a new project. This is the uncomfortable reality left in the wake of the first Carpathian Integration Initiative (C8) Summit, held on 18 September 2026 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, at the initiative of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Romania attended the meeting at the invitation of Kyiv.

The difference is evident even beyond the formalities. Ukraine organised the summit, the Carpathian Economic Forum, and an agenda linking energy, transport, security, investment and European integration. The portfolio presented to investors comprises 95 projects valued at over 42.5 billion euros. Nearly 1,400 participants from 25 countries and around 400 companies attended the forum.

Bucharest delivered a message that was accurate but familiar. Specifically, we need roads, new border crossings, energy interconnections, investment, tourism and the protection of local communities.

The problem for Romanian foreign policy is the contrast between potential and initiative. Romania has the geography, EU and NATO membership, Black Sea port infrastructure and access to European funds. However, it was Kyiv that put the new diplomatic framework for the Carpathians on the table. The political class on the Dâmbovița is once again lagging behind.

Kiev is building a regional architecture

The summit declaration provides for annual meetings, coordination between governments and local authorities, energy projects, transport infrastructure, border modernisation and even the consideration of a future European Union Macro-regional Strategy for the Carpathians.

This is where the real stakes lie. Those who shape regional frameworks can influence their agenda. Those who bring projects to the table can attract investment. Those who link energy, infrastructure and reconstruction into a single vision multiply their political clout.

Ukraine is doing this whilst waging a defensive war against Russia. Zelensky has succeeded in placing energy at the heart of the project. We are talking about production, storage, and electricity and gas infrastructure. The summit declaration explicitly links energy resilience to new production and storage capacities and networks. It also incorporates transport and logistics into a joint project to connect to European infrastructure.

For Romania, these issues are fundamental. Ukraine’s reconstruction will involve huge flows of materials, machinery, energy and capital. Constanța, the Danube, Romanian Moldova and the crossings into Ukraine could become essential infrastructure for this reconstruction.

Romania therefore possesses exceptional geopolitical assets.

The challenge lies in transforming these into a coherent regional strategy, not merely listing them at summits.

Geography does not guarantee influence

There are concrete Romanian-Ukrainian projects. At the bilateral meeting between Zelensky and Nicușor Dan, discussions centred on the joint production of drones, the European SAFE instrument, and infrastructure and security in the Black Sea.

But the Carpathian Summit highlights the difference between a bilateral project and a regional architecture.

Romania has demonstrated in the past that it can participate in building such frameworks. The Three Seas Initiative and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region already provide tools that Bucharest can utilise. Now another one is emerging, launched by Ukraine.

This is precisely where the summit’s warning lies. Geography does not guarantee influence. Neither the size of a country’s territory nor its membership of the EU and NATO automatically transforms a state into the political centre of a region.

Influence stems from projects, funding, infrastructure and the ability to rally other capitals around a common agenda.

Ukraine has taken the first step and placed the Carpathians on the European geopolitical agenda. For Bucharest, the challenge is to come up with projects large enough to ensure that Romania is not merely the country through which other nations’ roads, energy and goods pass.

Romania has the Carpathians. Now it must transform this geographical advantage into a political initiative.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Gabriel-Felician Croitoru

After 21 years, Constanța was, for a week, one of the most important hubs for European model boat racing. From 14 to 20 September 2026, the city hosted the European Class C Model Boat Championship – NAVIGA, one of the most significant international competitions dedicated to static model boats. The European Class C Model Shipbuilding Championship – NAVIGA took place under the auspices of NAVIGA – World Organisation for Modelshipbuilding and Modelsports, and was organised by the Romanian Model Building Federation (FRMD) and the Farul Constanța Sports Club, with the support of the Constanța County Council

Constanța, whilst the models were exhibited at the “Ioan N. Roman” County Library in Constanța.

This year’s edition brought together 121 competitors from 9 countries (Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Ukraine, Poland and Hungary), with 223 models entered into the competition. The models were assessed by an international jury, with the judging criteria focusing on fidelity to the original vessels, the quality of workmanship, technical complexity and the documentation used.

