Tracking by the Program on Extremism reveals this is the tenth ISIS-related arrest in 2026, and the 106th arrest since the collapse of the ISIS caliphate. Sleeper is the second 15-year-old in the Program on Extremism’s ISIS in America database and the 49th individual under 20 years old, 10 of whom were minors. The other 15-year-old is Santos Colon.

The investigation into Sleeper began when authorities learned he was engaged in online discussions with ISIS members and supporters. The investigation determined that he was asking for help to build drones and explosives for an attack on an unknown location. On October 23, law enforcement gained consent from Sleeper’s parents to conduct a consensual search of his phone, where they found files containing instructions for making explosive devices and chemical compounds, as well as ISIS propaganda. On October 26, law enforcement conducted a search of Sleeper’s residence with the consent of his parents, where they found a jar containing chemicals. Sleeper told the investigators the jar contained chemicals used to produce triacetone triperoxide (TATP), an explosive commonly used in ISIS-inspired attacks. Because of the suspect’s age, law enforcement has said it has not released further details.

The arrest of the 15-year-old fits a recent trend of ISIS supporters getting younger. Historically, the average age has been approximately 27 years old, but over half of the ISIS-related arrests in 2026 are 21 years old or younger. Investigating and prosecuting minors for terrorism related offenses represents a challenge for federal law enforcement due to legal and policy limitations. For this reason, partnerships with local law enforcement remain critical to facilitate expeditious disruptions of minors seeking to conduct violence. In this case, the FBI and Alachua County Sheriff’s Office conducted a joint investigation and charged him with local charges, highlighting the value of the partnerships between federal and local law enforcement to identify and mitigate the risks of terrorist attacks.

Sleeper’s nascent plot also shows the continued interest in terrorists and extremists seeking to use drones as a means of conducting a terrorist attack. Drones represent an appealing option for individuals seeking to cause violence because they allow an attack to be conducted from a distance with a higher degree of anonymity if successful. Drone attacks also create challenges for security professionals to identify and prevent.

Finally, this disruption highlights the value of the community partnering with law enforcement to prevent acts of violence. In this case, the Sleeper’s parents were instrumental in assisting law enforcement to identify the threat and prevent harm to the community by consenting to their son’s phone and then their house being searched.

Sleeper was arrested for attempting to make a destructive device and charged in Alachua County Court. As the investigation continues, Sleeper may face additional charges.

Over the weekend, Italian authorities arrested 30-year-old Italian-Moroccan national Youssef Siher, alleging that he is the mind behind the violent riots that took place in Milan and, to a lesser degree, in other Italian cities, on October 17^th. More specifically, Siher is under investigation for incitement to commit a crime, with aggravating circumstances related to terrorist intent and the use of digital means. In addition, he faces a charge of organized violence during public demonstrations. His wife is also under investigation for the same offenses, but has not been arrested.

Italian authorities allege that Siher ran the Telegram chat (with 10k users) and the social media pages of the so-called October 17 Movement and through them provided detailed instructions on how to sow chaos. He reportedly distributed a manual titled Revolution, Instructions for Usage—Freely Inspired by the Manual of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, an urban warfare kit whose tactics were widely employed during the riots that caused massive destruction in Milan on October 17^th.

The charges against Siher are serious but he is, of course, innocent until proven guilty and it is much too early to weigh in on them. What is noteworthy is the profile of Siher that has emerged over the last few hours.

The first aspect is how well integrated into Italian society he was, at least from a professional point of view. Born in Brescia, naturalized Italian, he had a degree in Communications and a Masters in Political Science from State University in Milan, where he focused on political Islam. During his time at university, he founded the Association of Muslim Students. A prolific writer, he wrote for prominent Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. He also obtained a short-term fellowship at the Observatory on Middle East and North Africa at ISPI, Italy’s most prominent think tank (personal note: having run the Observatory on Terrorism at ISPI almost a decade ago, I am fairly familiar with the line of thinking at the institute and Siher’s position there does not surprise me in the least). He was currently employed by American AI company Mercor, and authorities argued he used his knowledge of AI to develop the October 17^th Movement.

These scholarly and professional endeavors were accompanied by a leadership role in various activist movements. According to Corriere della Sera:

Though previously unknown to law enforcement and with no prior criminal record, Siher had recently drawn attention as a fervent pro-Palestinian activist—most notably through his organizational role within the “Palestinian Youth of Italy” (Giovani Palestinesi d’Italia), as well as online. This attracted the interest of intelligence services, which, in 2024, flagged his group, “Rising Dawn” (Organizzazione Alba Nascente), highlighting its role in coordinating pro-Palestinian demonstrations and characterizing its stance as aligned with Hamas.

It is too early to assess not only Siher’s actions but also his worldview. Yet, some of his writings clearly display signs of what many refer to as the Red-Green Alliance. Siher himself addressed the Red-Green Alliance in a piece titled Islam and Western Lefts: false friends?, which he published on Substack in August 2025. He started by saying that:

It is true that Islam (not Islamism, political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other Western category applied to Islam) and Western leftists are, in the case of the Palestinian issue, false friends. This is because Western leftists—and with them, the affiliated emulating movements in the Third World—that do not fully adopt a radical idea of breaking with the current Western system are themselves considered part of the colonial problem by those leading the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle. This is why few in the West, on October 7, 2023, could understand—without ifs or buts—the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation for what it was: a revolutionary act of decolonization.

After having referred to the October 7^th attacks that killed more than 1200 people in as “a revolutionary act of decolonization,” Siher added that:

Decolonization is, in fact, a break from the status quo of the subjugation of racialized indigenous masses, and therefore dehumanized, for the benefit of the colonial class. It is a process that necessarily implies upheavals, social unrest, and conflicts, paving the way for a new social and political order that reflects the aspirations and values of the liberated people. The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation is, in this sense, an act of liberation—part of the broader decolonization process—in which the Palestinian resistance fighters from Gaza freed themselves from the concentration camp where they were confined.

In a section titled Islam, the Great Nightmare of the West, he concluded that:

In this historical moment, subaltern peoples are rediscovering, through a very difficult process of decolonizing thought, new tools and methodologies for building epistemologies that draw from their history and culture. One of these elements is Islam itself, which is central to the theorization of the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle and the conceptualization of popular revolution against Arab regimes.

In January 2022, I published an essay titled The Rise of “Woke” Islamism in the West. Many of the dynamics described in that piece appear to be relevant in the Siher case:

Many from this new generation of Islamist activists retain only tenuous formal links to established Islamist structures. They might have grown up with Islamist influences—in some cases literally, as some of them are the children of Islamist pioneers in the West—such as being active in Islamist youth groups or giving frequent lectures at mosques and events linked to the network. But they have often created their own ways of amplifying their voices, from establishing new organizations and a multi-platform online presence. Their degrees of connectivity with traditional Islamist organizations varies but is at times quite limited, at least formally.

Moreover, most of these young Islamist actors rarely use Islamist references and if they do so, it tends to be done in somewhat veiled terms. Instead, they speak the language of discrimination, anti-racism, internalized oppression, intersectionality and post-colonial theory. Several of the causes they embrace, such as the environment or lowering university fees, have nothing to do with Islamism. Others can be seen as overlapping with Islamism’s traditional grievances but are framed in typically progressive terms and with no apparent Islamist undertone. For example, Western Islamists’ recent adherence to calls to “de-colonize” school curricula fit the ideology’s inherent anti-colonial nature but are formulated adopting the phrasing commonly used in progressive circles.

These approaches have allowed the new generation of Western Islamists to make inroads in political, media and civil society circles in ways their predecessors could only hope. By largely shedding Islamist tropes and adopting progressive frames and causes, young Western Islamists have forged strong alliances in mainstream society and have come to be widely accepted in Western establishment circles. Many of them have therefore come to run as candidates in political parties, pen op-eds for and appear in debates on mainstream media; forge alliances with a broad array of progressive organizations and thought leaders; receive grants from respected foundations and governmental agencies.

Return to the Land (RTTL) was founded around September 2023 when five men formed a limited liability company (LLC) and bought a $237,000 property in Ravenden, Arkansas. Eric Orwoll and Peter Csere, two of the community’s co-founders and main spokespeople, were described by the New York Times as “a classically trained French horn player who has livestreamed his own sex videos, and a former jazz pianist arrested but not charged for attempted murder in Ecuador.” Together, they lead a whites-only homesteading community, where individuals who want to live on the land must go through an application process to confirm their European ancestral heritage and whiteness.

While the white power movement has long sought to create whites-only enclaves within the United States, RTTL has taken steps to create what they believe to be a legal framework to enforce segregation within its white separatist compound. This framework is unsurprisingly the subject of an active civil case, brought by a woman with Jewish ancestry and a Black husband whose application to purchase property within this community was rejected. RTTL and its founders also recently filed their own civil suit against the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, alleging First Amendment violations and a myriad of related abuses stemming from investigations into the whites-only compound.

These ongoing legal cases have seemingly put a financial strain on the RTTL founders, who have been publicly seeking donations from their online supporters. At the time of publication, their GiveSendGo page has already raised over $200,000 of their $650,000 goal. However, as of today, it appears that RTTL has turned to a new source of funding to secure their white separatist goals.

