Originally published on Brasil de Fato. Republished with permission.

In Tehran and in Washington, the expectation is the same: a new round of the United States’ and Israel’s war on Iran could begin right after the US midterm elections on November 3. On Saturday (the 31st), the Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, met for the first time with the high command of the Armed Forces and ordered that any threat receive a response that is “immediate, effective and without geographical limitation,” according to the Tehran Times. In Washington, the establishment itself doubts the plan. The Financial Times spoke with former US military chiefs who believe none of the strike options would bring down the Iranian government, and the Congressional Research Service already counts 81 US aircraft lost or damaged and 21 service members killed.

It was in this climate that Seyed Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a senior analyst and Iranian strategist, received me at the headquarters of Fars Media, in Tehran, in mid-October. We talked for almost two hours, over tea and Iranian sweets, and he did not hold back on predictions. “It will be a shorter war than the last one, from the side of the United States, but way stronger,” he said. “This time, Iran believes there shouldn’t be any limits, and it will try to inflict as much cost on the United States as possible.” Three weeks later, Khamenei’s order sounded like an echo of that conversation.

For Khoshcheshm, Donald Trump has lost the weapon he always used. “He has always beaten his opponents through escalation, the madman practice. In this round, he has lost this card. Now it is Iran that is embracing escalation in order to put an end to everything.” The Iranian response, he warns, would take the war to the Indian Ocean and to “countries that they would never imagine.” And Iran holds in its hands what he calls a weapon “millions of times stronger than the atomic bomb”:

“With an atomic bomb, you could hit a country once. With the Strait of Hormuz, you could leave an impact on the entire planet, repeatedly.”

The war, for him, is part of something bigger. The 2020s would be the decade of a “painful birth,” that of the transition of power from the West to the East, which the US-led empire “doesn’t let go so easily.” No superpower will come out of it, he predicts, but four big powers — China, India, Russia and Iran — and Washington, defeated in Iran, will bet on hybrid warfare against China, including biological warfare.

The strongest explanation for Iran’s confidence, however, he looks for not in arsenals but in faith. He recounts that in his neighborhood, in eastern Tehran, residents standing in front of their bombed houses said: “This is nothing compared to what Hussein went through.” A grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Imam Hussein was killed in 680 at Karbala, in present-day Iraq, along with a handful of companions, facing a much larger army, and his martyrdom is the heart of Shia identity. For Khoshcheshm, this is the key the West has never understood. The interview follows.

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At the third Russia-Africa Summit, which opened in Moscow on October 28, 2026, with delegations from 48 countries, Vladimir Putin presented Russia as the best partner for a continent that the “colonial” West continues to treat as a source of raw materials and a market for debt. In Europe, the counterargument is well known: Moscow is exploiting the memory of colonialism to build its own form of colonialism. Both positions treat “colonialism” as an accusation. Instead, it is better to use it as a historical category—with a precise definition—and to measure Russian conduct against it. The argument put forward here is that Moscow’s presence belongs to another category of phenomena: asymmetric partnerships between a great power and sovereign states, which may be equitable or predatory but do not nullify the sovereignty of others.

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Across the global media landscape, digital content consumption has surged to an average of 520 minutes per day per individual, yet in major emerging markets, a mere 2% of users are willing to pay for digital news. Faced with this monetization bottleneck, 54% of media organizations have been forced into aggressive cost-optimization programs, gutting marketing budgets, talent acquisition, and editorial production.

At the exact same time, media executives, state communicators, and news agency directors from across Africa and Eurasia gathered in Moscow to confront a parallel geopolitical crisis: the systematic distortion of Global South realities by Western media legacy structures that operate through centralized distribution monopolies and algorithmic gatekeeping.

These two dynamics are not isolated industry trends. They represent the twin pressures defining the global information environment today. On one side stands an economic model where raw reporting has degraded into a low-margin commodity. On the other stands a structural imbalance where foreign media platforms frame sovereign nations through narrow, Western-centric lenses.

For the Global Majority—representing the nations of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the BRICS alliance—overcoming this double burden requires a fundamental reassessment of how media institutions operate, monetize, and defend their information space.

Two Moscow Forums, One Underlying Imperative

To evaluate how multipolar alliances construct independent communications, our team at Think BRICS engaged directly with key discussions across two major industry gatherings in Moscow during late October 2026.

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Events have accelerated so much that by New Year’s there will be real changes in the status quo of Europe, and certainly in the entire world.

I will begin with Lavrov’s visit to the USA, because it preceded the attempted coup in Poland—undoubtedly exceptional news today—as well as the incredible historical awakening of a part of the Bulgarian political elite in the person of Iliana Yotova regarding Ukraine, and the leakage of unacceptable things into our national airwaves.

Sergey Lavrov is in Atlanta, where yesterday he took part in the G-20 meeting. These meetings are regular, but the previous one was attended by another Russian minister, Anton Siluanov, and for the next one, again in the USA in December, an invitation to Vladimir Putin is being discussed.

Lavrov met with Marco Rubio and with the Japanese Foreign Minister, who recently made up words attributed to his Russian colleague and became a laughingstock.

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By 2050, the center of global demographic gravity will settle permanently in Africa. Home to over 2.5 billion people, with seven out of ten citizens under the age of thirty, the continent already claims twelve of the world’s twenty fastest-growing economies. Yet behind these macroeconomic projections lies an enduring structural paradox: despite generating $1.5 trillion in annual international trade, intra-African commerce accounts for a mere 15 percent of total volume, while manufacturing value added remains stuck below 2 percent. For over a century, the continent’s trade infrastructure was engineered not for domestic industrialization, but to channel raw commodities to foreign capitals.

The 3rd Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow—convening delegations from 48 African nations and 21 heads of state—addressed this structural contradiction head-on. The gathering produced a 101-point political declaration, a binding Action Plan for 2027–2029, a landmark agreement on Artificial Intelligence, and 146 executed bilateral contracts. Beyond the diplomacy, these outcomes demonstrate how multipolar partnerships are evolving from anti-colonial solidarity into functional financial, technological, and industrial sovereignty.

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The EU is taking a tougher stance towards China. After several years of disputes over electric vehicles, industrial subsidies and market access, new restrictions on Chinese imports are now being discussed. Brussels wants to reduce the trade deficit and protect European jobs. But the question is whether higher trade barriers will really solve Europe’s industrial problems or risk undermining the cooperation needed to strengthen its competitiveness. I believe the latter is more likely.

The Trade Deficit Has Become a Political Issue On 9 October, the EU and China reached a preliminary agreement on limiting exports of Chinese hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles to Europe. At the same time, discussions focused on improving market access for European companies in China and easing export licensing restrictions on rare earth elements and permanent magnets. On 16 October, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that further measures targeting Chinese imports would be prepared. Chemicals, plastics and ferroalloys were mentioned as possible areas for new trade protection measures. The background is a growing trade deficit.

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The political landscape of the Western Balkans experienced a seismic shift on October 25, 2026, when Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections delivered an unprecedented victory to a newly formed, youth-led political coalition. The “Student List” (Student List — Students Win), a movement created just six weeks prior to the vote, secured a decisive majority in the National Assembly, bringing an end to fourteen years of dominant rule by former president Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).

For observers across the Global South and the BRICS community, this political development holds significance far beyond the borders of Belgrade. Long regarded as a key pillar of non-aligned diplomacy in Southern Europe, Serbia has navigated a delicate foreign policy balancing act—maintaining robust economic relations with the European Union while deepening strategic, energy, and political ties with Russia and China. The unexpected collapse of the ruling party’s electoral machinery raises fundamental questions about how emerging democratic movements handle multipolar diplomacy, resist external information manipulation, and preserve national sovereignty in an era of global strategic realignment.

From Local Tragedy to National Mobilization

The catalyst for Serbia’s political upheaval was not born in boardroom negotiations or foreign diplomatic missions, but in public outrage over domestic governance failures. On November 1, 2024, a catastrophic structural failure at the newly renovated railway station in Novi Sad resulted in the deaths of 16 citizens. The tragedy triggered widespread anger over corruption, opaque public contracting, and institutional unaccountability.

What began as localized student protests demanding judicial investigations rapidly expanded into a nationwide movement. By March 2025, mass demonstrations in Belgrade drew upwards of 300,000 citizens. Recognizing the institutional advantages of the ruling party—which boasted between 700,000 and 800,000 members in a country of less than seven million—the student organizers adopted a decentralized, grassroots strategy. Through campaigns such as “A Student in Every Village,” activists traveled across small towns and rural municipalities via foot and bicycle marches, establishing direct dialogue with citizens to bypass state-aligned media channels.

A central pillar of the movement’s strategy was the intentional exclusion of polarizing geopolitical debates from its core platform. Rather than forcing voters to choose between competing pro-Western or pro-Eastern orientations, the Student List centered its campaign on public integrity, rule of law, and institutional reform. This approach enabled a broad coalition of urban intellectuals, university professors, legal experts, healthcare workers, and rural farmers to unite behind a single platform.

The election results reflected this broad mobilization, driven by a record voter turnout of 68.8%. The Student List, headed by Dr. Ilija Srdanović, a cardiologist and medical professor from Novi Sad, secured approximately 52% to 53% of the national vote, capturing between 135 and 141 seats in the 250-seat parliament. Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition received 38.8% to 39% of the vote (~103 to 105 seats), signaling its transition into the parliamentary opposition. Meanwhile, traditional political parties suffered complete displacement; the historical Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), led by long-time government ally Ivica Dačić, garnered just over 2% of the vote, failing to cross the 3% parliamentary threshold for the first time since 1990.

Evaluating the outcome, international political scientist Prof. Branislav Radeljić noted that the victory demonstrated the resilience of civic agency in the face of political pressure. In a comment we asked him to provide regarding the transition, Prof. Radeljić emphasized that

“…despite attempts to obstruct the voting process, the movement successfully placed government accountability and legal integrity at the top of the national agenda, demonstrating that public institutions must serve citizens rather than political interests.”

Regional electoral data highlights clear geographic dynamics. In major urban centers such as Belgrade and Niš, voters backed the Student List by substantial margins. Conversely, in southern and south-eastern municipalities closer to Kosovo, support remained concentrated around Vučić and the SNS, where voters expressed greater hesitation regarding the movement’s stance on national security and territorial integrity. Central Serbia largely mirrored the urban centers, delivering strong support for the opposition.

Digital Interference and AI Deepfakes in Modern Campaigns

The 2026 Serbian election provides a clear case study in how artificial intelligence, synthetic media, and digital disinformation are deployed during sensitive political transitions. Findings published by the Global Fact-Checking Network (GFCN) identified three distinct vectors of information manipulation designed to confuse voters and discredit political candidates.

The first vector involved deliberate narrative distortion and selectively edited quotes. Opposition candidates were falsely accused of planning 25% cuts to state pensions and 300% increases in university tuition fees—proposals entirely absent from the Student List platform. Similarly, candidate Aleksandar Baucal was targeted with clipped video footage framing his arguments for civic rights as an attempt to undermine state authority.

The second vector featured sophisticated synthetic content generated by artificial intelligence. A viral image purportedly showing tennis champion Novak Djokovic marking ballot number “3” on a broadcast camera lens was analyzed using SynthID digital watermarking tools, exposing it as an AI-generated forgery. Another deepfake targeted movement leader Ilija Srdanović, editing video from a student cycling event to falsely depict him displaying divisive nationalist hand gestures. Additionally, audio tracks from public sporting events were altered to manufacture fake stadium chants supporting political leaders.

The third vector focused on procedural voter suppression and misleading voting instructions. Campaigns on social platforms urged citizens to vote for multiple party lists simultaneously—an act that automatically invalidates ballots under Article 103 of the Serbian election law. Other deceptive guides encouraged voters to alter their physical ballots after taking photographs, misleading citizens into inadvertently spoiling their votes.

These information threats underscore broader vulnerabilities faced by sovereign nations across the Global South. As digital tools and generative models become widely accessible, protecting democratic procedures requires advanced fact-checking infrastructure, digital literacy, and regulatory safeguards to maintain public trust in election outcomes.

Multipolar Balancing: Sovereign Agency and Non-Aligned Foreign Policy

Following his electoral defeat, Aleksandar Vučić alleged that foreign European entities and American domestic political actors had orchestrated a political shift, predicting that a new government in Belgrade would implement anti-Russian sanctions by spring 2027. However, statement analysis and public declarations from the Student List paint a more complex picture of foreign policy continuity.

At the center of Serbia’s diplomatic stance lies a strategic balance between economic integration with Europe and historical partnerships with non-Western powers. Economically, the European Union represents Serbia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 58.3% of total trade volume (approximately €43.7 billion in 2025) and holding key strategic agreements in critical raw materials such as lithium. At the same time, Serbia relies on Russia for natural gas supplies and maintains joint ownership in strategic assets like the NIS petroleum refining company.

Addressing international concerns, leading figures within the Student List reaffirmed their commitment to military neutrality and multi-vector diplomacy. Senior movement representative Jovo Bakić stated clearly that the incoming administration would not implement sanctions against Moscow, citing historical partnerships and economic interests in energy stability. Dr. Ilija Srdanović echoed these sentiments, noting that any eventual accession to the European Union would be submitted to a binding national referendum, ensuring that major sovereign decisions remain directly in the hands of the electorate.

This commitment to non-aligned pragmatism reflects broader sentiment among the Serbian electorate. Public frustration with the previous administration mounted following diplomatic missteps, including Vučić’s high-profile meeting with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky in Belgrade, which traditionalist voters viewed as an unnecessary departure from strict neutrality. For many citizens, maintaining independent decision-making means resisting unilateral pressure from any foreign power.

International responses to the election highlight the careful diplomatic maneuvering under way. In Moscow, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed confidence that Russian-Serbian relations would continue to develop constructively, noting that bilateral ties reflect the fundamental interests of both nations. Concurrently, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen offered official congratulations and pledged support for institutional reforms, while regional leaders—including Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska—extended early recognition to the new parliamentary majority.

Governance Challenges and the Complex Road Ahead

While winning a parliamentary majority represents a major political milestone, the transition of power presents significant constitutional and operational complexities. Under the Serbian Constitution, the interim government led by Prime Minister Đuro Macut and acting President Ana Brnabić remains in office until the new National Assembly convenes and formally ratifies a cabinet. With presidential elections scheduled before December 27, 2026, the incoming leadership faces a tight timeframe to establish stable governance.

Maintaining cohesion within a broad, ideologically diverse coalition remains a central challenge. The Student List encompasses a wide spectrum of views—ranging from pro-European reformers to conservative traditionalists—united primarily by a shared commitment to anti-corruption and institutional integrity. Analysts point to the 2020 transition in neighboring Montenegro, where an expert-led coalition under Zdravko Krivokapić struggled to maintain unity once in office, as a caution against internal fragmentation.

