In the years when Jacques Kallis bestrode like a colossus in the sport with over 13000 test match runs and nearly 300 wickets the presence of such a mathematical illusion was unmistakable.

Yet, those readers who tracked Test cricket half a century ago will see a greater structural resemblance to the side that mauled the Australians four-nil in the one-sided 1969-70 series.

That 1970 South African team might well have developed into one of the greatest Test outfits of all time, had its progress not been abruptly halted by the sporting isolation imposed in response to the country’s abhorrent apartheid policy.

This ban deprived the cricketing world of witnessing a possible supremacy, at least for some years, of a team that boasted of great talent of which Mike Procter and Eddie Barlow were but two who possessed exceptional versatility.

Barlow, a lynch pin of their middle order, averaged 51.42 with the bat in that series; opening the batting with Barry Richards, when asked to. His series haul of 11 wickets at 23.30 as a seamer, is far from reckoning him as any less than the spearheads, Peter Pollock and Mike Procter.

Procter was a different kind of all-rounder: the kingpin of an attack that dismantled Australia’s batting, which did not produce a single century in the series. He finished with 26 wickets at 13.57, while averaging nearly 35 with the bat—figures that would have graced a specialist in either discipline.

When a team fields players who effectively do the work of more than one, the opposition’s task becomes far harder than the team sheet suggests. Australia encountered precisely that problem against the modern Proteas. In Marco Jansen, Wiaan Mulder and, to an extent, Simon Harmer, they faced bowlers capable of turning defiant lower-order contributions into match-defining partnerships.

The psychological damage of such resistance exceeds that of a century from an established top-order batter. An opposition may plan for a recognized batter; it is far harder to plan for a No. 8 who takes five wickets one innings and plays a match-defining hand with the bat in the next.

Jansen and Mulder transformed the lower order into a fortress, averaging nearly 40 with the bat—a figure that put the touring frontline batsmen to shame, as only a solitary Australian batsman managed to average above 40 across the three Tests.

South Africa’s capacity to produce such cricketers has deep roots. Basil D’Oliveira, whose inclusion in England’s planned 1968 tour led to the cancellation of the tour and precipitated South Africa’s sporting isolation, and Tony Greig were among those who left the country to pursue careers elsewhere.

Yet even in isolation, the legacy endured: Clive Rice’s combative batting and medium-pace, and Garth Le Roux’s fast bowling and lower-order hitting, suggested that the same all-round instinct survived beneath apartheid’s distortions.

On readmission, Jacques Kallis embodied that tradition so completely that even Shaun Pollock—a frontline bowler with dependable batting—was sometimes overshadowed in the conversation. After a hiatus following their retirements, the present side appears to be reconnecting with that inheritance.

Jansen and Mulder, both still under thirty, have revived it with particular force. Jansen’s counter-attacking batting after taking crucial wickets, and Mulder’s capacity to apply sustained pressure while contributing substantial runs, do more than win Tests: they revive a style of combat the game’s lovers were denied for a generation.

The present combination under the lead of Temba Bavuma has won fifteen of the last eighteen Tests played: a record that may make any of the past ‘invincibles’ proud. The all rounders have made a significant contribution to this outcome. There is logic to view this development as a sustainable formula for success.

Australia, despite its formidable record, may be approaching a phase of transition. An ageing bowling combination and a noticeable inconsistency in its batting have exposed vulnerabilities which a side with greater depth and versatility can exploit

Australia would do well to produce its own versions of Jansen and Mulder if it seeks to regain the primacy it lost recently.

The ones to find a place are those confirmed in the media as cases of business splits. The less publicised, may be, the raunchy ones, typically get transmitted only in soft whispers over drinks at the Madras Club, and don’t feature!

Though no particular chronology has been followed, the first two covered here were possibly the earliest ones in the city, concerning companies listed on the stock exchanges.

A common factor in these two cases is that the siblings split, consequent to a family dispute and courts were involved. The reason why this is highlighted is that some of the later cases ended in a split, but the press could not formally establish any fight that took place leading to the end result.

The Kothari group, founded by C.M. Kothari, was possibly the earliest one to suffer a sibling split that involved companies listed on the exchanges. Whether the fight between the two sons of the founder, D.C. Kothari and H.C. Kothari, reached any public legal forum like the CLB or court could not be validated based on a search on the internet.

The brothers split in 1981/1982. The vertical split resulted in Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd- fertiliser, chemicals, caustic soda, coffee/tea estates, leather- going to the account of the elder brother. H.C. Kothari took over the sugar and alcohol units of Kothari Sugars and Chemicals Ltd, along with, Kothari Safe Deposit Ltd and Investment Trust of India Ltd.

Since the corporate HQ, Kothari Building, one of Madras’ landmarks of those times, could not be physically split, both factions reconciled to retain it as their corporate office.

However, the families did clash in the court when the sons of D.C. Kothari and H.C. Kothari took charge after the demise of their respective fathers.

Kothari Industrial Corporation Ltd faced a takeover threat due to certain companies linked to the Ambani group taking a significant shareholding. This was viewed by the D.C. Kothari faction as an attempt to takeover by the other side- Shyam Kothari being the son in law of Dhirubhai Ambani.

In those times this was portrayed as a possible faceoff of the two biggest industrial groups- Reliance and Tata- since D.C. Kothari had a long association with the Tata group whose help could have been sought to thwart Reliance!

Today, neither branch commands the market prominence, once enjoyed—far from the days when a board seat in one of those may have been coveted!

A better documented sibling squabble that almost tracked the Kothari case, was that of the KCP group.

Founded by a renowned civil servant, Velagapudi Ramakrishna, I.C.S(retd), his three children, Rajeshwari Ramakrishnan, Dr. V.M. Rao and V.L. Dutt were entangled in court cases over the control of the companies in the group.

The promoter had structured the group with two managing agencies at the apex: V. Ramakrishna Sons Ltd, under which KCP Ltd functioned; R.S. Industrial Corporation P. Ltd, overseeing Jeypore Sugars Ltd. The two managing agencies became holding companies when that concept was abolished in the law.

Rajeswari Ramakrishnan was given the management responsibility for Jeypore Sugar. The sons were entrusted with KCP’ business.

The shareholdings were not demarcated to mirror the control structure given above. Cross holdings existed at the level of the three individuals and their families.

When Rajeshwari Ramakrishnan and her son were elected as directors in V. Ramakrishna Sons Ltd, Dr. V.M. Rao took up the cudgels that it violated the family agreement to stay apart from each other.

Different suits to challenge this surfaced before the CLB and the Madras High Court. The central dispute was whether the founder had established a family arrangement that allocated distinct spheres of management to the siblings. Dr. V.M. Rao contended that the appointment of his sister and her son to the board of V. Ramakrishna Sons Ltd breached that arrangement.

After examining numerous witnesses, including family members and outsiders, the Madras High Court found no evidence establishing the alleged family arrangement. It also held that a family agreement would not bind the companies and the election of the directors was a matter for the shareholders to decide.

The KCP litigation exemplified that disputes among family members that end in the courts brought personal animosities and allegations into the public domain. Whatever the legal outcome, the resulting disclosures rarely improved the family’s public image.

The scene changed next when Dr. V.M. Rao and V.L. Dutt, who had the joint oversight of KCP Ltd, fought to have their respective domains earmarked. Consequently, the company had to be split into two.

In 1996, no pin code in Madras had previously known a demerger. KCP Ltd followed the footsteps of DCM, that had done a four-way split for a similar reason. The sugar units of the company were hived off into KCP Sugar and Industries Corporation Ltd. Dr. V.M. Rao secured the control of this company. The remaining business of cement and engineering remained with KCP Ltd, with V.L. Dutt at the helm.

Three decades hence, KCP Sugar and Industries Ltd is managed by the family of (late) Dr. V.M. Rao, and KCP Ltd is managed by the family of (late) V.L. Dutt.

Unlike the first two which bore the marks of a split following a family dispute, the next two cases of sibling separation were portrayed as non-combative ones.

The India Cements Ltd, a pioneering venture of S.N.N. Sankaralinga Iyer and T.S. Narayanaswami, carries the distinction of being the first company to raise public funds post the independence.