Eric’s Farm gives users an opportunity to play as Eric Orwoll and build and run a farm. While the game’s trailer avoids displaying overt white nationalist symbols, the connection with RTTL is evident. The game developer, another RTTL co-founder, posted the trailer on X with the caption “A fun way to support the legal fund,” which Orwoll himself reposted to his over 75,000 followers, reaffirming that the profits go to RTTL. Beyond the game being named after one of the RTTL founders, an Arkansas flag flies in the background, the avatar of Eric plays a French horn, and journalists and government drones are among the enemies that players battle against.

The seemingly mundane nature of this game—one of dozens of similar-looking “slop” titles that are regularly published on Steam—provides insight into the financial motivations behind releasing Eric’s Farm. While a far cry from the school shooting recreations found on Roblox, the innocuous nature of a game like Eric’s Farm being released on the largest mainstream digital distribution site offers appeal to unsuspecting individuals simply browsing for a new video game to play. Simultaneously, this game provides online supporters of RTTL’s white nationalist enclave a tangible product to promote in exchange for donations to RTTL. Already, Steam reviews of the game reference that playing the game led to “news journalists with suspiciously large noses knocking on my door,” suggesting some of those playing the game on release day are aware of the developer’s connections to the white separatist movement and are happy to contribute to RTTL’s goals.

In late 2023, Fergie Chambers, the radical American political activist with a $250 million inheritance and a vow to invest in revolutionary and anti-imperialist causes, fled the United States. He knew he was under FBI surveillance, he has said. And four young comrades in Palestine Action US, an anti-Israel group co-founded by Chambers shortly after Hamas’s terrorist attack on southern Israel, had just been arrested for allegedly attacking two U.S. offices of Israel’s largest defense company.

Chambers soon wound up in Tunisia, where he made no secret about his ambition to keep using his money to further his causes. He converted to Islam, bailed out a Tunisian soccer team, and has said that he continued funding radical groups, particularly ones focused on Palestine. Those financial connections led to his arrest in July in Spain on charges of providing financial support to international terrorist groups. He has been fighting extradition to the U.S. ever since.

Exactly what evidence has the Justice Department amassed against Chambers? And why is the Trump administration so determined to get him back? The answers to those questions have remained a mystery, largely because the federal indictment of Chambers is sealed and because government officials have not commented on him since the arrest.

But Spanish court documents obtained by The Free Press reveal crucial details about those accusations, including that Chambers was actively conspiring with Iran while in Tunisia to support Hamas and possibly other terrorist activities backed by Tehran, according to information provided by American law-enforcement officials.

Chambers, 41, allegedly met with Iranian officials in the Tunisian capital of Tunis, who were eager to tap into his vast personal fortune. “During his stay in Tunisia, the requested person transferred large sums of money from the United States to Tunisia, while publicly expressing his support for the foreign terrorist organization, Hamas,” the court documents say. “Several of these transfers were made at approximately the time the requested person visited the Embassy of Iran in Tunisia.”

“The requested person’s associates remarked that Iranian officials were trying to obtain money from him and that his motivation was to be part of ‘global terrorism activities,’ ” according to the filing in Spain’s National Court on October 9.

Last week, a Spanish judge denied a bail request by Chambers, partly because of the severity of the accusations detailed in the court documents. “The maintenance of pretrial detention continues to be justified by the seriousness of the penalties the requested person faces in his country of origin and the existence of sufficient resources to move his residence outside Spanish territory,” Judge Ana Revuelta Iglesias wrote. The judge’s ruling and the U.S.’s allegation about Chambers’s ties to Iran were first reported by El Español, an online news publication in Spain.

The Justice Department declined to comment on the documents, which are consistent with what members of Chambers’s family and his legal team have been saying since the arrest: The Justice Department was accusing him of using over $7 million transferred to Tunisia to support Hamas. Chambers’ family and legal team have denied that.

According to the court documents obtained by The Free Press, the sealed indictment refers to Chambers’s alleged funding of Palestine Action US and the unrest fomented by the group after October 7, 2023. That unrest includes the sabotage of Elbit Systems, the Israeli defense company, at two locations in the U.S. One of the attackers was Calla Walsh, a rising star in Democratic politics before veering toward militancy. She spent time in jail for the attack.

The court documents say that, according to the indictment, Chambers “conspired in and participated in disturbances against Elbit in the weeks following the massacre.” As a result, “during October and November 2023, multiple acts of direct violence took place at Elbit’s facilities, causing significant damage.”

The office of Chambers’s lawyer in Spain, renowned international human-rights defender Baltasar Garzón didn’t respond to a request for comment from The Free Press. Garzón and Chambers’s wife, Stella Schnabel, have repeatedly denied that Chambers played any role in financing Hamas or international terrorism. They have accused the Trump administration of persecuting the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist agitator for his staunch support of the Palestinian cause, including funding humanitarian activities inside the Gaza Strip.

“I think he’s being targeted because it’s very uncommon that you have someone coming from a very wealthy family giving money to the causes that he gives money to,” Schnabel told Spanish media personality Laura Arroyo last month. “It’s very hard to find someone who is American that gives money to Palestine.”

Schnabel added that all of his donations to organizations in Tunisia and the Palestinian territories were made transparently. “He’s extremely open about his actions and what he does,” she said. “So it’s not a mystery what he was doing with his money in Tunisia. It was very, very public knowledge.” Schnabel has pressed Spain’s progressive government, led by President Pedro Sánchez, to grant political asylum to Chambers.

Chambers received his fortune as part of a breakup with his family, which founded Cox Enterprises, a business empire that includes telecommunications, media, and automotive services. His great-grandfather James Middleton Cox was governor of Ohio and ran for president as a Democrat in 1920, losing to Warren G. Harding. In 2023, Chambers started a Marxist compound in Massachusetts and a funding vehicle called the Babochki Collective for his political causes.

Palestine Action US, the anti-Israel group founded by Chambers and Walsh, quickly put him in the crosshairs of U.S. law enforcement. Palestine Action US is similar in name and advocacy to Palestine Action, an organization in the UK that has been designated a terrorist group by the British and U.S. governments.

The Trump administration’s pursuit of Chambers is part of a wider crackdown on groups that officials believe have foreign funding or ties to international terrorist groups.

In July, a federal grand jury in New York launched a probe into organizations backed by the Shanghai-based American technology executive, Neville Roy Singham, due to concerns that he is advancing interests of the Chinese Communist Party inside the U.S. In Congress, the Republican-controlled House Ways and Means Committee is trying to take away tax-exempt status from the Middle East Children’s Alliance, accusing the charity group of providing funds to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.

The judge who denied Chambers’s bail request last week said her ruling will have no bearing on the Spanish government’s continuing deliberations about whether to extradite Chambers to the U.S. to face the criminal charges against him. Her ruling “does not address the existence of criminal liability,” she wrote.

Celebrities like Richard Gere, Cynthia Nixon, and Greta Thunberg are part of the pressure campaign to win Chambers’s release. Left-wing Spanish politicians and political parties demanded in rallies in Madrid earlier this month that the Spanish government block his extradition.

Schnabel, now pregnant with the couple’s second child, has said that she is still preparing to make Spain the family’s home. Schnabel and Chambers were looking for a preschool for their son on the Spanish resort island of Ibiza, a haven for the jet set and the ultrarich, in July when they were surrounded by police cars.

“We love Spain,” she said last month. “Not only for its incredible history, but, frankly, because of its stand on Palestine and the understanding of injustice.”

Ilich Ramírez Sánchez was 20 years old when he arrived in Beirut in 1970 and made his way to the offices of al-Hadaf, a weekly Arabic-language newspaper. Deputy editor Bassam Abu Sharif welcomed the young Venezuelan, but they didn’t discuss feature stories or a reporting job.

Abu Sharif was also a senior operative in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and he was looking for recruits to help the Palestinian terrorist organization advance its wars against Israel and several Arab states, which it accomplished through assassinations, bombings, and airplane hijackings.

“I want to fight the enemy,” Ramírez Sánchez assured Abu Sharif with steely confidence during the interview, according to The Jackal, a new biography by veteran Washington Post investigative journalist Joby Warrick about the man who became known to the world as Carlos the Jackal.

“Who is that?” Abu Sharif pressed.

Ramírez Sánchez replied: “The Israeli capitalist imperialists.”

Warrick is hardly the first person to document the murderous exploits and playboy lifestyle of Carlos, one of the world’s most wanted men during the 1970s and 1980s. At least half a dozen investigative journalists and memoirists have tackled the same subject, and a French-language docudrama in 2010 devoted nearly six hours to the terrorist’s life. Even today, Hollywood continues to tap into his lore: The British series The Day of the Jackal, based on the 1971 Frederick Forsyth novel that gave birth to Carlos’s nickname, is now streaming on Peacock, and a second season will air next year.

But Warrick’s take on Carlos, dubbed “the world’s first super-terrorist,” is both fresh and well-timed. It documents the development of the terrorist’s anti-imperialism and pro-Palestine militancy just as those ideologies are being re-embraced across the West since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. The language and symbols of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the PFLP have been on display at college campuses in the United States and Europe, and leaders of the terrorist groups are lionized by students too young to remember what they did.