For BRICS nations and the wider Global South, Serbia’s experience offers valuable insights into the changing dynamics of global diplomacy. The election demonstrates that sovereign non-alignment is not merely a top-down diplomatic strategy managed by individual leaders, but a deeply rooted public value maintained through active civic participation and transparent institutions.

As Serbia enters this new political chapter, the key question for both Belgrade and its global partners is whether a government born from grassroots mobilization can successfully manage internal political diversity while preserving an independent, non-aligned posture on the international stage.

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Awaiting yet another madness—a new war by the US and Israel against Iran—the West is loaded with plenty of madness. The EU will not stop the phase-out of Russian gas starting in 2027, even if the war in Ukraine ends. These people are condemning us; they do not care at all about the needs of the nations within the union. They have taken care of their own needs; ours are not their concern. Zelensky asked the West for 127 BILLION EUROS AND DOLLARS FOR NEXT YEAR.... There are no words left.

At the same time, the true Nazi Mariana Bezuglaya demanded that the Rada remove all restrictions on mobilization in Ukraine, except for the president, ministers, and MPs. Everyone else to the front! Once again—these people and their European masters do not wish well upon anyone but themselves and have no intention of improving anyone's life. The next madness.

The youth organization of the CDU in Germany wants the Bundeswehr to be used against protesting pupils and students in Berlin as early as this Saturday, for which a major protest is scheduled in Berlin. The reason is the same—to preserve power and money for a select few, while everyone else is thrown under the knife, into poverty, misery, and the destruction of industry and the economy. They care about nothing.

This is the EU right now, and in Bulgaria, the mood among the pro-EU forces is absolutely the same—arrogant, ruthless, greedy. In the event of a war against Iran, the "Code 0" system will be triggered. The Iranians announced it, and we must prepare ourselves mentally and physically. Because if Trump and Netanyahu carry out a new, third strike on Iran, a massive crisis will follow—not just in oil and gas. Iran will retaliate in all Middle Eastern countries that have relations with the US and Israel against Iran, and that host American military resources on their territory. The plan includes the destruction of bridges, railway lines and crossings, reservoirs, energy storage facilities, data centers, hotels, military bases, and much more. Iran officially and publicly announced the list and the targets worldwide.

Just so we know what will follow if our "partners" continue. I explicitly want to add the latest news on this topic. Germany has also appeared on the Code 0 map... due to the American bases, aircraft, and soldiers stationed there. I don't know what else to say. Regarding yesterday's meeting of the Mecca Alliance with Iran in Tehran, the information is official and conveys a peaceful tone. Iran demands from the Meccans that the US save the Memorandum and force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. Why do Shia Persians continue to do the work of Sunni Arabs?

Pezeshkian's subsequent visit to Moscow—he was at the meeting with the Meccans—outlines the horizon of the regional security structure. Without the US and against Netanyahu. At the same time, it became clear that Saudi Arabia has offered 1 billion dollars to the Houthis to stop the war against the Saudis. And here I am left speechless. The Saudis are trying to buy their way out after destroying everything in the Persian Gulf. Since Qatar is also sourcing similar things by making flights to Tehran—which are suspected of carrying parts of frozen Iranian assets—there is an attempt to buy their way out.

But why? Aren't the Iranians, as well as the Russians, savages, dictators, dying of hunger and spiritual poverty? Isn't the West strong and great? Why is there a need to buy their way out? So, if Trump attacks Iran again, the world will enter an even sharper crisis. Who is forcibly pushing the world into wars and crises, and who is seeking dialogue and cooperation, is not hard to see.

Lula's victory in Brazil is extremely important because of the blow to Trump and to his vision of a unified America under US control. Also because through this victory, another attempt—a very dangerous one!—to break up BRICS was stopped. Next year there will be presidential elections in Argentina, and I predict that the foolish Milei, who for the Bulgarian psycho-right mindset is a financial titan and genius, a modern prophet of success, will not only fall from power but will also be prosecuted for causing exceptionally large damage to his country. Lula's victory has some historical aspects. A fourth term for him.

For the first time ever, a candidate who lost the first round went on to win the second round and the election. Here it is important to point out that in the first round Brazil showed extremely low voter turnout, while in the second round it was extremely high. This stroll across the field of public responsibility is Lula's most undisputed success—he managed to organize Brazilians to prevent Trump, through Bolsonaro's son, from ruling Brazil. A blow to Trump, painful and unexpected, despite a pre-determined vote.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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Lula’s victory is deeply personal for me. As a Brazilian, I feel relief that the far right has been prevented from returning to the presidency alongside a strengthened right in Congress. As someone working on geopolitics and global governance from South Africa, I also see consequences that extend well beyond Brazil.

The result preserves an important source of diplomatic autonomy in Latin America and an advocate for reform of international institutions. Yet the domestic foundations of that role remain contested. Brazil’s ability to act internationally will depend partly on whether Lula can govern effectively, sustain democratic legitimacy and give substance to his diplomatic ambitions.

A clear victory within a divided political system

Lula won 51.79% of valid votes against Flávio Bolsonaro’s 48.21%, a margin of 4.43 million votes. That is a clear electoral victory. Still, almost 60 million people voted for his opponent. The political coalition, grievances and interests behind Bolsonaro will continue to shape the country.

The congressional results make that particularly clear. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party elected 121 of the Chamber of Deputies’ 513 members and will hold 28 of the Senate’s 81 seats. The broader right is stronger still. Lula has secured another presidential mandate without reversing the rightward shift in Congress.

This will make his fourth term difficult. Negotiations over budgets, appointments and legislation will determine how much of his programme survives. At the same time, treating the congressional right as a single, disciplined far-right bloc would obscure the bargaining, competing interests and shifting alliances through which Brazil is governed.

The election has therefore prevented one route towards authoritarian consolidation while leaving Lula with the task of assembling support for a governing programme. Those are distinct achievements that require different coalitions.

The events surrounding access to voting also deserve sustained attention. Bahia’s consumer protection agency, Procon, reported finding 544 buses standing idle in Salvador’s garages on election day. Allegations that transport was deliberately restricted to obstruct voting require investigation and accountability, with responsibility established through evidence.

The broader democratic issue is already clear. Formal voting rights depend on transport, time, safety and accessible institutions. Failures in these conditions hit people with fewer resources hardest. Electoral integrity includes whether citizens can actually reach the ballot.

The electoral court’s delay in ruling on requests to extend voting created an avoidable institutional crisis. By the time the Supreme Court intervened, many polling stations had already closed. The resulting uneven extension left some voters able to cast their ballots while others could no longer do so.

Flávio Bolsonaro has already used the extension to challenge the result and announced his intention to seek annulment. His own campaign had requested additional voting time in areas affected by severe weather. The requests differed in scope, but procedural confusion does not establish electoral fraud.

Assessing the extension’s numerical effect requires evidence that is still missing: how many polling stations had closed at 5 pm, how many remained open and how many people voted afterwards. People already queuing at the ordinary closing time were entitled to vote anyway. Their votes cannot simply be counted as additional participation produced by the extension.

Beyond the immediate dispute lies a longer-term vulnerability. Brazil remains heavily dependent on Lula’s personal capacity to hold together a coalition against the far right. His fourth victory creates time for political renewal. Developing leadership, organisation and public support that can endure beyond him is among the most important uses of that time.

Latin American autonomy under pressure

Internationally, Lula’s victory preserves an important centre of diplomatic autonomy. Brazil and Mexico, Latin America’s two largest economies, carry particular weight in shaping the region’s choices. Their capacity to resist pressure can also create space for neighbours with fewer resources and less bargaining power.

I see the result as a setback for Trump’s “Donroe doctrine”, the effort to consolidate US primacy in the Americas. Brazil remains outside the politically aligned regional bloc Washington would prefer. US economic, financial, and security pressure will continue, but the election shows the region’s political direction remains contested.

The scope of that setback should nevertheless be assessed carefully. Brazil’s external relationships are rooted in economic structures and domestic interests that persist across governments. China bought almost 30% of Brazilian exports between January and September 2026. A Bolsonaro presidency would also have had to accommodate that relationship.

Presidential choices matter greatly for diplomatic alignment, security cooperation and the political meaning attached to international partnerships. Trade, investment and domestic constituencies constrain how far those choices can go. Ideological affinity with Washington would not have removed Brazil’s economic relationship with Beijing.

Brazil and Mexico also pursue autonomy from different positions. Mexico must defend its choices within deep economic integration with the United States. Brazil balances a wider mix of partners and dependencies. Cooperation between them can strengthen both without requiring identical foreign policies or pretending that they face equivalent constraints.

The Global South needs coalitions that can deliver

For the Global South, Lula’s victory preserves an advocate for reform across BRICS, the G20 and the United Nations. The opportunity lies in connecting countries around specific demands on development finance, trade and representation. Their interests overlap sufficiently to make cooperation possible, while differing enough to make claims of a united South unconvincing.

Brazil’s contribution will depend on its ability to organise these areas of convergence into coalitions with influence over decisions. Diplomatic visibility can help, but sustained influence requires expertise, institutional continuity and resources.

The same applies to autonomy itself. Industrial capacity, technological choices, diversified partnerships and the ability to withstand external pressure all shape a country’s room to act. Dependence on China can constrain choices too. Brazil’s success should be assessed by whether its international relationships expand its capacity to pursue domestic and international priorities.

Africa and the need to reinvent Brazil’s niche

From an African perspective, the gap between Brazil’s diplomatic ambition and its capacity to deliver matters most. Africa received too little sustained attention during Lula’s third term. Historical connections and the language of South–South solidarity have not provided a sufficiently clear strategy for sustained engagement.

Brazil remains a marginal player in many of the continent’s economic and strategic relationships. That position will persist without clearer priorities, tangible initiatives and the tools to implement them.

Brazil needs to reinvent its niche. Its expertise in areas such as agriculture, public health and technical cooperation offers possible foundations. Each would require choices about which partnerships to pursue, how to finance them and which institutions would sustain delivery. A smaller number of credible initiatives could establish a stronger role than an expansive agenda without the resources to support it.

Those choices must also begin with African priorities and institutions. African countries have their own development strategies, diplomatic relationships and assessments of what Brazil can offer. Brazil’s relevance will depend on how effectively it responds to those priorities and builds partnerships that endure beyond presidential visits.

Lessons for South Africa

For South Africa, one lesson is that defending democracy cannot become defending the status quo. Coalition politics must produce improvements in jobs, services and security. Citizens need reasons to support the constitutional order that connect with their daily experience of government.

There is also a foreign policy lesson. Diplomatic ambition requires economic capacity, functioning institutions and public legitimacy at home. A government’s international standing becomes harder to sustain when its commitments abroad appear disconnected from its ability to deliver domestically.

Brazil and South Africa both have experience, relationships and institutions that give them opportunities to shape international debates. Turning those opportunities into durable influence requires strategic choices about priorities and the means to pursue them.

My relief at Lula’s victory is real. So is the scale of the task ahead. The election has preserved political space for democratic renewal and diplomatic autonomy. Whether that space survives the next electoral cycle will depend on better lives at home, stronger institutions and international partnerships with the capacity to deliver.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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When the European Union and China announced a “shared understanding” over hybrid vehicle exports in early October, Brussels pitched it as a diplomatic victory—a calibrated measure to protect European automakers while keeping communication channels open.

Look closer at the numbers, however, and the victory vanishes. Hybrid vehicles accounted for just 2.06% of all Chinese exports to the EU between January and August 2026. Even after doubling from the previous year, the segment represents a negligible fraction of bilateral trade. Within days of the announcement, both German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged the reality: the deal was not a breakthrough, but a brief pit stop on the path toward an escalating trade confrontation.

This disconnect between European policy rhetoric and material reality raises a fundamental question: Can the European Union’s aggressive deployment of protective tariffs and “de-risking” toolkits actually insulate its economy, or is Brussels merely walling off its internal market while accelerating its own industrial obsolescence?

The surface narrative coming out of European capitals presents “de-risking” as a necessary, defensive evolution. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has repeatedly described the EU’s massive trade deficit with China as structural and unsustainable, pointing to state subsidies, overcapacity, and artificially devalued currencies as the root causes. To counter this, Brussels has rolled out a suite of trade defense mechanisms—ranging from the DiversifyEU initiative to new anti-coercion instruments—designed to curb critical dependencies and penalize market distortion.

What this narrative leaves out is the physical reality of global manufacturing and material supply chains. Over the past 18 months, despite announcing numerous mining, processing, and recycling projects, the EU has failed to secure alternative sources for critical inputs. European industry remains fundamentally dependent on Chinese refining capacity for rare earths and essential battery components.

By treating regulatory licensing regimes as equivalent bargaining chips—attempting to trade European dual-use technology export permissions for guaranteed Chinese mineral shipments—Brussels has misjudged its leverage. Beijing retains its hand on the supply switch. As demonstrated in mid-2025 and again in July 2026, when China restricted dual-use shipments to European firms following EU sanctions, Beijing is fully prepared to deploy targeted licensing controls when challenged.

The structural imbalance becomes clearer when examining who bears the cost of this retaliation. While China relies primarily on high-volume manufacturing exports for its current growth targets, its dependencies on European imports are shrinking. Should trade frictions escalate into full-blown restrictions, European exporters in high-margin sectors—French luxury goods and agri-food, Swedish salmon, German machine tools, and precision instruments—face direct exposure.

Here lies the core contradiction: Brussels is erecting trade barriers to protect legacy domestic industries, yet those very barriers incentivize Beijing to restrict the processing equipment and critical minerals required for Europe to execute its own green and digital transition.

To understand the broader systemic shift, one must contrast the dominant Western framework with the material realities observed from the Global South.

In the dominant European view, defensive trade instruments are framed as neutral, rules-based responses to state-driven market distortions. Protectionism is rebranded as “strategic autonomy,” and supply chain weaponization is presented as a uniquely non-Western behavior.

Viewed through a Global South analytical lens, this framework crumbles. Developing economies recognize European “de-risking” for what it is: hypocritical protectionism designed to shelter uncompetitive Western industries while locking emerging markets out of high-value industrial chains. More importantly, the Global South sees that European trade barriers do not eliminate Chinese manufacturing capacity; they merely redirect it.

When European markets close their doors to competitive Chinese electric vehicles, renewable energy infrastructure, and advanced machinery, that capital and industrial output does not disappear. Instead, it flows directly into the developing world.