Tension surfaced when the mantle passed on to the next generation in the founders’ families. Around 2004 or so, the sons of T.S. Narayanaswami- N. Srinivasan and N. Ramachandran- bought out the grandsons of S.N.N. Sankaralinga Iyer-N. Sankar and N. Kumar.

August 12, 2009, saw the siblings, Srinivasan and Ramachandran, part ways. The excerpts from the Times of India on the following day-

Sources said they are not sure why Ramachandran chose to exit especially when the cement industry is growing and ICL is on a national expansion……...

“I and my family have sold off my entire holdings in the company. I do not see any reason to be on the board of the company, therefore I decided to resign” Ramachandran told TOI. “It is a personal transaction and I do not wish to comment”

At that time, the media estimated the settlement was between Rs550 crores and Rs.650 crores. In 2018, the income tax department revisited the past assessments regarding this and the order of the Income tax Tribunal shared the details of the settlement.

N. Ramachandran received Rs.337 crores to sell his holdings in EWS Finance & Investments Ltd, the family holding company in which the brothers held shares. Prince Holdings Madras Pvt Ltd, another promoter entity, invested Rs 225crores in Birdie (Investments) Madras Ltd and Rs.125 crores in Results Investment P Ltd. Both the investee companies were owned by N. Ramachandran. There was a non-compete payment which the tribunal did not quantify in the order.

Around 2010, Sundaram Clayton Ltd had different businesses carried on through many subsidiaries. It was jointly managed by the brothers, Venu Srinivasan and Gopal Srinivasan.

When they wished to chart their own courses, a demerger carved out the businesses managed by Gopal Srinivasan. In some sense, this was similar to the KCP demerger. The nuance was that the resulting company, TVS Investments Ltd, did not list, may be the first of its kind.

An extract from the Economic Times, reporting this in December 2012- “In May this year, Sundaram Clayton, the parent company of TVS Motor, underwent a reorganisation in its shareholding that on the face of it seemed unremarkable. But what it has resulted in is quite significant - a de facto distancing between Venu and Gopal Srinivasan, scions of one of south India’s most prominent business families.

Venu, 59, is now in charge of the automobiles-focused Sundaram Clayton while Gopal, 54, oversees Sundaram Investment, with interests in electronics, software and asset management. “They have only separated the operating companies to give management focus and enhance value for stakeholders,” said TVS Group veteran H Lakshmanan.

“The brothers have not split,” said Lakshmanan, who is an executive director of the Rs 1,100-crore Sundaram Clayton. Neither Venu nor Gopal replied to emailed questions seeking views for this report.

A senior partner at a multinational accounting firm which has handled mandates for the TVS Group said he does not “see any problems” between the brothers. One of the key reasons for the separation, he observed, is “to avoid any problem for Gopal in future, especially with Venu’s children joining his companies”.

TVS Investments, over time, squeezed out the minority and itself was consumed in the restructuring scheme implemented in 2025.

A sensational one that evaporated at the same pace it erupted, was when a Member of Parliament issued a legal notice alleging wrongdoing by his own brother. The allegations concerned transactions dating back several years.

Dayanidhi Maran alleged his brother, Kalanithi Maran, inter alia, issued to himself shares worth Rs3,500 crores for a nominal cost of Rs 1.2 crores; and illegally transferred to himself shares belonging to their father in Sun TV.

A legal notice to this effect was issued on June 10,2025. However, on August 11,2025, Sun TV Ltd made a disclosure to the stock exchanges that “we would like to inform you that we have now been informed by the Promoter of the Company that all the legal notices issued by the family member to the Promoter of the Company, his relative and other unrelated individuals have been unconditionally and irrevocably withdrawn by the said family member and the issues hereby stand resolved.”

Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd has recently initiated a demerger of its omnichannel pharmacy, digital and telehealth businesses into a separate entity. One among the four sisters, Shobana Kamineni, leads this separation. The promoters have denied that the reorganisation represents a family split, presenting it as a move to create shareholder value.

The promoter family has reportedly put in place a family charter that allows for the rotation of key positions like chairperson among the siblings to eschew concentration of power in any single hand.

May be a precursor to Apollo Hospitals, Kasturi and Sons Ltd, the publisher of The Hindu and other publications, having weathered many a court battle among the family members on management control and editorial rights, has adopted the modus vivendi of rotating the position of the chairperson among different family members. A rare case of a family sticking together after many rounds of litigation.

The case, where a mason helped speedily resolve a family dispute that expensive lawyers take years and yet fail, should not be missed out in this context.

Grand Sweets, established in a serene residential locality in the early 1980s, changed the way the tradition bound society of Madras prepared for a festival like the Deepavali. It displaced the monopoly of the mothers preparing the sweets. To the fastidious customers it addressed its single shop-cum-kitchen model as a guarantee for originality, freshness and consistency.

After more than two decades of success, the founder’s death brought the question of succession to the fore.

The families of his two daughters reportedly divided the original premises physically, each operating from its own side of the wall.

A rare one, if the news reports were taken at their face value, when the only time these brothers opposed each other was on the tennis court.

Dated, August 30,2000, Shoba Warrier writes in Rediff.com, “Ever since the rift between the promoters of a business group in Madras was splashed across financial dailies, everyone views even the slightest change in any business group with suspicion.

That’s why N. Sankar, Chairman of the Sanmar group, informed the press that the talk about the rift between the two brothers, N. Sankar and N. Kumar is not true.

The reason why his brother N Kumar shifted his office is because he had decided to look after their revived information technology unit.

“Yes, we do fight but not in office. It is only when we are in the tennis court. The reason for the fight is his poor tennis: he has put on a lot of weight “Sankar said in jest!

Finally, the tail piece to this longish essay-

When Vaali pursued a demon into a dark cave, he instructed his brother Sugriva to guard the entrance. After a long vigil, seeing blood emerge from the cavern, Sugriva erroneously thought his brother had died. He sealed the entrance with a boulder and returned to rule Kishkindha.

When Vaali unexpectedly survived and returned, his fury triggered an unbridgeable rift—ending with his death, caused by an intervener!

Whether it is the Kishkindha Bros. or any other family, unless siblings communicate to explain their problems and predicaments, which Vaali-Sugriva couldn’t, absent technology, and strictly avoid getting outsiders to intervene, the end can be quite disastrous!

The AI assisted visuals do not represent any real life person(s). The resemblance if any is purely accidental

The above article’s discussion is limited to the loss of her status as the MD of the holding company that, also, over saw TVS Motors Ltd. When the separation of the holding structure was implemented, her role shrunk to overseeing the diecasting business alone.

Based on what has been going around, the dispute in the family seems to be only on the economic imbalance in the division of the family’s holdings, rather than on her role or title.

However, this headline did trigger the urge to look for some concrete facts or data to see if there was any particular choke point where the pitch was queered for her.

The analysis that follows may not be sufficient to draw any definitive inference on this aspect but sheds some light with a few relevant facts. It traces the evolution of the listed company, TVS Holdings Ltd, from its inception.

The family first setup Cheema Investments and Holdings Pvt Ltd in 2019, with a nominal capital of Rs.1,00,000. The share capital structure shows both the siblings with an identical ratio of 21.73% each.

A question for which no ready explanation may exist is, whether the 21.73% - Which obviously is not any ad hoc number- is answering to any astrological or numerological input, or based on some pre-existing interest of the two siblings in the family’s assets/investments?

The above picture is as of March 2019 when the larger TVS family’s division of assets would still be more than a year away from its final contours emerging.

However, when the next milestone of March31, 2021, arrived much water had flowed in Vaigai or Adyar, depending upon how one understands the group’s axis.

The TVS scheme had been finalised and probably inching its way in the NCLT bureaucracy. Cheema Investments changed its name twice in that interregnum and became, TVS Holdings Pvt Ltd.

The company’ share capital increased more than a hundred-fold-from the regulatory minimum of Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,16,00,000.

Did numerology continue its sway? The ratio stayed at 21.73%. Yet, the reason behind the additional dose of capital for this entity eludes one’s understanding. The amount remained unspent in the current account.

In a demerger, the resulting company is set up with a bare minimum capital which gets extinguished in the course of implementing the scheme. This entity is not expected to issue capital beyond the consideration for the demerger till that process is completed.