Carlos also has inspired ideological heirs such as American left-wing activists Calla Walsh and Fergie Chambers, who have embraced militancy to support the Palestinian cause and check America’s power. Their words echo Carlos’s—and their actions sometimes do, too. After Chicago activist Elias Rodriguez was charged with murder and hate crimes last year for allegedly gunning down Israeli embassy employees Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., Walsh signed her name on a statement justifying the killings as “a legitimate act of resistance against the Zionist state and its genocidal campaign in Gaza.”

Warrick’s book depicts Carlos as a poster boy for the red-green alliance: the coalition that is thriving today and marries the far left with Islamists and Arab nationalists in a bid to curb American might and eradicate the state of Israel. The author expertly stitches together Carlos’s life and travels over three decades, which saw him conduct spectacular terrorist attacks and assassinations for a who’s who of Middle Eastern patrons and despots, including Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Syria’s Hafez al-Assad, and Sudan’s fundamentalist Islamist government. The operations orchestrated by Carlos and his PFLP cohorts include the 1972 massacre at Israel’s Lod Airport, the 1975 kidnapping of OPEC’s oil ministers in Vienna, and the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris, which ended with Israeli commandos freeing almost all the passengers in the Ugandan city of Entebbe.

During his reign of terror, Carlos coveted wealth, fame, and perhaps most of all, beautiful women. He left behind a trail littered with maimed and murdered police officers and innocents in Paris, Vienna, and Marseille. He represented a form of radical chic that has become fashionable again in American politics, academia, and entertainment. His ideological heirs are very much on the march across the West. The biggest question is: How willing are his heirs to cross the line from rhetoric to murder, including by inciting others to do it?

***

Calla Walsh is probably the best example of a left-leaning American influencer to go down a path toward radicalization that shares remarkable similarities to the path taken by Carlos a half century ago. As I wrote in The Free Press in March, the 22-year-old Walsh, raised in Boston, was a rising star in Democratic politics before her path veered toward militancy. She spent time in jail for attacking the offices of Israel’s largest defense contractor in October 2023, including scrawling anti-Israeli graffiti at the company’s manufacturing and engineering facility in New Hampshire. She is a regular contributor to Iranian state media and often travels to Iran to bolster the regime’s information warfare efforts against the U.S. and Israel. And in a move eerily similar to Carlos, Walsh made Beirut her base of operations and is regularly seen in the Lebanese capital with leaders of the PFLP.

Walsh’s arrival in Lebanon last year was marked by a joint event with Khalid Barakat, sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2024 for being a key PFLP recruiter, just like Abu Sharif once was. They were joined by Barakat’s wife, Charlotte Kates, who leads the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, which the State Department blacklisted as a PFLP fundraising front.

Walsh used the event to rally radicals across the Middle East and the West. “For my comrades in the heart of the Belly of the Beast, I pass my salutations to everyone in this room, and above all, to the glorious resistance forces in Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran,” she said in front of a picture of Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s terrorist mastermind behind the October 7 attack on Israel.

This August, Walsh toured a Palestinian refugee camp with Georges Abdallah, a Lebanese militant who carried out terrorist attacks in Europe in the early 1970s under the leadership of Wadie Haddad, the same PFLP commander who once trained Carlos the Jackal.

Walsh now appears regularly on a Beirut-based news site called Vocal Politics, which propagandizes for Iran and its militant allies, and exhorts her Gen-Z followers to carry out revolutionary violence inside the U.S. In early August, she lionized George and Jonathan Jackson, two African American brothers who died fighting California police officers and prison guards in the early 1970s.

“He embraced the liberatory violence required to make revolution,” Walsh told her followers about George Jackson, who, like Carlos the Jackal, studied Marx, Che Guevara, and Frantz Fanon, and sought to foment a global uprising.

One of Walsh’s ideological mentors, the self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist millionaire Fergie Chambers, also has followed a path reminiscent of Carlos’s, vowing to use his $250 million inheritance to collapse the American empire. Chambers, 41, is currently being detained in a Madrid prison while Spanish authorities decide how to respond to an extradition request by the U.S. So far, Chambers has failed to win his release on bail.

The Justice Department hasn’t publicly announced any charges against Chambers, but an extradition notice said that he is accused of money laundering, rioting, and conspiracy to riot. The notice also referred to his financial support of terrorist organizations in the Palestinian territories. Last week, a court in Spain said that the evidence against him includes alleged communications between Chambers and Iranian officials about “global terrorist activities.”

In The Jackal, Warrick writes that Carlos was raised in affluence and initiated into communist thought through elite circles. He spent his high school and college years traveling between Caracas, London, and Moscow, and was pressed by his father, a prominent lawyer, to pursue a revolutionary path. “So devoted was his father to Bolshevism that he named all three of his sons in honor of the Soviet Union’s founder, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin,” Warrick writes. “Ilich’s brothers were Vladimir and Lenin.”

Chambers has used his own wealth to live and study in Russia and to promote Lenin’s and Marx’s ideas. Chambers’s first wife was a Russian national, and they moved to Moscow in the late 2000s. He embedded himself as a journalist with Russian forces fighting in Ukraine after Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion in 2022. When Chambers received his inheritance in 2023, as an heir to the Cox Communications empire, he invested some of it in a Marxist compound in the Berkshires. The young acolytes he trained included Walsh.

But Chambers, like Carlos, never gave up on his taste for the high life. Warrick details in The Jackal how Carlos always coveted the finest restaurants, wines, clothing, and hotels, even while conducting terrorist operations in Europe. Chambers was arrested in July on the Spanish resort island of Ibiza, a bastion for the jet set and the ultrarich.

His current wife, Stella Schnable, is an American socialite and actress and the daughter of the renowned New York artist, Julian Schnable. She told El País that she and Fergie were preparing to settle in Ibiza and were looking for a school for their 5-year-old son when he was taken into custody.

Carlos’s transformation from ideologue to terrorist is also echoed in the story of Elias Rodriguez, who was heard screaming “Free Palestine!” after allegedly shooting Lischinsky and Milgrim outside the Capital Jewish Museum in May 2025. The attacker used a 9mm pistol and shot Milgrim in the back as she tried to crawl away, according to the indictment.

While living in Chicago, Rodriguez participated in Black Lives Matter protests and actions to prevent Amazon from opening a headquarters there. He joined the local branch of the Party for Socialism and Liberation and lobbied against American military operations overseas. October 7 radicalized him further, according to the indictment and press accounts.

“Those of us against the genocide take satisfaction in arguing that the perpetrators and abettors have forfeited their humanity,” Rodriguez wrote in what he called an “explication” that was discovered after the killings. “A perpetrator may then be a loving parent, a filial child, a generous and charitable friend, an amiable stranger, capable of moral strength at times when it suits him and sometimes even when it does not, and yet be a monster all the same.” He has pleaded not guilty to the charges.

In The Jackal, Warrick documents how Carlos attempted his first assassination in 1973. The PFLP told Carlos to assemble a hit list of prominent British supporters of Israel, and Joseph “Teddy” Sieff rose to the top. Sieff was the former chairman of the Marks & Spencer retail chain and a leader of the UK’s Zionist movement. Sieff had been vice president of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland and was deeply involved in fundraising for Jewish and Israeli causes.

At first, murder wasn’t second nature for Carlos, despite his commitment to the cause, in Warrick’s telling. “Snuffing out life from two human eyes that are staring at you is not easy,” Carlos said. Nevertheless, he forced his way into Sieff’s estate in London and shot him in the face from point-blank range. The bullet ricocheted off the businessman’s nose, knocking him unconscious. He survived, and Carlos fled after his pistol jammed. Dozens of his later targets wouldn’t be nearly as lucky as Sieff was.

Carlos’s campaigns of terror during the 1970s and 1980s, which claimed more than 80 lives, eventually caught up with him, just as justice almost certainly will for his ideological successors. The Venezuelan was captured in 1994 in Sudan and convicted in 1997 of the murders of two French policemen and a Lebanese informant. “¡Viva la revolución!” he shouted after the verdict, shaking his fist.

Warrick met him in Poissy Central Prison, where Carlos is serving a life sentence. What Warrick found was a graying, slightly sick septuagenarian who vented about not killing enough before he was finally captured. His only joy seemed to come from ogling a female prison guard who was monitoring the conversation.

“Every revolutionary ends up as an oppressor or a heretic,” writes Warrick in The Jackal, citing Albert Camus’ essay The Rebel. While Warrick meant that about Carlos, it will likely be said about his ideological heirs, too.

This charge comes shortly after a 17-year-old girl from North Carolina, Sarah Lindsey Santiago, was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, in connection to the San Diego mosque shooting where three died, as she allegedly recorded the livestream and disseminated the attackers’ manifesto.

Taken together, these charges represent a nascent—albeit notable—trend in broader Department of Justice efforts to prosecute domestic violent extremists and their supporters in the United States.

According to the criminal complaint, two days after the Tumbler Ridge school shooting, federal agents interviewed Bryant about his connection to Van Rootselaar after Discord found the two had extensive conversations about the shooting. Bryant and Van Rootselaar first met online three years ago, and spoke for approximately six months before the Tumbler Ridge shooting. During the six months, Bryant and Van Rootselaar discussed preparations for the attack, including tactics to kill more individuals, what to wear, and stickers to put on the weapon Van Rootselaar would use. Several times, Bryant indicated he thought there could be potential punitive action against him for his part, including stating they should delete their messages and he should get a VPN before disseminating the livestream. Still, he not only provided advice and recorded and disseminated the video of the attack, but also sent nearly $150 to help her buy shoes she wanted to wear for the attack.