The city of Constanța previously hosted the Class C European Model Boat Championships in 1995 and 2005. The return of the European Championships to Constanța, after 21 years, represents both a recognition of the achievements of the Romanian model boat-building school and an opportunity to bring this sport closer to the public and, in particular, to children and young people.

On Sunday, 20 September, at 12.00, in the auditorium of the ‘Ioan N. Roman’ County Library in Constanța, the European Championship awards ceremony took place, an event which marked the conclusion of the Constanța 2026 edition.

On this occasion, several players from Bulgaria were awarded gold medals (Radolslav Rashkov, Emil Netzov, Plamen Genov, Diyan Dimitrov, Kolio Ghineshki, Dinko Alexandrov and Slavian Narlev), silver (Emil Netzov, Anastasia Boncheva, Diyan Dimitrov, Kristin Boncheva, Atanas Atanasov, Ivo Chernev and Plamen Genov) and bronze (Stanislav Hristov).

The large Bulgarian delegation, one of the most successful teams at this championship, made a good impression on the organisers and the public, with the medallists being rewarded with thunderous applause from the spectators and members of the other teams.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Romania’s participation in the Rovaniemi summit links Black Sea security to the agenda of Northern Europe. The value of this rapprochement will depend on joint projects, the involvement of neighbouring countries and the ability of diplomacy to transform declared solidarity into sustainable cooperation.

Alexandru Drăgulin

Summary

Romania’s participation in the European Summit on the Arctic Region in Rovaniemi (13–14 September 2026), led by President Nicușor Dan, aimed to link Black Sea security concerns with the priorities of Northern Europe, argues Alexandru Drăgulin from the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. By highlighting shared Russian threats—such as drones, sabotage, and cyber operations—Bucharest sought to extend European solidarity to its own region while offering expertise in mineral extraction, shipbuilding, and demining.

While the summit yielded institutional developments, including a joint declaration for an upcoming EU Arctic strategy and plans for future European Council discussions, the practical success of this diplomatic outreach depends on execution. Romania is scheduled to host the next meeting of the Helsinki Format in early 2027, serving as a key benchmark to determine whether these initiatives translate into sustainable industrial and security cooperation or remain purely general declarations.

Video - Joint press statements with the leaders at the European Summit on the Arctic Region

Article

Intro

Nicușor Dan’s presence at the European Summit on the Arctic Region, held in Finland on 13–14 September 2026, raises a legitimate question: what is Romania doing in a discussion about the north of the continent? The president’s answer stems from the interdependence of European security. For Bucharest, this participation can be interpreted as an attempt to link Black Sea concerns with the priorities of the Nordic states. A few days after the meeting, we can identify this diplomatic intention, though any lasting impact remains to be seen.

The central message had already been set out at the working dinner hosted by Prime Minister Petteri Orpo: ‘the link between the Arctic region, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea is becoming increasingly evident’. This statement expresses a vision of security in which the vulnerabilities of one region affect the entire continent. Implicitly, Romania is calling for the same solidarity invoked for the Arctic to apply to the Black Sea as well. This is the political stake behind a presence which, viewed purely from a geographical perspective, might seem unusual. [Report on the statement]

Romania’s interest at the EU Summit on the Arctic Region

Ahead of the summit, Dan identified Russia as the source of the common threat and listed drones, attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber operations and acts of sabotage. He proposed exchanges of expertise on demining, intelligence gathering and the protection of submarine cables. He also highlighted Romania’s expertise in mineral extraction and processing, the collaboration between Romanian and Finnish geological institutes, and opportunities in shipbuilding. The speech thus included an offer to contribute, going beyond a mere request for protection. [Transcript of the statements]

This offer suggests a useful direction for foreign policy: Romania can gain influence through the expertise it makes available to its partners. However, regional experiences are not automatically interchangeable. Geographical conditions, infrastructure and operational needs differ. A common threat justifies the exchange of information and coordination, but solutions must be tailored. Bucharest’s credibility will depend on the precision of the proposed contributions and the resources allocated to implement them.