Across South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, emerging economies are acquiring advanced green technology, industrial equipment, and infrastructure investments at lower costs, unburdened by European tariffs or Western regulatory compliance costs. While Europe spends years attempting to build out high-cost, subsidized domestic processing plants that have yet to deliver material output, the Global South is integrating directly with Asian processing power and manufacturing scale.

The strategic implication of this divide extends far beyond bilateral trade balances. By prioritizing market insulation over industrial competitiveness, the European Union is accelerating its own marginalization within the emerging multipolar order.

Historically, Western leverage rested on two pillars: control over global financial infrastructure and unmatched purchasing power within its consumer markets. As Western powers weaponize sanctions and unilateral trade barriers, non-Western economies are constructing insulated, autonomous payment networks and trade corridors that bypass Western gatekeepers entirely.

When Brussels uses market access as a political weapon, it forfeits its ability to set global technical and industrial standards. As Chinese, Indian, and broader BRICS+ trade networks deepen, the standards governing the next generation of global commerce—from digital trade rails to green tech integration—are being established outside Western jurisdiction.

The EU’s attempt to “de-risk” from China is producing the exact opposite of its intended effect. Rather than securing European independence or forcing structural concessions from Beijing, Brussels is marooning its own capital on a shrinking economic island.

The European Union cannot draft regulatory papers fast enough to replace physical mineral refining, processing capacity, and cost-efficient manufacturing. As European tariffs rise, European industries face higher input costs, constrained access to critical inputs, and retaliatory barriers in key export markets. Meanwhile, the rest of the world—unencumbered by European regulatory overreach—is deepening its integration with Asian supply chains and building the real infrastructure of 21st-century commerce.

Returning to the hybrid vehicle agreement of early October, the true significance of the deal becomes clear. It was not a victory for European diplomacy, nor was it a sign that “de-risking” is working. It was a brief, symbolic pause in an irreversible structural shift.

For the strategic observer, the lesson is straightforward: regulatory walls cannot alter material gravity. While Brussels preoccupies itself with defending legacy markets, the Global South is seizing the momentum, absorbing capital and technology, and consolidating its position at the center of the multipolar economy.

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The visit to Kabul by Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), alongside Moscow’s parallel diplomatic activity in Islamabad, raises a strategic question: is Russia seeking to mediate between the Taliban and Pakistan, or is it more concerned about preventing insecurity from spreading from Afghanistan into Central Asia and threatening Russia’s partners? Because neither side has publicly disclosed the agenda of Naryshkin’s talks, the visit cannot be assigned a single, definitive purpose. Yet the seniority of the official involved and the wider regional context make the security dimension especially important.

An Intelligence Visit Amid Regional Maneuvering According to Afghanistan International, Naryshkin met Abdul Haq Wasiq, the Taliban’s intelligence chief, in Kabul. Neither side publicly disclosed the purpose of the visit. At the same time, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev was in Pakistan. In its October 16, 2026, analysis, Al Jazeera examined the two visits in the context of tensions between Kabul and Islamabad and Moscow’s possible bid to play a mediating role. Russia’s special representative for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has said that Moscow would be prepared to help ease those tensions if both sides requested its involvement.

The simultaneous contacts may indicate that Moscow wants to position itself as a more active diplomatic and security actor across South and Central Asia. However, timing alone does not prove that Naryshkin’s mission was intended to mediate between the Taliban and Pakistan. If mediation were the sole objective, it is not self-evident why the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service would lead the engagement when Moscow already has a dedicated Afghanistan envoy. This does not prove that the talks focused on intelligence cooperation; it does make threat assessments, information-sharing, and the monitoring of transnational militant networks plausible areas of concern.

Islamic State–Khorasan and the Credibility of Taliban Assurances The Taliban have repeatedly said they have contained Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-K, also referred to as ISKP). Such assurances should be assessed against measurable indicators: a sustained decline in attacks, disruption of recruitment and financing, the dismantling of support networks, and a reduced ability to plan or carry out cross-border operations. A temporary drop in attacks, by itself, would not demonstrate that an organization’s operational capacity or underground networks had been eliminated.

A deeper question concerns the Taliban’s own military and security structures. The United Nations Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in its sixteenth report (S/2025/796), says that more than 20 regional and international terrorist organizations remain active in Afghanistan. It also notes that the Taliban have absorbed some former fighters from various militant groups into local security forces, raising concerns about possible infiltration and ideological alignment. The report does not establish that specific Taliban personnel are deliberately cooperating with IS-K. It does, however, show why networks of influence, ideological affinities, and divided loyalties warrant scrutiny.

If individuals within Taliban ranks were knowingly cooperating with IS-K—or if ideological sympathies were weakening efforts to confront it—counterterrorism operations would face an internal contradiction: institutions responsible for providing security could contain elements that undermine those efforts. Any allegation of such collaboration requires specific evidence and independent verification. Until transparent, verifiable information is available about internal vetting, command accountability, and the disruption of militant support networks, claims that IS-K has been fully contained should be treated cautiously.

Northern Afghanistan: The Front Line of Russia’s Concern For Moscow, the issue is not confined to security inside Afghanistan. The central concern is the potential spillover of instability into Central Asia. Tajikistan is particularly important because it shares a long border with Afghanistan and maintains close security ties with Russia. Jamaat Ansarullah, a militant group associated with Tajikistan, is one of the organizations relevant to this concern. Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan and its longstanding relationship with Dushanbe make the security of the Afghan–Tajik frontier a matter of strategic interest. Militant activity in northern Afghanistan could have consequences beyond Afghanistan’s borders, including recruitment, the development of support networks, and possible cross-border attacks or destabilization.

The threat landscape extends beyond any single organization. The UN monitoring report identifies groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jamaat Ansarullah, and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP) among the militant organizations active in Afghanistan. These groups have different aims, networks, and relationships and should not be treated as a unified bloc. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has a history of targeting the Uzbek government; Jamaat Ansarullah is directly relevant to Tajikistan’s security; and ETIM/TIP is primarily associated with Uyghur militancy and China’s security concerns, not necessarily with organized opposition to Turkmenistan’s government.

It is therefore more accurate to say that Afghanistan hosts a range of transnational militant networks whose objectives or connections relate to different countries in the region—not that every Central Asian state necessarily has a distinct opposition group based in Afghanistan. Even where such groups lack the immediate capacity to launch attacks, their networks may provide infrastructure for recruitment, communication, and logistical support. For Russia, the strategic risk lies in the possibility that these capabilities could develop into direct threats against its partners.

Moscow: Mediation or Threat Management? Naryshkin’s visit to Kabul, alongside the Russian interior minister’s engagement in Pakistan, gives Moscow channels to communicate with both sides and present itself as a consequential security actor across South and Central Asia. Political influence, however, does not automatically translate into the ability to impose an outcome. Structural disagreements between Kabul and Islamabad, mutual distrust, and recurring border violence could limit Russia’s room for maneuver as a mediator.

Intelligence cooperation with the Taliban may therefore offer Moscow practical value beyond diplomatic symbolism: an opportunity to assess threats, map militant networks, and seek specific assurances concerning the security of Afghanistan’s northern borderlands. Yet excessive reliance on information supplied by the Taliban would carry its own risks. The two sides may differ in how they define the threat, which groups they prioritize, and how they assess the activities of particular armed networks.

Conclusion: The Real Test Is Cross-Border Security The available public information does not allow Naryshkin’s visit to be reduced to a single, confirmed mission. Nevertheless, the seniority of the Russian official and the parallel activity in Kabul and Islamabad indicate that Afghanistan remains important in Moscow’s security calculations. A central concern is the possibility that militant threats could spread from Afghanistan into Central Asia, with consequences for Russia’s partners, particularly Tajikistan.

For Russia, success should not be measured simply by closer relations with the Taliban or by repeated assurances that IS-K has been contained. The more meaningful test is a demonstrable reduction in cross-border threats, supported by credible evidence that militant networks are being disrupted, recruitment channels constrained, and security institutions protected against infiltration. Without such evidence, closer political ties between Moscow and Kabul may expand cooperation without resolving Russia’s strategic anxieties about northern Afghanistan.

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When astronomers from Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and other BRICS partners gather in Pune from 26 to 30 October 2026, they will be discussing more than distant stars. They will be deciding how countries of the Global South can build shared scientific infrastructure, train a new generation of researchers, and turn access to the night sky into a source of knowledge, skills and development.

The 12th Annual Meeting of the BRICS Astronomy Working Group (BAWG) will be hosted by India’s Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA) in collaboration with the Department of Science and Technology. Its central scientific theme is “Multi-messenger and Multi-wavelength Transients”—the study of sudden, powerful cosmic events observed through different kinds of signals, from visible light to radio waves and particles.

For a bloc often discussed through trade, energy and diplomacy, astronomy may seem an unusual arena. Yet it is precisely in fields such as this that BRICS cooperation is testing a practical question: can countries outside the traditional centres of scientific power create world-class research networks on their own terms?

A meeting with practical stakes

The Pune meeting will combine scientific lectures with sessions on education, development, science communication and a data science hackathon. According to the official meeting page, it will also include the annual BAWG business meeting, where government representatives and national focal points review progress and set priorities for the year ahead.

The programme reflects a broad understanding of what science policy can do. Astronomy is not only about telescopes; it depends on optics, engineering, software, data storage, telecommunications, education and public engagement. A country that invests in these areas gains capabilities that can spill over into other sectors, from weather monitoring to digital infrastructure.

South Africa is sending a delegation of 17 representatives from institutions including the South African Astronomical Observatory, the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory, the University of Cape Town, the University of the Western Cape, the Inter-University Institute for Data Intensive Astronomy and the University of Johannesburg. The delegation will be led by Takalani Nemaungani, Chief Director of Astronomy at South Africa’s Department of Science, Technology and Innovation.

That level of participation matters. South Africa has become one of the world’s important locations for radio astronomy, particularly through its role in the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) project. Its presence in Pune signals that the country views BRICS scientific cooperation as part of a long-term national strategy, rather than a symbolic diplomatic exercise.

Why transients matter

The meeting’s theme—multi-messenger and multi-wavelength transients—sounds technical, but the idea is straightforward. The universe is not static. Stars explode. Black holes swallow matter. Neutron stars collide. Some events release flashes of light; others send out gravitational waves, radio signals or high-energy particles.

“Multi-wavelength” means studying an event using different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as optical light, infrared radiation, X-rays and radio waves. “Multi-messenger” goes further: it combines those signals with other carriers of information, including gravitational waves and particles such as neutrinos.

To catch these events, astronomers need telescopes in different places, observing at different times and wavelengths. A burst of energy may appear briefly in one part of the sky. If only one observatory sees it, scientists may miss crucial context. If observatories across several continents can share alerts and coordinate follow-up observations, they can build a much fuller picture.

This is where BRICS geography becomes an advantage. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa span vast territories and time zones. A coordinated network could reduce gaps in coverage and allow scientists to monitor changing parts of the sky more continuously.

The BRICS Intelligent Telescope and Data Network (BITDN) was designed around this logic. It aims to connect telescopes and data infrastructure across member countries to support wide-field sky surveys and the rapid study of transient and variable cosmic phenomena.

From shared science to shared infrastructure

BITDN is the flagship project of BRICS astronomy cooperation. It was agreed at the 2019 BAWG meeting in Rio de Janeiro and brings together observational facilities with the data and computing systems needed to process what those facilities detect.

Its ambition is significant: a network capable of supporting continuous, wide-field, multi-wavelength imaging surveys and rapid detection of events such as supernovae, gamma-ray bursts and fast radio bursts. In practical terms, this means telescopes, sensors, algorithms and data centres working together as one distributed scientific system.

The project is still developing. In 2026, BRICS astronomy partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the GOTTA-BRICS Pathfinder Programme, a next step intended to advance BITDN. According to the BRICS Astronomy website, the programme will bring together China’s National Astronomical Observatories, Brazil’s National Laboratory of Astrophysics and South Africa’s South African Astronomical Observatory to develop a prototype intelligent observatory network across China, Brazil and South Africa.

That approach—beginning with a prototype before committing to a full-scale network—is important. Large scientific infrastructure projects often fail not because the science is uninteresting, but because costs, governance, data standards and long-term funding become difficult. A phased model gives BRICS partners a chance to test cooperation in practice.

It also raises a question relevant far beyond astronomy: when countries build shared infrastructure, who owns the data, who decides research priorities, and how are benefits distributed among participating institutions and societies?

Science as development policy

For Global South countries, the value of astronomy cooperation cannot be measured only in discoveries. It also lies in capacity building: training scientists, engineers, programmers, teachers and communicators.

The Pune meeting explicitly includes education, human-capital development and public engagement. It will feature the BAWG Data Science Hackathon, organised with the Aryabhatta Research Institute of Observational Sciences and the Indian Space Research Organisation, as well as science-communication training and the launch of a BRICS Astronomy Robotics and Coding Training initiative.

These activities point to a wider shift in how scientific cooperation is being imagined. Rather than treating Global South countries mainly as hosts for foreign telescopes or suppliers of raw data, BRICS astronomy cooperation seeks to build domestic expertise across the full research chain.

That distinction has real consequences. A country that only hosts instruments may gain prestige and some local employment. A country that develops its own data-analysis capacity, instrumentation skills and research leadership gains far more durable influence in global science.

The BAWG’s stated mission reflects this broader aim: to promote cooperation in astronomy and enabling technologies through joint activities involving government, universities, research institutions and industry; to develop astronomical science; to train human capital; and to improve public understanding of science.

India’s role as convener

India’s hosting of the 2026 meeting carries symbolic and practical weight. The country has a mature astronomical research community, strong computational capacity and a growing space sector. IUCAA, based in Pune, is a major centre for research and training in astronomy and astrophysics.

The wider BRICS context

Astronomy is one part of a broader BRICS effort to deepen cooperation in science, technology and innovation. The BAWG was formally created in 2015, following agreements within BRICS science and technology structures.

Why this matters beyond astronomy

The Pune meeting arrives at a time when many Global South governments are asking how to reduce dependence on a small number of technological powers. The answer is unlikely to be isolation. Scientific progress depends on openness, exchange and international partnership.

A test of BRICS agency

The 12th BAWG meeting will not resolve every question facing BRICS science cooperation. It will not instantly create a fully operational global telescope network, nor will it eliminate the inequalities that shape global research.

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When South African President Cyril Ramaphosa warned his cabinet that the country must prepare for potential exclusion from the United States’ flagship trade preference program, he was stating the quiet part of Washington‘s trade policy out loud. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)—long framed by Western capitals as an act of economic grace designed to integrate developing nations into global value chains—is running hard against the reality of political conditionality.