Santiago’s charges demonstrate a parallel to Bryant’s. While being charged at the state level, she allegedly agreed prior to the attack to livestream and disseminate it. It is not clear whether Santiago ever met either of the San Diego Islamic Center shooters in person or the extent of their communication, but the pattern of alleged online support aligns with Bryant’s case. Prosecutors claim she bought and sent one of the attackers a Sonnenrad patch that he wore during the shooting, publicly distributed the livestream recording, and released a manifesto purporting to justify the attack.

These cases are indicative of the continued relevance of mass-casualty attack propaganda within the domestic violent extremist landscape. Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings which killed 51, popularized “livestream terror” with his first- person GoPro footage broadcast on Facebook. Tarrant’s propaganda is ubiquitous within both niche online subcultures and mainstream spaces like Roblox and TikTok, and his deification by far-right actors has seen imitation of both his attack and manifesto.

These recent prosecutions of online supporters connected to acts of real-world violence represent a potential evolution in the Department of Justice’s efforts to counter domestic violent extremists using the existing legal toolbox. Experts have often discussed the gaps in our terrorism statutes, including the challenges associated with the prosecution of domestic violent extremists in the absence of a federal domestic terrorism statute. However, numerous cases brought against nihilistic violent extremists (NVE’s) have underscored the transnational nature of these networks, offering avenues for criminal prosecutions. Similarly, the cases of Bryant and Santiago represent newfound efforts to target not only the perpetrators of acts of real-world violence, but the online support networks which allegedly played a key role in enabling the attacks.

Mohamud initially expressed a desire to travel to Somalia and join a terrorist organization there. Beginning in December 2024, he told the CHS he intended to travel overseas to Somalia and fight with either al-Shabaab or ISIS. Later, Mohamud stated that if he could not save the necessary money to travel overseas, he would instead conduct an attack in the United States. In January 2025, days after Shamsud-Din Jabbar rammed a truck into a crowd on Bourbon Street in New Orleans and swore allegiance to ISIS before the attack, Mohamud spoke favorably of Jabbar, calling him a “real muslim.” Over the following year, his loyalties migrated from al-Shabaab toward ISIS outright; by December 2025 he wrote that “when i make hijrah insha Allah i will go to ISIS in somal no matter how tempting going to Al Shabaab is,” and he spent much of 2026 collecting ISIS propaganda, joining Discord servers, and soliciting a formal introduction to the group.

Beginning in March 2025, Mohamud’s objective shifted towards conducting an attack in the United States. Mohamud told the CHS that if he could not get out of the country, he would rather “get a gun here and just start killing a bunch of white ppl” than be taken alive. By July 2026, Mohamud told the CHS he did not have enough money to purchase the plane ticket and instead decided on doing an attack in the U.S., writing, “so i will do attack here.”

Mohamud chose to target the Mall of America, in a suburb south of Minneapolis. His planned attack included buying either pistols or an AK-47 and then going to “malll of america or valley fair on Minnesota on christmas time.” Valley Fair is a popular amusement park also in the Twin Cities area. Mohamud ultimately chose the Mall of America as his target “because its owned by jewish [sic] so if i kill even 30 people noone would go there anymore.” In explaining his antisemitic views, he referenced the December 2025 attack on Jewish beachgoers in Bondi Beach, Australia, as a model he wanted to emulate. Mohamud later shifted the planned date of his attack from Christmas to October 24, 2026, after identifying a Hmong Arts Celebration at the mall as a gathering of “asians [sic] Chinese Vietnamese and other kuffar.” Kuffar is an Arabic term referring to people who do not believe in Islam.

Mohamud also sought inspiration from Omar Mateen, the individual who conducted the Pulse Nightclub Shooting in 2016. In September 2026, he told the CHS, “yesterday i was watching omar matteen attack video and i think i can do the same thing omar matteen did. i just walk in and shoot.” Omar Mateen killed 49 people and wounded dozens on June 12, 2016, after pledging allegiance to ISIS. Mohamud followed Mateen’s example even further, recording his own selfie-style video pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

As part of their investigation, the FBI attempted to interview the family members of Mohamud to further assess the threat he posed. However, the family members chose not to talk to the interviewing agents and referred them to an attorney. Following Mohamud’s continued statements about conducting an attack on October 24, 2026, the FBI introduced an undercover employee (UCE). The UCE described himself as a fellow ISIS member and was able to sell Mohamud the AK-47, magazines, and ammunition he required for the attack. On October 6, 2026, Mohamud met with the UCE and purchased the inert weapon, ammunition, and magazines for $600. During the exchange, Mohamud reiterated his intention to shoot up the Mall of America festival and repeated that the mall’s Jewish ownership was part of his motivation. Mohamud was arrested as he stepped out of the UCE’s vehicle after making the purchase.

The Mall of America has previously been the target of interest by terrorist organizations. On November 12, 2017, Mahad Abdirahman stabbed two people at the Mall of America. After being arrested, Abdirahman stated his attack was inspired by ISIS. In February 2015, al-Shabaab named the Mall of America as a target for future attacks. In their statement, al-Shabaab explicitly called for attacks on “Jewish-owned” shopping malls in the West. Mohamud’s antisemitic motivation for choosing the Mall of America mirrors this call by al-Shabaab and follows the terrorist group’s own 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall that killed 67 people.

This investigation also highlights the decision aspiring terrorists in the United States must make between traveling overseas to join a terrorist organization and conducting an attack in the United States. There continue to be U.S. individuals who attempt to travel overseas to join terrorist organizations. However, the barriers to travel, including financial requirements and facilitating a trusted contact with the terrorist group, may force some to conclude a domestic attack is easier.

Mohamud was charged with knowingly receiving a firearm and ammunition with reasonable cause to believe they would be used to commit a felony or a federal crime of terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(h), predicated on an underlying violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2339B, providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Authorities and researchers have raised alarms about 764 for some time now. 764 often targets and exploits children or vulnerable people, engaging in sextortion and CSAM, among other criminal activities. 764 sits within the NVE ideology, which is motivated by misanthropy. These decentralized networks idolize mass attackers and encourage attention-grabbing acts of violence.

Concerningly, these networks produce instructional material in the form of manuals and digital magazines, which provide step-by-step guides for acts of violence, extortion, and even chemical attacks. While the exact material on the devices of the 15-year-old perpetrator in Portland has yet to be publicly detailed, the presence of 764-adjacent content itself in this case further evidences the ease with which those with violent ideations can consume online content that further radicalizes and provides a roadmap for turning ideas into real-world acts of violence.

NVE attackers in the United States include the likes of Solomon Henderson, the Antioch High School attacker, and Robin Westman, the Annunciation Catholic Church shooter, among others. The Program on Extremism has tracked 115 NVE cases in the United States, which only includes perpetrators who can be publicly named. Of the 115, 13 individuals have successfully conducted their attacks, which have focused primarily on targeting schools and students, and have utilized firearms as the most common tactic.

The Program on Extremism has no documented case of the use of CBRN materials in an NVE plot or attack.

The case in Oregon presents an evolution of the NVE threat. While the federal government has moved to impose higher penalties on NVE-motivated individuals, such as the recent sentencing of Kyle William Spitze, who received a record 77 years in prison for his activities in 764, the threat remains. Yet perhaps most concerning are the increasingly young individuals who are becoming involved in nihilistic groups and acting on those grievances.

Ellaboudy is a Department of Energy (DOE) electrical engineer from Richland, Washington, who has worked for the DOE since 2022 and holds a master’s degree in electrical engineering. According to the FBI complaint, Ellaboudy stated that his brother is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and is currently incarcerated in Egypt.

The State Department designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in February 2024 and as a foreign terrorist organization on March 5, 2025.

Beginning in November 2024, the FBI learned that Ellaboudy had purchased numerous chemicals and components commonly associated with the manufacturing of homemade explosives. Around the same time, Ellaboudy told his supervisor at the DOE that he had to take a sick day because he had been exposed to nitric acid, one of the precursor components he purchased. To cover up the incident, Ellaboudy claimed he was working on fuel for model rockets, a hobby he had previously never mentioned.

In April 2025, the FBI introduced a confidential human source (CHS) to Ellaboudy in an effort to assess any threats. In an April 2025 meeting at Ellaboudy’s residence, the CHS saw circuit boards, wires, a digital timer, and a quadcopter drone in his home. In later recorded conversations, Ellaboudy explained how one can hide a drone pilot’s location and mentioned Yemenis had used drones to overwhelm radar for at least 30 minutes, which he called “playtime.” In July of 2025, Ellaboudy also expressed support for Houthi attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea.

During the summer of 2025, Ellaboudy said he wanted to travel to Yemen and meet with representatives of the Houthis. In September 2025, Ellaboudy flew to Salalah, Oman, a country that neighbors Yemen, and paid a smuggler $1400 to smuggle him into Yemen with hopes of reaching the capital where he planned to meet Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. On returning through Los Angeles Airport, he told the Customs and Border Protection officer he had been on a DOE missile-defense inspection, held a secret clearance, and presented an official U.S. passport obtained from a previous government employer, which is only to be used by U.S. government employees while traveling for official government business. Ellaboudy’s supervisor told the FBI that no such program exists, that Ellaboudy holds no DOE clearance, and that he had no authorized foreign travel. Ellaboudy later explained to the CHSs that he was unable to travel to Sanaa due to the time required.