Ukraine

At the joint conference, the President shifted the focus to an institutional vulnerability: states are aware of their own incidents, but lack a sufficiently comprehensive shared understanding of actions directed against Europe. When asked about public support for Ukraine, he emphasised the need to combat disinformation and electoral interference. These responses indicate an interest in information cooperation and the protection of democratic processes. [Transcript of the speeches]

However, there is a limit to this explanation. The debate on support for Ukraine cannot be reduced to disinformation alone. Economic costs, mistrust in institutions and the lack of convincing explanations regarding the objectives of foreign policy can influence public attitudes. A sustainable policy must address these concerns through reasoned arguments and transparency. Otherwise, cooperation against manipulation risks being perceived as an avoidance of legitimate political debate.

The EU level

At European level, the summit has produced a clear political outcome: the joint declaration calls for the strengthening of the EU’s role in the Arctic. The Finnish Government has announced that the proposal for a new Arctic strategy and the implementation plan are expected this autumn. António Costa linked the new security reality to the future multiannual budget and announced that the issue would be revisited at the European Council. There is, therefore, an institutional channel for continuing the discussions, although this does not yet equate to approved investments for Romania. [The Finnish Government, Costa’s statements]

The regional formats

With regard to regional formats, Rovaniemi is continuing a process of rapprochement that began earlier. The Helsinki summit in December 2025 brought together eight states, including Romania and Bulgaria, to coordinate the defence of the eastern flank. Finland and Poland were assigned the role of coordinating the joint project. Separately, the B9 meeting with the Nordic countries in Vilnius in June 2025 had already demonstrated the expansion of dialogue between Central, South-Eastern and Northern Europe. We are therefore not witnessing the sudden emergence of an alliance, but rather the overlapping of cooperation networks. [Finnish press release on Helsinki, NATO Secretary-General’s address in Vilnius]

Dan announced that Romania will host the next meeting of the Helsinki Format in early 2027. This commitment provides a concrete deadline for assessing Romanian diplomacy. Bucharest can propose projects, partners, funding and implementation timetables. If the meeting produces nothing more than a new general declaration, the proliferation of such formats risks draining diplomatic energy without commensurate results. If it links expertise to administrative and industrial decisions, closer ties with the north could become sustainable.

Significance for South-Eastern Europe

There is already a relevant example in the Romanian-Bulgarian relationship. The MCM Black Sea Group, established by Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to combat sea mines, expanded its missions in July 2026 to include the protection of critical subsea infrastructure. This cooperation predates the Arctic summit and should not be presented as its outcome. However, it provides a concrete basis for the exchanges of experience proposed by Dan: regional expertise is built together with neighbours. [Ministry of Defence press release]

From this perspective, opening up to Finland can strengthen cooperation in South-Eastern Europe if Bucharest involves Sofia in relevant projects. The protection of shipping, port infrastructure and transport links have an impact on the economy and daily life. A foreign policy with visible results for communities would give substance to regional solidarity and prevent participation in meetings from turning into a prestige contest between capitals.

Aftermath and future outcome

The Arctic itself calls for such a broad perspective. The Finnish communiqué emphasises sustainable development, indigenous peoples and the involvement of local residents in investments. The security agenda must also be assessed in terms of its social and environmental impacts. The same requirement applies to the projects that Romania would like to develop alongside its Nordic partners.

The outcome of Nicușor Dan’s participation is, for the time being, a plausible diplomatic opening, underpinned by a number of concrete initiatives. Its lasting impact on foreign policy cannot yet be ascertained. It will become apparent through the continuity of cooperation, the projects funded, and Romania’s ability to bring its Nordic partners and Black Sea neighbours to the same table. The meeting in Bucharest will be one of the first tests.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship

Ancuța Stanciu, Financial Intelligence, 16 September 2026

Summary

At a conference in Bucharest, Professor Dan Dungaciu argued that Romania and Bulgaria need to move past their post-integration passivity and transform their partnership into a robust geopolitical and economic alliance. Highlighting that bilateral trade has already reached roughly 8.7 billion euros, he stressed that economic ties have outpaced politics and that the two nations share convergent national interests that go beyond EU or NATO requirements.