If pre-existing shares remain in the resulting company, it would distort the demerger ratio and effectively transfer value from one set of shareholders to the other. This distortion in the structure actually worsened at the next check date, January 31,2022.

The choice of this date itself needs more scrutiny. The NCLT order in the TVS scheme was issued on December 6,2021. The transfer of the 1,30,94,460 equity shares of Sundaram Clayton Ltd under the scheme to TVS Holdings P Ltd took place on February 4, 2022. The issue of shares as consideration under the scheme should have also been coterminous.

But, Sundaram Clayton and TVS Holdings P Ltd along with two other entities initiated their composite scheme on January 28, 2022, when they appointed Bansi S Mehta, Chartered Accountants as registered valuers.

The audited accounts for TVS Holding P Ltd being made up till January 31,2022 effectively excluded what took place within the next four days. The receipt of 1,30,94,460 shares in Sundaram Clayton and the issue of consideration for the demerger- the sole reason for the existence of this company

Most importantly, the company increased the capital significantly by Rs.18.84,00,000/- before January 31,2022 and the equilibrium was upset. Lakshmi Venu’ s interest dropped dramatically to a level of insignificance.

Did the shareholding undergo a Special Intensive Revision?

Yet again, the puzzle of why an additional infusion was required, as no operation started. However, the spend on professional charges stand out for a company yet to get off the mark!

Interestingly, the board of directors of this company which only catered to the family’s personal holding, did not include any of the family members.

It is not easy to comprehend how decisions like capital infusion and from whom the funds should be raised could be decided by this board with no family members being part of it.

Recently, in Tata Sons, the issue of directors’ fiduciary duties overriding the mandate of the majority shareholders was much debated. Whether these directors acted according to the fiduciary duty may cross one’s mind.

Now back to where we started- Rather than term the title ‘How Lakshmi Venu ended with less’ as given in Mint, it can be How Much did Lakshmi Venu end, less with?.

Her share dropped from 21.73% to 1.3%= 20.43%. Total family holding in TVS Holdings Ltd is 70.71%. Calculating the loss of 14.45% of the company’ market cap on Friday of Rs 23,268 crores gets to Rs. 3,362 crores. (E & O.E)

Another way- TVS Holdings hold 50.26% of TVS Motor Company Ltd’ Rs 1,94,453 crores value- ∴ 14.45% X 50.26% X Rs.1.94 trillion = Rs 14,160 crores. (E & O.E)

Do numbers numb ?

By surpassing Joe Root to become the leading non-wicketkeeper fielder in Test cricket, he has provided a fitting occasion to examine an aspect of the game that fails to receive the attention it deserves: fielding.

Australia has a long tradition of formidable slip fielders: There are twelve Australians with more than a hundred catches against their names in test matches. This elite list features a total of forty-three, with ten from England, the next highest.

At the conclusion of the latest test match, Smith leads this pack with a tally of 224. His per innings average of 0.929 catches is unsurpassed in the very elite category of fielders who have snared at least 150 batsmen. The closest is Stephen Fleming, with no less an impressive average of 0.859.

If Fleming aspired to match the best average, he should have taken another fourteen catches to add to his 171. Joe Root, closest to Smith in terms of numbers, falls short by a whopping sixty catches, as his more modest average of 0.681, falls in the lowest quartile of these elite fielders.

Smith towers above the field and not by any insignificant number. Doing this over 241 test match innings is no ordinary athletic feat.

Here he is shown going for the 224th!!!

His numbers are not made by a heap of victims in a few tests or in some specific test series. The consistency is unchanging and hounding.

It may surprise anyone to know the fact that even Smith’s stunning average falls marginally short of the best, among the elite group of players that have to their name, at least, a hundred catches in test matches.

Smith’s almost mythical 0.929 figure is bettered by a more magical, 0.940. Should this detract from the awe that Smith’s numbers evoke, is a subjective speculation.

It is no shame, as Smith lags in this statistic only someone considered for a long time the best close-in fielder and a benchmark that helped measure all the rest in this discipline.

Bobby Simpsons had little regard for records and statistics. He retired in 1968 with 99 catches to his credit, the second highest at that time after Walter Hammond, who had retired a full two decades before.

In retrospect, in some sense, it appeared pre-ordained that he be recalled, even after a decade post his retirement and at the age of forty-two, to lead Australia in two test match series.

He reached a tally of 110 catches when he finally bid goodbye in 1977/78. His image as the revered guru in close-in catching not only remained intact but was enhanced due to him maintaining the standard even when aged, forty-two.

In the first century of this sport being played, 1877-1977, there were just four players who had a tally of more than a hundred catches- Bob Simpson, Walter Hammond, Gary Sobers and Colin Cowdrey.

The following fifty, added thirty-nine names. The elongated playing career and the significant increase in the number of test matches played in the more recent years contributing to this burgeoning, rather than a marked improvement in the quality of fielding, alone.

A fielder like Smith increases the probability of a false stroke being converted into a wicket, giving an extra edge for the ball over the bat. Nathan Lyon has called him a ‘freak’ for some catches plucked out of the thin air in the recent test match. ‘Genius’ is loosely used and with its value eroding- freak explains Smith’ s personality better!

There may be no gainsaying that, had India possessed better fielders during the era of its celebrated spin quartet, the bowlers might have ended their careers with better personal records — and the team might have won more Test matches.

There were exceptions: Eknath Solkar, Syed Abid Ali, Ajit Wadekar and S.Venkataraghavan, the top of the mind recall.

Solkar’s record as a close-in catcher is nearly beyond belief. He betters Smith’s average- a single fact that speaks to his greatness, rather than a tiring analysis of numbers.

If Smith has to match Solkar’s 1.06 catches/innings, he should have taken an additional 31catches. Did Smith drop that many?

Yet, Solkar is not a benchmark to assess Smith, given the length of Smith’s career over which he has maintained his record: Solkar played in a mere fifty test innings.

A Solkar record that may sound surreal is that he averages at least one catch per innings in all the test series he played. This must be unmatched given the historical data that no player has even an overall career average of one catch per innings, much less to do this in every series played.

No screaming headlines announced Smith’s record: These are reserved for batting and bowling statistics, quite symbolic of the extent the game is viewed through the prism of batting and bowling achievements.

Fielding is a much wider discipline than just catching, though catches remain the more measurable component. A fielder may save runs, prevent boundaries, create run-outs or turn an apparently certain four into a dot ball. Yet the conventional scorecard records none of these contributions with anything like the precision with which it records runs and wickets.

AI and videography may now make it possible to develop more meaningful measures of fielding performance. The challenge would be to assess not merely what a fielder accomplished, but also the difficulty of the opportunity and the value of the contribution in the context of the match.

Regrettably, the number of catches taken is seldom counted in choosing a key achiever in any match. Even the nine catches, the maximum ever taken in a single test, by Aiden Markram, was not adequate to fetch him the ‘man-of- the-match’ in the Guwahati test in 2025- it went to a team mate for his all-round performance.

But it is not all despair. The most memorable Test match ever in the 150-year history, is still defined by the last run out that birthed the first ever tied Test match.

Another example, though not in the context of Test match cricket, is how the West Indies captain, Clive Lloyd, whose contribution in the first Prudential Cup final ranks alongside the best knocks played in that format, would actually credit the narrow win against Australia to the fielding genius of Vivian Richards.

While, presently, Steve Smith carries the record, Joe Root may yet reclaim it, particularly if he continues his career longer than the Australian. That is possible.

But records and reputations are not synonymous. Root may eventually own the numbers; Smith’s extraordinary consistency, anticipation and reflexes may continue to define the benchmark against which close-in catching is judged.

And that, perhaps, is the larger lesson of Smith’s achievement. The scorecard keeps count of the number of catches taken, but not the underlying art that a ‘freak’ calls his own!

AI assisted pictograph shown

Media reports suggest that a dispute is underway over how the family’s ownership interests are to be shared between the two heirs, a daughter and a son. Are there some gaps between what the media reports have covered and the available facts?

Drawing on publicly available filings and aspects already covered in this column earlier, the purpose of this essay is to trace the evolution of the group’s ownership and corporate structure, identify the changes that are on record, and pull up some questions seen relevant.