The immediate trigger is familiar: deteriorating bilateral relations and political friction between Washington and Pretoria. But the deeper significance is structural rather than diplomatic. What we are witnessing is a stress test for a foundational premise of the post-Cold War economy: how much leverage do unilateral Western preference programs actually hold over sovereign developing states, and what happens when that leverage begins to fail?

The Anatomy of a Unilateral Lifeline

To understand why Ramaphosa’s warning carries weight, we have to look past the political headlines and audit the actual mechanics of the trade relationship.

Bilateral trade between the United States and South Africa reached $28.8 billion in goods and services. U.S. goods exports to South Africa stood at $6.3 billion, while imports reached $16.5 billion, leaving Washington with a notable goods deficit of roughly $10.2 billion. South Africa’s own merchandise data reflects a balanced, highly integrated exchange, anchored by critical industrial and mineral exports like platinum, which accounts for nearly 32% of its merchandise shipments to the American market.

Yet the institutional architecture governing this trade is profoundly asymmetric.

For decades, AGOA has served as the primary conduit for South African exports into the U.S. market. But AGOA is persistently misunderstood in mainstream commentary. It is not a reciprocal free-trade agreement. It is a U.S. legislative preference program. Under its terms, Washington unilaterally determines eligibility based on periodic reviews, congressional reauthorizations, and—crucially—compliance with domestic and foreign policy expectations set in Washington.

When political friction arises, the terms of trade are instantly weaponized. The threat of exclusion is dangled not as a market adjustment, but as a disciplinary tool designed to align Pretoria’s sovereign foreign policy choices with Western strategic interests.

The Cost of Coercion and the Search for Real Alternatives

The potential loss of AGOA would undoubtedly deliver localized economic shocks, particularly for South Africa‘s automotive and agricultural sectors, where employment and capital are concentrated. President Cyril Ramaphosa was candid about that vulnerability, labeling the potential impact on jobs as severe.

Yet mainstream coverage treats this vulnerability as an inescapable trap—proceeding from the assumption that without Washington’s tariff exemptions, developing economies are left stranded and politically compliant.

That assumption ignores how the Global South is actively redesigning its economic architecture.

Faced with the perpetual volatility of politically conditioned trade preferences, South Africa’s diversification strategy is a structural necessity rather than a panicked reaction. Pretoria has leaned into robust regional and bilateral frameworks that provide genuine legal certainty rather than discretionary charity. Domestically and regionally, South Africa’s participation in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) anchors its integration within the continent.

Beyond Africa, Pretoria is forging direct, predictable trade corridors. A case in point is the zero-tariff preference scheme introduced by China for qualifying South African goods. Unlike AGOA, which remains hostage to congressional politics in Washington, these emerging arrangements are built on mutual market access and developmental partnerships.

Decoding the BRICS Reality: Beyond the Free-Trade Myth

Analytical clarity is required here. Commentators frequently commit a fundamental error when assessing South Africa‘s economic pivot: they conflate geopolitical alignment with customs union integration.

BRICS is not a free-trade area. It operates without a constituent treaty, a permanent secretariat, or a dedicated budget that overrides member states’ individual tariff schedules. Ministerial declarations, roadmaps, and discussions on local-currency settlement or supply-chain cooperation are vital instruments of economic coordination, but they do not automatically grant exporters lower customs duties or replace existing trade agreements.

South Africa‘s pivot away from Western dependency is not happening through a blanket BRICS tariff wall. It is happening through concrete, practical layers: regional consolidation via SACU and AfCFTA, targeted bilateral trade agreements with major Asian and Global South economies, and the systematic strengthening of trade-facilitation channels.

BRICS provides the political umbrella, the financial coordination mechanisms, and the strategic breathing room; domestic and regional trade agreements provide the legal machinery.

The Strategic Horizon: The Self-Limiting Nature of Economic Leverage

When viewed through a traditional Western lens, Ramaphosa’s warning is framed as a cautionary tale about the costs of defiance. From a multipolar perspective, however, the story signals something entirely different.

It exposes the rapidly diminishing utility of unipolar economic leverage. When Washington converts trade preference programs into ideological enforcement tools, it signals to every developing economy that reliance on Western-centric infrastructure carries an unacceptable sovereign risk.

The harder Western capitals push to penalize sovereign foreign policies through tariff threats, the faster emerging markets accelerate the creation of parallel, non-coercive economic corridors.

The Reality Behind the Noise

The potential revocation of South Africa‘s AGOA benefits will bring friction, logistical adaptation, and short-term adjustment pains for specific export sectors. That uncertainty is real.

Yet the strategic takeaway for the informed observer is clear. The era when developing nations could be kept in line through the benevolent dangling of unilateral trade exemptions is drawing to a close. As Pretoria diversifies its partnerships, deepens its continental integration under AfCFTA, and locks in reciprocal trade terms with new economic powerhouses, the threat of exclusion loses its coercive power.

The story is not about South Africa‘s inevitable vulnerability. It is about the obsolescence of a system that treats trade as a political favor rather than a mutual exchange—and the steady, structural march toward a multipolar trade order where national sovereignty is no longer negotiable at the customs gate.

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When Tesla and Volvo abruptly halted assembly lines in European factories in early 2024, the official explanations cited component shortages caused by maritime diversions around the Cape of Good Hope. Across the same period, Asia-to-Europe container freight rates surged fivefold, while vessels carrying essential industrial inputs were forced into a 4,000-nautical-mile detour around the African continent. Simultaneously, in the narrow maritime arteries of the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz—a 21-nautical-mile passage carrying 21% of global petroleum and 25% of liquefied natural gas (LNG)—demonstrated how precarious the entire architecture of global energy distribution has become.

For decades, the foundational assumption of global commerce was that efficiency, minimal inventory, and Western-policed maritime corridors would remain permanent features of international trade. Today, that assumption has dissolved. Localized security shocks and unilateral regulatory regimes no longer function as momentary interruptions; they operate as permanent structural forces driving the reorganization of world production.

At the heart of this global economic friction lies a fundamental inquiry: as Western powers attempt to weaponize global trade architecture through “de-risking”, “friend-shoring”, and technological export restrictions, how are nations across the Global South actively re-architecting international trade to safeguard their own industrial development and national sovereignty?

The post-Cold War model of hyper-globalization was constructed around lean, just-in-time supply chains designed to squeeze out operational friction and minimize working capital. Industrial production was fragmented across emerging markets to exploit low labor costs, while corporate headquarters in North America and Western Europe retained high-value intellectual property, financial settlement channels, and maritime insurance mechanisms.

However, compounding crises—ranging from unilateral trade sanctions and weaponized semiconductor export controls to military escalations across the Red Sea and Eastern Europe—have exposed the fragility of this asymmetric design. What Western policy circles describe as “building resilient supply chains” frequently translates into extraterritorial legal mandates, market fragmentation, and the offloading of economic risk onto developing economies. In response, the BRICS alliance and non-aligned states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are moving from reactive survival strategies toward the systematic construction of alternative trade corridors, sovereign industrial ecosystems, and de-dollarized financial infrastructure.

1. The Mirage of Western ‘Friend-Shoring’ and Bottleneck Migration

Western policymakers increasingly advocate for friend-shoring—the strategic concentration of critical supply chains, technology manufacturing, and raw material sourcing within politically aligned jurisdictions. Framed as a benevolent mechanism to enhance national security, this policy attempts to divide the global economy into trusted and untrusted spheres.

Yet an empirical examination of strategic sectors reveals that political alignment offers a false guarantee of operational resilience. Advanced industrial manufacturing—most notably in semiconductors and clean energy technologies—depends on hyper-specialized, multi-tiered networks where direct supplier names hide deep upstream concentration. A corporate buyer can contractually relocate a manufacturing deal to a “friendly” nation, only to discover that the new vendor relies on the very same wafer fabrication plants, specialized lithography tools, refined rare earth minerals, or packaging facilities situated in non-aligned or targeted states.

Furthermore, coercive regulatory instruments such as the United States’ Foreign Direct Product Rule extend Western legal jurisdiction over products manufactured anywhere in the world if they incorporate software or equipment of Western origin. As demonstrated in analyses of downstream electronics manufacturers, this regulatory overreach creates what economists call bottleneck migration. When export controls block access to a specific advanced processor or software platform, manufacturers do not magically eliminate dependency; instead, they shift demand onto mature semiconductor nodes, alternative input materials, or secondary packaging hubs, creating new structural bottlenecks and escalating unit costs across the entire global economy.

Rather than fostering stability, Western friend-shoring generates duplicated industrial investments, inflates capital expenditure, and imposes severe compliance costs on third-party enterprises in the Global South. For developing states, aligning unconditionally with Western technological blocs risks forfeiting sovereign industrial flexibility while accepting higher prices for essential technology inputs.

2. Maritime Chokepoints and the Asymmetry of Disruption

The physical geometry of ocean freight exposes another deep asymmetry in global economic governance. World trade remains tethered to vulnerable maritime chokepoints—including the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Hormuz.

Recent events in the Red Sea demonstrate that a maritime corridor does not need to be physically blockaded to render it commercially unusable. When security threats emerged near Bab al-Mandab, commercial shipping lines preemptively diverted container vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This operational shift added 10 to 14 days to Asia-Europe voyages, tied up vessel capacity, caused acute container imbalances at major ports, and triggered massive spikes in war-risk insurance premiums.

A crucial contribution to this analytical framework comes from Prof. , a member of the Think BRICS team and scholar at UniDolomiti. In his exhaustive study on global energy logistics (Chapter 6 of the underlying text), Prof. Pacini analyzes the severe vulnerabilities surrounding the Strait of Hormuz—a narrow maritime passage that acts as the primary artery for global hydrocarbon trade. Prof. Pacini demonstrates that militarization and geopolitical rivalry in critical chokepoints do not merely produce transient price volatility; they trigger systemic, multi-tier disruptions that cascade across energy, petrochemical, fertilizer, and agricultural supply chains worldwide.

Crucially, Prof. Pacini’s work highlights the stark distributional asymmetries of these maritime shocks. While well-capitalized Western multinational corporations can absorb freight rate spikes, reserve airfreight capacity, or pass cost increases onto affluent consumers, import-dependent economies across the Global South face immediate inflationary pressures, currency depreciation, and severe food and energy insecurity. When maritime insecurity inflates the cost of transporting crude oil, refined fuels, or synthetic fertilizers, it is the agricultural producers in Latin America, fuel-importing nations in Africa, and industrializing economies in South Asia that bear the heaviest economic penalty.

3. The Global South’s Search for Local Value and Real Autonomy

Faced with global supply chain fracturing, several Global South economies have emerged as primary destinations for manufacturing relocation. Nations such as Vietnam—under the China Plus One framework—and Morocco—leveraging the world-class Tanger Med port complex—have attracted billions in foreign direct investment from Western and East Asian MNEs seeking to diversify production sites.

However, a critical question arises: does foreign factory investment automatically translate into genuine economic autonomy?

The evidence points to a complex reality. In many instances, manufacturing relocation establishes shallow export-assembly platforms rather than deeply integrated domestic manufacturing ecosystems.

• Vietnam’s electronics boom, while driving impressive export figures, relies heavily on imported sub-assemblies, intermediate components, and foreign-owned intellectual property, leaving local value capture relatively constrained.

• Morocco has successfully integrated into European automotive and aerospace supply chains through Tanger Med, taking advantage of market proximity and high-quality maritime logistics. Yet, as empirical assessments reveal, limited domestic supplier depth, specialized skill bottlenecks, and high reliance on imported raw materials present ongoing hurdles to capturing higher-value engineering and design functions.

For the Global South, true economic resilience cannot be achieved simply by hosting foreign assembly lines that remain dependent on Western technologies or foreign intermediate inputs. Sustainable development requires deep local value creation: expanding domestic supplier depth, promoting technological absorption, investing in local workforce skills, and ensuring that industrial policy serves national development goals rather than external corporate de-risking.

4. Corridors of Multipolarity: Re-Engineering Global Trade

Rather than remaining passive subjects of Western regulatory regimes and maritime chokepoints, the nations of the Global South and the expanding BRICS bloc are building sovereign infrastructure to bypass legacy trade bottlenecks. This is not an abstract ideological aspiration; it is an active, capital-intensive re-engineering of global trade geography.

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)

A cornerstone of this transformation is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—a 7,200-kilometer multimodal rail, road, and maritime network linking India, Iran, Central Asia, and Russia. By connecting Mumbai directly to Saint Petersburg via Tehran and the Caspian Sea, the INSTC offers transit times approximately 30% shorter and logistics costs 40% lower than traditional maritime routes through the Suez Canal. The corridor provides a secure trade artery for energy, agricultural commodities, and industrial goods that operates completely independently of Western-controlled maritime chokepoints or unilateral sanction regimes.

Re-Orienting Commodity and Energy Flow

A similar structural pivot is occurring in global energy and agricultural markets. Following Western sanctions against Russian seaborne crude, trade flows underwent an unprecedented structural reorientation toward major Asian economies, primarily China and India. This realignment was facilitated by sovereign adaptation mechanisms: customer substitution, alternative maritime insurance, long-term bilateral supply agreements, and the expansion of non-Western tanker fleets. Similarly, in fertilizer and grain markets, alternative trade corridors and direct bilateral state agreements have prevented severe global food deficits while reducing dependency on Western commodity trading desks.

De-Dollarization and Financial Architecture

Physical trade infrastructure is being paired with alternative financial architecture. The expansion of BRICS—incorporating major energy producers and consumers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Egypt alongside founding members—creates a institutional foundation for local currency trade settlement. As trade in Renminbi, Indian Rupees, UAE Dirhams, and Russian Rubles expands, developing nations are insulating their commercial transactions from Western banking sanctions, exchange rate volatility, and extraterritorial enforcement.

Who Controls the Future of Global Trade?

The contemporary reconfiguration of global supply chains is frequently portrayed in Western media as a technical effort to manage supply chain risk and secure critical technology. Yet beneath this administrative vocabulary lies a profound geopolitical reality: the post-Cold War trade model, anchored in Western institutional dominance, unilateral regulatory jurisdiction, and monopolized maritime corridors, is reaching its structural limit.

Attempting to enforce economic security through friend-shoring, coercive export controls, and market fragmentation does not eliminate global interdependencies. Instead, it drives up economic costs, accelerates bottleneck migration, and forces the non-Western world to accelerate its own institutional and physical decoupling.

The emerging trade geography will not be defined by a single unified international market, nor by a total retreat into isolated national autarky. Rather, it will be shaped by a multipolar network of overlapping trade corridors, regional industrial hubs, and sovereign financial mechanisms. Nations across the Global South are no longer content to serve as passive assembly sites or vulnerable consumer markets in a system governed elsewhere. By investing in sovereign connectivity, expanding domestic technological capacity, and insisting on local value creation, the multipolar majority is constructing an international trade architecture capable of serving its own strategic future.