Dungaciu addressed the ongoing public debate over Danube river crossings, asserting that current infrastructure discussions approach the problem backward. Instead of building bridges in hopes of forcing a relationship, he maintains that a strong strategic and economic partnership must come first, which will naturally make infrastructure development inevitable. To achieve this, he proposed a broader geopolitical vision centered on a Bucharest–Sofia–Ankara axis, positioning Bulgaria not as a dead end, but as Romania’s vital gateway to the Balkans and Turkey for trade, energy, and regional security.

Article

Romania and Bulgaria should transform their existing strategic partnership into a much more robust economic and geopolitical relationship, built around trade, energy, infrastructure, security and regional cooperation, and Bucharest should view Sofia, amongst other things, as a gateway to the Balkans and Turkey, said Prof. Dan Dungaciu, First Vice-President of the AUR, at the conference ‘Romania and Bulgaria – Neighbourhood and a Shared Future’, organised by the ‘Titu Maiorescu’ Foreign Policy Group at the Palace of Parliament.

“We are neighbours. We share a border of almost 470 kilometres, most of which runs along the Danube. We joined NATO together in 2004. We joined the European Union together in 2007. We have travelled the long road to Schengen together. We are two states bordering the Danube and two Black Sea states. And yet, paradoxically, Romania and Bulgaria continue to know far too little about one another and, above all, to give one another far too little thought in strategic terms,” said Dan Dungaciu.

“What interests does Romania have in Bulgaria today?”

Dan Dungaciu began his address by referring to the famous line from I.L. Caragiale’s “D’Ale carnavalului” – “What was the German doing in Bulgaria?” – which he transformed into a question about Romania’s current interests south of the Danube. He recalled that Caragiale’s play was first performed in April 1885, a significant year for the Bulgarian national project, which was subsequently marked by the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia.

“Joking aside, the question posed in Caragiale’s play suggested a serious concern,” said Dungaciu, asking: “What are we doing in Bulgaria? Or, to be more precise: what interests does Romania have in Bulgaria today?”

In his view, the fact that Romania and Bulgaria went through the process of joining NATO and the European Union together was not followed by the development of a sufficiently strong bilateral vision for the post-integration period.
In this context, Dan Dungaciu recalled the early 2000s, when Romania was led by Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and Bulgaria by Simeon of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and there was talk of a “Romanian-Bulgarian tandem”: “The two states shared the same strategic objective at the time: Euro-Atlantic integration. They joined NATO together and negotiated their accession to the European Union in parallel. However, the partnership functioned primarily as a diplomatic formula and as an instrument of Western integration. It did not produce a sufficiently strong bilateral vision for the post-integration era.”
The question that must now be asked, according to Dungaciu, is: “What do we want to do together, as Romania and Bulgaria? Not because Brussels is asking us to. Not because we have a joint accession dossier. But because the national interests of the two countries converge.”

Dungaciu: The economy has overtaken politics

One of the central arguments of his speech concerned the development of trade relations between the two countries. “There is a significant paradox here. Politics has lagged behind, but the economy has moved forward,” said Dan Dungaciu.
According to Bulgarian statistical data cited by him, in 2025 Bulgaria exported goods worth approximately 8.87 billion leva to Romania, whilst imports from Romania amounted to around 8.19 billion leva. Bilateral trade in goods thus stood at approximately 17.1 billion leva, the equivalent of around 8.7 billion euros. “Our economies are telling us something that politics has not yet fully grasped: Romania and Bulgaria need each other,” stated Dungaciu.

“The issue of the bridges is being approached the wrong way round”

As regards infrastructure across the Danube, Dungaciu argues that the public debate usually starts from the wrong issue: “Whenever we discuss the Romania–Bulgaria relationship, we almost inevitably end up on the same topic: the bridges over the Danube. Why do we have so few? Why is construction taking so long? Why aren’t there more road and rail links? These are legitimate questions. But, from our perspective, the problem is being approached the wrong way round.”
According to him, infrastructure should be the consequence of an economic and geopolitical strategy, not a substitute for it: “You don’t build the bridges first and hope that they will subsequently create a strategic relationship. You build the strategic relationship, and that makes the bridges inevitable.”
Dungaciu believes that, viewed solely through the prism of current traffic flows, some new crossings over the Danube might appear more advantageous to Bulgaria, for which Romania represents the gateway to Central and Northern Europe, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The outlook would, however, change fundamentally, he says, if Romania were to build a broader economic and strategic link southwards via Bulgaria.
“The bridges are no longer simply infrastructure through which Bulgaria reaches Romania. They become infrastructure through which Romania reaches the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, Istanbul and beyond. At that point, every bridge across the Danube also becomes a Romanian interest.”
“This is the shift in perspective we are proposing: it is not the bridges that create the strategy. The strategy creates the bridges,” emphasised Dan Dungaciu.