The vast TVS group till five years back was owned entirely by three companies in Madurai, T.V. Sundaram Iyengar and Sons P. Ltd and its two subsidiaries, Southern Roadways P Ltd and Sundaram Industries P Ltd.

These companies promoted and funded all the downstream operating companies that used the TVS brand. Over three generations, these companies were managed by designated families, being the descendants of the founder, T V Sundaram Iyengar.

While the individual companies performed appropriate to the industry segment they belonged and the entrepreneurial skill of the person running it, the group appears to have functioned in the spirit that the wealth was commonly owned with no earmarked share to individual families.

In 2021, this spirit of common ownership informed the way the group was split among the various family members- those getting a business of higher value compensating those who didn’t

Sundaram Clayton Ltd and its subsidiary, TVS Motors Ltd, accrued to Venu Srinivasan’s family. The valuation of this being the highest, there was an obligation to compensate others which was done by Venu Srinivasan taking a loan of about Rs.1600crores through a personal investment company, VS Investments P Ltd.

The extent of these inter-se payments are not in the public domain. Since Venu Srinivasan borrowed by pledging the shares of Sundaram Clayton Ltd, the information on this became public. He, according to the media reports, paid out around Rs 2000crore.

Once the main family settlement was completed, to clear the loan burden assumed in VS Investments P Ltd, and to separate TVS Motor from its holding arm, Sundaram Clayton, another round of corporate actions was put through during 2022/ 2023 culminating in a new structure in August, 2023.

This was in four parts- (1) cutting the umbilical cord between Sundaram Clayton and TVS Motor; (2) Addressing the debt taken by VS Investments to settle other TVS family members; (3) separating Sundaram Clayton’ casting business as a standalone operating company; and (4) pumping out a large dose of cash, Rs 2346.92 crores, from Sundaram Clayton through a bonus preference share issue to help fund the loan repayment.

Once this composite scheme was completed, the shareholding in TVS Motors Ltd rested in TVS Holdings Ltd (erstwhile Sundaram Clayton). The promoter shareholding in both TVS Holding and the newly formed Sundaram-Clayton vested directly in the person of Venu Srinivasan.

This outcome helped Venu Srinivasan to create two personal trusts, VS Trust and Srinivasan Trust, to which all the shares were moved- VS Trust held 66.55% and Srinivasan Trust, 3.07% in TVS Holding Ltd.

On 29/12/2023, Venu Srinivasan filed a declaration with TVS Holding that he was the Substantial Beneficial Owner of the two trusts. The exclusion of the other family members is a noticeable fact.

The next such filing of SBO on 16/4/2025 with TVS Holding added Sudarshan Venu as the second beneficiary in the two trusts. No change happened in the case of Sundaram- Clayton Ltd, where also the two trusts held the shares with Venu Srinivasan as the sole beneficial holder.

In between the above two dates, a MOU dated 20/21 March 2024 (widely covered in the press reports) was entered into among the four family members by which the boundaries within which the son and the daughter would conduct their business was specified including the rights and limitations on brand usage.

While the public disclosure of this MOU was limited to the management related issues, the question is whether the same instrument also alluded to the succession to the shareholding, which has since given rise to the dispute.

Parallel to the restructuring in 2021 of the TVS conglomerate and the later one of SCL in 2023, the composition of the board of directors of SCL underwent some interesting changes.

It appears that SCL is the only listed entity in the group that saw significant board changes because of the various corporate actions. The chart below captures this:

When the TVS split happened between March2021 and March 2022, it saw the exit of two TVS family members.

More noticeable is the changes in the composition and titles post 2023 SCL composite restructuring.

The exit of Lakshmi Venu with effect from August 11,2023, the date on which the restructuring took final shape, and TVS Holding becoming the holding company of TVS Motor, is something little explained.

Was this a signalling that she held no right or interest in TVS Motor, though the MOU was to come into existence only on March 20, 2024 and the inclusion of Sudharshan Venu as the substantial beneficial owner was to happen even later on April 16,2025?

Did the daughter miss to read the writing on the wall that the ground was being laid to oust her of any interest in TVS Holding Ltd?

In all of the above, a seminal question arises, but cannot be answered from the material examined here: did the daughter hold any shares or other enforceable economic interest in the three apex holding companies that originally controlled Sundaram Clayton and the wider group?

If she did, the nature of that interest, and what became of it during the subsequent family settlement and corporate restructuring, would merit close examination. The answer could materially alter how the later changes in ownership and beneficial interests are understood.

A corporate fight only leaves all the contenders poorer. To end on a lighter note, has the media over the last two days reported a live internecine corporate clash or, given a glimpse into an incomplete manuscript of Jeffery Archer found near his bedside?

Note-Since many dates and events are listed, should any factual error be pointed out the same shall be corrected.

But what if the loss is only an anticipation in the future? Can the management provide for it?

Does that sound a little like an astrologer predicting to a client a difficult planetary phase several years later but recommending an immediate pilgrimage to ward it off?

An individual can take steps in the present to protect against future evils. A corporation, too, can implement risk mitigation measures. But it has limitations to use its balance sheet to buffer future losses. Prudence is not boundless in accounting!

The story of a listed entity setting up a ₹700 crore contingency provision in its FY26 books is not too distant from the astrologer episode. The relevant schedule in the accounts is given below-

It is only proper that the reasons that weighed with the Board of Texmaco Rail and Engineering Ltd in doing this is explained in their own words-

“As the company is looking to grow significantly in its core as well as allied and diversified areas, the Risk Management Committee of the company has considered the uncertainties arising out of ongoing geo-political factors and their resultant potential impact on the business of the Company due to trade uncertainties, supply chain disruptions, escalation of costs and foreign exchange risks. Given the nature of these risks and their potential impact, the Board felt that as a mitigation measure, it was prudent to make a provision for contingencies of ` 700 crores. The Board also felt that such contingencies would arise neither because of operational issues, nor would be attributable to identifiable individual risks or a single reportable year for which operating performance of the company is reported. In these circumstances the Board felt it appropriate to carve out such provision from free reserves.”

As a writeup, not meant for the experts in accountancy, this is not burdened with the technicalities of creating a provision as explained in the Accounting Standards.

Yet, the core accounting principle is that a provision requires a present obligation arising from a past event, even though the amount or timing may remain uncertain. An anticipated business downturn in the future cannot ordinarily be met by creating a present provision. The question to raise is whether Texmaco’s accounting tests the elasticity of creativity in published accounts!

Not only is the provision made in anticipation of future problems- its construction is also debatable. The provision does not emerge out of current earnings, but the ₹700 crore contingency provision is made up of ₹ 494 crore swiped out of the general reserves and ₹ 206 crore pulled out of the accumulated retained earnings.

In terms of materiality, the ₹700 crore provision is not a mere rounding-off exercise. It significantly exceeds the company’s aggregate consolidated profit of ₹586 crore for the four preceding financial years (FY2023-2026).

The more intriguing fact is that the initiative to make this provision arose from the Risk Management Committee of the Board. The astrologer not only suggested the place of pilgrimage but also which tour operator to contact for the trip!

Just like two different departments in a government may say quite contrary things, the Board’s report given in the latest annual report paints a very rosy picture of the company’s coming years and not in any way echoing the dismal projections of the RMC. The board report is peppered with words like technology, resilience and operational excellence etc.,

A brief extract is given below-

“Looking ahead, the Company remains focused on executing its long-term strategy of growth and diversification. The strategic initiatives undertaken during FY26 mark important steps in your Company’s evolution beyond its traditional strengths, while expanding its presence across infrastructure, engineering and technology led businesses.”

There are examples of companies, temporarily affected by losses adjust such losses against the general reserve, share premium and so on. These were a one-time restructuring of the books, done as a capital reorganisation scheme under the aegis of the courts/NCLT.

Quite apart from the question of its initial creation, the manner in which the contingency provision may be utilised in the future raises a graver concern. Any withdrawal from it would reduce the losses—or boost the reported income—of the year in which that withdrawal is made.

If and when such adjustments are made in the future the same will fall into the category of what is known in the U.S. as cookie jar accounting. A practice that SEC has come down heavily on when used by corporations to smoothen earnings across years. Dell Inc. paid a USD 100 million penalty after the SEC found that it had used reserves to smooth earnings during 2002–2007. There are other cases as well.