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When we talk about the emerging multipolar world order, the discussion is largely focused on competition between major powers. The United States, China, Russia and India are frequently mentioned, along with BRICS and its ambition to reshape the global balance of power. But what does this development mean for smaller countries that have limited ability to influence the rules of the international system?

The Nordic countries offer an interesting example. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland have relatively small populations by global standards, yet they have developed economies, extensive international trade relations and a long tradition of cooperation across national borders.

At the same time, the Nordic countries operate in a world where security policy, trade and economic dependencies are increasingly intertwined.

The question, therefore, is not simply how the Nordics should relate to the major powers. It is also about how these countries can preserve their room for manoeuvre as the global balance of power changes.

A Changing World Order

The world’s economic and political centre of gravity is no longer as concentrated in the United States and Western Europe as it once was. China has become a central player in global industry and trade, India is growing in importance, and several countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America are calling for greater influence over international institutions.

BRICS is one of the platforms through which this development is taking shape. The group brings together countries with different political systems, economic circumstances and national interests. Its members do not agree on every issue, and BRICS is neither a military alliance nor a unified political organisation.

One of their shared interests is the ambition to reform parts of the international order and give emerging economies and developing countries a greater say in global affairs.

This is a development the Nordic countries also need to understand. Studying BRICS does not mean supporting every decision made by its member states. It means taking seriously the fact that more countries are seeking to influence how the global economy and international institutions should function.

Five Nordic Countries – Shared Interests, Different Circumstances

The Nordic countries have much in common, but their economic circumstances and foreign policy priorities are not identical. I have written about this in earlier articles.

Norway has a substantial energy and petroleum sector, Sweden and Finland have extensive industrial and technological capabilities, while Denmark has a strong international trade profile. Iceland has a smaller economy with different characteristics, in which fisheries, energy and tourism play important roles.

The Nordic security landscape has also changed. All five countries are now members of NATO. Denmark, Iceland and Norway were founding members in 1949, Finland joined in 2023 and Sweden in 2024.

This is an important starting point for the discussion. The Nordics are not outside the Western security framework, nor do they need to be in order to develop international relations beyond the traditional Western sphere.

Trade with BRICS Countries: A Practical Reality

The discussion about the Nordics and BRICS does not have to remain at the level of abstract principles. There are concrete economic relationships to consider.

Sweden’s exports of goods and services to India, for example, amounted to €2.958 billion in 2025, according to European Commission data on trade relations involving the EU, India and Sweden. The Swedish economy therefore already has substantial commercial interests in one of BRICS’ key member countries.

This does not mean that trade with India is without challenges or that economic cooperation carries no risks. It does, however, demonstrate that relations with emerging economies are a practical concern for Swedish businesses and workers, not merely a subject for international conferences.

How can the Nordics benefit from international trade and technological cooperation without creating one-sided dependencies? How can businesses gain access to new markets while security risks and strategic vulnerabilities are properly managed?

There are no simple answers. But a well-considered policy should be able to distinguish between different sectors, companies, technologies and forms of cooperation, rather than treating every relationship with a particular country in the same way.

When Security Policy Meets Economics

One of the major challenges of our time is that trade and economic relations are increasingly viewed through a security policy lens.

Access to energy, semiconductors, critical raw materials and digital infrastructure can affect a country’s security. Economic dependencies can also be used as instruments of political pressure. It would therefore be irresponsible to ignore these risks.

If every form of cooperation with a country outside one’s closest political circle is treated as a potential threat, opportunities for trade, research and the exchange of knowledge may be restricted. Over time, this could also weaken business competitiveness and make it more difficult to develop alternative supply chains.

For us in the Nordic countries , this should mean assessing risks on a case-by-case basis, diversifying dependencies wherever possible, and developing international relationships based on both shared interests and clear national priorities.

Can Small Countries Benefit from Greater Room for Manoeuvre?

Small countries cannot measure their international significance solely in terms of military strength or economic size. They can also influence developments through diplomacy, research, education, trade and long-term relationships.

This does not mean that the Nordics must try to act as mediators in every international conflict. But there is value in maintaining knowledge of different parts of the world and being able to cooperate wherever interests overlap.

India, for example, can be an important partner in industry and technology. Brazil plays a significant role in agriculture, raw materials and climate issues. China is a central actor in global industry and trade, while relations with the country require careful consideration of security concerns and economic dependencies.

A broader network of international relationships can create new economic opportunities and improve understanding of how other countries think and act.

Can the Nordics Think Beyond Blocs?

Perhaps the question is not whether the Nordics should choose between the West and BRICS. Such a formulation risks oversimplifying a reality in which countries have different interests depending on the issue at hand.

It is possible to safeguard security while supporting diplomacy. It is possible to maintain close relations with Western partners while also understanding why countries in the Global South want to reform international institutions. It is also possible to criticise a government’s policies without rejecting every form of cooperation with that country’s society and business community.

This does not mean that every form of cooperation is possible or desirable. Some conflicts of interest are real and can be difficult to overcome. But they should be addressed on the basis of their specific circumstances, rather than through the assumption that every international relationship must reflect complete political alignment.

For the Nordic countries, this approach could mean paying greater attention to trade, research, diplomacy and shared global challenges. It could also mean strengthening cooperation among the Nordic countries wherever their interests coincide, without requiring them to adopt identical positions on every issue.

In a multipolar world, this ability may prove to be one of the most important assets smaller countries possess.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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From the Diplomacy of Presence to a Substantive Partnership

Russian-African relations have gone through three distinct phases. The first, during the Soviet era, was based on support for liberation movements and the training of entire generations of technical and military personnel. The second coincided with the withdrawal of the 1990s, when Moscow closed embassies and cultural centers and left the continent to others. The third phase marks the resurgence of the past fifteen years, marked by the summits in Sochi (2019) and St. Petersburg (2023) and now by the third summit, scheduled to take place in Moscow on October 28–29, 2026, which is expected to adopt the action plan of the Partnership Forum for the 2027–2029 period. ^[1]

The organizers have stated that they intend to build the agenda around economic issues, because, according to Deputy Minister Borisenko, these are the topics of greatest interest to African partners.^[2] Moscow thus implicitly acknowledges that the political capital it has accumulated has not yet translated into economic substance.

For Russia, since 2022, Africa has served distinct functions. It is a diplomatic buffer against isolation, with significant numerical weight in multilateral forums; it is an export market for grain, fertilizers, petroleum products, and arms; and it offers access to strategic minerals and maritime positions on the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. For African countries, Russia is not a general partner but a selective supplier: competitively priced grains and fertilizers, arms without political strings attached, nuclear technology accompanied by state financing, and, last but not least, a bargaining chip in dealings with Western and Chinese counterparts.

The thesis of this paper is that the relationship has so far rested on three asymmetrical pillars: diplomacy, security, and the export of Russian raw materials. Its transformation into a structural partnership depends less on a political will that has already been declared than on four material conditions: financing capacity, the localization of added value, physical connectivity, and institutional reliability in security cooperation. Where these conditions are lacking, cooperation is likely to remain sporadic and concentrated in just a few countries.

Trade and Investment: The Issue of Composition

According to Minister Lavrov, trade exceeded $27 billion in 2025, and the Ministry of Economic Development believes it is possible to increase this figure by a factor of 1.5 to 2 by 2030. ^[3] However, this figure must be put into perspective: in the first five months of 2025 alone, China-Africa trade reached $134 billion, while approximately 30% of African exports of goods (176 billion euros in 2024) are destined for the European Union. ^[4] Russia is therefore a medium-sized partner, significant in certain sectors but not systemic.

Composition matters more than volume. In 2023, nearly 90% of Russian exports to Africa consisted of oil, refined products, wheat, and metals, while imports were limited to fruit, cocoa, coffee, and other agricultural goods.^[5] This results in a Russian trade surplus exceeding 10 billion annually and a strong geographic concentration: Egypt alone accounts for about 30% of trade, and North Africa absorbs the lion’s share. ^[6] Direct investment remains the weakest link: a 2023 estimate placed it at around 1% of investment flows to the continent, and there are no recent comparable data documenting significant growth.^[7]

The agri-food sector is where the potential is most tangible. Between January and August 2025, Russia exported approximately 11 million metric tons of agricultural products to Africa, worth over $2.8 billion.^[8] A qualitative leap, however, would require shifting part of the value chain to African soil: milling, storage, fertilizer blending, and cold-chain logistics. Without this step, African food security would remain dependent on a single supplier, with the risks that already emerged in 2022–2023.

The industrial test bed is the Russian Industrial Zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, agreed upon in 2018 on a 50-year basis and long left on paper. In July 2026, Moscow announced the selection of the developer; an Egyptian government source estimates potential investments of $5 billion and completion by 2028.^[9] The mechanism is significant because, with a localization rate exceeding 30%, the products obtain Egyptian origin status and gain access to Cairo’s preferential trade agreements. Its outcome will determine whether the model is replicable.

On the financial front, the ruble’s share of settlements rose to 84% in the first ten months of 2025, and Moscow is promoting the A7 platform, to which Nigeria and Zimbabwe are connected. ^[10] The mechanism solves a problem for Russia but shifts one onto Africans: importers must obtain rubles, often through a double conversion into dollars, and banks using sanctioned infrastructure expose themselves to secondary sanctions. Balanced compensation agreements, export credits, and co-investment funds would be needed, rather than simply changing the invoicing currency. On the other hand, African companies’ access to the Russian market remains hampered by certifications, phytosanitary regulations, and transportation costs; a dialogue between the Eurasian Economic Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area—proposed by Moscow as early as 2023—has not yet yielded verifiable results.

Defense and Security: The Post-Wagner Model

Military cooperation is the oldest and most solid channel. During the 2020–2024 period, Russia was the continent’s leading supplier of major arms, accounting for 21% of imports, ahead of China (18%) and the United States (16%).^[11] At the same time, its global exports plummeted by 64% in 2021–2025 compared to the previous five-year period; the figure of $15 billion in revenue for 2025 announced by the Kremlin cannot be independently verified.^[12] Russia’s competitive advantage lies in its installed base: decades of Soviet and Russian systems create a continuous demand for maintenance and spare parts.

Overhaul centers and licensed manufacturing facilities in countries such as Egypt or Algeria would strengthen this tie and, at the same time, reduce Africa’s dependence on Russian industrial capacity, which is currently tied up in the war in Ukraine.

More problematic is the paramilitary dimension. Following Prigozhin’s death, the Ministry of Defense replaced Wagner with the Africa Corps, a more hierarchical and directly state-controlled structure. The Malian case highlights the model’s limitations: the jihadist and separatist offensive in April 2026 forced the Africa Corps to abandon Kidal—a symbol of its 2023 successes—and Human Rights Watch documented civilian killings attributed to Russian forces the following July. ^[13] The most cautious interpretation is that this model ensures the survival of regimes but not control over the territory. For Moscow, the reputational cost extends to its more institutional partners; for the juntas, legitimacy remains tied to a supplier that fails to defeat the insurgency.

The “Russia-Africa” relationship breaks down here into at least three types. With Egypt and Algeria, cooperation is intergovernmental, institutionalized, and embedded in diversification strategies. With the states of the Sahel Alliance, it is about regime security. With South Africa, Nigeria, or Ethiopia, it is a selective relationship that coexists with Western, Chinese, and Turkish partnerships. The maritime dimension also reflects this uncertainty: the 25-year agreement for a base in Port Sudan, with a maximum of 300 military personnel and four ships, was declared terminated by the Sudanese government in 2025, but formal ratification—based on available sources—remains to be verified in a country at war. ^[14] Public data on cybersecurity is scarce; Russia’s offer of “information sovereignty” could strengthen state capabilities as tools for internal control. Sustainable security cooperation should therefore shift from protecting regimes to training national armed forces, with transparent rules of engagement and accountability mechanisms.

Energy and Raw Materials: Nuclear Power as Long-Term Infrastructure

Africa’s needs are enormous: approximately 600 million people lack electricity, and the International Energy Agency estimates that $15 billion annually is needed to achieve universal access, compared to less than $2.5 billion committed to sub-Saharan Africa in 2023. ^[15] The question is where Russia has a real comparative advantage.

Civil nuclear power is the clearest answer. The El-Dabaa plant in Egypt—four VVER-1200 reactors totaling 4.8 GW—is largely financed by a Russian government loan based on a cost set in 2017 at $28.75 billion; the pressure vessel for the first unit was installed in November 2025, that of the second in July 2026, and the parties are discussing two additional units as well as small reactors, floating power plants, and desalination. ^[16] Nuclear power creates a relationship lasting sixty or more years, involving fuel, personnel training, regulatory authorities, and maintenance. It is both cooperation and dependence: for this reason, the value for the host country depends on the effective transfer of expertise and the diversification of fuel supplies over time.

The Egyptian model, however, is not easily exportable. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger signed agreements or memorandums with Rosatom between June and July 2025, but small power grids and limited credit capacity make large reactors unlikely in the medium term; modular solutions would be more appropriate, provided that financing is secured.^[17] The case of Niger adds another element: the nationalization of Somaïr, a subsidiary of Orano, opens the door to Russian interest in uranium but exposes the country to litigation and risks replicating the extractive model that the military juntas claim they want to move beyond.^[18]

In hydrocarbons and renewables, Russia’s scope for action is more limited. Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, and Libya are producers in their own right; Moscow can contribute refined products, gas processing, offshore exploration, and training, but U.S. sanctions against major Russian oil companies limit its ability to invest abroad. In solar energy and batteries, Chinese competition—backed by low costs and the tariff exemption granted in 2025 to 53 African countries—appears difficult to challenge. In strategic minerals, Russia competes with China, the Gulf states, and the United States; its contribution would be most credible in local processing and geological surveying—sectors in which it possesses recognized expertise.

Logistics is where political agreements clash with geography. There is a lack of regular and frequent shipping lines: the FESCO service to Durban, launched in 2025, involves transshipments at Nhava Sheva or Jebel Ali, while the Novorossiysk–Lagos route announced by A7 African Cargo Lines calls for 700-TEU container ships.^[19] Costs and transit times particularly penalize African exporters and contribute to the trade imbalance.