Beginning in July 2025, the FBI introduced two additional CHSs to further investigate Ellaboudy, including one CHS who was introduced by phone and portrayed himself as a Houthi colonel located in Yemen. From May 2026 through July, Ellaboudy assisted the CHSs in preparing solar panel supplies and communications gear intended to be shipped and smuggled into Yemen to assist the Houthis. Ellaboudy assisted in testing this equipment, offering recommendations on the components required, providing guidance on what gear should be purchased and from where, and then assisted the CHS in preparing the equipment.

Ellaboudy has been charged with one count of attempting to provide material support to the Houthis, specifically, personnel (himself), services, expert advice and assistance, and equipment in the form of electronic components. To convict a defendant of providing material support of personnel and services, the government would have to prove that they took direction and control from, or coordinated with, members of the terrorist organization. Ellaboudy attempted to do just that when he traveled to Yemen. Moreover, the provision of equipment does not require such direction or coordination.

Ellaboudy is the first U.S. person charged with providing material support to the Houthis. On January 11, 2024, the Navy ship, USS Fuller, interdicted a boat in the Arabian Sea and discovered Iranian-made advanced conventional weaponry, including missile components and a warhead, destined for the Houthis in Yemen. Fourteen mariners aboard the boat were brought to the United States, and the captain, Muhammad Pahlawan, was tried and convicted for his actions.

The assistance Ellaboudy attempted to provide the Houthis is particularly relevant considering their ongoing military conflicts in the Middle East. The Houthis are closely aligned with Iran and are viewed as a significant proxy for Iranian efforts to expand their influence in the region. The U.S. Navy previously countered Houthi efforts to attack shipping beginning in October 2023, ending with a truce agreed to in May 2025. The Houthis have recently taken more territory in Yemen, allowing greater control over a critical shipping chokepoint. They have also launched a series of drone attacks on infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in the last few months. If successful, Ellaboudy’s expertise in electronics and drones may have been beneficial to these Houthi efforts and directly impacted the United States’ national security interests in the region.

Federal U.S. agents have made another arrest of an American citizen for allegedly sending money to the designated Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas.

On September 16, Raed Yousef was arrested by federal agents and booked into the Pinellas County jail in Florida. Yousef’s arrest marks the third case this year and represents a significant shift in the Department of Justice’s record of prosecuting Hamas fundraising cases. Earlier this year, Reda Mazen Rida Sabassi and Mohammed Yousef Hasna were charged separately for allegedly sending money to Hamas.

Raed Yousef was born in Kuwait and has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since February 12, 1991. Yousef lives in Florida and also maintains a Jordanian passport in the name of Raed Mohamed Salim Suleiman. Yousef has been charged by the Department of Justice with nineteen federal felony offenses, which can largely be grouped into four categories: conspiracy and attempt to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (counts 1-6); conspiracy and attempt to provide funds, goods, and services to a specially designated terrorist (counts 7-12); conspiracy to commit international money laundering and international money laundering with the intention of promoting a specific unlawful activity (counts 13-18); and passport fraud (count 19).

Yousef allegedly worked with several co-conspirators in a financing network to move money to Hamas. One unidentified co-conspirator is a French national residing in France; another co-conspirator is a Palestinian national who resides in the Gaza Strip and is a member of, and associated with, Hamas; and a third is an American citizen residing in Louisiana. The alleged conspiracy also includes a France-based NGO that purports to provide financial, material, and physical aid to recipients in Africa and the Middle East.

Interestingly, the France-based NGO was created on October 13, 2023, by the French co-conspirator, just six days after Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack on southern Israel that killed approximately 1,200 civilians.

Beginning in 2023, Yousef sent money from Florida through a PayPal account to the co-conspirator in France and his newly created France-based NGO. The co-conspirator deposited the money into a bank account and converted the funds into cryptocurrency, which he then moved into a digital wallet and sent to the third co-conspirator who had tied ties to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Yousef expressed in his electronic communication to members of his network a desire to foment mass carnage against Israel. He noted that his Hamas contact, “knows people over there and he told them to cut off heads and show the whole world, like what the fucking jews are doing to us over there.”

He added: “You need to frighten them and scare them so they can flee from our land! Then after they hit them, they need to behead them and show that on social media, so they can be frightened and scare them to death.”

The France-based organization transferred at least $334,432 to cryptocurrency wallets associated with the Hamas co-conspirator. Between January 30, 2024, and July 23, 2025, Yousef sent approximately $46,000 to the group.

Operationally, the group took additional measures to avoid scrutiny and conceal their activities. Code words were created to discuss Hamas. The terms “bread,” “bread people” and “green” were used in their communications to refer to the terrorist organization. Following the transfer of funds, a Hamas affiliate confirmed receipt and indicated the money had reached the “bread people.” The subjects also expressed the need to delete conversations and applications from their devices when travel was anticipated, further demonstrating efforts to conceal their activities and communications.

Yousef was arrested at an airport in Tampa, Florida, after returning from the Middle East after a month of travel. One of the items seized was a Jordanian passport in the name of Raed Mohamed Salim Suleiman. Documents were also located that reflected his previous military service with the Jordanian military. A records check showed Yousef had applied for a U.S. passport in the past and answered “no” to a question on whether he used names other than Raed Yousef.

Looking ahead, the arrests this year may represent a reinforced focus on post-October 7 activities in which individuals and entities move money, and on the financial ecosystem they are using. Yousef allegedly provided $46,000 to Hamas, which is relatively a small amount compared to the $7.3 million worth of contributions seized by the Israeli government’s National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing (NBCTF). This may suggest the U.S. government is focused on disrupting any amount of money that is sent to Hamas and its affiliates, as it represents the “lifeblood” of terrorist activities.

The pathway in which the money in this case moved is interesting. The money originated from a U.S. donor, moved through an online payment system to an intermediary who operated a foreign organization, deposited into a foreign bank account under the name of the organization, converted to cryptocurrency, moved to a crypto wallet, and then to Hamas.

If the government can establish that Yousef and others used intermediaries to get money in the hands of Hamas, then it could be used as a model to target other networks in the U.S. Donor intent will be important to demonstrate, and according to Yousef’s statements, his alleged intent to target Israelis was clear. Collecting these important communications among conspirators helps determine intent. Who received the money, what the donor knew, what communications exist, and how the money was moved are all important elements that differentiate between genuine support for charitable purposes and knowingly providing material support to Hamas.

Counterterrorism authorities in the U.K. are investigating an incident near RAF Fairford in central England after five men were arrested in the early hours of Sunday morning. Local Police said the response began at approximately 00:45 BST following a report of three suspicious vehicles approaching the military base. The men were initially detained under the Explosives Act and later alleged to be preparing an act of terrorism. Explosive ordinance teams responded, and approximately 85 homes in the surrounding area were evacuated as a precaution.

Authorities have not released many details regarding the incident nor information concerning the five men detained. All are U.K. nationals between the ages of 23 and 25. President Trump issued a statement saying the individuals had all been “under view for a long time.”

While no other information has been released regarding who was behind the attack, the apparent targeting of RAF Fairford and the tradecraft involved suggest the possible role of Iran or Russia, and potentially their proxies.

RAF Fairford Nexus to Iran Conflict

RAF Fairford is utilized by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) as a forward base for its long-range bombers, including B-1s and B-52s. The U.K. has allowed the use of this base “for defensive missions to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities.” The role of this facility in concluding strikes on Iranian targets has been noted by Tehran and its media organs.

On July 23, Press TV, Tehran’s official English-language broadcaster, stated: “US enemy has turned to using B-1 bombers flying from the Fairford airbase in Britain.” They then warned the U.K. directly that “any base used to aggress against Iranian territory is a legitimate target.”

Iran’s History of Using Proxies to Strike the UK

Tehran and its proxies have actively targeted the U.K. since the beginning of the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, which began in late February. Iran’s primary tool has been a transnational terrorist group calling itself Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI).

Beginning in March, HAYI utilized individuals recruited, tasked, and paid online to conduct a string of attacks on the U.K.’s Jewish community. The campaign began with an arson attack in March 2026 that destroyed four ambulances belonging to Hatzola, a Jewish volunteer emergency medical service. This was followed by additional arson attacks targeting synagogues, Jewish cultural institutions, and Orthodox Jews.

The violence escalated with a stabbing attack on two individuals in April in the Golders Green neighborhood of London. In response, authorities across Europe and the U.K. rolled up dozens of individuals for their alleged support of HAYI, culminating in the FBI’s arrest of Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi in Iraq. Al-Saadi is an Iraqi-Iranian dual national and Kata’ib Hezbollah commander who was leading HAYI on behalf of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The vast majority of attacks previously attributed to HAYI were arson, sabotage, or assaults on individuals. However, Iran and its proxies have also employed explosives when operating inside Western countries. One disrupted attack attributed to HAYI last March, which targeted a Bank of America office in Paris, was determined to involve an improvised explosive device.