Texmaco in its earnings call with the analysts has alluded to this provision being available to strengthen the balance sheet and enhance risk-taking capability for large future bids.

It is also relevant that FY 2026 inventory and trade receivables together amount to about ₹2,120 crore—nearly half the year’s revenue.

These current assets do come under stress when the business environment is tough, especially, if the very supply-chain, cost and business uncertainties cited by the company were to materialise. Whether any future write-offs is adjusted against the ₹700 crore provision is therefore an important question.

The statutory auditor deserves credit for qualifying the report, rather than issue a polite EOM, as many tend to.

Yet, the audit report concludes that subject to the qualification the accounts present a true and fair state of the affairs of the company. The irony is that even post a qualified report, the final picture is never altered from ‘true and fair’!

It is relevant to note that in the AGM the resolutions for passing both the standalone and the consolidated accounts were carried through only due to the weight of the promoters’ shareholding. The public institutions voted 99.9% against the resolutions, demonstrating how institutional investors viewed this practice.

The larger question is therefore not whether ₹700 crore is enough to protect Texmaco from an uncertain future. It is whether a company can create, today, a reservoir ( out of past earnings) against losses that have neither arisen nor been identified, and then draw upon that reservoir when tomorrow’s losses arrive.

Should the regulators charged with preserving the integrity in reporting stay silent, then a trap door may have been opened in questionable accounting!

AI assisted cartoon used

As franchise sport involves the freedom to assemble a team through player acquisitions, a system of financial equity among the contestants is critical to spread the available talent equitably.

A familiar league like the IPL uses a fixed purse for every team so that none can dominate an auction; a cap on individual player contract provides a further check.

The American model in football and basketball leagues imposes strict rules on player remuneration based on collective negotiation. It limits the number of stars who can be paid above the negotiated thresholds.

The soccer leagues in Europe and the UK have long operated a model that links the cost of player acquisition and other expenses to a proportion of a club’s commercial
revenue. That model has now been exposed by an accounting scandal.

Manchester City, one of the most successful clubs in the sport, has been found by an independent commission, appointed by Premier League, to have overstated its revenues to artificially raise its spending limits. It succeeded in contracting high profile players that would not have been permissible based on its true accounts.

Its success on the pitch has been attributed, at least in part, to the deviant accounting that enlarged its budget. The case of a foul being the cause of victory moved from the field to the accountant’ office.

The independent commission’s findings confirmed the charges of accounting manipulation on most counts.

The breaches covered the period 2009–18, precisely when the club made the major player acquisitions that propelled it to the top of the league and secured key titles.

According to the commission’s findings, the club inflated its commercial revenues by £830.69 million ($1.08 billion) through a series of “sham” sponsorship deals.

The owner, Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), adopted a disguised funding scheme that funnelled money into the club in the guise of sponsorship and commercial income.

Man-City signed commercial arrangements totalling £949.94 million; it actually received only £119.25 million as legitimate fees. ADUG funded the remaining £830.69 million.

These inflated figures became the axis to work out its spending limits imposed by the Premier League and UEFA. Naturally, the inflated numbers permitted it to spend far in excess of its eligibility.

Under the evolving Financial Fair Play framework, UEFA restricts a club’s spending on wages, transfers and agent fees (the current squad-cost rule is 70 % of
relevant revenue).

The Premier League’s Profitability and Sustainability Rules likewise limit losses over a rolling three-year period. Capital infusions by the owner that are dressed up as commercial income are strictly curbed and attract penalties. ADUG almost followed to a letter what is forbidden- to pass the funds to the external sponsors who then paid it as sponsor fees to the Club.

Although Manchester City has denied any wrongdoing and retains the right to appeal, most media coverage points to inflamed spectator outrage.

Soccer fans are far more sensitive to a fraud perpetrated on the competition than investors who routinely absorb losses from accounting scandals!

The Premier League faces a tightrope: restoring fairness may ultimately require stripping titles won during the period of the breaches. Yet, doing so risks a political
fallout with the club’s owner, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a member of
the Abu Dhabi royal family and the Vice President of the UAE.

BDO, the club’s auditor for many years, will inevitably come under scrutiny. The scale of the overstatement recalls somewhat the modalities in Satyam Computer accounting
scandal of almost twenty years ago.

The nauseating frequency of such straightforward scams confound a lay person: why don’t the auditors display an iota of scepticism to reach for some independent audit evidence than the impulsive tendency to take the numbers at face value—the client’s face!

Whether Man-City is required to surrender any of its titles, and how the players react to that outcome, is likely to command more attention in the coming months than the
matches themselves!

Investors may passively gulp their financial losses due to an accounting scam. Soccer is a religion; to the fans a stolen match is a blasphemy.

Remember the 3-2 result in favour of Argentina in FIFA World Cup knockout fixture that Egypt believed it actually won. Egypt’s manager Hossam Hassan publicly claimed the match was "rigged" to keep Lionel Messi and Argentina in the tournament!

The pictographs are AI assisted

Obviously no corporate chieftain would wish to stand in the way of incrementing the crorepati count in the country as that would be an even more important marker, than even the record GDP growth, of the nation’s promised march towards the viksit destination.

Still, the Tata Trusts are averse to taking the company public. Is the disinclination solely based on the apprehension that their agenda of philanthropy will be adversely impacted? Many retired senior executives of the group have aired this view- is this the primary concern or, is there an unstated fear of something deeper?

Without having to second guess the possible deeper concern, the recent happenings around the board meeting help better visualise the type of challenges that the Trusts, despite the majority shareholding, may encounter which they have not escaped even with the full protection under the Articles of Association.

The present essay is not based on any factually evidenced material nor, a mere figment of the imagination. What it is, is best understood only by reading it.

Listing Tata Sons may create liquidity for the shares but unlikely to unlock its potential value. The prevalent view is that the share will fetch a price markedly lower than its intrinsic value.

That discount could be significant because Tata Sons may carry not just a holding company discount but also suffer the conglomerate syndrome of a heterogeneous portfolio, including many businesses at very different stages of profitability and capital requirement.

A significant discount in a share’s value is not something that will go unnoticed by value pickers. Taking a significant minority position may be within the reach of investors even outside of pure passive institutions.

Painting this as a corporate raid will be viewed, rightly, as fear mongering. Equally, dismissing the possibility of a disruptive minority stake is naïveté.

In this context, the SP Group’s 18.37% shareholding is a loose cannon. It is a substantial minority stake held by a shareholder with an evident urgency to monetise at least a part of it. At an attractive price, the economic incentive to sell looms large.

This level of inroad may be enough to disturb the rhythm of the group though, by itself, it will not translate into an ability to stall even special resolutions.

The irony is that the danger posed by the 18.37% SP Group’ stake is no longer merely theoretical. They are the ones strongly pushing for the IPO given the prospect of default on their debts.

Another exposure the Tata Trusts’ shareholding carries which has not surfaced in any discussion, is the locus of the voting rights.

The voting rights that the Tata Trusts currently enjoy did not exist till a law change enabled it a few years back. There was very little explanation behind lifting this embargo. Possibly, these very Trusts secured it by representation to the powers that were.

While there is nothing to suggest that the concept of a ‘public trustee’ voting on behalf of charitable trusts’ will be revived, it is not entirely imaginary.

A reference to the way the Azim Premji’ charitable endowments are structured may illustrate the reason to view this matter with caution. He has only transferred the beneficial interest in the shares dedicated to the charity while retaining the legal ownership.

The 6.48% holding in Wipro Ltd by Azim Premji Trust and the 0.26% by Azim Premji Philanthropic Initiatives Private Limited are still considered as part of the promoter holdings- implying, that the voting rights still stay with the promoter.

Despite, a very significant promoter holding in Wipro which at no stage is expected to face any control threat, this matter has been very smartly dealt with.

The Tata situation is precarious because any change in law, either, restoring the previous dispensation or, putting in place any other impediment in exercising the rights fully by the Trusts, will significantly upset the assumptions that underlie their legal rights today.

The matter of Tata Sons’ IPO and the voting rights on the shares may be seen as two unconnected matters. Somewhere, these issues can meld together and create an incendiary situation.