As early as 2023, Putin had identified as priorities a Russian logistics hub in an East African port, regular shipping lines, more direct flights, and a connection to the North-South Corridor.^[20] The most promising route remains the Black Sea–Mediterranean–Suez–Red Sea corridor, with Egypt serving as a natural hub thanks to its industrial zone and the ports of Port Said and Ain Sokhna. However, this route is hampered by instability in the Red Sea and the war in Sudan. The Arctic routes are of marginal importance: the Northern Sea Route serves Asia, not Africa, and for West Africa, the Baltic ports and Murmansk on the Atlantic route are more significant. In the digital sector, where undersea cables and data centers are dominated by Western, Chinese, and Gulf operators, Russia occupies a niche: electronic tax administration and digital public services, sectors identified by the Russian government itself.^[21] Without frequent connections at predictable costs, any trade agreement remains merely an intention.

African Diversification and Russian Constraints

This relationship is part of a multi-player competition. China operates on an industrial scale; the EU remains the primary market and views Africa as a neighboring region; the United States views it through the lens of competition with Beijing and critical minerals; and Turkey and the Gulf states are expanding their commercial and military presence there. The war in Ukraine has had mixed effects: it has prompted Moscow to redirect its flows toward the Global South and to expand its diplomatic presence—with new embassies in Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan in 2025—but it has reduced available financial and industrial resources and exposed African partners to the risk of sanctions.

The decisive factor, however, is African agency. Most governments are diversifying their partners in a way that does not equate to alignment: Egypt is building a nuclear power plant with Rosatom while remaining tied to Washington and the Gulf states; South Africa claims non-alignment; Ethiopia has joined the BRICS without abandoning its Western financiers. Even the BRICS offer a political framework rather than a financing channel, given that the New Development Bank itself has adopted a cautious stance toward Russia-linked projects since 2022. From the Russian perspective, Africa is a hub of the multipolar order; from the Western perspective, the Russian presence often appears to be a destabilizing factor; from the African perspective, a transactional logic prevails. None of these interpretations, on its own, explains the dynamics: Russia is welcomed where it offers something that others do not offer or offer under worse conditions, and tends to be sidelined where its offer is replaceable.

A brief and provisional conclusion: five priorities and their obstacles

How can Russia and African countries transform a relationship based on geopolitical interests and sectoral cooperation into a more structured partnership? The analysis suggests that the answer lies in a limited number of capital- and expertise-intensive projects, rather than in the proliferation of memoranda of understanding. Five priorities appear to be the most plausible.

1. Localize value. Use the Suez Industrial Zone as a pilot project and replicate its model in agribusiness (milling, fertilizers, storage), thereby reducing the trade imbalance and creating African jobs.

2. A realistic financial framework. Focus government loans on a few strategic projects, seek co-financing with Asian and Gulf partners, and develop payment systems that do not transfer the risk of sanctions to African banks.

3. Logistics as a prerequisite. Regular shipping routes, an Egyptian hub and one on the Indian Ocean, direct flights: without these elements, the 2030 trade targets will remain difficult to achieve.

4. Institutionalize security. Prioritize intergovernmental agreements, local maintenance and training centers—with verifiable rules of conduct—rather than the protection of individual regimes.

5. Energy and human capital. Tailor nuclear capacity to the scale of the grids (modular units, regulatory authorities, training) and expand technical scholarships, one of the few low-cost tools for long-term Russian influence.

The obstacles are equally clear: financial constraints and sanctions, the diversion of Russian resources toward the war, reputational damage stemming from the Sahel, instability in Sudan and the Red Sea region, and, above all, Africa’s preference for diversification, which precludes exclusive relationships. The Moscow summit will provide a useful indicator: if the 2027–2029 action plan includes funded projects, deadlines, and verification mechanisms, the relationship may move toward a structural framework; if it remains a declaration of principles, cooperation is likely to continue to depend on political circumstances rather than on established economic interests.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

📌 Subscribe to Think BRICS for weekly geopolitical video analysis beyond Western narratives. Follow also our new channels BRICS Business and Think BRICS Chronicles.

_{[1]Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the African Union Commission, reported by TASS, “Third Russia-Africa Summit to Be Held in Moscow on October 28–29,” 2026; S. Lavrov, remarks at the MID Business Council, Moscow, June 30, 2026.}

_{[2]“Third Russia–Africa Summit will be held in Moscow in autumn 2026,” Izvestia, May 19, 2026.}

_{[3]Lavrov, remarks of June 30, 2026, op. cit.; P. Kalmyček, statements to TASS, October 7, 2025. These figures come from Russian government sources and have not yet been corroborated by African customs statistics or IMF (Direction of Trade Statistics) data.}

_{[4]General Administration of Customs of China, January–May 2025 data, reported by Xinhua; GSP Hub (EU), “The GSP and Africa,” updated June 2026.}

_{[5]D. Volvač, Deputy Minister of Economic Development, Sochi Ministerial Conference, November 2024, reported by Agence Ecofin.}

_{[6]“Friendship benefits: how Russia and Africa are increasing the volume of mutual trade,” Izvestia, 2025. The North African share varies, depending on the source, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total.}

_{[7]J. Siegle, “Russia-Africa summit provides a global stage for Moscow to puff up its influence,” The Conversation, 2023. This figure is outdated and should be updated using UNCTAD data.}

_{[8]Agroexport, data reported by TASS, October 8, 2025.}

_{[9]Ahram Online, “Egypt, Russia select developer for Russian Industrial Zone in SCZone,” July 15, 2026; EnterpriseAM, “Russia’s USD 5 bn industrial zone in Egypt set to break ground in 2026.” The estimate of 5 billion has not been officially confirmed.}

_{[10]Lavrov, Partnership Forum Ministerial Conference, Cairo, December 2025 (Interfax, December 22, 2025); bne IntelliNews, “Russian crypto payment system A7 to expand to Africa,” April 7, 2026.}

_{[11]SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024, March 2025.}

_{[12]SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025, March 2026; Defense News, February 2, 2026.}

_{[13]“Russia’s Africa Corps withdraws from Malian city amid rebel attacks,” NV, April 27, 2026; Human Rights Watch, “Mali: Russia’s ‘Africa Corps’ Massacres Villagers,” August 20, 2026.}

_{[14]bne IntelliNews, February 13, 2025; DefenseMirror, 2026. The status of ratification as of October 2026 has not been confirmed by official sources.}

_{[15]IEA, Financing Electricity Access in Africa, Paris, October 2025.}

_{[16]Ahram Online, August 13, September 1 and 2, 2026; World Nuclear News; analysis by the French Treasury cited by CapMad, July 2026.}

_{[17]Le360 Afrique, June 21, 2025; World Nuclear News, “Russia-Niger MoU on nuclear energy cooperation,” July 2025.}

_{[18]bne IntelliNews, “Russia offers Niger nuclear deal as France loses influence,” August 28, 2025.}

_{[19]The Maritime Executive, June 2025; Freight News, 2025.}

_{[20]V. Putin, remarks at the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, St. Petersburg, July 27, 2023 (TASS).}

_{[21]Kalmyček, statements to TASS, October 7, 2025, op. cit.}

Exclusive interview originally published on Brasil de Fato.
Republished with permission.

On one side, a few young people with cheap laptops. On the other, studios with budgets in the billions of dollars. That is how members of the Iranian collective Explosive Media—the creators of the “Lego” videos that went viral worldwide during the United States’ war against Iran—describe the battle they have been waging since the United States and Israel attacked the Persian country on February 28.

One of its members, who identifies himself as Explosive Man, received Brasil de Fato for an exclusive interview in a café at the top of a 14-story building in Tehran, Iran’s capital. At the very beginning of the conversation, he pointed to a plane flying on the horizon and said: “A light like that, during the war, was a missile.”

They say their videos have accumulated more than 1 billion views in just a few months, since they released their first video at the start of the so-called “Ramadan War,” which lasted 40 days until the ceasefire in April. The collective is anonymous and brings together around ten young people, aged 18 to 25, trained in communications, engineering, and theology. They began in June 2025, during the 12-Day War, producing videos in Persian with a live presenter.

The first video to use “Lego”-style animation was completed on the last day of that war, but it was never published because the ceasefire came into effect. When the war resumed at the end of February, they posted the first video, went to sleep, and woke up to find the material being discussed in the British press—and, from there, around the world.

Their formula combines artificial intelligence, their own rap music, and the pop grammar of the United States. A two-minute video takes about 24 hours to produce, and the video about the April ceasefire was ready before the official announcement. The team’s favorite, titled “A Vengeance for All,” dedicates each missile to a victim of empire: Indigenous peoples, enslaved Black people, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Iran Air Flight 655, and the children of Epstein’s island. “I cried when I watched it,” Explosive Man says.

The success came at a price. In April, YouTube shut down the channel for “spam, deceptive practices, and scams,” while Instagram removed the account. “In a country that is home to Pixar, DreamWorks, and Disney, an independent animation channel was taken down. Why?” reacted Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

The LEGO company has never commented. Western media coined the label “slopaganda”—low-quality, AI-generated propaganda—a term the group rejects: “We see our work as art. It is cinema.” The format has already crossed the ocean: in May, an art historian from Havana published a video in the same style against Trump’s threats to Cuba, and the collective welcomed her as “LRF Cuba,” the Lego Resistance Front.

But none of this, in their view, explains what matters most. Asked what secured Iran’s resistance—the missiles, the drones, or the videos themselves—he answers with faith: “It was the serenity God granted us.” In the first nights, with the Supreme Leader dead, they were in the streets when they saw an American drone in the sky: “We were not afraid at all.”

Below is the full text of the exclusive interview with Brasil de Fato:

Brasil de Fato: What was most important to Iran’s success in resisting the U.S. and Israeli attacks? Drones, missiles, the Revolutionary Guard, or the Lego videos you made, which won hearts and minds around the world by presenting Iran’s view of this war?

Explosive Man: It was the serenity God granted us. In the Quran, God says that when Muslims—when believers in God—face enemies, He sends a kind of serenity upon them so that they do not fear them. We still do not understand that serenity, but I think we will understand it many years from now.

When I think of ourselves in the first days of the war, in the first nights, we had no leader. Our leader had been martyred. And we were in the streets at night. We shouted it at the United States: “We will defeat the United States,” but we did not really know what it meant for the United States to be against us.

We were in the streets, and I saw an American drone in the sky. We were not afraid at all. It was an air-defense system that shot it down, and we were watching. The people—men, women, elderly men, elderly women, children—no one felt fear. That is what God did for us. It is very powerful.

Tell us a little about the group. You began producing content for the public about five years ago. How did you move from personal videos with a presenter to English-language animations made for the whole world?

We were making videos for the Iranian public. In the first days of the war, we made our first Lego video. We posted it on our channels on Iranian apps. Then we went to sleep. When we woke up, we saw that an account had tweeted the video. Soon afterward, The Times and The Telegraph were writing about it. So we realized it was something different, and that this should be our next step: to start making videos for English-speaking audiences.

Could we say that your main audience is the people of the United States?

During the war, yes. Most of our audience is also American. On Twitter, around 60%. Then Canada and Great Britain.

And you are very young—at most 20 years old.

We have a colleague who is 15.

You combine backgrounds in communications, engineering, theology, and AI. How do these different backgrounds come together in your work? What is the creative process like?

Passion and love unite us, and we all love our country. So, with these different backgrounds, we came together to create something for our country. As for the process, we have an ideas bank. We discuss ideas weekly. You know, we have ideas 24 hours a day. We think about the work even when we are sleeping. It is incredible. So we have an ideas bank, and we hold meetings during the week. We think about the ideas, write our plans, write our scripts, and throughout the week we produce them one by one.

We trained ourselves to do all of this. At the beginning, one of us knew how to use Photoshop, one knew how to animate, another knew how to communicate. But we trained ourselves so that a single person could do everything—from writing the script to animating, creating images, and communicating. We read books about cinema. We watched videos.

Did you decide to start with this type of video because of the war, or were you already making content with a global audience in mind?

No, we made the first Lego video on the last day of the 12-day war. But when the ceasefire began, we did not publish it. Still, we were ready; we knew how to make it. So, in the first days of the next war, we posted the first video, but for the Iranian public. The first was “Chronicles of Victory,” then “The Strait of Hormuz Is Closed,” and then “A Vengeance for All.”

That is the video in which you show Black people in the United States, Indigenous peoples, Palestinians, and the girls who suffered because of Epstein?

Yes. It is the one I like most. I cried when I watched it. It was incredible. Then came “Rise Up,” in Persian, with that religious singer Mahdi Rasouli. It said, “Heidar, Heidar.” That was the one I liked most. “Heidar” means “lion”; it is an epithet of our first Imam, Imam Ali [the son-in-law of Muhammad].

In the Battle of Khaybar against the Jews. In their books, some prophecies say that “Haider” will come and defeat them. The book says: “Do not fight him when he comes. Be obedient to him.” And when Imam Ali reached them and said, “I am Heidar,” and defeated their most powerful hero, they realized: “Ah, this is Heidar.” And they did not fight; the battle ended. The Muslims reached Khaybar, which is a castle.

What led you to choose Lego as a form of expression?

We tried many formats. But Lego has a certain comic quality. You do not need to be exactly realistic. If you are making Trump, you can make something that resembles him, and people will know it is Trump. When you make realistic videos, people look for flaws. They say: “Ah, Trump is not like that. His nose is not like that. His hair is not like that.” But when you make Lego videos, people look for similarities. They say: “Ah, that really looks like him.” That is an advantage of using Lego, and Lego brings people nostalgia. When people were children, their children played with Legos, or they themselves played with Lego.

Many of you are at university, and the university was being bombed. What was it like to post the videos, receive hundreds of millions of views, and at the same time have little internet access while drones and missiles flew overhead? What were those 40 days of war like for you?

We felt that we were fighting too. We are a media army; we are media guerrillas, and we needed to act fast. We did not go home at night. We slept there, in our office. Yes, we worked 24 hours a day, and we wanted to do something. It was our duty. We did not want anything from anyone. We only wanted to fulfill our duty for our country.

You have said that you studied U.S. media and reverse-engineered their narratives about wars. At the same time, the Iranian armed forces also reverse-engineered Western drones and missiles. In the case of media, what does that reverse engineering mean?

We have lived in an environment of Western media warfare for years. We were born into it. There are many Persian-language channels sponsored by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. So that is our environment. We learned it naturally. We were not taught propaganda or psychological warfare at university.

We lived it. So we saw how Western media buries the truth beneath its lies. How it reverses truth and falsehood. How it magnifies a small problem in our country as much as possible. How it makes our young people lose faith in our country. So we understood this and decided to do something against it.

But not with lies—not with that kind of cruelty, that kind of propaganda—but with the truth. We knew that humanity has a love for truth in its soul. So when you speak the truth, it liberates the mind; it unbinds it. Some chains will break. People will understand: “Ah, there is a truth. They were lying to me all these years.” So we turned the situation around, but not with lies.

You use AI in the videos, but AI also carries a great deal of Western bias. What has that experience been like, and how do you confront that bias?