A Possible Russian Nexus

Iran isn’t the sole actor that may be behind this attempted attack in England. Russia has been engaged in a prolonged hybrid campaign within Europe, similarly using proxies recruited online and paid to conduct acts of sabotage. There is a documented history of a sustained Russian campaign of sabotage, assassination attempts, cyberattacks, and political interference within Europe. Recent examples include a foiled drone-borne explosive plot at Leipzig/Halle Airport, sabotage of rail lines linking Poland to Ukraine, and a sharp rise in unauthorized drone incursions across Romania, Poland, and Lithuania.

On September 15, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed an indictment in New York charging five people with running a Russian intelligence network that conducted surveillance, sabotage, and murder-for-hire operations since 2024. This included a plot to assassinate a Russian dissident in the U.S. and coordinated attacks against military and civilian targets in NATO countries backing Ukraine. American prosecutors described the network as “one arm of the Russian Federation’s apparatus used to carry out external attacks, including murder, around the world,” and they are viewed as a concerted effort to test the resolve of NATO and weaken support for Ukraine.

The details released so far by British authorities remain consistent with the recent tradecraft employed by Russia and Iran. This includes relying on proxy individuals with status in the country to target locations of symbolic importance and without any claims of responsibility. If this attack is ultimately attributed to either of these countries, it will represent an increase in the risks they are willing to accept.

Any use of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, in the U.K. plot would represent an escalatory effort by Tehran, Moscow or their proxies to target the U.S. military. The construction of these explosive devices, if confirmed, would require a significant ability to procure supplies in Europe Additionally, the use of three vehicles and a cell of five individuals is a larger footprint than has recently been utilized by either Russia or Iran and remarkable for its boldness.

Finally, attacking a U.K. base that hosts U.S. military assets with possible explosive devices, even if through proxies, further raises the level of violence either Tehran or Moscow is willing to employ outside of the battlefields of Iran and Ukraine.

Masar Badil, a transnational Palestinian organization sanctioned by the U.S. government last month, says it’s helping to build a new Palestinian youth initiative in Lebanon, including by staging a conference last week in Beirut.

The development tracks closely with Masar Badil’s stated plans. In its 2021 founding document, the organization said it would build a “network of Palestine Centers” in cities, refugee camps, and capitals across the Arab world and beyond.

The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Masar Badil in August, and alleges it operates as a front for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, (PFLP), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.

Jaldía Abubakra, a member of Masar Badil’s executive committee, said her organization helped stage the conference last week in Lebanon with the Palestine International Center. She specifically worked with the Center’s youth arm, called Ajyal al-Tahrir (Generations of Liberation), to develop the event.

“The truth is they are organizing it. We are helping,” Abubakra told a Spanish-language interviewer shortly before the Sept. 19 conference. She also placed Generations of Liberation alongside, Tariq el-Tahrir, Masar Badil’s youth and student arm, saying: “First in Spain, at the international level, we have Tariq el-Tahrir. And now, in Lebanon, Generations of Liberation.”

The Threat previously reported that the newly opened Palestine International Center resembled the kind of structure Masar Badil had promised to build, though it never cited any direct relationship. Abukbakra’s comments appear to make that link for the first time.

She said in the Spanish-language interview that connecting young Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps with youth in Europe and the Americas was one of the primary tasks Masar Badil had set for itself.

The Palestine International Center described the September 19 conference as an effort to bring together young Palestinians from Lebanon’s refugee camps, connect them with Palestinians abroad, and turn what it called “scattered energies” into an “organized force.” Reporting after the event identified Abubakra as speaking on behalf of Masar Badil and quoted her thanking both Generations of Liberation and the Palestine International Center for organizing the conference.

The conference featured the Masar Badil official alongside members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both of which are also U.S.-designated terrorist groups. Abubakra is also under U.S. counterterrorism sanctions. In May, the Treasury Department identified her as the Madrid-based coordinator for the Samidoun Palestinian Solidarity Network, which the U.S. has also blacklisted for allegedly being a PFLP front.

The Department of Justice announced the extradition and arrest of ISIS supporter Davud Ansariy on September 24, 2026. According to court records, Ansariy was detained by authorities in the Republic of Georgia after traveling from Uzbekistan to Tbilisi in August of this year. He was flown to New York on September 23, the day before his arrest was announced. This marks the ninth arrest of an ISIS subject by the FBI this year, and the 105th since the fall of the ISIS caliphate in 2019.

Ansariy was part of a cell of ethnic Uzbeks based in New York City who espoused support for ISIS. He and his co-conspirators raised money for aspiring jihadists to travel to Syria and fight on behalf of ISIS. They also raised money for the families of fighters who traveled to Syria, and those killed fighting.

The investigation into this group dates back to 2014 when FBI agents from the New York Field Office discovered an online post from a co-conspirator, Abdurasul Juraboev, who pledged support for ISIS. During a subsequent interview, Juraboev told the FBI he supported ISIS, wanted to fight in Syria, would consider killing President Barack Obama if ordered, and had discussed bombing Coney Island.

An ensuing investigation later determined that a co-conspirator, Akhror Saidakhmetov, shared the same goals. The two discussed traveling to Syria via Turkey or Russia, to join ISIS. In December 2014, Juraboev bought a plane ticket from New York to Istanbul for a late-March 2015 departure, using Uzbekistan and Turkey travel plans as cover.

Saidakhmetov’s employer, Abror Habibov, agreed to finance the trip due to Saidakhmetov’s lack of resources. Habibov drew on a financial network they referred to as the “chayxona,” an Uzbek word meaning “tea house” or “tea party.” It had been raising small, recurring contributions, roughly $20-$50 every two weeks, since about 2012 to fund fighters’ travel to Syria and to support the families of fighters.

Another co-conspirator, Azizjon Rakhmatov, a citizen of Uzbekistan, contributed to this effort and discussed traveling to Syria himself. Prior to Saidakhmetov’s departure, the co-conspirators discussed plans to solicit funds to assist Saidakhmetov, such as purchasing a firearm. The group collected $1600 and delivered it to Saidakhmetov at JFK Airport shortly before his flight. Saidakhmetov was arrested on the jetway just after midnight on February 25, 2015, with the cash recovered from his person. The other co-conspirators were arrested or detained on immigration charges the same day. Rakhmatov was arrested later, on May 11, 2016.

It was Rakhmatov’s arrest that prompted Ansariy to flee the United States five days later and remain a fugitive until his capture this month. To date, the FBI has not released any details on Ansariy’s activities during the last ten years from his fleeing the United States in May 2016 to his arrest in Georgia in August 2026.

Today’s arrest of Ansariy demonstrates the diligence of FBI New York in continuing to pursue individuals who attempted to support ISIS. In total, at least seven individuals were arrested as part of this Uzbek cell that was seeking to support ISIS both financially and through facilitating fighters to join the jihad in Syria. It also highlights the contributions of Task Force Officers as part of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force as several of these co-conspirators were initially detained on immigration charges prior to being charged federally.

Several international news outlets recently reported that German authorities disclosed a failed Hamas plan to execute coordinated terrorist attacks in Europe. These operations were planned for 2025 to mark the second anniversary of the October 7 assault on southern Israel and were to target Israeli and Jewish interests in Berlin and Vienna. Prosecutors alleged that the network was coordinated from Lebanon, where a Hamas member oversaw a European-wide procurement channel. One of the suspects had produced a claim-of-responsibility video in front of a Hamas flag, threatening to attack targets in Europe.

In a separate event, disclosed in November 2025, Austria’s Directorate for State Security and Intelligence seized a weapons cache believed to be linked to Hamas. According to articles reporting on the episode, a British citizen was arrested in London, as part of an “internationally coordinated investigation (...) into a global terrorist organization with ties to Hamas.” The operation was coordinated with the Israeli Mossad, and it was later disclosed that the weapons belonged to Mohammad Na’im, the son of Hamas official, Basem Na’im.

These episodes show that Hamas is potentially pivoting towards external operations as its position in the Palestinian territories grows increasingly precarious. With Israel controlling 70% of Gaza and increasing its military activities in the West Bank, pivoting to external operations appears to be a logical next step for Hamas, allowing the militant force to continue advancing its war against Israel outside Gaza’s borders. Much of the organization’s senior leadership is now based in Türkiye and Qatar, and Hamas has an office in Cairo.

These aren’t the only Hamas-related incidents in recent years. In October 2025, German prosecutors announced that three suspected Hamas members were arrested while procuring weapons and ammunition in the country. In December 2023, a joint German and Dutch operation arrested four alleged Hamas members, including two Lebanese, an Egyptian, and a Dutch national.

As recently as July 2026, Greek authorities announced that they had detained a 37-year-old Palestinian man who tried to purchase materials suitable for making explosives online, allegedly as part of a Hamas-linked network. He was also under investigation for allegedly taking part in military training related to overseas terrorist operations.

Other Palestinian factions were also involved in using Europe as a base of operations. In 2024, three Palestinians in Italy were investigated for planning terrorist attacks in the West Bank. They were allegedly coordinating with Munir al-Maqdah, described as an Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades commander closely associated with Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Italian authorities arrested one of the suspects, but the whereabouts of the other two are unknown.