Imagine- first, the IPO will cause the special rights to lapse; second, a significant minority interest, replacing the SP group, enters the scene; and just to make the scene dramatic, the law relating to the voting rights of the Trusts changes in some manner!

Even while the legal eagles are descending in droves on Bombay House, to make sure that this controversy plays out fully and no legal conundrum is left unexplored and the clients feel that they are getting significant value for the astronomical spends, this column closes this subject for today by speculating somewhat wildly on how Tata Sons can try to come out this imbroglio.

The inspiration for the solution comes from none other than the TVS group!

The two cases may be seen to have a solitary but significant resemblance, and a plethora of, but less important, differences.

The thought process rides on the similarity, keeping aside all the dissimilarities as mere distractions.

TVS group had a holding company owning the shares belonging to the group in all their listed entities. Different branches of the families descended from a common progenitor were managing these companies.

The reference to holding company in singular may be contested by persons aware of the case but it is of little relevance. There were three companies (TVS &Sons, Sundaram Industries and Southern Roadways) which actually had a consolidated interest in all the downstream entities.

Under a family settlement the individual family branches decided to take over the respective legal entities managed by each of them.

This was achieved by separating the investments in each of these listed entities and passing it on to each specific family company. The central point is, similar to Tata Sons having multiple investments under its wing, TVS &Sons had multiple investments in listed entities.

Each of these was separated and passed on to the individual family concerned. Tata’s case has no such requirement to cater to multiple families.

TVS case is cited as a precedent to the effect that separating the investments from a central holding company through a demerger has apparently not met with any tax challenge to the extent the information available in public sources show.

The present problem of Tata Sons is the bulging investments causing it to exceed the RBI imposed limit and to provide an exit to the SP group.

Taking forward the TVS example, each of the investment that Tata Sons owns can be separated as done in TVS so that the new structure has only a specific investment attributable to a specific listed entity.

Each of these individual entities will mirror the shareholding of Tata Sons. By merging the new entity into the downstream listed entity, the shareholding in illiquid Tata Sons’ shares will be substituted by shares in the listed entities.

The idea is not to advocate a solution which many experts may view as an over simplification of a very complex problem that can only be resolved by retired judges and senior lawyers. It is just to say that this subject has possibly more facets than being debated in the media!

^$மாடு வாங்கும் முன்னே நெய் காய்ச்சக் குடம் கழுவினாளாம்

For the Tata clan, the coming ‘Second Battle’ over the listing of the hold co and its chairmanship may become the crucible for the hard-fought rights secured in the First battle to survive.

The First Battle of Bombay House saw the Tata Trusts emerge with formidable control of the holding company- indirectly, the entire conglomerate. The critical veto rights embedded in the Articles of Association gave the Trusts formidable leverage in any boardroom tussle and received judicial recognition.

A success in the latest round will firmly place the group’s reins in the surname ‘Tata’- paving the way for a dynastic devolution of power, with the Charitable Trusts and philanthropy providing a powerful veneer of moral legitimacy.

How the Trusts became a vehicle to back-seat drive the group was vividly brought out in Cyrus Mistry’s letter dated December 5, 2016, to the shareholders of the various Tata companies from which he was sought to be removed through an EGM. Of the list that provides a graphic account of the events, the one quite telling is extracted-

“Mr. Ratan Tata, 78, former Chairman, Tata Sons and Mr. N.A. Soonawalla, 81, former Vice-Chairman, Tata Sons, in their capacity as trustees of Tata Trusts took the veto rights of the Trustee-Nominated Directors as their entitlement to dictate to these directors how Tata Sons should conduct itself. They interpreted the Articles of Association to mean that they could call for information and seek discussion on any subject they considered material. In the view of these trustees, the Board of Tata Sons was answerable to them and through the Trustee-Nominated Directors, they could not only call for such information but also dictate what decisions be taken by Tata Sons.” (Para 31)

In paras 35 and 40 he goes onto explain how his ouster was manoeuvred. Just two months before the Board meeting on October 24, 2016, three directors were inducted into the Board of Tata Sons- Amit Chandra, Ajay Piramal and Venu Srinivasan.

Two of these were brought in by Ratan Tata. No NRC process was followed.

When the meeting on October 24^th orchestrated the ouster of Mistry from the post of Chairman, the votes against him were cast by the three trust nominated directors as well as the three new directors, who had attended just one Board meeting prior to this meeting. Two directors had abstained.

How well the new directors could have assessed his performance over the previous four years in that short time does raise the obvious question of their objectivity in that exercise.

However, the Supreme Court did not adjudicate Mistry’s broader critique of the manner in which the Trusts exercised influence over Tata Sons. Its decisive analysis rested on the Articles of Association — particularly Articles 104B and 121.

These very articles that the judgment is pinned on, have reappeared in the discussion since yesterday.

This makes the present stand of Venu Srinivasan particularly intriguing: he is, in effect, invoking the very principle of corporate interest and directorial discretion that had figured in Cyrus Mistry’s challenge to the manner in which the Trust-nominated directors functioned.

However, it is highly doubtful that his vote will count as it clearly runs counter to the court’s unequivocal interpretation of the two aforesaid Articles.

The subject is elaborately considered by the court in paras 19.23 to 19.26 of the order. A layman’s summary is- though, all directors have similar role and responsibilities, the very existence of independent director as a category shows that the said quality cannot be insisted upon from all directors.

International practices clearly pointed out to certain class of investors enjoying privileges that the rest may not.

The judgment therefore leaves considerable difficulty for any Trust nominee seeking to disregard the Trusts’ mandate on matters falling within these special rights

The critical finding in the case was that if the nominees were free to vote contrary to that mandate on those very matters, the affirmative rights conferred by the Articles could be rendered ineffective.

Further, the court emphasised that the directors appointed by the Trusts ‘owed a fiduciary obligation to the Trusts and its nameless and faceless beneficiaries’ -the import being that these directors have restricted agency to act independently on those issues where the Trusts have taken a formal stand.

Similar is the locus standi of the Board that approved the continuation of the Chairman for a fresh term of five years. This is a matter on which the Trusts have a veto.

Further a chairman’s position is a derivative one and doesn’t stand independent of being a director. As the Trusts have a clear majority N. Chandrasekaran’s continuance as a director ultimately remains subject to the shareholders’ vote, where the Trusts command a 66% holding. In fact, the Trusts can remove him from the present post exactly the way Cyrus Mistry was.

Whereas the Trusts’ say on the choice of the chairman may be absolute, the position gets tricky on the more critical matter of the public listing of the company.

The listing arises from a regulatory mandate. The Board of the company is bound to follow the law. Even if the Trusts issue a directive to the contrary, the special force enjoyed by their rights under the Articles on corporate matters may not extend to directing the company to act contrary to a regulatory requirement.

It will be untenable for the Trusts to even legally challenge the decision of the Board, where the latter is merely following the law of the land.

Therefore, the moot point is, can the Trusts approach the court challenging the RBI order? It appears highly doubtful if that would be entertained by the court without the company being made a party. And the company is supporting the listing- a true legal conundrum!

This is perhaps the bigger worry for the Tata clan than who chairs the Board.

If the public listing goes through then much of what Ratan Tata secured in the First Battle of Bombay House will unravel.

Practically, the Trusts will be left with no special rights except what they derive from their level of shareholding.

The Second Battle of Bombay House is as critical for the Tata clan as the one Akbar fought to secure the empire for his successors.

In the present instance the outcome will decide if the reins of the group rests with Noel Tata or with NO Tata!

Note-AI assisted pictograph used

By capturing the title in New York after hoisting the Coupe des Mousquetaires on June 7 this year, Zverev joins Jimmy Connors (1974), Guillermo Vilas (1977), and Jannik Sinner (2024) as the fourth man in the Open Era to achieve this distinction.

Yet, while his predecessors reached this milestone before the age of 25, Zverev had to wait until 29. In professional tennis, that is closer to the afternoon of a player’s prime than its morning.

Zverev’s career has been a testament to patient perseverance. Since childhood, he has lived with Type 1 diabetes, a medical condition that could have easily derailed a less determined athlete. His ascent has therefore demanded not just immense baseline talent, but a high level of discipline and physical endurance.

Until Zverev’s breakthrough in Paris earlier this year, the label “the Lost Generation”—often applied to the talented cohort born in the 1990s—was difficult to counter.