Sometimes we had problems with prompts and with the restrictions on AI accounts. Sometimes the AI says: “Ah, we cannot do that because of such-and-such. We cannot challenge that person. We cannot say that. We cannot create that image.” But we find a way around it. They are little magic tricks [laughs].

Both YouTube and Instagram took your accounts down. Even so, the videos kept spreading everywhere. Do you have any idea how many accounts are sharing your videos?

I do not know how many accounts, but I know that in the first months of our work, our work received more than 1 billion views worldwide.

Russia faces the same problem, with several media outlets outside YouTube and outside Meta. What reflections do you have on communications sovereignty for countries such as Iran and others in the Global South? Are you thinking about creating your own platforms?

I hope we can do that in the future. We are looking for something like that. We created an NFT collection called LRF, LEGO Resistance Front. We are looking for a way to use Web3 and blockchain technologies to create free media for the whole world. But, for now, I think it is still too early. I think we need to use their own media to influence their people. It is like a river they are poisoning. And we need to detoxify that river and thaw people’s minds.

Part of the Western media became irritated by your success. They began calling it “slopaganda” [a term derived from “slop,” meaning pig feed, plus “propaganda”]. What do you think of that?

I think people know that “slopaganda” is that Lego video the Israeli Ministry published on Twitter, around October 7. We truly see our work as art. It is making videos, making films. It is cinema, you know? It is not garbage. But their work is garbage. You can search for “Israeli prime minister published a Lego video.” And that is low-quality propaganda. We see ourselves as educational entertainment.

This is the first time in history that the United States wages war against a country without controlling the narrative. Think of Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria—when they controlled the narrative. How do you see this?

First, they dehumanized the people of those countries. They tried to do the same with our country. They have been doing it for 47 years, since the revolution.

How did you manage to reverse that?

I think it is part of God’s plan. God decided to make the truth manifest and to make truth triumph at this moment. I think it is an important moment in world history. I think it is the beginning of a new era. We are simply working within God’s plans. Look at us: we are just a few young people with cheap laptops.

On the other side, there are studios with budgets in the billions of dollars. We do not consider ourselves anything. We are proud, but we do not praise ourselves. We see ourselves as we are, and we thank God because He gave us this blessing. We will use it in the best possible way.

Is there a lesson for other countries in the Global South, for groups of young people who now look to you as an example?

Being an instrument of God, or being within God’s plan, does not mean that you cannot do anything. It does not mean that you should not try. You must try to be within God’s plan. I think it means maintaining morality, believing in truth, loving people, loving children.

When you see a country—a Zionist regime—killing children, killing people… You cannot be human and not fight against them. If you take a stand against them and try to do something, God will help you. Do not fear the results. Do not fear the problems. All problems will be resolved in the future.

Do not think about them. Just fulfill your duty. Just do what you must do. You will achieve the results. That will bring you a kind of relief when you say: “The result is not mine. Only the duty is mine.” That is why I will be judged: whether I fulfilled my duty or not.

If it was in God’s plans, you will achieve the result. If it was not, someone else, years later, will achieve the result from the path you began to walk. So think only of your duty. And be at peace. Have confidence. That will help you do anything.

Everything is possible. Defeating the American armed forces is possible. Defeating their media is possible. Making great videos is possible. Writing great stories is possible. Making great animations is possible. Influencing people is possible. People will love you. Even those whose minds have been bombarded for decades will love you. They will discover the truth.

I read that you are dreaming big: cinematic formats, longer works, perhaps your own characters. What are the group’s next steps?

We are thinking about a kind of documentary. Perhaps a “Lego doc,” in a few months. We are also thinking about new styles. Perhaps the algorithm may turn against Lego videos. And we are thinking about making videos for different events, for example film festivals. Since we are independent, we are also looking for sponsorships. We sell videos. After we produce them, we sell them to some media outlets, and they pay us. It is normal.

But we are still not satisfied. We want to avenge the children of Gaza. We want to avenge the children of the school in Minab. And the Supreme Leader. That is our greatest dream: to avenge the blood of our martyred Supreme Leader.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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The diesel deal between Russia and the US contains much more than meets the eye, and things have started popping up regarding it. As a complete wake-up call that will spark hellish howling even today, Trump signed a decree effectively lifting Lindsey Graham’s hellish 500% sanctions against Russia. But that is not all. The same decree states that the 100% secondary sanctions on all buyers and transporters of Russian energy carriers are also being lifted.

I am continuing.

The US government has sent the Russians a list of companies in need of diesel, and the Russians returned a list of Russian companies whose sanctions should be lifted.

Madness!

Kirill Dmitriev announced perhaps the most important thing: Russia and the US will use SHARED DATA CENTERS. This is totally unbelievable and means not only an exchange, but also data sharing.

At the same time, a Ukrainian diesel reaction is starting against Trump in the US. The regrouping in the Senate and Congress is in full swing. There is already a petition signed by 16 people who want to block the diesel deal. The tantrum and howling can be heard from California to Vilnius!

Trump continues to troll Zelensky and is confidently steering US media against him, paving the way for his removal. Note the reaction in Vilnius — THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE IN THE WORLD IS ENDING.... Isn’t that our line? 😁
All these are symptoms of something very serious. And we haven’t even reached Nord Stream yet...

At the same time, almost all major American think tanks have come out with analyses, reports, and programs on what is happening. From them, it becomes clear that the Americans still do not understand Russia at all. The causes of the war in Ukraine are Terra Incognita to the entire US! Total incomprehension. And now comes the interesting part.

The think tanks are proposing a mass freezing of the conflict. They refuse to understand and accept Russia. Never mind, Putin is advancing in the Donbas; one thing is certain: until the specifics of a peace plan—which I am somehow sure Putin has tasked Trump with drafting—are worked out, Russia will take the Donbas militarily.

I am very curious about what Russia is doing regarding the diesel deal from a military standpoint and how it will develop internally within the country. But I see a calm president, a confident Dmitriev—super active as usual, Lavrov, and a very busy Alexander Novak, Deputy Prime Minister.

And now it even gets funny.

The Americans are proposing a freeze; that is clear. In exchange, they will drop Zelensky. Apparently.

However, the Americans are offering a 100-day halt on Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries so that the diesel can flow to the US. If Ukraine complies, the US will restore Starlink speeds, and Ukraine will be able to strike Russia and... Russian oil refineries once again. 😁😁😁

I read, read this proposal by a think tank and congressmen, re-read it, and aside from laughing, nothing else comes to mind.

This is nonsense and once again shows the level of the entire American state.

Now I will show a figure.

20 trillion dollars is the US budget deficit for the year 2026....
20 trillion dollars are missing from the US treasury....

People, what kind of state is this, and who on earth calls this state rich, successful, and reliable?

What would you think of a company that has a gorgeous facade, attracts clients, and has the image of being successful and rich, but turns out to have debts behind the scenes, an empty cash register, and fails to pay?

This exact same thing is the US, which wants to rule the entire world and impose its opinion and methods everywhere. Do you understand now why hollowed-out companies and people at home in Bulgaria are at the top, managing and living "happily" on credit? Because that's the model.

In addition to a budget deficit, the US has 40 trillion in domestic debt, which means the state is financially destroyed—there is no state, no money, no future. The state's money is conveniently taken by the globalists who have settled in and embedded themselves into it with all their schemes. This thing is out of this world; there is no such logic in real life. The US does not live on credit because they print money, but that does not cancel the fact at all that they have no money, everything is hollow, the king is naked, and it’s all one big, very big scam. And these people are going to govern and educate me!?!

Another White House spokeswoman, a blonde with a nice bust, was fired by Trump on the 5th day of her appointment. Which set an absolute record in US history! Until now, the record was held by a spokesman for Harry Truman — 17 days.

The reason for the firing was ugly remarks made by the spokeswoman regarding China. She said that toilets in China are stinking....

Where they find such people, I don't know, but things are clearly very ripe in the US, and Trump must find the internal toilet stinking a lot in order to react lightning-fast and avoid a huge diplomatic scandal.

And a few words about Saudi Arabia.

Which are openly allies of Israel against another Arab state, fulfilling the most demonic plans in the Middle East. Apparently on the advice of Israeli forces in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is striking civilian targets in Yemen, and children are once again dying and being injured...

The Epstein cartel's cult of children is truly monstrous! If children are dying anywhere, being sexually assaulted, killed for organs, or subjected to other horrific abuses, look for Americans, Israelis, Ukrainians, or Catholic priests.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

📌 Subscribe to Think BRICS for weekly geopolitical video analysis beyond Western narratives. Follow also our new channels BRICS Business and Think BRICS Chronicles.

Originally published on Brasil de Fato as part of “Columna Valdai”, a biweekly column by , who serves as its curator. Republished with permission.

The past month of summit diplomacy involving the Global Majority has arguably been the most unsettling for outside parties. After all, neither BRICS nor the SCO includes representatives from Western nations in any capacity. Consequently, the potential for further deepening cooperation among the Global Majority countries across these various platforms holds special significance for the future global order. The Greater Eurasia initiative is also of particular importance, as are the opportunities arising from the alignment of BRICS and SCO cooperation projects.

The concept of Greater Eurasia is built around a simple yet ambitious premise: the vast region spanning from Eastern Europe and Central Asia to the Middle East, India, China, and Southeast Asia relies on a system of interconnected frameworks for cooperation. In this context, a key role in shaping this space falls to structures that, on the one hand, help establish rules governing both their own interactions and, potentially, those of a wider group of nations; and, on the other, include members committed to creating an integrated zone of prosperity and security across the Eurasian continent.

Two pillars—one continent

BRICS and the SCO have the potential to become complementary pillars of Greater Eurasia. BRICS represents global economic, financial, and political reach, while the SCO serves as a regional framework for security, transport connectivity, and political dialogue. There is no need to artificially merge these two mechanisms; rather, the focus could be on creating a network of joint projects—and potentially, in specific instances, institutions and rules—that would eventually be open to other non-Western entities, such as the EAEU or ASEAN.

The SCO was historically formed as a regional platform for strengthening security and combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. Gradually, its spheres of interaction were expanded to transport, energy, trade and investment. If we speak of BRICS, it is a global, trans-regional structure that has gradually been asserting itself more and more loudly in laying claim to active global reform, the building of a new model of cooperation, the strengthening of global trade, and the enhancement of the role of the countries of the global majority in value-added chains, in technology transfer and in sustainable development. At the same time, the core participants in both mechanisms coincides: we are talking about Russia, India, Iran and China. The Chinese researcher Jiang Tianjiao believes that the SCO will in future be transformed from a platform for coordinating security into a comprehensive framework of governance with an even stronger focus on the economy and mature mechanisms of internal balance. At the same time, he agrees with the general premise that BRICS will continue to strengthen as the core for coordinating the efforts of the global majority, with a further deepening of cooperation in the monetary and financial sphere and in the sphere of non-traditional security challenges. It would seem that each has its own goal and tasks, albeit with the prospect of expansion. However, combining potentials may yield a different sum than mere addition.

When 2+2 can equal 5

Given their different models of interaction and the fact that the associations have different inherent aims, there is a whole series of issues where the potential for synchronising the work of BRICS and the SCO could yield the greatest result. Let us begin with the most complex yet fundamental sphere—finance. De-dollarisation is not an end in itself within BRICS; nevertheless, more than 10 years ago the association’s participants adopted a framework for the use of national currencies, and today 67% of all intra-BRICS trade is already conducted in national currencies. Work continues on creating an alternative payment system and on the technical parameters of a new investment platform. And although no breakthrough on this issue occurred following the Delhi summit, the general determination to achieve the goal of securing the conditions for sovereign and equal development was confirmed (in circumstances where both the dollar itself and tariffs continue to be used by Washington as weapons and a means of blackmail, even against those who would very much like to preserve the status quo in relations with Western countries; no other options for action remain), marking the final transition from political coordination to technical fine-tuning.

The SCO summit in Bishkek, among other things, also noted the leaders’ commitment to “the further implementation by interested SCO member states of the roadmap for the gradual increase of the share of national currencies in mutual settlements”. And a year earlier, the SCO Development Strategy until 2035 had been adopted, which likewise set out the tasks for deepening practical cooperation in the spheres of trade, economy, finance and investment.

Accordingly, a synchronised expansion of the use of national currencies in mutual settlements, as well as the involvement of all SCO participants in BRICS efforts to develop an alternative payment mechanism, would help to test-run the capabilities of such a payment system across a broader number of global majority countries.

We also recall that even as long ago as last year, a decision was taken at the Tianjin summit to establish an SCO bank, although technically it has still not become operational. Despite the restrictions that persist to this day, imposed by the Western-centric system itself on the operation of the New Development Bank, an alternative path to the stalled launch of the SCO bank could be the gradual participation of non-BRICS members in the NDB.

Another sphere is that of security. For the SCO it is more primary and organic, whereas within BRICS any undue emphasis on questions of military-political coordination is intentionally avoided. Thus, while periodic joint exercises are natural for the SCO (the most recent counter-terrorism exercises took place in Iran in December last year—Sakhand Anti-Terror 2025), we recall that the Will for Peace 2026 exercises initiated by South Africa at the beginning of this year and initially positioned as a “BRICS plus” format failed to attract all the members. Nevertheless, a certain division of roles, with practical cooperation on the part of the SCO and a theoretical framework and political dialogue on global risks and the coordination of positions of the global majority on the part of BRICS, could offer a workable format. In turn, such mutual complementarity leads to the formation of a safer environment for trade, investment, and the realisation of transport connectivity among the countries participating in both associations.

Questions of global governance themselves are, in turn, more organic to BRICS, yet we see analogous approaches being conveyed in SCO documents regarding the reform of the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, and the enhancement of the role of the Global South. In this case, there is an opportunity to act, within the framework of the existing universal institutions, as a broader platform, with the possibility of involving all BRICS member states and their partners, the SCO countries, including dialogue partners and observers, as well as the countries of the EAEU and ASEAN. Such a unified voice would be difficult to continue to ignore.

Another potential area of convergence is energy and critical resources. Back in 2006, the Russian president proposed establishing an SCO Energy Club within the framework of the SCO, while eleven years later an Energy Research Platform was initiated under the aegis of BRICS. On the one hand, the very format of these institutions does not imply a serious coordination of the positions of the participating countries; on the other hand, it is at the very least an opportunity to regularly compare notes on the most sensitive issues for both producers and consumers of energy within these mechanisms, identifying the most promising paths towards ensuring a just energy transition, while taking into account the sovereign interests and particular characteristics of all the participating countries. Moreover, in a format of convergence, what may be at stake is not only, and not so much, ensuring the resilience and security of supplies and the development of regional networks, but, when combined with questions of critical minerals, one can speak of creating value-added chains (incidentally, this was precisely one of the points emphasised at the most recent BRICS summit in Delhi): deeper processing, the manufacture of equipment, the development of joint technological standards, and so on.