The Romania–Bulgaria Strategic Partnership: economy, energy, transport and security

Romania and Bulgaria officially elevated their bilateral relationship to the level of a Strategic Partnership in March 2023, through a declaration signed in Sofia by the presidents of the two countries. The document covers, amongst other things, economic cooperation, connectivity and infrastructure, energy, security, European affairs and regional cooperation.
Dungaciu believes, however, that the partnership must be translated into concrete projects: “A strategic partnership must not exist solely in joint declarations, diplomatic meetings and official photographs. It must be visible on the map, in the economy and in trade balances.”
The vision he presented is structured around six areas: the development of trade and mutual investment; energy and interconnections; transport and navigation on the Danube; security in the Black Sea and the Balkans; European cooperation, including in relation to the integration of the Balkans; and strengthening the regional dimension.
On the economic front, Dungaciu spoke of developing “Romanian-Bulgarian production chains”, whilst on energy he referred to “interconnections, energy infrastructure, energy security and joint projects in the Black Sea region”. In transport, the priorities should include, according to the vision presented, “bridges, railways, motorways, navigation on the Danube and the connection of Black Sea ports”.

Dungaciu proposes a Bucharest–Sofia–Ankara axis

An important component of the strategy presented by Dan Dungaciu is broadening the perspective beyond bilateral relations to include Turkey. “For Romania, Bulgaria must not be the end of the road. Bulgaria must be Romania’s gateway to the Balkans and to Turkey,” he stated.
Dungaciu cited Turkey’s status as a NATO member, the size of its economy, its strategic position regarding the Straits and the development of the Turkish defence industry: “That is why Romania must think more ambitiously: Bucharest–Sofia–Ankara.”
He clarified that such a framework should not be seen as directed against another state or as an alternative to NATO or the European Union: “Not against anyone. Not as an alternative to NATO or the European Union. But as an expression of the concrete interests of the three states in a region that is once again becoming essential to Europe’s security and economy.”
The aim would be to create economic flows strong enough to subsequently generate the need for infrastructure. “If we create substantial economic flows along the Romania–Bulgaria–Turkey axis, the infrastructure will follow the economy.

Then we will be able to discuss the bridges over the Danube, the rail corridors, the ports of Constanța and Varna/Burgas, the link to Istanbul, energy and the Black Sea in a different light,” said Dan Dungaciu.

“What do we want to achieve together over the next 20 years?”

In concluding his speech, Dan Dungaciu argued that the bilateral relationship should be built on the basis of long-term strategic objectives and not exclusively on individual infrastructure projects: “For too many years, we have been starting the discussion from the wrong end. We have asked: ‘How many more bridges shall we build?’. We propose asking first: ‘What do we want to achieve together over the next 20 years?’. If we answer this question, the issue of bridges will become much simpler. Because infrastructure follows interests. Trade follows infrastructure. And political influence follows the economy.”
In this vision, Romania should view Bulgaria “not as the country on the other side of the Danube, but as one of the partners through which Romania can once again become a relevant player in the Balkans”, whilst Bulgaria should see Romania “not merely as the route to the north, but as a strategic partner for the Danube, the Black Sea and Central Europe”.
Returning to the question inspired by Caragiale – “What is Romania doing in Bulgaria?” – Dungaciu replied: “It is seeking its national interest. It is seeking markets. It is seeking infrastructure. It is seeking security. It is seeking access to the Balkans and Turkey. And it is seeking a partner.”
“AUR proposes that Romania and Bulgaria move from geographical neighbourliness to a community of interests. Because the Danube must not be the line that separates us. It must be the axis that unites us,” said Professor Dungaciu.

Share

Share The Bridge of Friendship