Hamas’s infrastructure, which has sustained fundraising and ideological support for the terrorist group across Europe for decades, could be exploited now to activate cells. A report by ELNET, the European Leadership Network, describes how Hamas-affiliated organizations, fronts and leaders operate across the continent, even though several are designated by the U.S. government as terrorist entities. They operate a complex network of civil society organizations that ostensibly engage in Palestinian politics and culture but often serve as a funding pipeline for Hamas’s militant activities.

One major example of this trend was an organizational network operated by Mohammed Hannoun, head of the Palestinian Association in Italy. Hannoun allegedly diverted most of the donations to the charity, ostensibly for use in civilian activities in Gaza, to “finance its [Hamas’s] military wing and support the families of suicide bombers or those detained for terrorism,” according to a report from Italian police.

The U.S. has seen a similar pro-Hamas network grow in the Islamic Association of Palestine, whose affiliated think tanks and charities have provided legitimacy and funding to the terrorist group. Shukri Abu Bakr, one of the Association’s heads. echoes the methods employed by Mohammed Hannoun in Italy: “We give the Islamists $100,000, and we give others 5,000,” he said.

However, this U.S. network operated during years in which Hamas was still an insurgent terrorist group in Gaza, not the quasi-state entity that attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. Even if much diminished after almost three years of war in Gaza, Hamas still seeks ways to maintain its combat capabilities. Israel’s TV channel Kan reported in 2025 that Hamas allegedly built weapon caches in African countries to bypass attempts to disarm the group.

The group’s investment portfolio in 2023 was estimated at $500 million across several countries. The weapons procured by Hamas in Europe, and those funds intended for terror attacks, are part of a sophisticated transnational operation that has been able to evade enforcement and exploits the increasing division in Europe over the war in Gaza.

While Hamas routinely denies reports of a pivot toward external operations, this mounting evidence of foiled attacks suggests otherwise. The reports of potential operations in Europe aren’t surprising when seen in light of the growing complexity of Hamas itself, and the ways organizations supporting it have operated on the continent. One Hamas-linked charity, called Humani’terre, has been able to operate for twenty years after being sanctioned by the U.S. simply by adopting an alias. It’s seen as successfully navigating Europe’s uneven commitment to clamping down on terror finance.

Hamas hasn’t yet carried out an attack in Europe. The multiple foiled cases are displays of successful European counterterrorism but also a warning: As long as Hamas’s financial and political infrastructure exists on the continent, it allows operational networks to mature and reconstitute. A single cell that evades detection would be enough for a devastating attack.

IRW’s International General Assembly has passed a resolution to remove IRUSA from its federation. A press release published on September 12, 2026, announced that, by a decision taken by representatives elected from members worldwide, “IRUSA no longer has the right to operate or trade using the Islamic Relief name or assets it currently holds, until a model that complies with the federation’s governance agreements is established.”

This decision stems from a dispute that surfaced publicly on March 23, 2026, when IRUSA filed suit against IRW. In its complaint, the American affiliate stated that it had notified the parent organization on October 12, 2025, of its intention to suspend all continuing relationships. The complaint was built on three central allegations. First, that IRW had “wrongly and illegally sought donations” from American citizens in multiple states despite being barred from soliciting there. Second, that IRW had fabricated records and misappropriated the email account of an IRUSA employee to create the false impression that IRUSA was terminating benefits to orphans. Third, that IRW had breached its contractual obligation to comply with American law by exporting sewing machines from Iran to Afghanistan for an earthquake-relief project, which IRUSA characterized as a potential sanctions violation. IRUSA subsequently demanded an audit of the project and the return of its unused funds.

IRW has now moved decisively outside the courtroom. The practical consequence is that IRUSA has lost the right to operate or fundraise under the Islamic Relief trademark, the name it has carried since its founding in 1993. The organization maintains offices in Buena Park, CA, Richardson, TX, Alsip, IL, and Saddle Brook, NJ, in addition to its headquarters in Alexandria, VA.

The lawsuit is best understood as a defensive maneuver rather than the origin of the conflict between the two parties. Its precursor was a letter dated September 24, 2024, from Jason Smith, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to then-IRS Commissioner Daniel Werfel, requesting that the IRS investigate and potentially revoke IRUSA’s tax-exempt status. The letter alleged that IRUSA had “engaged in conduct that appears to provide support for a designated terrorist organization and other conduct designed to incite chaos in a way that is contrary to the public good.” On October 6, 2025, the committee followed up with a letter to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, then serving as acting IRS Commissioner, and IRS CEO Frank Bisignano, urging them to prioritize examinations of the organizations previously referred for revocation.

Six days later, on October 12, 2025, IRUSA’s board concluded that any continued participation with the parent organization may present an “immediate threat to the reputation, integrity, or operation” of IRUSA. The timing is telling. The board’s resolution explicitly cited the Ways and Means referral, suggesting that the driving concern was not the three aforementioned items but rather the existential risk of losing 501(c)(3) status. For an American charity that raises tens of millions annually from donors who rely on tax deductibility, revocation would be catastrophic. The affiliation with IRW had become a liability that outweighed the value of the brand.

On December 7, 2025, IRUSA formally notified IRW of its intent to disassociate, citing audit obstruction and demanding the return of at least $3.6 million in residual project funds. IRW followed up by filing a motion to compel arbitration under the federation’s Members’ Agreement, which requires that all disputes be resolved through arbitration in Birmingham, England, where the company is based. Arbitration there would take the dispute out of a U.S. federal court and into a private tribunal in IRW’s home jurisdiction. In federal court, discovery could expose IRW’s internal correspondence, and the sanctions allegation would be tested under American law, both of which IRW has every reason to avoid.

The most recent available development on the docket is from July 15, 2026, when the court heard further argument on the motion to compel arbitration. The judge ordered both parties to exhaust the dispute-resolution mechanisms set out in their Members’ Agreement and License Agreement before the court would take up the arbitration question. Six months after the suit was filed, the court has not yet ruled on where the case will be heard, let alone on the allegations themselves.

IRW has publicly announced IRUSA’s removal from the federation with immediate effect, a decision taken by representatives elected from members worldwide, “members of the board of trustees and the remaining independent member.” The separation costs both sides. IRUSA loses a brand with three decades of equity among American Muslims and must now rebuild its identity under a new name, while the IRS examination that prompted the severance remains open. IRW loses its second-largest source of income and its only substantial foothold in the American donor market at a moment when it is already under pressure from Western governments.

IRW’s 2025 annual report records that its American affiliate, IRUSA, contributed £36.8 million, roughly 13 percent of the federation’s total income. Only the UK, whose donations and government grants, including funding from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, totaled £54.2 million, or 20 percent, contributed more. Whether disaffiliation will be enough to satisfy the Ways and Means Committee, which framed its concerns around IRUSA’s own conduct rather than IRW’s, is far from certain.

As a minor, Kramer demonstrated a pattern of pro-ISIS activity and violent rhetoric that culminated in his first arrest. In March 2023, the FBI received a tip alleging Kramer, at seventeen years of age, had posted threatening statements alluding to an unspecified act within three months. A search of his residence at the time recovered a recording of his “bayat,” a pledge of allegiance to deceased ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The subsequent investigation also identified that Kramer knowingly solicited and received child sexual abuse material. Kramer was charged as a juvenile with a role in a plot to commit a mass-casualty incident and with Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) possession. While incarcerated in a juvenile facility, a black banner consistent with an ISIS flag was later found among his belongings.

Kramer was released from incarceration in March 2026 at age 20. Following his release, he almost immediately returned to his previous extremist behavior. Within a month of his release, an anonymous tip reported that Kramer had unmonitored internet and phone access, was receiving unexplained packages, and had said he was “talking to his friends from before” his terrorism-related juvenile charges. By May 2026, he was seeking a means to acquire a firearm, hoping to avoid transactions that required a background check. He also posted online his concepts for future attacks to include employing arson, poison, vehicle-ramming, and firearms. Between June and September 2026, he described a specific attack plan to an FBI confidential human source, including “choke points,” a gas mask, and pepper grenades. On September 9, he stated he was “preparing for my mission” and needed only a weapon. That weapon came on September 12, 2026, when Kramer was observed receiving a semiautomatic rifle from an individual in a Walmart parking lot and purchasing matching ammunition before his arrest.

The case is a study in tradecraft. Since 2023, Kramer is alleged to have operated under no fewer than six online personas across six different encrypted platforms. He compartmentalized each identity, paid for the firearm in cash, and used tradecraft to mask his mobile device and his location. Using his various misattributable online personas, Kramer also circulated a document offering detailed guidance on arson, vehicle-ramming, poisoning, and firearms attacks, along with methods to increase resulting chaos and misdirect responding law enforcement. This tradecraft did not substitute for the online community and camaraderie he was openly seeking. Through these online accounts, Kramer sought a like-minded community that would reinforce his beliefs and motivations. This reflects the continuing pattern among aspiring ISIS attackers: isolated individuals who find purpose and peer approval in encrypted chat groups even as they plan to act alone.

The case also illustrates the difficulty of confronting extremism in minors. Kramer’s radicalization predates his eighteenth birthday. Before becoming a legal adult, Kramer had already recorded a bayat. His propaganda output, including Roblox-styled videos set to ISIS nasheeds and captioned with references to school, suggests a deliberate effort to reach and resonate with a youth audience on the platforms young people use. While in a juvenile treatment facility, he displayed a black banner, understood by investigators as an ISIS flag, among his belongings.