Ensuring digital connectivity and fostering cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence could also prove to be crucial. Last year in Rio de Janeiro, BRICS leaders adopted a declaration on global AI governance; more recently, ahead of China assuming the BRICS chairmanship, Xi Jinping proposed an initiative to establish an international AI centre, advocating for the “development of open-source AI in a spirit of cooperation and sharing”—all in addition to the World AI Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) previously initiated by China. Furthermore, a shared agenda could encompass secure data exchange channels, digital trade documents, and interoperable payment standards. While each individual initiative warrants detailed study, one thing is certain: for BRICS and SCO nations—and the Global Majority at large, characterized by widely varying levels of technological development—what matters is not closed platforms but open rules that prevent the creation of new dependencies on any single centre of power.

Other areas of potential convergence of policies and approaches, as well as work on concrete joint projects, could also include the development of transport connectivity, the ensuring of food security and the creation of joint strategic reserves, climate resilience projects, and many other points of interest.

The guiding principle is multi-level and multi-speed integration

Given the difficulty of launching rigid formats of integration, in the case of forming the space of Greater Eurasia through the convergence of the policies and projects of BRICS, the SCO, and also other interested players and organisations, multi-level and multi-speed cooperation could work well. Incidentally, despite the fact that further expansion within BRICS is for the time being rather counterproductive, a gradual involvement not of individual countries as partners, but of entire regional organisations, could serve as an alternative. Recently, certain experts have begun to express the view that it would be advisable to involve the AU in the work of BRICS (by analogy with its earlier involvement in the work of the G20); possibly, such a Solomonic solution could in the future indeed prove to be the inclusion in the work of the association not only of the AU, but also the SCO, ASEAN, the Arab League, CELAC and other organisations composed of representatives of the global majority.

This would fully correspond to the logic of multipolarity and equal development. If we return from the global to the Eurasian level, then such an approach, together with multi-level cooperation on individual projects, could correspond to the spirit of Eurasian partnership—a space with several centres of power, diverse economies, different foreign-policy orientations and several cultural-civilisational codes. If we follow this logic, Greater Eurasia could become one of the key centres of the future polycentric architecture of the world, where BRICS and the SCO are pillars of the future world order.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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A political deal, a legal vehicle

On 9 October Donald Trump announced on social media a deal with Vladimir Putin, reached in a phone call, for supplies of Russian diesel to the United States: over 300,000 tonnes immediately, another 500,000 in November, larger volumes to follow.^[1] The stated reason is the cost of energy, and the background explains it: on 3 September the US national average diesel price had climbed to $5.82 a gallon, above the June 2022 record, according to GasBuddy data.^[2]

That same day, 9 October, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 135 (GL 135), which authorizes until 7 April 2027 transactions related to the sale, delivery, offloading and importation of Russian-origin diesel.^[3]

The announcement is political; the license is the instrument that makes it executable. Ivan Timofeev of the Valdai Discussion Club starts from this distinction, and I share it: a license lifts no sanctions and can be revoked at any moment by the head of OFAC.^[4]

Valdai’s text, however, stops short of the more interesting points. The license has precise limits. It does not authorize debits to accounts at US financial institutions of the Russian Central Bank, the National Wealth Fund and the Ministry of Finance, and it leaves in place the prohibitions of other OFAC programs.^[5] It therefore opens the goods, not necessarily the payment channel, and how the supplies would be settled is the most important operational question for anyone expected to buy. The documents I consulted do not resolve it, and I prefer to say so. Then there is the calendar.

The Graham Act was signed on 18 September and most of its provisions take effect on 18 October, nine days after the license; general licenses issued before entry into force remain valid, and OFAC may extend them or issue new ones.^[6] GL 135 was therefore born before the new regime is fully operational and enters it as an existing license. The sources do not allow us to say whether the timing was deliberate. Anyone assessing the license’s durability should nonetheless bear it in mind.

Law against law

Timofeev sets politics, which made noise, against law, which would be ordinary. The contrast holds for the license taken alone and fails for the framework it falls into. In April 2022 Congress banned by statute the importation of Russian energy^[7]

A note by the law firm HSF Kramer flags a possible conflict between GL 135 and that ban: the license does not mention it, and the Graham Act, while preserving the Treasury’s licensing power, does not expressly suspend it.^[8] A bipartisan group of senators has asked the administration to reverse course, arguing that the decision contradicts the ban and that Congress was not consulted; Thom Tillis said there is a legitimate argument that the president is not complying with the law.^[9] This is a political challenge and a law firm’s assessment, not a court ruling. In the documents consulted no judge has ruled, and whether the licensing power prevails over the 2022 ban remains an open question.

The consequence is that the license’s fragility has two sources. One is administrative revocability, which Timofeev describes well. The other is legislative contestability, which he does not describe. The choice of instrument adds a further element. The Graham Act distinguishes two routes. To repeal sanctions on Russia it requires certification of a peace agreement accepted by Kyiv and of the cessation of hostilities; to suspend them it is enough for the president to certify the national interest to Congress and submit a report. Timofeev recalls section 115 as the formal route, with written justification, but the legal summaries I read do not give the section number, which remains to be verified.^[10]

The administration chose the license, which requires no report. In procedural terms, the decision moves from an act that Congress can read and contest to an administrative act that arrives after the fact. That this is also the intention cannot be demonstrated. In a Schmittian reading, which is mine and not Timofeev’s, the question is an old one: the law sets the rule, the license suspends its application in one case, and the exception is decided by an office director acting on delegated authority.^[11]

Three licenses, one pattern

Timofeev mentions the Belarusian case. The facts, according to the sources I verified: from 2015 OFAC generally authorized transactions with nine Belarusian companies, including Belneftekhim, Naftan and Grodno Azot, without lifting the underlying sanctions, within a rapprochement coordinated with the European Union; the license was extended until 2021.^[12]

On 19 April 2021 GL 2G was replaced by GL 2H, which allowed only wind-down operations until 3 June, that is, for forty-five days.^[13] The second case is Venezuelan. GL 41, of 26 November 2022, allowed Chevron’s joint ventures with PdVSA to operate in the country; on 4 March 2025 GL 41A turned it into a wind-down window, with the deadline set at 3 April and then moved to 27 May by GL 41B of 24 March, the same day an executive order introduced a 25% tariff on goods from countries importing Venezuelan oil. Trump justified the turn by citing electoral conditions in Venezuela and the pace of migrant returns.^[14]

Two elements recur. First, the license depends on the conduct of the political counterpart more than on the economic object: Belarus after the 2020 elections, Venezuela over electoral and migration issues. Second, the end does not come abruptly but through a short window: forty-five days in the Belarusian case; thirty in the Venezuelan one, later extended to about eighty-four days (my calculation from the dates cited). I infer, with moderate confidence, that for an operator the real contractual horizon of GL 135 is not the printed date, 7 April 2027, but the wind-down period that would follow a revocation, which can itself be extended. Two cases do not make a rule, and I chose them because Timofeev mentions one and the other concerns the energy sector: they should be read as an indication, not as a law.

The European asymmetry

The comparison with Brussels is instructive. According to TASS, citing an anonymous European official, on 7 October EU ambassadors had reached agreement on the twenty-second package: about 1,570 names of companies and individuals, with no significant new economic restrictions, pending formal adoption by the Council.^[15] The figure matches the one reported by Reuters via APA. For scale, the twenty-first package, adopted on 23 July, listed 48 individuals and 168 entities, 216 names in all; the roughly 1,570 now expected would be more than seven times as many (my calculation).^[16] The European mechanism rests on unanimity, which makes decisions slow and easy to dilute; according to Bloomberg, again reported by TASS, the twenty-first package had been weakened by the vetoes of some member states.^[17]

The adopted text nonetheless contained substantial measures, including the extension of the ban to another 33 Russian banks, 41 vessels added to the shadow-fleet list, and the freezing until 14 July 2027 of the mechanism for adjusting the crude oil price cap, which stays at $44.10 a barrel.^[18] The chain of sources is secondhand, and the picture must be confirmed against the Council’s official releases.

If the data hold, Washington can loosen in a day, by an administrative act, what Brussels can tighten only through collective decisions. The stated goal is the same, pressure on Moscow; the speed of modulation is not. The diesel license arrived while the Europeans were closing a package of listings, and the sources do not show whether this is coordination or divergence. If the figures stand, the twenty-second package also shifts the weight from economic measures, which prevailed in the twenty-first, to lists. What remains is the structural fact that a multipolar reading cannot overlook: the sanctions instrument leaves Washington a discretion its allies do not have.

Assessment and indicators

It is highly likely (high confidence) that GL 135 will remain a revocable concession and not become a change of regime, because no law has been amended. It is likely (moderate confidence) that its durability depends more on Congress and on the political counterpart than on the diesel market, which Timofeev names as a possible cause of revocation; in my view, with prices at record highs, the glut of imported diesel he evokes is implausible in the short run. Whether the license will reach its expiry on 7 April 2027 is instead an open question (low confidence), because the political conditions sustaining it beyond the announcement of a phone call are not known.

Several observable developments will help to tell. The first is the text of the bipartisan proposal announced by Representative Brian Fitzpatrick, which had not been published as of 12 October.^[19] The second is the first enforcement acts under the Graham Act after 18 October, in particular on tariffs for importers of Russian energy. The third is any clarification by OFAC on the payment channel. The fourth is the ratio of actual deliveries to announced volumes: an expert cited in the press, Richard Nephew, believes the quantities are too small to affect pump prices.^[20]

The license takes nothing away from the sanctions. It does show who holds the key: for now an office of the Treasury, with a Congress asking to be heard.

^{The author’s views are their own and do not necessarily reflect the blog’s.}

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Notes & References

[^1]: ABC News (wire), “Six senators call for Trump administration to ‘immediately reverse course’ on Russian diesel plan,” October 2026, https://abcnews.com/amp/Business/wireStory/senators-call-trump-administration-immediately-reverse-russian-diesel-137179378. The announcement of 9 October, the volumes and the assessment by Richard Nephew (Columbia University) are reported by this source.

[^2]: “US average diesel price hits new record,” The Daily Ittefaq, 4 September 2026, https://en.ittefaq.com.bd/17980/us-average-diesel-price-hits-new-record. The source cites GasBuddy data ($5.820 a gallon against $5.819 in June 2022), not EIA or AAA: secondary source, figures to be checked [TO VERIFY].

[^3]: HSF Kramer, “OFAC issues General License 135 authorizing transactions involving Russian-origin diesel fuel,” October 2026, https://www.hsfkramer.com/notes/sanctions/2026-posts/ofac-issues-general-license-135-authorizing-transactions-involving-russian-origin-diesel-fuel. Law-firm summary: the official OFAC text must be consulted as the primary source [TO VERIFY].

[^4]: Ivan Timofeev, “The Diesel Deal: Politics Is One Thing, Law Another,” Valdai Discussion Club [publication date and URL to be verified]. The theses attributed to Timofeev in the text, including section 115 and Treasury licenses, derive from this article.

[^5]: HSF Kramer, cited above.

[^6]: Orrick, “New Russia Sanctions Law Enacted,” September 2026, https://www.orrick.com/en/Insights/2026/09/New-Russia-Sanctions-Law-Enacted. The dates (signature on 18 September, main entry into force on 18 October) and the validity of earlier licenses are reported by this source.

[^7]: White House (archive), “Bills signed: H.R. 6968 and H.R. 7108,” 8 April 2022, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2022/04/08/bills-signed-h-r-6968-and-h-r-7108. H.R. 6968 is the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act. The statutory text, in particular any waiver clauses, was not consulted [TO VERIFY].

[^8]: HSF Kramer, cited above.

[^9]: ABC News (wire), cited above. The statement of 11 October is attributed to six senators (Collins, Murkowski, Tillis and Curtis for the Republicans; Shaheen and Blumenthal for the Democrats); the HSF Kramer note, cited above, speaks of four Republicans and three Democrats. The discrepancy needs clarifying [TO VERIFY].

[^10]: Orrick, cited above, and Jenner & Block, “Partner Rachel Alpert Quoted in GIR on Waiver Authority in New Russia Sanctions Bill,” https://www.jenner.com/en/news-insights/publications/partner-rachel-alpert-quoted-in-gir-on-waiver-author-in-new-russia-sanctions-bill. Both confirm a broad waiver power with certification and report; Orrick also reports the condition of a peace agreement accepted by Kyiv for repeal, and secondary tariffs of up to 100% on goods from third countries buying Russian energy and up to 500% on Russian goods. The section number has not been verified [TO VERIFY].

[^11]: Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie (1922): the reference is to the thesis that the sovereign is the one who decides on the state of exception. Edition and page to be specified [TO VERIFY].

[^12]: Steptoe, “OFAC reactivates sanctions against Belarussian companies and provides 45-day wind down period,” April 2021, https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/international-compliance-blog/2021/04/ofac-reactivates-sanctions-against-belarussian-companies-and-provides-45-day-wind-down-period/. The exact dates of the 2015–2016 renewals are not given in the source.

[^13]: Steptoe, cited above.

[^14]: Thompson Hine, “Reversing the Biden administration, OFAC announces the wind down of Venezuela General License 41,” March 2025, https://www.thompsonhinesmartrade.com/2025/03/reversing-the-biden-administration-ofac-announces-the-wind-down-of-venezuela-general-license-41/; Baker McKenzie, “President Trump announces secondary tariffs on countries importing Venezuelan oil; OFAC amends Venezuelan General License No. 41A,” March 2025, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/president-trump-announces-secondary-tariffs-on-countries-importing-venezuelan-oil-ofac-amends-venezuelan-general-license-no-41a/. The 25% tariff is that of Executive Order 14245 of 24 March 2025.

[^15]: TASS, 8 October 2026, https://tass.com/world/2199325, and TASS on Bloomberg, https://tass.com/world/2166499; APA on Reuters, 6 October 2026, https://en.apa.az/europe/eu-ambassadors-intend-to-agree-on-a-22nd-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-on-october-7-528549. Secondhand and anonymous sources [TO VERIFY against Council of the EU releases].

[^16]: White & Case, “EU adopts 21st sanctions package against Russia,” July 2026, https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/eu-adopts-21st-sanctions-package-against-russia. Data on the twenty-second package come from the sources in note 15.

[^17]: TASS, cited above, and the sources in note 15.

[^18]: White & Case, cited above.

[^19]: HSF Kramer, cited above.

[^20]: ABC News (wire), cited above.