While the two major titles won within three-months do not let him escape this tag fully, he has every chance to move out of this pejorative ring and join a few elite players that have won more titles in their career.

For over a decade, Zverev and his contemporaries endured a gruelling, often uphill struggle to claim the sport’s biggest prizes while the Big Three dominated this space.

Then, just as that legendary era began to recede, a vibrant next wave moved aggressively into the vacuum. The rapid rise of Carlos Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner threatened to shut the window of opportunity for this group before it had ever truly opened.

With two major titles, Zverev now stands as the most successful Grand Slam competitor of his immediate generation. Alongside Daniil Medvedev, Dominic Thiem, Stefanos Tsitsipas, and Casper Ruud, he has long been part of a “frustrated five”—accomplished players who spent much of their absolute athletic primes playing second fiddle to the sport’s dominating personalities.

Zverev may regret that glory in New York arrived six years late. In the 2020 final, he led Thiem by two sets to love before surrendering the advantage and ultimately falling in a fifth-set cliff hanger.

In the years that followed, he endured a string of devastating near-misses and a major ankle injury. His double triumph this season finally attests to his perseverance, placing him squarely on the historic shortlist of multiple-major champions.

Among the four Grand Slam tournaments, the U.S. Open has historically provided the broadest spread of men’s singles champions. Positioned at the rear end of the gruelling season, the tournament acts as a physical and mental crucible.

By September, the accumulated fatigue, levels the playing field, wearing down even the most hardened competitors. This year was no exception. Sinner was forced to withdraw due to a knee injury, while Novak Djokovic suffered a stunning, fitness-hampered early exit. A below-par Alcaraz was knocked out in the quarterfinals by Ben Shelton, who rode that momentum all the way to the final.

Over the past dozen years, Flushing Meadows has uniquely served as an oasis for players seeking to break a title drought. Outside of the historic elite, it is the one venue where Juan Martín del Potro, Marin Čilić, Medvedev, Thiem, Wawrinka, and Andy Murray, all found a way to break through the generational stranglehold.

The contrast with the other three majors is stark. The Australian Open, serving as the season’s opening fixture, has been plainly inhospitable to all but a fistful of five names; Stan Wawrinka’s 2014 victory over Rafael Nadal stands as the solitary exception in over two decades. In that time, no final played in Melbourne was without at least one player from the group of five.

Wimbledon’ turnstiles have been no more welcoming of any one less than the God’s own. Only, the 2016 final between Murray and Raonic stands as an exception that did not feature at least one of the usual suspects in a final. All the titles have been shared within the small clique.

Even Roland Garros, with its highly varied surface, yielded but two exceptions in twenty years: Wawrinka’s 2015 run against the grain and Zverev’s triumph this year. In fact, Zverev’s final against Flavio Cobolli in Paris ended a nineteen-year monotony where at least one member of the established elite stood on the baseline on championship Sunday.

New York is different. Since Roger Federer’s historic run of five consecutive titles ended in 2008, no man has successfully defended the men’s singles crown at the U.S. Open. Since that year, seven different players outside the traditional elite have lifted the trophy.

Zverev in his title run, was no exception to the fatigue factor that affects most players. He came within two points of a shocking first-round exit against Lorenzo Sonego and survived a gruelling, five-set test against Quentin Halys in the second round. His survival during the opening week was a factor of minuscule margins and not dictating dominance.

What separated Zverev from the field was his adaptability. Relying on his punishing first serve and ironclad baseline depth, he stayed patient, internalizing the old tennis adage that a match is never over until the final ball is struck.

His delayed realization that he had actually won the championship point against Shelton produced one of the most comical celebrations in modern tennis history: while the stadium erupted and his opponent walked to the net, Zverev stood frozen, looking entirely bewildered before the jubilation finally set in.

Zverev became only the second male player from Germany, since Boris Becker in 1989, to win the U.S. Open- filling a 37-year void.

The delight to the Germans became a disappointment to the home fans: an American did not win the trophy yet again in men’s singles leaving Andy Roddick’s win in 2003 as the last by an American male player.

As Zverev approaches his 30th birthday, he can look directly to Stan Wawrinka for a career blueprint. Wawrinka also unlocked his full potential much later than his peers, capturing two of his three Grand Slam titles after turning 30. He retired at 41 in this very tournament.

Zverev’s best season is not just a case of delayed gratification. It is a reminder that athletic journeys do not always conform to the rigid timetables imposed by age, media expectation, or reputation. After years of heartbreak, he has turned steadfast persistence into tennis history.

In the last many weeks or months, the business news was suffused with the prospective end of the tenure of the CEO of the country’s biggest business group, allegorically, the Chandra Asthamanam.

The other half of the story is intriguing and nuanced; the reason why this essay had to emerge.

To learn more on the Chandrodayam, shed your laziness, and read on!

The Essel group is as big a bank defaulter as any that have collectively cost the nation more than Rs. 20 trillion in a few years.

YES Bank alone is said to have lost more than Rs.8,500 crores in this case. The total amount that banks and others lost in humouring the group helmed by Dr. Subash Chandra must be over Rs.22,000 crores.

The two primary listed flagships of the group—ZEE Entertainment Enterprises Ltd (ZEEL) and Dish TV—were not direct borrowers in the primary loan defaults. However, both have faced their fair share of regulatory heat for allegedly facilitating transactions linked to privately held group entities.

When lenders invoked personal guarantees furnished by Subhash Chandra and initiated personal insolvency proceedings under the IBC, the stage appeared set for a potentially precedent-setting resolution.

What followed may well qualify as a benchmark in the artistry of haircut.

After a split verdict between two members of the NCLT Bench, a Third Member was called upon to resolve the deadlock. The matter has since been decided, as widely reported.

The fundamental question remains: Was the process simply an exercise of commercial wisdom, or was there something more to it?

It is difficult to reconcile the numbers with ordinary creditor expectations: a resolution providing ₹6.5 crores against claims of ₹22,006 crores translates into a recovery of roughly 0.0003%.

Yet the Third Member held that the Committee of Creditors (CoC), having acted within the statutory voting framework, was entitled to exercise its commercial wisdom in approving the settlement.

The Resolution Plan submitted by the Resolution Professional deserves a prominent entry in the Limca Book of Records!

During arguments by the aggrieved lenders, some stultifying details surfaced: the Personal Guarantor (PG) had previously submitted net worth certificates—presumably, certified by qualified accountants—showing ₹45,888 crores in 2017 and ₹40,562 crores in 2018.

By the time IBC proceedings commenced, that personal net worth had withered to ₹31.79 crores, the basis on which the settlement was structured.

Dissenting lenders like LIC Housing Finance and HDFC Bank have voiced their intent to appeal. Meanwhile, the PG issued a clarification asserting that disputed claims were only ₹3,372 crores, not the widely cited ₹22,000 crores.

As this matter winds its course up the appellate ladder, a legion of lawyers will make hay, though a fundamental shift in the outcome seems unlikely.

Aggrieved creditors are now belatedly beating their breasts, alleging that assets were salted away and demanding forensic audits.

All of this carries the comical flavour of a P.G. Wodehouse page turner like Money in the Bank. One wonders: why the lenders failed to initiate forensic due diligence before accepting those eye-watering net worth certificates at loan origination?

Adding to the irony, LIC remains the largest single shareholder in ZEE Entertainment, a company valued around ₹10,000 crores, alongside major mutual fund holdings.

Yet, Subhash Chandra and his sons (Punit Goenka and Amit Goenka) maintain total operational control over both ZEE and Dish TV while holding a miniscule single-digit equity stake.

The institutions vote against many resolutions to display token resistance. Nothing has changed on the ground. When Punit Goenka’s appointment as Managing Director was voted down at the AGM in November 2024, his designation changed as Chief Executive Officer— requiring no direct shareholder approval.

Chaired by former Finance Secretary, R. Gopalan, ZEE’s board consists entirely of independent persons, with distinguished lawyers, technocrats, and accountants. Perhaps no other family-run business in India features a board of such pristine pedigree. Yet, despite a heavy institutional equity presence and an independent board, the promoter family—holding just ~3% equity—remains firmly in the saddle.