The case also demonstrates the continued draw of ISIS ideology among aspiring terrorists. Tracking by the Program on Extremism reveals this is the eighth ISIS-related arrest in the United States in 2026, and the 104th arrest since the collapse of the ISIS caliphate. Of the eight arrests in 2026, four were domestic plotters, and all but one were under 30 years old.

This case also highlights the increasing trend of recidivism. Kramer’s case is at least the third this year in which a subject recently released from custody has attempted or carried out an act of terrorism, following the attack by Mohammed Jalloh at Old Dominion University and the Berlin Parade attack orchestrated by Abdul Ballout. Taken together, these cases point to a recidivism problem that current reentry and supervision frameworks have not adequately addressed.

The forum, held days before the 25^th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the U.S., brought together practitioners and scholars to analyze how the terrorism landscape has evolved, where it’s headed, and how to preserve the memory of 9/11 at a moment when younger Americans have no living memory of the attacks.

Panels at the conference focused on how New York’s security posture has evolved since 2001, security challenges that have emerged since, how to confront new forms of radicalism, and the impact of identity politics on the evolving terrorist landscape. Rebecca Weiner, NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, discussed how her department adapted its capabilities while reflecting on the radicalizing potential of social media, AI and large language models.

Vidino and Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented on al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the continuing Salafi-jihadist threat. Vidino noted the complexity of confronting the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S., where the organization has no formal presence but operates through a network of individuals and organizational fronts. This amorphous structure creates a challenge for open and democratic societies that need to confront the Brotherhood’s subversive threats.

Speakers identified several threats to watch going forward. Vidino pointed to the militant elements of a growing global left-wing extremist movement, which is vocal in support of violence, but not yet engaged in it. Hoffman, meanwhile, mentioned the continued threat posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS, naming them as the most formidable terrorist organizations today.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, the forum underscored how the threat landscape has changed. But Vidino and Hoffman stressed that other forces like Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood have endured.

Two recent federal cases in the U.S. highlight the growing intersection between online child exploitation and the promotion of violent extremism.

Kyle Spitze of Tennessee was sentenced on August 19 to 77 years in prison for producing and distributing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) as part of an online network called 764. These networks have also inspired acts of violent extremism.

Spitze’s trial produced the longest federal sentence for a member related to “nihilistic violent extremist groups,” as the Department of Justice has labeled them.

764 isn’t a conventional extremist organization, according to federal authorities. Its decentralized online network, rather than organizing around a coherent ideology, resembles a collection of different cliques that compete over the amount of material they can obtain from victims depicting sexual abuse and gore, as described by Program on Extremism Research Fellow Jon Lewis.

Spitze administered a social media platform called “HarmNation” within the 764 network, according to federal authorities, and used this and other online sites to collect illicit content, which included the torturing and sexual abuse of children. HarmNation often coerced and blackmailed victims into committing further acts of self harm, animal abuse, and sexual exploitation.

Also last month, Austin L. Knoob, a former teacher’s aide, was detained in Illinois on two charges related to the exploitation of a child. While Knoob wasn’t officially connected to 764 by the FBI, the details provided in the affidavit points towards the man’s interaction with the network’s ecosystem.

Knoob’s case has similar dynamics to other nihilistic violent extremist cases. According to the filing, Knoob had been talking to one minor for years as part of a grooming operation. The child was then added to a Telegram group, which the victim called “seven something four,” and was forced to carve 764 on her stomach. She was threatened with further violence if she didn’t do so. Knoob was accused in the affidavit of seeking to exploit other children through his network.

These cases underscore the continuing threat posed by nihilistic violent extremism and the difficulty in protecting children from online predators. The problem is compounded by the fact that these networks are decentralized and possess no traditional ideological convergence or structure to track.

To explore more about this threat, check out the Program on Extremism trackers:

https://www.poemonitoring.org/

Masar Badil was sanctioned last month by the U.S. Treasury Department under its counterterrorism authorities. The transnational movement has pledged to build “Palestine Centers” around the world as part of its anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist political campaign. And in the southern suburbs of Beirut, it appears to be getting down to work.

This summer, The Palestine International Center was opened in Lebanon’s Bourj al Barajneh camp, which has housed Palestinian refugees since 1948. Masar Badil has made no formal announcement that it built or controls the facility. But the Center closely hues to the type of youth organizations Masar Badil has pledged to build, including the programs the Center is promoting and the guests it’s hosting.

Masar Badil is the Arabic-language acronym for the Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement.

Recent materials published by Masar Badil documents how it organizes Palestinian youth and students, works with women and Palestinian refugee communities across the Middle East, and supports their right of return to all historic Palestine. Masar also says it wants to deepen relationships with Palestinians in the international diaspora and to make common cause with anti-imperial movements globally.

All these activities are already taking place at Lebanon’s Palestine International Center.

In recent weeks, the Center has invited student groups, political activists, trade unionists and journalists into Lebanon’s refugee camps to meet Palestinian residents and local organizations. The program tells visitors to build relationships that continue after they leave Lebanon and to “transform their experience into sustained work” through public events, exchanges and campaigns for Palestinians and their right of return. On July 30, Al Quds International Institution described a U.S. youth and student delegation visiting refugee camps in Beirut and pursing an “Alternative Revolutionary Path.”

Days later, Palestinian Refugees Portal reported that the Palestine International Center had organized a tour of the Bourj al Barajneh, Shatila and Nahr al Bared refugee camps, where the students met representatives of what the outlet described as Palestinian factions and local organizations. The report said the delegation included activists and students who had participated in the U.S. campus protests that followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel. One activist, identified as a member of the Seattle University branch of Students for Justice in Palestine, said she planned to bring her experience back to U.S. campuses.

The Palestine International Center’s formal opening in July included leaders from militant Palestinian and Lebanese organizations that have long fought Israel. It was inaugurated by Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, who was released last year from a French prison after serving 40 years for allegedly helping to assassinate American and Israeli diplomats in Paris.

Hisham al Issawi, the Palestine International Center’s executive director, said Abdallah’s presence at the opening helped to commemorate the “birth” of a new movement. Masar Badil celebrated Abdallah’s release last year by calling the militant a “touchstone” and a “living, vital leader” of the anti-imperial and anti-Zionist movements.

In addition to these programs, the Palestine International Center is home to Ajyal al Tahrir, or “Generations of Liberation,” a youth and student movement born from Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps. The group says it wants to organize young Palestinians and help them develop connections with international movements to pursue “joint struggles.”

Whether Bourj al Barajneh formally belongs to the network Masar Badil envisioned remains unclear. However, the organization said it would build these centers by 2027. And in southern Beirut, the blueprint appears to be in place.

A year ago, a convicted terrorist from the Palestinian movement’s past emerged from more than 40 years in a French prison and stepped back into the limelight to rally behind the language of revolution and militancy.

Hunched and 75 years old, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah is unlikely to pick up a gun or plant a bomb. But his recent embrace by pro-Palestine activists and organizations – from Beirut to Boston – suggests he may play a different role today. Not as an operative, but a symbol of resistance for a new generation of leftists, Islamists, and anti-Israel campaigners eager to rekindle Abdallah’s radical and militant message.

Abdallah was an early member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. And created a Lebanese arm of the PFLP in 179, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Factions.

French authorities released Abdallah in July 2025 from Paris’s Lannemezan prison where he had been serving a life sentence for his complicity in the assassinations of American and Israeli diplomats in France during the 1980s. Abdallah always denied his role in the murders, but at the same time championed Palestinian militancy. Pro-Palestinian and leftist groups portrayed Abdallah as a political prisoner, and their campaigning eventually convinced the French government to commute his sentence.

Abdallah’s supporters greeted him in Beirut with drums and chants. And Palestinian and Lebanese Communist Party festooned the city’s streets. Abdallah told his supporters to rally behind Gaza as Israel was “living the last chapters of its existence.”

Abdallah’s persona has quickly been recast to that of both a political martyry and a symbol for future militancy. In January 2026, Al Akhbar, the Hezbollah-aligned newspaper, carried an interview under the headline: “Together, and only together, do we win.” The piece presents Abdallah as an active revolutionary force, not a relic of the Palestinian resistance’s past.

By this August, the same message was being translated to a younger Western audience. The American political activist, Calla Walsh, interviewed Abdallah in Beirut’s Burj al-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp where he described Lebanon as “the last stronghold before Palestine” was freed. Walsh swooned over Abdallah as an anti-imperial hero who “never walked back on his political principles.”

The recent coverage of Abdallah notes an important linguistic shift. A conviction has become a false accusation. More than four decades in prison have become political captivity.

Abdallah’s lionization also fits into a pattern detected in a new July report from George Washington University’ Program on Extremism. Its shows how the leaders of the PFLP, a Marxist-Palestinian terrorist organization, have been repackaged for young Western activists through coordinated media campaigns, campus events, press conferences, protests and online donations. It identifies figures such as Leila Khaled, Ghassan Kanafani, Ahmad Sa’adat, and Rasmea Odeh as part of the new generation’s political inheritance.

In this vein: Abdallah is not a footnote in the PFLP’s history. He offers a model for the way forward.