To cap off the spectacle, just as insolvency proceedings concluded with a king’s ransom settlement of ₹6.5 crores, ZEE promoters subscribed to a preferential allotment aimed at raising their stake toward 17%.

They may feel they are doing the enterprise a grand favour by injecting capital, even as their actual operational grip was never in doubt. All of this occurs in the shadow of SEBI proceedings restricting promoter activity in the securities market.

Reports suggest that once the IBC resolution reaches finality, the curtain falls on recovery actions, insulating the promoter from further litigation.

While other fugitive tycoons in far off lands chafe, with the hanging Damocles' sword of ED and CBI notices, the Chandra clan fears little: their core media asset remains firmly under their control, and their corporate survival story is intact.

The Sandesara brothers secured a favourable nod from the highest court to clear criminal proceedings; Subhash Chandra appears to have gone one step further, creating modern corporate history.

His tale of surviving against all odds is the ultimate script for a drama series—one that ZEE TV itself should produce. Is there a more befitting title to this serial than Chandrodayam?

AI assisted graphic used

A passage extracted from one such, picked at random, may help land this postulation better-

‘I feel that the purushartha of Tata (its purpose) has been pretty much maintained for over a century and a half: To serve the nation and society through enterprise. I respectfully disagree with the view that Tata needs to reassess what it stands for (Business Standard, August 20). Investment in, for example, electric vehicles, batteries, defence, and chips do prioritise national needs. Air India faced an unprecedented bunching last year of high prices of aviation turbine fuel, no-fly over regions, and the unfortunate Ahmedabad accident. The foray into smartphones and semiconductors would have pacified the atma of the late FC Kohli, who bemoaned that India (and Tata) had missed the microelectronics revolution. And all this without affecting the expenditure on philanthropy!’

Quite legitimately, financial metrices alone may be inadequate to measure the value of an enterprise to the society at large. Market capitalisation, in isolation, may be even more misleading as a yardstick.

Yet, over two or three decades, a sustained growth in the market value is difficult to disregard as an indicator of the commercial strength of a business and the value that investors and society attach to its mission and purpose.

Long-term business value, reflected in sustained investor confidence, is significantly driven by factors like a viable business model with a competitive advantage; the business fulfilling a larger societal need; fair treatment of the stakeholders; respect for laws; ethical financial management; effective succession planning and robust governance.

There is unlikely to be an example of an enterprise that failed consistently on even one of these criteria and, yet, prospered in the long run. A long-standing business may slip at times, but will set right the course quickly and avoid repeating a mistake.

Reflecting the above sentiment, and the curiosity to understand as to what this group has delivered in the long run led to looking at the market valuation of the eight of its major companies listed on the stock exchanges. (Why only eight and not more- anyone can improve on this exercise.)

The approximate valuation of these, based on the BSE data on August 24,2026, totals to about Rs.22(+/-) trillion - Tata Steel (2.3), Tata Motors (Commercial vehicles) (1.7), Tata Motor (Passenger Vehicles) (1.1), TCS (8.2), Trent (1.5), Titan (4.5), Tata Consumer (1) and Tata Power (1.2).

Looking at this in isolation may shed little light. A comparator is required to make better sense of this. In terms of the size and diversity, Reliance Industries is possibly the closest.

Together with the current value of JIO Financial Service that separated from the parent, their combined valuation is very much in the vicinity of the above.

Both sides sport a mix of manufacturing, infrastructure and services. TCS, significantly upsets the balance, but excluding it may make this comparison illusory.

The individual businesses in the two conglomerates may be different, but overall, they operate in a similar environment, both within and outside the country.

What lends due credibility and logic to this exercise is the similarity in the turnover across the entire 25-year period, from 2001 to 2026.

(1.Since TCS started publishing figures only from FY2005, its number has been taken for convenience in 2001 itself. 2.No elimination has been made for the intercompany transactions within the eight Tata entities. 3.Only the figures as per the consolidated accounts has been used in all cases. 4.Figures of JIO Financial has been ignored being not material. 5. Reliance underwent a major split in 2005/ 2006)

The CAGR is computed separately for the first 13 years (FY2001-FY2014) and the subsequent 12 years.

CAGR of the Turnover in %

FY2001-FY2014 FY2014-FY2026

Tata Group 24.65 6.53

Reliance 23.48 8.08

(An intermediate point has been reckoned in FY 2014, since many in business circles reckon this a turning point in the fortunes of the land.)

The overall economy is said to have grown in nominal terms (current prices) during 2014 to 2026 at 10.11%,cagr. Both, Tata and Reliance have lagged this, Tata even lower than Reliance.

The next indicator considered is the profit before tax (PBT).

CAGR of the PBT in %

FY2001-FY2014 FY2014-FY2026

Tata Group 24.09 6.72

Reliance 19.69 12.88

The profit growth of the Tata-Eight is low in the second period which is in line with the low turnover growth seen above. This has been featuring in recent press comments and one such that BS carried is given here-

‘N Chandrasekaran’s remuneration at Tata Sons grew at a much faster pace than both Tata Sons’ consolidated adjusted net profits (that includes the earnings of its listed and unlisted subsidiaries) as well as the combined net profit of the group’s listed companies.

Chandra’s annual remuneration, including base salary and commission, grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 14.1 per cent in the last eight years -- growing from Rs 55.1 crore in FY18 to Rs 158.7 crore in FY26.

In the same period, Tata Sons’ consolidated adjusted net profit declined by 11.9 per cent cumulatively to Rs 17,923 crore in FY26 from Rs 20,344 crore in FY18. The combined net profit of the group’s listed companies in the period grew at a CAGR of 9.2 per cent from Rs 44,786.5 crore in FY18 to Rs 90,698 crore in FY26.

His salary also beat Tata companies’ shareholders as the group companies combined market capitalisation grew at a CAGR of 11.9 per cent between FY18 and FY26. ‘
-- Krishna Kant, Business Standard, August 12,2026.

The third indicator considered is the investment in (fixed) assets.

(The figure includes intangibles, as both have a significant component of intangibles on their books. All financial investments held are excluded from this.)

CAGR of the Fixed Assets in %

FY2001-FY2014 FY2014-FY2026

Tata Group 23.62 7.00

Reliance 24.13 15.86

Numbers show that the Tata group did not make sufficient investments in businesses which are publicly listed and yielding profits over many years. They may have made significant investments in unlisted entities that are not included here .

It is possible that even after making allowance for the other investments made by Tata in unlisted entities, Reliance is likely to have forged ahead significantly in major investments, that may reflect in the future growth trajectory of these two groups.

It is also noteworthy that Reliance has augmented significant capital, both equity and debt, in the second period. The equity ( + reserves) moved from Rs 2trillion in FY2014 to about Rs11trillion in FY2026. The debt in the same time grew to nearly Rs.4trillion from Rs 1.3trillion.

In 2026 the Tata-Eight had equity in the books of Rs4.2 trillion and a debt of Rs 2.7trillion. Reliance has more lever to raise debt if needed for growth, as compared to the Tata-Eight.

The repeated claim about Tata’ larger goal of serving the society and building the nation as a differentiator may be valid equally for certain other companies that have stayed relevant over the years and invested in ventures to address the critical needs of the nation, whether in goods, services or infrastructure.

Equally, many examples exist of business groups that have a record of good governance and equitably satisfying different stakeholders of their enterprises. Only their sizes may vary.

Philanthropy can be supported out of the profits arising from carrying on a business. But business itself cannot be run as a philanthropy. To grow, business needs capital, which can be serviced only when it is profitable. Social good can be integral to the business model but not its sole goal.

The Tata group’s differentiated ownership structure, with charitable trusts as its ultimate shareholders, does not dispense with the need for prudent management of individual businesses or disciplined capital allocation. The concept of a charity holding shares may be less prevalent in India due to historical reasons, but quite common in the western economies.

Some of the common refrain, particularly those advocating an exemption from listing for Tata Sons and the ones that followed the recent debate over the succession of its CEO, could nevertheless be read as providing a rationale for looking past the underperformance of some newer investments, as well as the questions that have arisen around the Trusts and the governance of the holding company

Embracing greater public accountability for both business performance and governance as demanded by its size and stature, rather than seek exemption from the scrutiny, is the best the well wishers of this group can press for.